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**Book reviews**—critical assessments of new books that integrate peace and conflict concerns (1,500 words maximum).

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- Submissions should be prepared electronically, preferably in Microsoft Word.
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Guest Editor’s Note

As 2013 was coming to an end, a spiral of violence that engulfed the Central African Republic (CAR), South Sudan, and Syria shocked and left us wondering why building peace in societies emerging from armed conflict seems elusive. What was most shocking was the extent of the suffering of the civilian populations in these conflicts and the likelihood of these conflicts spilling into neighboring territories. In the case of the CAR, it is obvious that the conflict there had previously been considered only in terms of violence and its destruction of human life and property. Hence, containing the violence was deemed the best approach and solution for addressing the conflict. The intervention, however, managed only to produce a short-lived period of negative peace. If the source of an armed conflict is traced to structural factors, such as a state’s failure to deliver services to the population, then peacebuilding measures can address its root causes. It is important that those involved in peace negotiations are equipped with the right knowledge and deep understanding of the root causes of the conflict and that they mediate agreements that build and maintain peace. Quick fixes, such as the cessation of hostilities and sharing of the spoils among the combatants, will only postpone the suffering of the population as seen in the CAR, where Michel Djotodia played the dual role of peacemaker and rebel leader in ultimately attaining power.

The articles in this issue of the Africa Peace and Conflict Journal are being published at an opportune moment, as Africa and the international community grapple with complex emergencies in a number of countries. Questions are being asked about why these societies receded into vicious circles of violence after signing peace agreements or gaining independence, as in the case of South Sudan. Why did the postconflict programs established in these countries fail to deliver sustainable peace? What should be done to ensure that recently entered into and future peace agreements achieve the aims of building peace and delivering development? The articles in this volume persuasively answer these questions in highlighting a number of themes: the need for understanding the root causes of violent conflicts, adoption of comprehensive and integrative strategies, inclusiveness in implementation of peacebuilding measures, local ownership and participation, clearly defined roles for key actors, a smooth transition from peacebuilding to development, and grasping relationships among violence, inequality, and government failure.

A successful solution to a violent conflict depends to a large extent on how it is linked to the root cause. Earl Conteh-Morgan examines interconnections between child soldiers, irregular warfare, and the success or failure of building peace in postconflict societies. If it is considered that one of the contributing factors to the recruitment of children into armed groups is the lack of employment opportunities, a low level of economic development, and state failure or collapse, then it is inevitable that peacebuilding efforts should primarily aim ‘to eliminate the mindset that compelled the children to distrust and participate in destroying their traditional sociocultural and psychological environment’. Most critical, Conteh-Morgan asserts, the rehabilitation and integration of former child combatants needs to be carried out in conjunction...
with ‘rebuilding the structural and cultural foundations of society’. An important point to note is that there should be a balance in rehabilitation programs so that they do not appear to concentrate on former child combatants at the expense of their victims. Poor rehabilitation and inadequate integration of former child combatants can expose them to the world of crime and the gangs used by politicians during elections.

Olatunji Olateju analyzes popular struggles for democracy and the crises of transitions in Africa by tracing the historical evolution of the state and its impact on democracy. Olateju argues convincingly that popular struggles for democracy should not adopt the ‘best practice’ approach, which promotes liberalism. Rather, the approach must be contextualized for Africa. The discourse on the appropriate form of democracy for Africa has yet to take place. African scholars have been shy to engage in debates on what forms of democracy, type of states, and nature of leadership are best suited to African conditions and peoples. Despite the continued demonization of ethnicity as an antithesis of democracy, the reality is that it will persist until African politics is reengineered to accommodate it. African political theorists are yet to design a political system in which democracy works with ethnicity and in which ethnicity is democratizable, rather than treated as an evil factor that undermines democracy on the continent. Afro-pessimists will continue to have a field day asserting that Africans are ungovernable and incapable of embracing democracy if the trends continue whereby elections are badly conducted, democracy is not consolidated, states are poorly managed, ethnicity is manipulated, and political violence is widely exercised.

There is also a tendency for political parties that win elections with huge margins to dominate government and misuse the goodwill of the populace. While underscoring the importance of continued local participation in governance, Tatenda Mukwedeya warns of the danger posed to democracy by a leadership that disengages from voters and disregards grassroots input. Leaders and dominant political parties should not take citizens for granted, as activism is resilient. After embracing and consolidating democracy, countries such as South Africa should expect civil unrest if services are not delivered, leaders become corrupt, and input by the local community is disregarded in decision-making processes. The dominance of power by an individual or political party, in this case the African National Congress, weakens governance and stifles popular participation.

Fighting for and assuming political power is one thing, but how that power is used and whom it benefits are critical. How power is used in running a state amounts to governance. In other words, governance is how a state is run in delivering services and how it manages relations with citizens. It is about the management of state institutions and maintenance of an enabling environment for democracy to flourish and for citizens to enhance their livelihoods. Mukwedeya comprehensively illustrates how the ANC in Buffalo City has accumulated power and co-opted or muffled civil society, which is supposed to play the role of citizen watchdog. When a dominant political party destroys independent structures that the community can use to articulate its interests, it eradicates the transparency and accountability needed in delivering services, which is a basic function of a state. By doing this, the dominant party undermines state-citizen relations, the basis for legitimacy.

The functions of running a state are not just confined to providing such services as security and safety to its citizens, but also include ensuring that the people are pro-
tected from external threats. This means making sure that a country’s borders are well managed and secured. If there are disputes on defining international boundaries, countries can pursue a number of peaceful measures and avoid going to war, even as a last resort. Nations that go to war over their borders incur huge and unnecessary costs in terms of lost lives, properties, and finances. Most of the border disputes in Africa are attributed to colonial cartography. James Zotto uses the Tanzania-Malawi dispute over the boundary at Lake Malawi to argue that cartographic ambiguities are a source of border disputes in Africa. He asserts that most studies in border disputes in Africa have focused mostly on economic, political, historical, ideological, and legal sources and issues while overlooking cartographic sources.

Nevertheless, it is now universally accepted that in settling border disputes, a hierarchy of sources guide the decisions that are reached. Treaties are the primary source in this hierarchy, followed by official maps. It is important to bear in mind that there are a number of good practices in Tanzania and Malawi that can be referenced in settling their dispute. African countries should form joint border commissions to address disputes and issues, clearly delimit and demarcate boundaries, and involve local communities in reaffirming, recovering, and demarcating boundaries. The joint border commissions should also be empowered to address such border-related issues as security, trade, transboundary natural resources, transhumance, and so on. In the specific case of Tanzania and Malawi, the two countries should fully cooperate with the regional initiative headed by former Mozambican president Joachim Chissano and exhaust all African approaches before resorting to an expensive and long-drawn international arbitration.

Violent conflict never occurs in a vacuum. As a result, any analysis of conditions under which civil war occur must take into consideration the horizontal inequalities of a society as the sources of violence. Mauricio Uribe-López warns of the necessity of examining these inequalities within the context in which violence takes place as well as against the erroneous assumption that those countries experiencing the highest levels of violence are those experiencing civil war. To achieve sustainable peace, peace actors must address the societal polity by looking for and taking into account the mitigation of horizontal inequalities. In fact, Uribe López argues that such an approach is a sine qua non for achieving sustainable peace in protracted conflict environments. He uses analyses of characteristically similar indicators in Africa, the Caribbean, and Latin American, Uribe-López to highlight the importance of mitigating horizontal as well as vertical inequalities.

After all is said, one must then jump over the last hurdle—money. Nothing or little can be achieved without adequate financial resources, meaning the aims of peace agreements will exist only on paper while conditions on the ground deteriorate to the point of germinating renewed hostilities. On the other hand, warns Jan Pronk, a society emerging from conflict can also be flooded by donor money that results in the dependency syndrome taking hold. Pronk warns further that post-conflict reconstruction money can also be misdirected or misused, such as happened in South Sudan, where, for example, funds intended for demining were only used to clear mines around peacekeepers’ barracks and the roads they used in monitoring the implementation of the peace agreement. Farmlands and school playgrounds were ignored. With such firsthand
knowledge, a clear picture emerges that the current crisis in South Sudan is rooted in a badly conceived and implemented peacebuilding strategy that failed to address the essential needs of the population. During the period following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and after South Sudan's independence in July 2011, well-meaning outsiders invaded South Sudan with solutions looking for problems. As a consequence, a golden opportunity to ‘do good’ was lost as peacebuilding failed to be aligned with development, which should be homegrown and not driven by outsiders.

So, once again, the world is faced with a complex emergency in South Sudan, and its dexterity in learning from past mistakes is being tested by the way it is responding to and resolving the crisis. Will we get it right this time by designing and implementing a comprehensive and integrative strategy that creates conditions for peacebuilding and development? It is expected that the Interdevelopmental Authority on Development, the subregional organization leading efforts to restore and build peace in South Sudan, is aware that intervention measures should be designed in an integrated manner that ensures that no additional harm is done to the victims of violent conflict. Those involved in restoring and building peace in Mali, the CAR, and South Sudan should heed Pronk’s caution that there is no template or tailor-made ‘blueprint’ for peacebuilding, as ‘it all depends on the history of the conflict, the specific circumstances on the ground, and the needs and desires of the people’.

What happens when a country is badly governed after independence, fails to consolidate democracy and to deliver services to the population, and marginalizes and excludes groups on the basis of their identity? Should the population endure the bad conditions, rise up in arms, or break away to form another state that will provide for their needs? Identification of the root causes of conflict leads to the right solutions. Many conflicts are attributed to groups being marginalized and excluded from state benefits due to their identities. Most often, these groups opt for secession as the best solution to their suffering. Mathieu Bere wonders why such groups are tempted to claim autonomy for their territories as ‘the best way to solve an intergroup conflict within a state’. Bere argues that the best way to deal with intrastate conflicts is not for a group to break away or separate and create a new state, but to stay put and pressure political authorities to improve their governance or to establish ‘some form of decentralized or federal government’.

South Sudan could be cited as an example of why secession does not necessarily address economic marginalization and state failure. Sudan could have avoided the break with the south had the government fully implemented their peace agreement, fairly distributed national wealth, and governed the region well. The best way to prevent a secession itch from turning into a sore or bleeding wound is for a state to meet the human security needs of its citizens and to equitably distribute public goods.

After reading contributions that mainly focus on the root causes of violence, how it is managed and stopped, and how to prevent it from recurring, it is refreshing to read Jude Kagoro’s excellent review of Recovering Nonviolent History: Civil Resistance in Liberation Struggles, edited by J. Maciej Bartkowski. In this book, we are reminded that there is an alternative means to violent ones in confronting those using state powers to subject people to dehumanizing conditions. The book also reminds us not to forget that nonviolent strategies and means have played positive roles in popular struggles around the world, as illustrated in the case studies. Indeed, nonviolence could be the best way of
preventing bloody conflicts if it were installed as peace software for settling differences and addressing problems involving interpersonal, intercommunal, and international relations. Nonviolence should not, however, be seen as passiveness or weakness on the part of those using it to articulate their grievances. It should be embraced instead by society as a normal and regular means of addressing human differences.

Professor Wafula Okumu

*The Border Institute*

*Founding Director*
The past year was tumultuous for the continent of Africa. Several major events helped shape developments there in a number of ways. The continent experienced a series of violent conflicts from North Africa to West Africa and from Central Africa to East Africa. Meanwhile in Southern Africa, a continental giant passed from this life, but the legacy of Nelson Mandela will live for generations to come. Mandela epitomized the rare value of forgiveness, and through it, reconciliation. He embodied the soul of a people aspiring to secure their human dignity and aptly demonstrated how to achieve it. His is a story of courage, resilience, and sacrifice.

The year was also significant because it marked the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), now the African Union (AU). In January 2013, the AU began a period of euphoric celebration. Fifty years is not a long time by historical standards, but one can argue that in terms of gaining freedom from one's oppressors, it is indeed long enough to warrant some celebration. Amid the festivities, however, it is also important that Africans reflect on what the continent and the AU have actually achieved. Such anniversaries provide moments, and indeed opportunities, for reinterpreting the meaning of bringing together an entire continent within the context of the pursuit of political and economic freedom, peace, and development.

A starting point for such reflection might be to ask why alternative voices were quickly silenced during the first decade of obtaining independence in most African states. The cry for independence had been a dissenting voice vis-à-vis that of the colonial masters, but shortly after this voice was heeded, those to whom it had belonged began to vociferously oppose dissent. As a result, the one-party state became the modus operandi throughout Africa. The famed, so-called freedom fighters thus became known for depriving their citizens of fundamental freedoms.

The elections held under one-party rule lacked any significance, as the outcomes were predictably skewed toward rewarding the incumbents. Military coups and counter coups soon became the order of the day. Could this explain why Africa continues to face huge challenges in terms of democratic governance? Could Africa be witnessing a resurgence of the trend of the 1960s and 1970s when coups were "en vogue"? Regardless of the current state of affairs on the continent, one might justifiably argue that it has a direct bearing on what the founding fathers did and did not do.

The other significant event of 2013 was the rise in the number of insurgencies on the continent. From Mali to the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo and South Sudan, rebel movements seem determined to overthrow legitimate governments through violent means. The main grievance cited by the insurgents involved the failure of electoral politics to provide for inclusivity and adequate opportunities for the management of diversity. In fact, the management and organization of most electoral processes in Africa has left much to be desired. The lack of credible judicial mechanisms and the prevalence of nontransparent and not-so-independent electoral commissions have assisted in recent years to reverse democratic gains.
Incumbent governments have been able to manipulate constitutions with the goal of keeping political leaders and their cronies in power for extended periods of time. This has created executive branches of governments so powerful that the other branches essentially exist in name only, voiding any chance of a functioning system with a separation of powers. Under these all-powerful executives, everyone must dance to the tune of the presidency.

After the end of the cold war, democratization progressed nicely for a time, with Africa experiencing the reintroduction of multiparty politics. This period was short-lived, however, as African heads of government began to slowly but surely create parties to once again dominate the political space by weakening any viable opposition. In this respect, one needs to look no further than Angola, Mozambique, Togo, and Zimbabwe.

The establishment of the AU brought a new set of institutions to Africa that signified a transformation in ways of thinking and doing on the continent. The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the Pan-African Parliament, and other structures have ushered in new programs and initiatives sparking renewed energy and potential. The renaissance at the continental level has also brought about renewal at the national and state levels, but many challenges remain.

First, the persistent culture of ‘stayism’, the phenomenon of leaders prolonging their time in power for personal gain, has impacted negatively on the process of democratization and good governance. Second, the lack of visionary leaders with a capacity to move states in the right direction toward development has compounded the problem of nation and state building. The question of inclusivity is an important dimension of Africa’s problems that has not been given sufficient attention. Within the span of weeks and months in 2013, three countries plunged into violence as a direct result of excluding groups from the political process. South Sudan, Africa and the world’s newest country, descended in chaos because its leaders could not agree on who should be included, how, and why. A similar story unfolded in the Central African Republic, where Seleka rebels from the north continued to feel excluded from the political process despite agreements with the government to assuage their grievances. The Democratic Republic of Congo, a country in a perpetual state of civil war since 1997–98, has the same tale to tell.

This issue of the Africa Peace and Conflict Journal (APCJ) looks at governance from different perspectives, including popular struggles for democracy, dominant parties, the process of democratization in Africa, child soldiers and irregular warfare, peace-building amid violence, and the relationships among violence and inequality and government failure. Solutions to inequalities in society must therefore be rooted in mitigating structural inequalities. Fifty years after the OAU’s formation, the OAU has many reasons to celebrate and at the same time has even more reasons to ponder ways to bring the continent’s many countries back from the brink.

APCJ will continue to probe into these and other issues from an interdisciplinary perspective. We ask our readers and contributors to keep sending us articles, briefings, and book reviews for consideration and publication. As always, we appreciate feedback on how we can improve APCJ’s reach and focus in order to remain relevant.
I have been managing editor of APCJ since its inaugural issue in December 2008. I have witnessed its growing pains and its elevation to a premiere journal in Africa on peace and development issues. As this is my last issue, as managing editor, I would like to thank all of you who have supported APCJ through the years, especially those who have contributed by editing, reviewing, and of course reading the interesting and intellectually engaging articles that the journal has presented. To all of you, I say thank you. I would also like to thank Jean-Bosco Butera for giving me the opportunity to manage the journal at a time when the Africa Programme was unsure of where it was heading. Worthy of immense accolades is our able copy editor Robin Surratt. Without her, APCJ would have gone nowhere. I thank her for teaching me the process of publishing a journal and the patience required in achieving quality outputs. Finally, I want to personally thank the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) for its support of APCJ. I am confident that the journal will continue in the right direction and provide our readers solid intellectual and practical material in the field of peace, conflict, and development in Africa.

Professor Wafula Okumu, founding director of the Border Institute, provides a succinct summary of the articles in this issue. To him, we say thank you for his perspective on our understanding of the issues of governance, elections, and peacebuilding. We are also grateful to the IDRC. With its assistance, we have been able to share the journal with many of our partners free of charge. Please send us your recommendations on how we can improve its content and relevance to you, our readership.

APCJ is committed to publishing articles that reflect a diversity of topics and approaches. You may contact us at editor@apcj.upeace.org and assted@apcj.upeace.org.

Tony Karbo
Countries with severe subsystemic imbalances, such as a population with a high level of education but a low level of employment, tend to slide into civil war. In Sierra Leone, Liberia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, for example, the ensuing conflict involved a large number of child soldiers fighting on both sides, some for the state and some for rebels. Child soldiers, along with professional soldiers and rebel groups, tend to engage in irregular or unconventional warfare characterized by looting, extrajudicial killings, and a total disregard for human life and rules of warfare. Children are offered positive incentives (promises of reward) to participate and negative incentives (threats or punishment by death) for refusing to do so. Because of the trauma experienced by these young fighters, it is often difficult to rehabilitate and reintegrate them into society. Other factors hampering their reintegration include lack of funding and trained personnel and negative perceptions about child soldiers held by societies in general. Female child soldiers and abductees usually suffer the harshest rejection. The solution to these problems is a more concerted effort by national governments and the international community to fund the rehabilitation and reintegration of child soldiers in postwar societies.

A number of civil wars in Africa, especially during the early 1990s, have been characterized by the participation of children between the ages of eight and seventeen and the scope and intensity of the atrocities committed against civilians. These include conflicts in Angola, Ethiopia, Liberia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Sudan, and Uganda. Some children and youths volunteer, while others are coerced, with many eventually losing their lives or languishing as the captives of adult fighters. The widespread participation of children is detrimental to families as well as society at large. Child soldiers miss out on the positive values of peace, human dignity, and equality, and instead develop a worldview dominated by violence against women, the elderly, and others. They are often scarred for life with psychological problems and issues of morality.

The objective of this study is to analyze the connections between child soldiers and irregular warfare and their implications for peacebuilding in postconflict societies. It takes as an example the 1991–2001 conflict in Sierra Leone, focusing on the internal
and external factors that ignited the civil war, which was fought without rules or regulation, and the linkages between the use of child soldiers and the scope and magnitude of violence. It also briefly discusses the short- and long-term consequences of children’s participation in warfare.

**CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK**

The linkage between child soldiers and irregular warfare is oftentimes a reflection of a society characterized by imbalances in its economic and social sectors. Examples of such imbalances include low levels of employment and large numbers of unemployed youths and adults, a low level of economic development coupled with a high population density, and a small percentage of very wealthy people and a large percentage of impoverished citizens. Intensification of subsectoral imbalances spawns state failure or collapse, stemming from the inability of the governing regime to deliver even basic services in the areas of health, education, transportation, water, and electricity. The destabilizing effects of a weak economy lead to intense deprivation, anger, frustration, and misery, all of which are easily exploited by enemies of the state, resulting in the politicization of discontent and the outbreak of war in which children become an integral segment among combatants. In other words, irregular warfare and other forms of civil strife at times result from systemic imbalances that lead to state failure, which escalates to state collapse followed by civil war, opening the door for the recruitment of children into rebel and state armies.

A child soldier is anyone under the age of eighteen fighting in an armed conflict. According to Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and other research groups, some 300,000 children, in more than thirty countries, have been recruited or are currently serving voluntarily as soldiers in an armed conflict. The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (2002) raised the minimum age for direct participation in hostilities to eighteen years, superseding the previous Convention on the Rights of the Child and other legal instruments that had set the minimum age at fifteen. In conflicts in collapsed states, such as Somalia, or failed states, such as Colombia, child soldiers have been as young as eight, more often than not as members of rebel groups.

After the cold war rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union ended in 1991, irregular violent conflicts erupted in Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, and elsewhere. They constituted a new category of violent clashes because of their heinous and unconventional nature, without rules of war and with violence directed purposely against civilian populations. The fighters in such conflicts are often rebels and professional soldiers. Many of the latter typically defect to the rebel side, whose combatants often lack professional military training. Switching sides is common in irregular conflicts. For example, during the civil war in Sierra Leone, the national army did not display firm loyalty to the government.

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Both sides in such conflicts typically employ similar strategies and tactics. They move through villages and towns in search of resources and loot and in the process attack and terrorize civilians indiscriminately. Houses are torched, and the young are forcefully recruited and captured, with girls targeted for sex and boys to turn into young killers. Thus child soldiers form a significant portion of the combatants in irregular warfare. The inherent young age of child soldiers has implications for peacebuilding, which can be defined as efforts to ensure human security by fulfilling basic human needs and providing good economic and political governance. These children, who sometimes grow into adults by war’s end, must be deprogrammed and reintegrated into society. In addition, to a large extent, human insecurities are associated with institutionalized corruption within state bureaucracies and unachievable external demands on economically weak states due to the imperatives of globalization, as was the case with Sierra Leone.3 Adequate funding deployed efficiently is also required, along with a functioning economy. Thus the odds can be long for widespread success in peacebuilding in such situations.

SUBSYSTEMIC IMBALANCES

The Sierra Leone conflict was a consequence of subsystemic societal imbalances. Certain structural social conditions in the political economy generated widespread group discontent and eventually ignited violent challenges against the All People’s Congress (APC) regime. One contributing factor was the rigid, centralization of power by the APC. Despite repeated opposition, power consolidation was achieved in 1978 with the institutionalization of a one-party state. Another factor was the equally systematic effort to destroy and repress all forms of vocal civic society—that is, labor unions, student organizations, and the press—through coercion, intimidation, and co-optation. Local government bodies (e.g., district councils) were disbanded, and paramount chiefs were relegated to play a marginal role. Loyalty to the APC regime became the litmus test for being crowned chief and being granted permission to run for office.

The APC regime did not hesitate to use state violence and terror in response to challenges from individuals and segments of civil society. A state paramilitary unit, the Internal Security Unit (ISU), later renamed the State Security Division (SSD), consisted of marginal individuals whose employment security was tied directly to the perpetuation of the APC regime. SSD members were therefore vigilant and quick to order attacks on opposition civic groups and to silence individual dissenters. A development bias that resulted in major discrepancies in urban and rural areas created further disharmony, fomenting discontent and violence.4 In addition to these conditions, struc-

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4. See C. Magbaily Fyle, The State and the Provision of Social Services in Sierra Leone since Independence, 1961–91 (Dakar, CODESRIA, 1993). Development sector imbalances feed on one another. For example, a lack of economic development aggravates urban sprawl and its attendant widespread unemployment. The resulting strain on society further intensifies human insecurities in food, housing, and health care. These insecurities are in turn closely associated with widespread anger and frustration. Although the frustration and anger experienced by the rural uneducated can be mild, among the urban educated these feelings can become particularly intense.
tural factors precipitated the fatal spillover of the Liberian war into the eastern and southeastern regions of Sierra Leone in 1991.

In African cultures, the more fortunate are expected to help their kith and kin. In Sierra Leone, leading up to civil war, both high school and college graduates experienced a widespread sense of frustration and even lack of self-worth because of the pressures they felt from parents and other members of their extended families to secure jobs and help alleviate their economic misery. These unemployed, educated youths’ sense of demoralization and worthlessness was exacerbated by the pressures of modernization in general. Many developing countries face problems stemming from a lack of industrialization and a robust private sector to absorb high school and college graduates into the workforce through gainful employment. So, in addition to coerced rural youths, many of the others who participated in Sierra Leone’s civil war were high school graduates from urban areas who had suffered years of economic deprivation.

This situation, coupled with the collapse of the public sector in the mid-1980s, resulted in intense frustration as well as anger and violence directed at the government elite and innocent citizens. It was thus not surprising when later the rebel Revolutionary United Front (RUF) formed an alliance with the poorer elements among government soldiers in 1997. In Freetown, the capital, the alliance of fighters looted the property of wealthy residents, while the failure of state institutions and the state in general was evident in the deterioration of infrastructure, especially for transportation, education, and health. In the transportation sector, roads became impassable during the rainy season, and potholes were common in Freetown and other major towns. Maintenance and construction by the Public Works Department came to a halt because of a lack of funding. In classrooms at every level, including university, individual desks and chairs were no longer available. Chalk, dusters, and notebooks became scarce and sometimes unavailable. Public hospitals deteriorated into dilapidation, and medical supplies and qualified medical staff almost disappeared. Thus, within a decade, Sierra Leone descended steadily toward becoming a failed state. Collapsed state institutions, along with massive unemployment and human insecurity, served as fuel for civil war sparked by the spillover of the Liberian conflict.

The ingredients needed for rational economic planning, distributional equity, and even the rule of law were either lacking or out of sync by 1985. A new set of values were already pervasive, such as the view that corruption paid, education provided no benefits, and the only language understood by the wealthy political elite was violent rebellion. These values had become ingrained in many Sierra Leoneans by the time civil war erupted in neighboring Liberia in 1991. It was therefore not difficult for the Liberian conflict to quickly transform the mass frustration in Sierra Leone into a widespread rebellion of killing and looting, with children playing a major role.

Intensifying all these negative long-term societal determinants of conflict was the all-encompassing neopatrimonial system that excluded many Sierra Leoneans from sharing in the nation’s resources during APC rule. Instead of transparent institutional rules governing the allocation of resources, the chief executive, the president, encouraged politicians to directly compete with each other by demonstrating their loyalty to him. Cabinet ministers and top bureaucrats were also pushed to partake in corruption and secret deals and partnerships, while the president played the key role of power broker and distributor of resources to his loyal followers.
At the sociocultural and economic levels, the eruption of violence in Sierra Leone stemmed from the serious imbalance between the desire for modern amenities and the country’s level of development. The divergence between the two widened to the point that conflict ensued. One variant of this modernity–developmentalism discrepancy was the intense desire of Sierra Leoneans for western amenities without having achieved the corresponding modernization (in particular, economic modernization) needed to satisfy this desire. The frame of reference for Sierra Leoneans had been the West since colonial days and the postcolonial era, but they always lagged behind in western skills that could be put to use in factories or industries owned and operated by Sierra Leoneans to provide citizens with employment opportunities. Thus, by the mid-1980s, the combined effects of the shortcomings of neopatrimonialism, the centralization and consolidation of power, the behavior of the elite as well as the increasing divergence between western tastes and development levels dislocated the economic system and were reflected in a further deterioration of state institutions and an absence of social services.

By the mid-1980s, Sierra Leone had joined the category of the twenty-eight least developed countries in Africa because of its low per capita income, low literacy rates, and low contribution of manufacturing industries to the gross domestic product. Declining food production, stagnant economic growth, growing balance of payment problems, and the inability of the state to fund development projects, as well as government’s failure to pay employee salaries, were among the major features fueling crises. The measures required by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to remedy the country’s economic malaise did not lead to consistently positive outcomes, but instead resulted too often in adverse political and socioeconomic conditions.

It eventually became normal for government employees to work without pay for five consecutive months before receiving one month’s salary. Because government was the largest employer in urban areas, many Sierra Leoneans suffered severely from the economic downturn. The traditional extended family system meant that one government employee could have in his or her household as many as six to ten dependents, often children who needed to be fed, clothed, and educated. An IMF-required layoff of hundreds of civil servants further exacerbated people’s already devastated economic situations. Suddenly, many students, for example, realized that their parents or other relatives could no longer pay their school fees. Food and other essentials once easy to procure were becoming scarce. The plight of teachers was particularly difficult and, of course, directly affected students, which contributed to their developing negative attitudes toward education. Many students realized that education would not provide rewards because they could see their teachers struggling to survive. The children who volunteered to fight in the war probably viewed their participation as the only way out of their existential insecurity.


The triumph of the politics of consolidation over economic efficiency and good governance was evident in the deterioration of state institutions. Political elites, in the process of centralizing and monopolizing important functions, and thereby public revenues, deprived authorities of the revenues and responsibilities necessary for good governance at all levels of society. Thus, such basic but necessary tasks as collecting garbage, cleaning public toilets, and maintaining decent public markets were eventually abandoned, the victims of incumbent power consolidation, corruption, and lack of funding. The economic deprivation caused by these deteriorating conditions, coupled with APC repression, had spawned several student uprisings in the late 1970s and 1980s. In 1985 in particular, a large number of students were expelled because of the violence they fomented through popular uprisings. Three faculty members were also terminated for openly expressing radical visions of social change. A small group of expelled students would later travel to Libya for military training and instruction in rebellion and form the nucleus of the RUF.

Thus the RUF sprang from the radical collective behavior of a few individuals and their attempt to redefine the social order when conventional modes of dealing with the APC regime and the situation it had created failed. Identifying the APC regime as the source of the population’s frustration and misery, the RUF leadership decided that action had to be taken. The precipitating factor in the RUF’s violent challenge to the APC regime was provided by the Liberian Charles Taylor’s revenge for Sierra Leone’s participation in the Economic Community of West African States Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG).

CHILD PARTICIPATION IN IRREGULAR WARFARE

When the Liberian civil war crossed into Sierra Leone, violence against the civilian population, looting, and other terrible and senseless acts were carried out largely by child soldiers who had been promised rewards or threatened with punishment. Thus, participation by children as rebels, most of them between eight and sixteen years of age, can be viewed as a rational choice by them. Their need to survive forced them to engage in the most atrocious of activities. For example, at Taylor’s trial at The Hague for war crimes, a child soldier in May 2008 described the acts he had committed at the command of the RUF and the allied Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, including shooting captives in the mouth, looting and burning villages, cutting off women’s breasts, and hacking people in the neck and sometimes decapitating them. Such actions were often carried out under the influence of hard drugs and at the command of his group leader, who threatened to kill the boy if he disobeyed.

Many of the child soldiers rescued from the RUF or who succeeded in escaping told of how they had been coerced or promised rewards and indoctrinated into violence by being forced to watch villagers, in some cases their own parents, being killed or killing

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7. See Fyle, *The State and the Provision of Social Services in Sierra Leone*.
8. On the origins of the RUF, see Ibrahim Abdullah, *Between Democracy and Terror: The Sierra Leone Civil War* (Dakar, CODESRIA, 2000).
them themselves. Force was used to guarantee their obedience and loyalty. It was relatively easy to recruit Liberian children in the Sierra Leone conflict because of the tangible material objects and cash promised to them as the war continued. In Sierra Leone, child soldiers were typically promised diamonds, which was sufficient motivation for them to attempt to capture diamond mines defended by government soldiers. A great deal of the violence therefore centered on the status of the mining areas in eastern and southeastern Sierra Leone, leading to the conflict’s designation as a resource war. Large numbers of child soldiers were used as miners as well as fighters to ensure that the mines did not fall into the hands of government soldiers or civilian defense forces.

Abnormal situations, including those involving violence, can easily be internalized as normal. Children are highly susceptible to thinking that the abnormality of violence is in fact normal, especially those already mired in abject poverty or intense economic deprivation. According to Ibrahim Abdullah, the majority of children who trained in Libya were either from families that could not provide sustenance for them or that had exhibited socially deviant behaviors. Patrick Muana underscores that most of the RUF cadre and field commanders were from a category of society, the Mendes, a large ethnic group in Sierra Leone referred to as njiahungbia ngonga—that is, rough and unruly youth, drug abusers, social deviants, and misfits. They were mostly dropouts who did not value the goals of mainstream society. The RUF was thus an instrument through which to boost their low self-esteem and status in society.

It can be argued that the longer children participate in war, the more likely they are to view violence as a normal part of life. After all, they have not internalized the traditional values of society. Their experiences are ultimately traumatic and thus tend to linger. Intense counseling is typically used in attempting to introduce normalcy into the lives of former child soldiers. The refuge, security, and psychological gratification provided by fighting must be replaced by a more meaningful postconflict life that bolsters their mental, emotional, and spiritual lives. Despite their reasons for joining a conflict, the solutions to their postconflict problems must address their material and psychological needs through rehabilitation, job training, and gainful employment.

The outcome of using child soldiers was a large ‘army’ of youths who could not identify with the traditional values of society nor relate in any historical fashion to Sierra Leone as a once stable and peaceful society with little or no crime. The RUF’s strategy, first used in the Liberian civil war, was to deliberately create an army of child soldiers with a violent mindset and convinced that heinous acts were normal, brave, and even respected. The logic apparently was that the greater the number of hardened child fighters, the quicker the RUF would win the war. Not all children, however, were trained to be killers. In Sierra Leone, RUF fighters traveled on foot, passing through villages and towns in search of resources, booty, and recruits while en route to provin-

12. Abdullah, Between Democracy and Terror.
cial capitals and ultimately to Freetown. Along the way, they used many children as helping hands to transport food and loot as rebels moved from place to place.

There is a strong association between the availability of small arms, such as the AK-47, child soldiers, and levels of violence. Immediately after the cold war, arms markets worldwide were flooded with AK-47s, machine guns, mortars, grenades, and land mines at reasonable prices. These weapons were used by child soldiers to inflict a great deal of harm on village and rural populations. The irrationality of the Sierra Leone civil war stemmed in part from the terrible bloodletting devoid of any political doctrine or national strategy. Instead of villages and towns being liberated, their inhabitants were simply subjected to the worst terror imaginable. Many tried to understand the political goals and national development strategy of the RUF, but what baffled most people were the atrocities inflicted on ordinary people who had not in any way benefited from the years of APC rule. The RUF alienated most of the country and the international community with its brutality and disregard for human rights.

That RUF child soldiers lacked a well-articulated ideology for rebellion against the APC regime. Their actions in short were violence based on impulse, producing one of the most horrific episodes of violence in postindependence and post–cold war internal conflict in Africa. The scale of bloodletting and horrors and apparent anarchy that reigned supreme in Sierra Leone eventually galvanized the international community to focus on the issues of blood diamonds and war crimes.

African cultural traditions characterized by a strong tendency toward obedience and even docility on the part of children make it easier for adults to convince, coerce, and recruit children as soldiers. Children in general have a strong tendency to submit to the wishes of parents and other elders. In African societies, they are obedient mainly because they are heavily dependent on their elders for their livelihood in an environment in which there are few opportunities for the young. The lack of part-time jobs, educational opportunities, and welfare outlets creates a situation of permanent dependence by children. Moreover, in some instances, the absence of legal protections for children or enforcement against child abuse leaves them even more vulnerable to the whims and wishes of adults.

Thus, the related factors of dependence on parents for basic needs and a lack of economic opportunities are closely associated with child participation in civil wars. Well before state failure in the mid-1980s in Sierra Leone, only a few summer jobs were available to high school graduates and college students. By the late 1980s, college graduates were finding it difficult to secure teaching positions in secondary schools. During the 1960s and 1970s, these had been the easiest jobs to procure compared with positions in the state bureaucracies.

Female child soldiers are in general affected far more by war than are male child soldiers. The violence against girls and women is often more widespread and intense. Not only are girls coerced into military activity, but they also are abused as sex partners for male commanders. In the process, they are sometimes infected with sexually transmitted diseases and forced to bear children. In addition, their agony does not end with the cessation of fighting, as they then suffer ostracism, rejection, and other indig-

15. See, for example, ibid.
16. See White, ‘Irregular warfare: A different kind of threat’.
nities during postwar reconstruction. Society in general and their own communities often consider them impure and therefore not worthy of marriage or protection. That rejection, coupled with the lack of societal opportunities and effective rehabilitation in the form of physical and psychological assistance, drives many of them into lives of prostitution.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PEACEBUILDING

The coercive and brutal recruitment of children into rebel armies destroys the psyche of children and alienates them from humanity through a destructive belief in survival of the fittest. It also ingrains, especially in rebel child soldiers, a lack of respect for legitimate authority that has implications for long-term stability in a postconflict society engaged in peacebuilding. In Sierra Leone, child soldiers not only committed vicious crimes, but many also lost hope of ever reintegrating into their communities because of the terrible acts they had committed against its members, sometimes including their own relatives.17

The inhumane and heinous acts of the RUF alienated it in many communities. According to most of the narratives of demobilized child soldiers, they were typically abducted and forced into becoming rebel fighters. The RUF abducted thousands of children when it invaded Freetown, the purpose of which was to build its army, in particular the Small Boys Unit.18 As child soldiers have experienced intense trauma and participated in extensive inhumane deeds that are bound to affect psychological behavior, their effective rehabilitation and reintegration depends on a combination of both modern and more traditional methods. Both must take into account that those who recruited the children have stolen their childhood, which needs to be recovered through a concerted effort to situate each child in a viable, sustainable socioeconomic milieu in which he or she can undergo an intensive process of unlearning their traumatic experience and adopting a mindset characterized by respect for authority, humane treatment of all people, and the inculcation of a culture of peace. Successful demobilization, rehabilitation, and reintegration would in the end have to include vocational training in skills such as carpentry, automotive mechanics, bricklaying, and plumbing, and then, if possible, gainful employment. The provision of training in such areas would help facilitate their integration into society. In some cases, basic adult literacy must be provided because, forced into combat as children, these fighters entered adulthood at the end of the war most likely barely literate or numerate.

The church, mosque, and village are the main traditional avenues for the effective reintegration of former child soldiers into their communities.19 Political and economic integration may be easier to achieve than social integration because of personal rejection by individuals and communities. As a result, communities should be encouraged


to manifest attitudinal change by exhibiting a spirit of understanding and even compassion for traumatized former child soldiers. Demobilization can be easy to accomplish after war, but rehabilitation and reintegration often take longer to ascertain in terms of success and failure. Often, success depends on the availability of funds for housing, education, and training and efforts to find employment for the former combatants. Both the psycho-cultural and economic aspects of reintegration require adequate funding over an extended period of time. With the international community distracted by more serious conflict at one point, UNICEF announced that its child soldier rehabilitation program in Sierra Leone was in danger of stalling from a shortfall in funding. Often in such instances, thousands of former combatants and former child soldiers are released into society prematurely, without adequate educational, economic, and social preparation. Prematurely released former combatants would likely have little or no qualms about robbing, raping, and generally disobeying authority.

In Sierra Leone, less than 10 percent of girls associated with forced participation in war requested help immediately after the war concluded, in 2001. In 2003, UNICEF and various nongovernmental organizations worked to integrate more than 500 abducted girls into a community education program. Most of them had been abducted and used as ‘wives’ for male commanders. Critics charged that the needs of thousands of the girls and their children were not being effectively met. The problems stemmed from a lack of sufficient funding and the absence of well-articulated policy guidelines and procedures for integration. These shortcomings are directly related to inadequate counseling, education, and training.

Peacebuilding efforts by state and nonstate entities accompanied the end of the conflict in Sierra Leone, with the rehabilitation and integration of former child soldiers being one of the main objectives. The trauma the Sierra Leone conflict unleashed was tantamount to severe repression that escalated into an open rebellion against age-old traditional attitudes into which many children were dragged as active participants. Accordingly, the task of child soldier rehabilitation and reintegration primarily would be to eliminate the mindset that compelled the children to distrust and participate in destroying their traditional sociocultural and psychological environment.

A partial focus on simply deprogramming former child soldiers may not be an effective method of rehabilitation and reintegration. Also needed is a focus on rebuilding the structural and cultural foundations of society, such as eliminating the corruption at the elite level that negatively affects everyone. In other words, effective rehabilitation and reintegration of former child soldiers should combine resocialization to strengthen commonly held traditional values and material (economic) factors, vocational and technical training, and absorption into a growing economy. It should focus on the micro level (psyche) of the individual former child soldier as well as the macro level of societal equilibrium, with the objective being a sound economy and government free from corruption and misrule. In other words, as a complement to the material dimension of peacebuilding, issues of cultural sanctity and identity, inter-

group relations, and collective intentionality are all related to the attainment of permanent peace.21

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Although it may appear that most of the former child soldiers in Sierra Leone have been absorbed into society, the perennial problem of unemployment translates into many of them continuing to be manipulated by politicians and used as political thugs during elections or as instruments of political intimidation in general. They are easy recruits for participation in political violence because many are unable to find employment.

Among the many problems that plague child soldier reintegration in Sierra Leone are a lack of adequate funding to provide them with support and protection; the absence of a well-articulated policy and guidelines; the near neglect of sexually abused girl soldiers, as the programs available for counseling, training, and education are few; the absence of efforts to reach girls still held psychologically captive by rebel commanders; and the massive poverty and unemployment in the country that seem to undermine the efforts of UNICEF, the government, and other groups. The Sierra Leone government and various organizations could solve these problems by collaborating and pooling their resources to effectively assist former child soldiers. Creating jobs for them should always be a paramount concern in any postconflict reintegration program. Female child soldiers should receive special attention, as they are probably the most traumatized and stigmatized of all the children who participated in the war. Policies, procedures, and funding should not marginalize them. The overt and subtle attacks on them are a source of their greater burden of shame, guilt, and suffering compared with that suffered by the male child soldier.

A misperception exists that the struggles of civil society groups for multiparty democracy in Africa are the only entry point for understanding the quest for representative democracy on the continent. Uprisings against dictators, ethnic militia violence, and mass rejection of election results are all forms of popular struggle for democracy that are yet to be given sufficient attention in the discourse. This lacuna appears to be a product of the post–cold war neo-liberal discourse, which tends to ignore the social and historical dimensions of democratic governance. This has resulted in creating crises of transition with which African states continue to cope.

Although democratic transitions in most of post-independence Africa remain endangered, there is nothing that makes democracy inherently ‘un-African’ or makes Africans ungovernable. The major setback for democracy on the continent is not its failure to evolve from the seeds of ‘best fit’ values, but the imported ‘best practice’ principles of the grand theories. Using the critical approach can illuminate blind spots in the discourse on the quest for democracy in Africa and illustrate that the urge to prove that the struggle in Africa did not end with the attainment of independence or commence with post–cold war multiparty agitations. As one scholar notes, ‘The struggles continued in different forms.’

Popular resistance by African peoples against the policies of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank structural adjustment programmes (SAPs), the rise in ethnic militia violence, and violent reactions to the results of general elections represent various forms of struggle for genuine democracy. Such conflicts, however, have failed to attract serious attention because they do not conform to the image of modern struggles of civil society. They are either condemned as ‘primordial’ or ‘illegitimate’ or


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'backward, terrorist, fundamentalist and tribalistic violence'. Such condemnation not only prevents understanding the ideologies of people's resistance to their daily oppression and marginalization, and how this resistance threatens the stability of the state, it also ignores 'an important piece of locally generated knowledge, values and cultures' that sometimes underlines the quest for democratic governance. The boomerang effect of this neglect is recently evident in the Arab Spring that began in Tunisia in December 2010 and then spread to Egypt, Libya, and other parts of the Middle East. In Nigeria, the Boko Haram, the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta, the Oodua Peoples Congress, the Ombatse uprisings, and the Jos crisis are all characterised by the Nigerian state as tribal, terrorist-related, or religious crises when in reality the underlying reasons are a desire for democracy and for the inclusion of ethnic groups in the loop of development and for inclusive governance and poverty alleviation.

The post–cold war neo-liberal democratic discourse has tended to 'emasculate democracy of its social and historical dimensions and present it as an ultimate nirvana' and using civil society as the energiser of the democratisation pulse in Africa. Modern non-governmental organizations, workers' unions, and student associations have no doubt provided platforms for the articulation of civil resistance. The main driver in the quest for democracy, however, rests in the spirit and determination of the people to reject all forms of oppression, show their dissatisfaction with the economic hardships occasioned by SAPs, and enforce their right to determine their daily lives and future prospects.

That some civil society groups lubricate the liberal notion of democracy sets their perception apart from that of the poor majority, whose major preoccupation is to end poverty, improve their standard of living, and eliminate corrupt systems of governance. In essence, a conflict of interest exists between the populist masses and elite-driven civil society groups in their quests for democracy. Rita Abrahamsen has succinctly argued that African democracy movements indeed combine two different conceptions of democracy. For the poor, political change means an end to poverty and suffering, but for the political elite and middle classes, democracy is perceived as a route back to power and as a way of protecting their privileges. The need remains compelling to ascertain why the contributions of African scholars have failed to address the problems associated with the democratisation process before the post–cold war period and to understand the transition crisis and the challenges for African states coping with it.

THE POPULAR QUEST FOR DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA

The collision of the people with dictatorial leaders, to have control over their own lives and destinies, has been an ongoing issue in human history. The quest for democracy

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4. Ibid., 3.
5. Ibid.
in Africa is no exception. These are emancipatory political struggles aimed at state reconstitution, popular participation, and self-determination that did not end in the quest for independence or the ‘third wave’ of democracy. These conflicts represent emancipatory demands for which every national ethnic group strives: equal economic, social, and political opportunities, as well as active promotion of the welfare of the people. For example, in the late 1950s, widespread unrest erupted in Cameroon as the main party opposed to French rule was banned, leading to a bloody and protracted guerrilla war. Independence came in 1960, but amid extensive violence. Côte d’Ivoire’s civil war that broke out in September 2002 started with an attempted coup by a section of the army. Although the coup failed, insurgent soldiers took control of the northern part of the country, under the leadership of Guillaume Soro, a former student leader. Their main grouse was that northerners were treated as second-class citizens, raising the question of Ivorian identity and nationality. In Nigeria, apart from the indigenous people’s struggle for independence, as exemplified by the Aba women’s riot of 1929, the cause of the incessant maiming and killing of Nigerian citizens in Jos has remained the same for more than a century—a case of ethnic groups, specifically the Afizere, Anaguta, Berom, and Hausa-Fulani, laying claim to pre-eminence over one another. Their contention lies with who is an ‘indigene’ or a ‘settler’ in Jos.

As argued more than two hundred years ago by Pasquale Stanislao Mancini, nationalities that do not have a government issuing from their innermost life, but are subject to laws imposed upon them, are subjugated, and, therefore mere objects. Mancini’s argument remains relevant in contemporary Africa when taking into consideration the extent of agitation by ethnic groups, such as the Ogoni in Nigeria and the Massai in Kenya and Tanzania. Every nation strives to attain self-determination. The quests for democracy in African states is in line with Mancini’s thought, as they reflect the spirit of the people’s lives and desire to enjoy the right to determine their lives and future prospects. In light of this, and taking into account Africa’s colonial heritage, it is apparent that the democratic deficits in colonial and post-colonial African states set the conditions for popular struggles.

Whereas traditional African societies were gradually evolving into modern states in the form of empires and kingdoms during the pre-colonial period, post-colonial African states did not result organically from their ‘historical developments and cumulative experiences’. Instead, they were part of ‘a “hand-me-down” phenomenon in many respects’. In essence, the post-colonial states were artificial entities created by the colonial rulers, who sustained the institutions of the foregoing colonial regimes to exercise political power and the kind of social relationships required

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for the daily reinforcement of liberal capitalism equated with democracy in the neoliberal discourse.

Colonial rule had successfully wiped out the pre-colonial dependency of the traditional chief on his councilors and replaced it with neo-patrimonial autocracy and elite rulership that depended for its sustenance on the colonial and other foreign powers. For example, the ideological row in the Congo between Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba and President Joseph Kasa-Vubu was exploited by the U.S. government and other Western nations to assist Mobutu Sese Sako, Lumumba's chief of the army staff, to oust Lumumba in a coup backed by the Central Intelligence Agency in September 1960 and retain Kasa-Vubu as president. The supportive rapport between Mobutu and the West during his dictatorial reign, from 1965 to 1997, is well documented. Backing for Africa's dictators was also exemplified by French president Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, who declared himself 'friend and family' of the Central African Republic's (CAR) Jean-Bédel Bokassa in 1975. While France was supplying the Bokassa regime with financial aid and military backing, Bokassa was in turn supplying France with uranium, vital for France's nuclear energy and weapons programme, during the cold war.

William Easterly argues that colonial administration reinforced autocracy in Africa while neo-colonialism sustained and consolidated it. The colonial administrative and economic structures were maintained through Africa's foreign-backed dictators, as highlighted above, to preserve the flow of wealth from the continent to the West. All this supports Martin Meredith's assertion that neo-patrimonial autocracy results in bad governance and extremely selfish and cruel governors, such as Mobutu in Zaire, Idi Amin in Uganda, and Bokassa in the CAR. Post-colonial states could hardly stand up to their own traditional historical analyses, because their structures are mostly heirs of a liberal capitalist democracy that has nothing to do with the communal values of sub-Saharan African traditions. The political sector as examined by A. M. Gentili witnessed the promotion of the rules of plurality in the form of liberal democracy through multi-party democracy and building of the 'appropriate' institutions, such as the adoption of the rule of law and promotion of civil society as sine qua non for democratisation processes. This is a best practice approach to democracy that contradicts best fit values.

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13. Michela Wrong, In the Footsteps of Mr. Kurtz: Living on the Brink of Disaster in Mobutu's Congo (New York, HarperCollins Perennial, 2002), 68–70; Larry Devlin, a CIA agent during the cold war, recently gave an eyewitness account of the developments of the Congo's tumultuous post-independence years leading to the planned elimination of Lumumba on the order of U.S. president Dwight D. Eisenhower. See Larry Devlin, Chief of Station, Congo: Fighting the Cold War in a Hot Zone (New York, Public Affairs, 2007).
15. William Easterly, The White Man's Burden: Why the West's Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good (New York, Penguin, 2006), 273.
K. Mundy and L. Murphy debunk best practice rhetoric by simply arguing that democracy requires more than the formal establishment of certain rights, institutions, and procedures. Important as these are, consolidation of social relations undergirding these rights, institutions, and procedures is vital. Such support includes the development of an educated middle class and a framework of civil institutions. Mundy and Murphy’s submission is crucial, but its lack of historical analyses of social relations weakens their argument. To consolidate relations that support rights, institutions, and procedures in a democracy requires treating indigenous values as assets rather than as barbaric and anti-growth. The best practice assumption, however, seems to ignore that to be different in a democracy does not necessarily mean to be right or wrong.

Democracy is flexible, which makes it highly complex. To understand it requires consideration of context. Through context, the human element brings together and cements the bricks of knowledge about an object, which in this case is democracy. How the bricks of knowledge are put together defines their use. Every community has a certain human element that cements its bricks of knowledge in a particular way. The development of institutions, rights, and procedures cannot be assumed outside the context of their application, hence justification for non-uniformity in the application of democracy as a system of rule. Any analysis of a popular struggle for democracy that adopts the best practice approach outside the context of the community, even when the people think ‘this is not the way we do it here’, will end up not only separating the people from governance, but also promoting a liberal conceptualisation of democracy to the advantage of the elite, middle classes, donors, and creditors, that is, the beneficiaries of economic liberalisation. Democracy does not consist of only one particular set of institutions. Rather, democracies vary, but their practices aim for similar outcomes.

Thus the policies of global liberal institutions have faltered when forced onto the democratisation process in Africa through forced compliance with IMF and World Bank conditions and using civil societies to orchestrate the process as the best practice. The problem of liberal democracy lies in its global exchange of best practice ideas to determine ‘the good, the bad, and the ugly’ of democracy relevant to the collective ‘us’, while the recipients of these practices struggle to sustain their individuality within the collective.

Development of an educated middle class may be relevant in some contexts and irrelevant in others. This is where best fit surpasses the best practice assumption of liberal democracy. It is the best fit approach that separates the popular uprisings in sub-Saharan Africa in the 1980s and the Arab Spring, especially in regard to Libya. The 1980s protests in Benin and Cameroon left the infrastructures of the old regimes in place, while the Arab Spring is about rebirth of the state within different ideological parameters.

The Libyans, unlike the Egyptians and Tunisians, completely dismantled the former regime’s apparatus through a nine-month bitter fight and popular struggle that

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gave the rebels control of the country after having defeated Muammar Qadhafi’s security and military forces with the support of NATO. Protesters in Egypt had to engage in additional rounds of struggle with transition and elected leaders in a new state with a new orientation after Hosni Mubarak agreed to stop down. The Egyptians, however, agreed to the military, an influential element of the country’s political power structure for the past six decades, leading the supposed transition to democracy. As a result, they are still struggling, with limited success, as elements of the former regime, especially the military and the judiciary, continue to play dominant roles in the country’s future. It is this combination of forces, along with the marginally defeated political parties in the last general elections, that in part accounts for the resumption of mass protests in 2013 that led to the removal by military coup of the duly elected president, Muhammad Morsi, a year after he had assumed office.

**COLD WAR AND AFRICAN SCHOLARS’ RESPONSE TO POPULAR STRUGGLES FOR DEMOCRACY**

Mass protests for democracy in African states have derailed liberal democracy’s assumption that having regular multi-party elections will guarantee the establishment of a stable democratic state. A. Mafeje, in roundly debunking equating multi-party elections with democracy, bases his submission on popular African struggles having been subjected to the ‘perversion or appropriation by more articulate interlocutors who range from imperialist agents, liberals of all sorts to intellectual opportunists’. He contends,

> it is important to note that the ordinary citizens who were responsible for what became known as ‘the popular movement for democracy in Africa’ knew exactly what they were objecting to, but they did not know with the same clarity what they wanted. Thus, their popular slogans were open to conflicting interpretations, depending on who the interlocutors were. For instance, objection to one-party autocracy got interpreted as ‘multi-party democracy’, democratic pluralism got construed as ‘liberal democracy’, and local autonomy as ‘participatory democracy’, which got associated with development without saying what type of development.

Such misinterpretations by various interlocutors, as argued by Mafeje, are inevitable due to the presence of certain determinate conditions, such as ‘uneven development’. The greatest advantage of these misinterpretations, however, is rooted in their historical significance, which has provided the ground for the socially informed debate among African intellectuals from 1986 to date. Challenging the dominant paradigm of democracy and development in post-colonial sub-Saharan African states, Abrahamsen argues that the ‘good governance’ discourse merely legitimised the right of the North to develop and control the South. She dismisses the inherent assump-

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23. Ibid., 4.


tions in the discourse adopted by the IMF and World Bank to wrongly gauge the mood of popular struggles for democracy in Africa as struggles for multi-party liberal democracy. In her view, these movements were actually for better standards of living and an end to poverty and suffering, rather than misconceptions of the neo-liberal institutions that fuse democracy and economic liberalism. This mistaken notion, according to Abrahamsen, illiberalises alternative conceptualisations of democracy that could have reconfigured governance and development based on popular participation and promotion of the social and economic rights of the poor.

Taking a cue from Mafeje is Jephias Mapuva, who points out that it was not until the intensification of popular struggles for democracy in the 1970s and 1980s that African scholars began to pay sufficient attention to the question of democracy in Africa.26 African scholars were initially not unduly worried about a ‘one-party state’ or ‘parti-unique’, but more so about the failures of African states to deliver on the promises of independence.27 They thus focused on the growing disillusionment associated with these failures, which reached a crescendo in the 1980s, with the enactment of draconian ‘legislation and policies reminiscent of the colonial period’.28

Prior to these events, it was generally believed that the ‘progressive’ African leaders, commonly referred to as the Casablanca group, comprising Modibo Keita, Kwame Nkrumah, and Ahmed Sékou Touré, would bring independence to fruition irrespective of whether they were advocates of a one-party or multi-party state. The underlying reason for this conviction was that the independence movements of these leaders were popular and mass-based and gave the people hope in an independent state. It was when the popular trust in these leaders dwindled, within ten years of independence as a result of economic and social factors, that African scholars began to examine the democratic credentials of their states and leaders.

The African states could not halt popular struggles for democracy due to their inability to control the instruments of violence and because the states were merely hand-me-down post-colonial trading posts with a degree of public authority, but lacking the capacity to intervene in economic development as envisaged in the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA), which was supposed to serve as the compass for self-sufficient economic development.29 The plan’s main tenets were self-reliance as the basis of development at the national, sub-regional, and regional levels; equity in the distribution of wealth at the national level as a fundamental objective of development; expansion of the public sector as an essential for development; outside capital (an unavoidable necessity), to be directed towards those areas where African capital was lacking or inadequate, such as mining, energy, and large-scale projects; inter-African economic cooperation and integration as soon as possible; changes in the international economic order to favour Africa and third world countries; and continuation of the fight for a new international economic order.30

27. Ibid., 17.
28. Ibid., 19.
Towards realisation of the LPA, African governments gave priority to the development of agriculture (first for food and then for export), industrialisation (to satisfy basic needs), mining industries (to recover total and permanent sovereignty over national resources and establish mineral-based industries), human resources, and science and technology.\(^{31}\) The LPA was followed by the desire of African leaders to create a common market by the year 2000 as a practical step towards economic cooperation and integration. Without the economic integration of the small national economies, it would be impossible to achieve any meaningful alternative as a way out of Africa’s crisis. More important, without such cooperation and integration, Africa would not be powerful enough to bring about change, however small, in the existing international economic order, and change was crucial if Africa was to embark on an alternative form of development and overcome its problems.

Before 1980 most African scholars, including Frantz Fanon, Walter Rodney, and Nzongola Ntalaja, were preoccupied with the cold war’s effect on the underdevelopment of Africa, ideological competition between capitalism and Marxism, and the role of workers and peasants in development.\(^{32}\) The cold war confrontation not only ‘disfigured’ the liberation and democratic discourse in Africa, and turned the newly and fledging independent states into pawns and the continent into a chessboard of proxy hot wars, it also delegitimised autochthony and any other brand of democracy. The two sides in the cold war claimed to be the provider of freedom, with an alleged absence of freedom on the other side. The consequences of the wars were devastating for the continent. Today’s failed states—among them Côte d’Ivoire, the Central African Republic, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Uganda, Zimbabwe, and others—were once darlings or demons, depending on one’s perspective on the global, hegemonic powers. The overconcentration on the cold war diverted the attention of most African scholars from the domestic struggles of Africans for democracy.\(^{33}\) This neglect supplied the foundation for dictatorial regimes to consolidate their grip on power with the notion of the president-emperor.

The popular democratic waves of the 1980s were unprecedented in the African post-colonial era. They swept the continent, forcing changes in political arrangements and leading to multi-party democracy, an emphasis on human rights, dialogue between political opponents, and the liberalisation of post-colonial politics.\(^{34}\) These events also reflected the response of the masses to post-colonial rulers’ attempts to protect their profligacy. In arriving at such protection, these rulers imposed laws and policies that denied ordinary citizens the right to protest against an implicit but illegitimate financial squeeze.\(^{35}\) This in turn resulted in governments not only losing le-

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31. Ibid.
gitimacy, but shrinking leaders' support base to a narrow circle of trusted friends, kinsmen, and ethnic associates, all of whom survived on political patronage. This situation effectively elicited large-scale upheavals and struggles for democracy from below by the people that were also articulated by civil groups, organised labour, and student associations. Democracy from then on assumed a challenging new dimension in Africa.

The articulated struggles by civil society groups revolved around three major issues: the quest for multi-party democracy versus a one-party system, power devolution and decentralisation, and respect for the rule of law and human rights by government. These demands reflect the level of revulsion among the people towards corrupt leaders, who had become progressively oppressive and ruthless dictators plunging state economies into crises and countries into a political abyss. The involvement of civil society groups in these movements misrepresented the anger as a struggle for multi-party liberal democracy, thereby blinding many to the indigeneity of the struggles.

African scholars concluded unanimously that democracy is any phenomenon based on the participation of citizens in political debates and consultation in decision making. This idea is in contrast to tailor-made procedures, processes, and institutions that reinforce or repress democracy. The African scholars' assumption is based on the principle that those affected by a decision must have the right to participate in the making of said decision, or what Abrahamsen views as socio-economic rights.

Bingu Wa Mutharika, the late Malawian president, pointed out, however, that people's participation in the decision-making process is an insufficient guarantee of democracy. He averred that 'the masses can still be oppressed by the system or excluded from the decision-making process by the same system they have installed and that human rights abuses can still take place even under plural democracy'. The concern expressed by Mutharika is what Mapuva sees as the reason for engaging civil society as a shield against the oppression of the people in a multi-party democracy and as a sufficient catalyst for the promotion of democratic institutions in Africa. Does this, however, solve the problem? In spite of the presence of an active civil society in Botswana, the ruling Botswana Democratic Party still oppresses and excludes those affected by a given decision from participating in the decision-making process, even though it retains the status of a good model of liberal and stable democracy in Africa.

Following on Mutharika's concerns, multi-party democracy does create democratic challenges for post-colonial African states because of its inherent contradictions and the class structures of the liberal state. For example, the conventional first-past-

37. Ibid.
41. Ibid., 20.
the post electoral system imposes a new dimension, adding supplementary and run-off elections to the African political lexicon whereby a candidate is regarded as having won an election but not by a sufficient number of votes to be declared the winner. This is similar to a hung parliament, where none of the major political parties has an absolute majority and thus the ability to easily form a party-line government. This was the case in Zimbabwe in March 2008, when the opposition won in elections but had to take part in run-offs. The same scenario arose in Nigeria in May 2011, when the opposition won a governorship election in Imo state, and another opposition candidate won a senatorial election in Enugu state. The elections, however, were declared inconclusive by the Independent National Electoral Commission, and each was made to recontest in a run-off.

New political jargon referencing ‘coalition government’ and ‘national unity government’ has also appeared in the African political context. This political arrangement exposes the weak side of liberal democracy. Unity governments, currently in place in Kenya, Nigeria (federal level only), and Zimbabwe, force electoral winners to share the stage with the losers, thereby depriving the electorate of the right ultimately to determine their leaders and representatives through the ballot box. Unity governments not only weaken democracy by depriving the political process of vibrant opposition, but also essentially turn the country into a one-party state in disguise, as most of the co-opted parties not only end up supporting the ruling government’s policies and programmes, but also sometimes end up as members of the ruling party. Nigeria is an example of this.

Arrangements involving governments of national unity are a conspicuous formula in most African states. In the true sense of the concept, there is no opposition party as the political parties merge in the legislative assemblies under the banners of legislative committees to work as a team. Which party’s programmes and policies are they going to legislate? They all end up discussing the pros and cons of executive actions and proposals without canvassing alternative policies. Through this act of omission or commission, they implement the ruling party’s programmes. They not only shut the door to alternative views on issues, but also shortchange the electorate that voted for minority parties based on their platforms. The unity government arrangement remains an indictment of liberal democracy in Africa’s multi-ethnic states, but liberal scholars have yet to offer an explanation regarding its compatibility with liberal values.

**CRISIS OF TRANSITIONS**

Africa is still undergoing a development transition through which other continents have already passed. In addition, the continent also faces the challenges of political transitions in general and regime transition crises in particular. A regime transition is a shift from one set of political procedures to another or from an old pattern of rule to a new one, as is currently taking place in Egypt. Indeed, it is the most colourful aspect of political transition, yet it can also be the most stressful, turbulent, and tense because it results in uncertainties for individuals and groups, as there are new opportunities for political access, ascent, and competition, as well as for venting

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42. Ibid., 35.
grievances and hatred and seeking redress of some hitherto perceived injustice, such as marginalisation.

Transition crises in Africa have internal and external causes. Internally, transitions in Africa are afflicted by intra-elite power struggles that breed inter-ethnic or inter-religious violence. Externally, the economic interests of cold war mentors still remain a strong factor in transitions of power, which have produced two types of rulers—those over-staying and those under-staying their tenure. For instance, Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere ruled for twenty-four years (1961–1985), Kenyan president Jomo Kenyatta for fifteen years (1963–1978), followed by Daniel arap Moi for twenty-four years (1978–2002). Robert Mugabe has ruled Zimbabwe for more than thirty years, since independence in 1980. Qadhafi ruled Libya for forty-two years, from 1969 until being swept aside in 2011. In Uganda, the first twenty-four years after independence (1962–1986) witnessed five abrupt regime changes involving eight transitions, or average terms of three years per president, until Yoweri Museveni came to power. He was on his twenty-seventh year in office when in February 2011 he won an additional term of five years. In Nigeria, transitions from one democratic government to another since independence have always been tumultuous. The list of difficult transitions goes on to include Algeria, Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Gabon, Guinea, Mali, Niger, Somalia, Sudan, and Tunisia, to mention a few.

Africa’s difficulties with transitions can be interpreted as a result of undergoing a team-building process. The first phase of team building, formation or familiarisation, is characterised by group awareness and relationship building, including passive conduct, establishing ground rules (constitutions), and less activity by actors compared to that in later phases. This stage occurred for the first twenty-five years after independence. The second phase, the storming or charge stage, involves more activity, power plays, confrontations, ambiguity, negativity, fault finding, and recognition of the need for dominance and attempts to achieve it. This is the phase most countries in Africa are now in, hence, the crises.

Why do African leaders prefer to over-stay in power? This pertinent question readily stimulates the minds of concerned scholars of the African crisis. When African presidents assume office, many of them also assume absolute power. As Lord Acton famously noted, ‘Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely’.43 Absolute power tends to create dictators who close the political space (creating an uneven playing field), frame political opponents, personalise state resources, skew distribution of national wealth and appointments, award bogus contracts, misappropriate funds, engage in corruption, tribalism, and nepotism, and repeal and amend constitutions at will. Consequently, such leaders prefer to hold tight to power not merely for the comfort, but for fear of what might happen if they no longer held power. Prosecution (and embarrassment) by UN special courts for crimes against humanity and war crimes also contributes to the tenacity of dictator-presidents. Thus, remaining in office and dying there is less risky than leaving it and potentially facing the consequences of their misdeeds.

Leaders who assume power over financially impoverished states are expected to improve the plight of the poor, but the opposite is typically the case. These leaders themselves often experience a complete change in lifestyle, from ordinary to extravagant, to which they become accustomed and are not willing to relinquish. This leads them to extend their term in office, amend the constitution, or claim election rigging when the opposition wins an election.

When a leader accedes to power through violence or vote rigging, there is a tendency to develop feelings of being the most powerful person in the land. This is also true in situations of vote trading, whereby voters exchange their votes for cash, pitiable gifts, such as salt, soap, oil, or jewellery and the like. In such situations, the ruling elites feel they are unaccountable to the voting population, since its votes were exchanged for something, implying that accountability starts and ends with elections. This is what international observers alleged occurred in the 2011 Ugandan elections, which were simultaneously determined to be free, safe, and transparent. Where vote trading has succeeded, it will continue to be used as a strategy in subsequent elections to ensure control of power and government for as long as possible.

Incumbents sometimes fail to understand the distinction between crowds and supporters when campaigning. It is normal that everyone would want to get a glimpse of the person they have seen repeatedly in the media. Thus, a mammoth crowd does not necessarily translate into supporters. Crowds, however, can mislead an incumbent into believing that he or she is popular. Therefore, when defeated in an election, the incumbent often cites vote rigging by opponents. This posture has created the impression in the minds of many that the search for democracy in Africa has reached a dead end, as the continent constantly witnesses the resurgence of despots who barely allow the democratic process to take place by either manipulating elections or repressing any transitional project that will relieve them of their positions.

Nigeria presents a vivid example of manipulated electoral processes that have imposed rulers on the people. The International Crisis Group cites Nigeria as a nation with three flawed elections, in 1999, 2003, and 2007, the last being the most discredited. Regardless, rulers were produced.\textsuperscript{44} Elections in 2015 will be critical for Nigeria’s fledgling democracy and overall political health. In a spirited effort to show its preparedness and impartiality, the Independent National Electoral Commission instituted important reforms, including the introduction of community-mandate protections to prevent electoral malpractice, and to the surprise of everyone and for the first time in Nigeria, the prosecution of officials, including its own staff, for electoral offences. There are reasons to be pessimistic, however, including the prospect of flawed voter registration and voter rolls, unreliable scanners, lack of internal democracy within political parties, and biased security personnel, among other issues.\textsuperscript{45} Any combination of these anomalies can resulted in an upsurge of violence in any number of states.

\textsuperscript{45} Ibid., 46.
CONCLUSION

Reflecting on the setbacks of the transition projects in Africa, some observers have concluded that democracy could not survive in Africa because of cultural values that inhibit its emergence and sustenance. They are wrong and also fail to explain whose democracy and to which democracy they are referring. As discussed above, external factors imposing a best practice ideology that makes Africa susceptible to crises of various kinds cannot be ignored for contributing to the transition crisis in Africa. The political changes that took place during the 1980s and 1990s in Africa show that they were essentially donor-driven, by the IMF and the World Bank. Their collective intervention further drove Africa to the periphery of global economic calculations. They also stultified the democratic projects of African states.

The overall effect was a series of uprisings by people clamouring for regime change, power devolution, or decentralisation. These events in turn elicited extreme autocratic measures from the rulers whose leadership credentials were not only questioned but threatened. As Samuel Decalo argues, 'The majority of Africa, in the absence of global fiscal munificence may . . . once the international vogue with “democracy” recedes—be cut loose to drift their own way, sliding back into political strife, dictatorship and military rule'.

Along this line of thinking, and for various reasons, some observers went to the extreme of suggesting that Africa actually requires a ‘second colonisation’, as it appears that most countries in Africa cannot take adequate charge of their own destiny. For progressive African scholars, such a conclusion is based on a lack of understanding of African politics and governance.

Although democratic transitions remain endangered, there is nothing that makes democracy un-African or that makes Africans ungovernable. Democracy as a concept is universal and does not endorse the imposition of the best practice ideology. Rather, it allows for a best fit approach. There is nothing to suggest that the basic values of democracy are alien or diametrically opposed to African social values and cultures. Instead, the disconnection rests with the imposition of liberal democracy and its incompatibility with African values. This is what jeopardises democracy in Africa.

Revisiting the Dominant Party Debate: Implications for Local Governance in a South African City

Tatenda G. Mukwedeya

Since 2004, South Africa has been engulfed by increasing service delivery protests, leading it to be dubbed the ‘protest capital of the world’. These demonstrations can be explained as a response to weaknesses in the system and practice of local governance and the prevalence of a dominant party ideology. Empirical data from the Buffalo City municipality illustrate how one-party dominance can undermine local government performance. In the absence of organized platforms of deliberation, such as opposition parties and civic groups, unresponsiveness among the dominant party officials and local state bureaucrats weakens governance and ultimately service delivery. The African National Congress, the dominant party in Buffalo City, has actively stifled and weakened local government structures and civic organizations.

On 16 March 2011, residents of Duncan Village, a densely populated African township about five kilometres from the East London central business district, in the Eastern Cape province, gathered for a public meeting, as they had done many times before. On this day, however, the atmosphere was far from normal, as tensions ran high. The residents were unhappy about houses that had been built on a nearby open space. While the building of new houses usually invokes a celebratory mood, community members were displeased in this instance because they had not been told about the plans to construct the homes. In addition, the houses had been illegally occupied by people allegedly chosen by the councillor. Youths were also frustrated because they had not been hired as part-time laborers during construction.

The councillor failed to show for the meeting, raising tensions even further. A protest ensued, with residents blocking roads with burning tires and rocks. Some of the new houses were vandalized and there were chants to burn the ‘arrogant’ councillor’s house. The next morning, the protest was identified as a service delivery protest by the...
media, more specifically, a housing protest. It was clear that although housing was an issue, the other central driver of the protest was the community’s exclusion from the initial decision to build the structures and from the construction process. In short, local residents had been excluded from the entire process involving delivery of the houses.

This type of civil unrest, popularly called service delivery protests, has become common in South Africa’s poor settlements, especially since 2004. Numerous studies have examined such events, highlighting their triggers, dynamics, and patterns. The main drivers of these protests include lack of services, corrupt local officials, power struggles, and disregard for community opinion. Despite the myriad debates surrounding these protests, what these events broadly indicate is that the government lacks effectiveness or has succumbed to a persistent general malaise. This has been observed by the popular media and academics alike in South Africa. Protesters’ demands highlight discontent with local governance. How local governance is failing in South Africa can be assessed by examining the role of political parties, including one-party dominance, in the practice and workings of local governance and the relationship between one-party dominance and local governance.

This paper draws from an analysis of the Buffalo City municipality, the smallest metropolitan municipality in South Africa, located in the Eastern Cape province. Its local council has been dominated by the African National Congress (ANC), which has won more than a two-thirds majority in all elections, even following a decline in ANC support nationwide. The ANC’s uncontested power in Buffalo City has weakened local governance and service delivery by undermining the municipality’s responsiveness to public opinion as well as reducing accountability to citizens.

The findings here are based on ethnographic research conducted over eight months during 2011–2012 in Buffalo City. Research involved living in the community and participating in various activities organized by the local state and political parties and open to the public. In-depth interviews were also conducted with local ANC and opposition party leaders, municipal officials, community activists, and ordinary community members.

5. The ANC lost its two-thirds majority in 2009 national elections.
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PARTY DOMINANCE AND LOCAL GOVERNANCE: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Governance is about state-society interactions, an example of which is the collective effort of provisioning public goods. Political parties play a central role in this relationship because they mediate state-society interactions. These organizations simultaneously represent society as well as provide officials who constitute the state. The dual nature necessitates examining the role of political parties in local governance along the state-citizen interface, and in the case of Buffalo City, the role of a dominant party in state-citizen interactions and the connection between party dominance and local governance.

A dominant party is one that has established electoral success for an uninterrupted and prolonged period. It thus enjoys predominance in the formation and running of governments and in determining the public agenda while facing little prospect of electoral defeat in the foreseeable future. The ANC has attained the status of a dominant party in light of its unassailable electoral dominance since 1994. The dominant party thesis is at the center of debates on the consolidation of democracy in post-apartheid South Africa (as well as in India, Italy, Japan, and other countries). There are two contrasting views on the implications of one-party dominance, with one stressing its negative aspects and the other highlighting its positive effects.

Simon Thackrah asserts that one-party dominance should be avoided at all costs because it undermines liberal democracy, which is characterized by constraints on executive power, strong party competition, unpredicted electoral outcomes, and a framework through which minorities can express their views. Hermann Giliomee and Charles Simkins agree with this position and note that democracy rests on countervailing power being able to check tendencies toward authoritarian domination. They further argue that the best counter to such domination is a strong opposition, to guard against the erosion of democratic institutions and replace a governing party that outstays its welcome. In addition, they contend, without a strong opposition, dominant parties run the risk of sinking into unilateral, arbitrary decision making. Furthermore, when dominant parties are able to make key appointments to the public sector, such as judges, commission officials, and auditors, it undermines the autonomy of the institutions crucial to a democracy. In addition, as Heidi Brooks points out, party dominance becomes problematic when a governing party has no need to respond to public opinion because it is assured re-election.

9. Ibid.
As Brooks also notes, however, other scholars have called for more caution in labeling the dominant party system as irreconcilable with the advancement of democracy.11 Some scholars hail the system as a ‘stabilizing mechanism’, especially in fragmented polities like South Africa, divided along class, race, and ethnic lines.12 The stabilizing effect stems from the dominant party’s ability to organize and unite different social groups under one political agenda based on compromise instead of antagonism. In addition, in cases where dominance has been won through competitive elections or using the democratic rules of the game, the electorate confers legitimacy on the dominant party, and the party thus functions within the boundaries of the democratic system. Such ruling parties are what Giliomee and Simkins refer to as democratic dominant parties, which observe free and fair elections in which the opposition is tolerated and given space to organize.13

Those less tolerant of the dominant party thesis, such as Raymond Suttner, have argued that the framework restricts democracy to electoral politics and is hostile to popular politics. This limitation is manifest in an obsession with the ‘quality’ of electoral opposition and the sidelining of other forms of organization and opposition, which are regarded as of limited importance or as a matter separate from the consolidation of a championed version of democracy.14 It must be noted that electoral dominance in itself does not predetermine the impact that a party will have in government or on the society as a whole. Those effects are mediated by a variety of factors quite unrelated to the party’s electoral support, for example, the power of civil society.15 In Buffalo City, what matters is not the normative debates about dominant parties, but the importance of the dominant party’s observance of democratic practices in a setting where the political opposition is weak.

Governance as a concept has been used across a wide range of fields but unfortunately, as Mark Bevir notes, the ubiquity of the term governance does not make its meaning any clearer.16 Governance and good governance have often been used synonymously. Thandika Mkandawire notes that the concept of good governance was originally used among African scholars, including Claude Ake, Nakhtar Diouf, and Ali Mazrui, in relation to state-society relations in Africa, expressing the concern that they be developmentally, democratically, and socially inclusive.17 As Mkandawire observes, however, the term good governance has been appropriated by the international development community, in particular the World Bank, for use as a label in aid condition-

11. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
Revisiting the Dominant Party Debate

ality, especially for structural adjustment in its various manifestations.\textsuperscript{18} For the World Bank, ‘governance’ was for a long time about public administration, accountability, the establishment of rule of law, a capable judiciary, and transparency, which enhance the prospects for economic growth.\textsuperscript{19}

Anwar Shah and Sana Shah define local governance as the formulation and execution of collective action at the local level.\textsuperscript{20} Thus, it encompasses the direct and indirect roles of formal institutions of local government and government hierarchies, as well as the roles of informal norms, networks, community organizations, and neighborhood associations in pursuing collective action by defining the framework for citizen-state interactions, collective decision making, and delivery of local public services.\textsuperscript{21} This description captures how local governance is understood and aligns with how it is conceived in South Africa—that is, governance as the co-production and delivery by the state and non-state actors of public goods.

\textbf{LOCAL GOVERNANCE IN SOUTH AFRICA}

The origins of South Africa’s local governance system today can be traced to the municipal demarcations and restructuring of local government that went into effect in 2000, following the first democratic local government elections. These developments dramatically changed the format and style of municipal government in the country. Sakhela Buhlungu and Doreen Atkinson note that at the height of apartheid, municipal history consisted largely of the ‘white local authorities’.\textsuperscript{22} With Nelson Mandela’s release from prison in February 1990, and the start of the transition toward democracy, a new local government dispensation began to be developed. The enactment of the Interim Measures for Local Government Act in 1991, prefiguring the formation of the Local Government Negotiating Forum, allowed for negotiations and dialogue that led to the Local Government Transition Act of 1993 (Act 209), which became the national framework for guiding the transition toward a new local government system.

The interim constitution of 1993 and the new constitution adopted in 1996, in Article 3, further consolidated the development of local government by defining it as a distinct governmental sphere with executive and legislative authorities and powers. The constitution established the objectives of local government to be democratic and accountable; to allow for the provision of services to communities in a sustainable manner; and to facilitate the involvement of communities and associated organizations in local governance. The ‘White paper on local government’ and the various pieces of legislation passed during the transition period, from 1994 to 2000, drew from the constitution and stressed an evolving local government committed to work-

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid.
ing with citizens and community groups to find sustainable ways to meet their social, economic, and material needs and improve the quality of life.23

At the heart of this developmental approach to local government are pieces of legislation that innovatively introduced structures to ensure the participation of municipalities’ citizenry. Of note is the Municipal Systems Act of 2000, which introduced integrated development planning (IDP), ward committees, a code of conduct for councillors, performance management, development partnerships, and alternative service delivery mechanisms.24 IDP provides the primary modality for community interface, and the act applying it makes it clear that the entire IDP process must rest on a meaningful and multilevel participation process to ensure that citizens have a direct say in its outcome. Moreover, it also should be treated as an important tool for enabling citizens and interest groups to monitor and assess the performance of the municipality, based on specific targets for development linked to budgets.25

There are various systems of local government in South Africa. According to the ‘White paper on local government’, the country’s local government structure was designed with considerable flexibility because the democratic government inherited a varied landscape that required local government specific to each context. The South African constitution and the Municipal Structures Act of 1998 laid the groundwork for three different categories of municipalities. Category A municipalities are metropolitan areas with extensive authority, while category B municipalities (local municipalities) operate within the administrative boundaries of a district municipality (or category C). A metropolitan municipality has exclusive executive and legislative authority over its area, so it performs all the functions of local government for its constituency, including coordinating the delivery of services. Local and district municipalities share functional competencies and responsibilities.

The state recognized that there was no ‘best way’ to organize all municipal councils in the three categories of local government. The Municipal Structures Act therefore outlines numerous council systems. Buffalo City adopted the so-called mayoral executive system, which allows for the exercise of executive authority through an executive mayor. Under this system, the municipal council elects one of its members as executive mayor and delegates executive powers and duties to that person. The mayor then appoints a mayoral committee, comprised of councillors, to provide assistance to him or her. In essence, municipalities under the mayoral executive system have two interdependent arms that function in a complementary manner. The administrative arm consists of state technocrats and bureaucrats, who run the municipality. The political arm, in the form of a council, consists of representatives from different political parties and functions to direct and oversee the operations of the municipality, supposedly based on mandates from the community.

South Africa’s local governance system officially emphasizes collective action and participation, with the aim of achieving state-society relations that are democratic and socially inclusive. There has been little research, however, into how political parties in South Africa facilitate or hinder collective action in local government, such as the role of the ANC in the state-society relationship in Buffalo City.

**ANC Dominance and Local Governance in Buffalo City**

Buffalo City is the key urban center in the eastern part of the Eastern Cape. It consists of a corridor of urban areas, stretching from the port city of East London, in the east, to King Williams Town, in the west. In 2007 it recorded a population of 724,306, spread among 208,389 households. Approximately 70 percent of households earned less than 1,500 rand per month, with 28 percent having no income. Unemployment was an estimated 24 percent. Buffalo City has the highest percentage of households, 24.4 percent, living in informal settlements in the Eastern Cape. A reported 1.3 percent of households still used a bucket toilet system in 2007, while 11.6 percent of households had no toilets.

The ANC has dominated the city council since the first democratic local elections, in 2000. After the 2006 elections, the ANC held 69 of 83 council seats, and after polling in May 2011, it held 71 of the 100 seats. With more than 70 percent of all council seats, it exerts greater dominance in Buffalo City than at the national level, where the ANC’s electoral support waned from 69.7 percent in 2004 to 65.9 percent in 2009.

With the ANC’s local success, its officials populate local government as policy makers and bureaucratic overseers. As outlined above, the city operates under a mayoral executive system, whereby the municipal council elects one of its members as executive mayor and delegates executive powers and duties to that person. The executive mayor then appoints a mayoral committee comprised of councillors to provide assistance. The ANC has therefore been in a position to appoint the mayor and the executive leadership, controlling and directing the municipality. Inclusion of communities is central to local governance, but the ANC’s dominance has stifled public voices by creating a governing culture that is unresponsive to public opinion. It has also resulted in weakened ward committees and civil society organizations.

A community member in Buffalo City pointed out that ANC representatives deployed to the municipality, including councillors, bureaucrats, and other local leaders, see little need to respond to or even listen to public opinion because they are reassured of reelection because of the ANC’s popular support. Andrew Harding noted that the party has seen a ‘deep and instinctive loyalty’ from the black majority as the party that delivered freedom.

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come election time, these people will vote for them because they say it’s the party of black people’. General offered the following as an example: ‘They [the municipality] built tennis courts, but no one uses them because this is a boxing community. So, they should have built us an indoor boxing complex instead. Now they are white elephants, and kids are playing soccer there’. He added, ‘Our leaders are arrogant because they don’t bother to consult the community but just do projects so that they can write about them in their reports, and they know that we cannot do anything to them’.

Calling representatives ‘arrogant’ is common among community members, as illustrated at the protest in Duncan Village, calling attention to representatives’ habit of making decisions divorced from community input. This behavior, as General noted, stems from the realization that their political power is assured. The ANC continues to be popular and to win elections across the country apparently because of its undisputed ‘liberation war credentials’. Its involvement in the struggle for democracy reflexively confers legitimacy and support that sustains its power. This ‘mechanism’ is prevalent in the Eastern Cape because of its long history of revolutionary struggle, as the site of the earliest interactions with colonial settlers. The province has been a center of ANC political life since the party’s formation in 1912 to the present. As a result, the region has nurtured a number of prominent political actors, including Steve Biko, Chris Hani, Nelson Mandela, Govan and Thabo Mbeki, Walter Sisulu, Robert Sobukwe, and Oliver Tambo.

The unresponsiveness of local government is amplified by the closed-list proportional representation system of elections. Under this system, political parties submit a list of individuals to be elected as members of legislatures and councils. In local government, however, half of the councillors are elected directly, and the other half determined through a proportional system. The ANC has a great deal of power in determining who will serve as representatives by controlling who makes it onto the closed party list.

Senior party officials or factions are known to sideline their rivals by manipulating the list. In Buffalo City, councillors have acknowledged being preoccupied with party business and with increasing the party’s support base to impress their bosses and assure their continued presence on the party list. Because of this focus, Siyabonga Memela and colleagues note that discussions with communities and citizens are typically limited to compulsory consultations required by law (such as involving IDP and budgets). These are conducted only for purposes of compliance rather than genuine

30. Interview with General, Duncan Village, Buffalo City, 22 June 2012. Boxing is indeed popular across the Eastern Cape and in Buffalo City. The municipality regularly sponsors boxing matches, and the town has produced top-class boxers such as Vuyani Bungu, Nkosana ‘Happyboy’ Mgxaji, and Nkosinathi Joyi.


33. Interview with an ANC ward councillor, Mdantsane, Buffalo City, 7 July 2012.
consultation and input for decision making. This means, as one citizen asserted, ‘We are informed about decisions that have already been taken’.34

According to Tom Lodge, the dominant party is likely over time to lose many of the attributes fueling its original strength. Successive, overwhelming electoral victories reduce the importance of the party’s activists and hence the influence of the rank-and-file membership over the leadership.35 It follows that as a result of the ANC’s long-standing dominance in Buffalo City, ward and community plans are seldom included in municipal plans or budgets, nor is feedback provided to the communities on why their plans were not included.

Withering Local Government Structures: Ward Committees

South Africa has legislative structures designed to facilitate the participation of communities, such as IDP and ward committees, set out in the Municipal Structures Act of 1998 and Municipal Systems Act of 2000. Ward committees are structures created to assist the democratically elected representative of a ward, the councillor, in carrying out his or her mandate. They consist of members of the community who represent various interests in it and the ward. Laurence Piper and Roger Deacon note that these committees are chaired by the ward councillor and are typically composed of up to ten people representing a ‘diversity of interests’, with women ‘equitably represented’. The diversity of interests varies in each ward, for instance possibly focusing on youths, business, women and children, or the disabled.36 Section 74(a) of the Municipal Structures Act states that a ward committee ‘may make recommendations on any matter affecting its ward (i) to the ward councillor; or (ii) through the ward councillor, to the metro or local council, the executive committee or the executive mayor’.

Legislation and policy are explicit in stating that ward committees must be nonpartisan and dedicated to advancing the collective interests of the ward. Dysfunctional ward committees, however, are one of the challenges facing Buffalo City as they have become increasingly partisan. An official from the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) claimed that the developmental role of the ward committee structure was being undermined by politics, stating, ‘What you find is that a ward councillor is the chair of the ANC branch, and the PR councillor is the secretary of the branch, therefore they have nobody to report to. That is the trend. Or the chair is a parliamentarian, and the secretary is the councillor’.37 His observations are in line with Piper and Deacon’s argument that in Msunduzi municipality, ward committees are simply extensions of the local party branch and reflect the pathologies associated with

37. Interview with COSATU regional secretary, Southernwood, East London, 2 June 2011.
the dominant party syndrome.\textsuperscript{38} This dysfunction is exacerbated by the ANC’s structural organization, which mimics that of the state. The party sets up structures within the geographical boundaries of the local state, hence the ANC has branches in each of Buffalo City’s fifty wards. Other political parties that organize nationally, such as the Democratic Alliance, have similarly structured their local offices.

A municipal official in the public participation department, which is in charge of ward committees, offered familiar-sounding observations when she explained, ‘It is common that the ward councillor is automatically a member of the Branch Executive Committee (BEC) of his or her party and is deployed there by his organization, and you will find out that a member of the ward committee is also in the BEC. When the councillor is accounting to the organization, he is also accounting to the member of that ward committee’\textsuperscript{39} This echoes Piper and Deacon’s point on elite accountability, or in other words, a situation in which elected officials or public representatives become accountable to one another instead of to the electorate.\textsuperscript{40} The municipal official went on to say,

A councillor accounts to the organization that deploys him and inasmuch as the councillor gives feedback to the communities, they also account to their party, i.e., the BEC. If it happens that a member of the ward committee is also a member of the BEC, then the member of the ward committee has two ‘caps’, the first one as a ward committee member who is a subordinate to the councillor as the chair of the ward committee structure, and the second as a BEC member to [whom] the councillor reports. Therefore that member is now the principal of that ward councillor. This is a problem because the BEC can undermine the councillor in doing their job, and that ward committee member who is in the BEC is sort of policing the ward councillor instead of assisting the councillor. In most cases, this ward committee member also wants to be the councillor, thus they undermine the councillor to the BEC. However, the profound drawback is that ward committees dominated by a political party can ignore community interests and prioritize party interests whilst being driven by party politics.\textsuperscript{41}

\section*{Weakened Civil Society}

Civic organizations are important vehicles for residents’ participation in the delivery of public goods. Thus, governance, whether good or bad, is directly related to the strength of civil society. It is widely agreed in the literature that nonelectoral mechanisms, such as civil society organizations, are also necessary for holding elites accountable, thus reducing the unresponsive tendencies characteristic of a dominant party environment.\textsuperscript{42} In South Africa, however, many of the organizations founded as part

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
  \bibitem{Interview2012} Interview with Thembeka, Trust Centre, East London, 11 June 2012.
  \bibitem{Piper2012} Piper and Deacon, ‘Party politics’.
  \bibitem{Interview2012a} Interview with Thembeka, 11 June 2012.
\end{thebibliography}
of the anti-apartheid struggle simply faded into obscurity after 1994 and have not been replaced by new, vibrant community organizations, hence the lack of a conduit between ‘society’ and ‘government’. That said, after 1994 many civil society organizations did not feel inclined to mobilize because the party they had struggled to put into power now held power and would, it was assumed, work toward resolving the problems of poverty, inequality, and others for which they had fought. In essence, the ANC government had a domestic and international legitimacy that at the time appeared to promote a collaborative relationship with civil society, with some organizations being absorbed into government and others simply disappearing.

In Buffalo City, civic organizations confronting and trying to hold the local government to account are virtually nonexistent. The most notable nongovernmental organization is Afesis-Corplan, which works with municipal councillors and officials, as well as nongovernmental organizations, community-based organizations, and low-income communities, to promote local democracy and community-driven development. Afesis-Corplan has noted that the funding environment has not been encouraging, as donors were also opting to work with local authorities to strengthen their capacity. In addition, many had shifted priorities to focus on HIV/AIDS programs. The ANC has politicized other civic groups—such as the Mdantsane Residents Association, which mutated into the South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO)—thereby stifling independent organizations that could ordinarily engage the municipality in ensuring better service delivery. The coopting of the group was confirmed by an opposition politician, who related, ‘Organizations like SANCO and the labor movement align themselves to political organizations for one reason: It becomes a source of income. They are not independent in their thinking and how they raise issues and setting up their own agendas. So there is civil society, but the extent of activism is weak because it’s so close to the ruling party so you might as well say that it is dormant.’

Independent civic organizations find it difficult to operate in Buffalo City because they are isolated by the state and the ANC. In Mdantsane, the Mayibuye Development Trust, a cooperative, has failed to take off because of a lack of support from the municipality and the local ANC leadership, including the councillor. The cooperative had been trying to establish a recreation center along a local dam. A member of the cooperative noted that their plans were being deliberately ignored, because the cooperative and its leadership were seen as a potential political threat. He went on to say that the municipality had been instructed to sideline the project by denying the trust the authorization to use the land, which belongs to the council.

The trust’s membership is comprised of members of the ANC, the South African Communist Party, and the Pan African Congress. An ANC councillor in Mdantsane

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45. Interview with Sam, Democratic Alliance local politician, Vincent Mall, East London, 18 April 2012.
conceded that he would never support initiatives by people he described as ‘ambitions people seeking to replace him’. The cooperative contends that the party thinks politically rather than developmentally. This myopic view means that local ANC officials view civic organizations like Mayibuye as competitors for political support. In short, ANC officials undermine these civic groups to maintain their dominance either by co-opting their leaders—hijacking the organization and transforming it into an ANC initiative—or simply by stopping them in their tracks.

Without strong independent structures through which communities can voice their demands, Buffalo City suffers from a lack of transparency and public accountability, in the process compromising local governance and service delivery in general. Even opposition political parties face a similar fate, because they are weakened by the excessive dominance of the ANC, which has the power to make arbitrary decisions unrelated to community needs and demands.

CONCLUSION

Dominant parties can undermine local governance by compromising state-citizen relations. In Buffalo City, unresponsive representatives, a weakened local government platform, and a weakened civil society suppress citizens’ voices. There is a need therefore to strengthen and develop legislative mechanisms that limit the power of political parties and ensure the inclusion of civic organizations in local government structures. In addition, the closed-list proportional representation system should be scrapped in local government, where politics is more personal than in larger electoral areas, and a more direct form of representation adopted. Efforts that focus on building state capacity to promote good governance have been insufficient. Dominant political parties are an important part of promoting good governance and should also be the focus of relevant interventions. Capacity-building initiatives should therefore target local politicians, such as councillors, to develop competencies in local democracy.

46. Interview with Slovo, an ANC councillor, Mdantsane, Buffalo City, 30 July 2012.
Tanzania and Malawi have been at loggerheads over the Lake Nyasa frontier since attaining independence. Whereas Tanzania situates the boundary in the middle of the lake, Malawi claims that it lies on the eastern shore of the lake, on the Tanzanian side, and that Tanzania therefore has no rights to the lake’s waters and other resources. Documents concerning the Tanzania-Malawi border show disparities between the Anglo-German Treaty of 1890, which established the boundary between German East Africa (present-day mainland Tanzania) and the British protectorate of Nyasaland (present-day Malawi), and what was drawn on contemporaneous maps. In addition, inexact cartography is evident throughout the British mandate over Tanganyika. The cartographic discrepancies were not adequately addressed during the colonial period and reasserted themselves postindependence, resulting in the current border dispute between the two countries. Archival documentation from the Tanzanian National Archives and the British National Archives helps shed light on how inexact cartography and the mandate system caused such border disputes in contemporary Africa. The dispute between Tanzania and Malawi serves as a case study.

IN THE MODERN AGE, ESPECIALLY FROM THE 1880s INTO THE EARLY 1900s, imperial rivalries, desire for resources and wealth, and the needs of developing industries set in motion a scramble among European nations for colonies in Africa. To resolve the varying territorial claims, the European powers convened the Berlin Conference, held during 1884–1885, to establish ground rules for partitioning the continent.¹ The drawing of boundaries by the colonial powers involved bilateral diplomacy derived from the General Act of the Berlin Conference on West Africa. Bilateral treaties were translated into maps that indicated international and interterritorial boundaries.

Before the early nineteenth century, frontiers in Africa had been demarcated by using such landmarks as dykes and walls. These descriptive boundaries caused considerable confusion over demarcations.² Beginning in the nineteenth century, land and property of a local jurisdiction and of sovereign states were defined using maps. Although maps were used in defining colonial boundaries, the evidence points to inconsistencies among treaties, maps, and reports on interterritorial boundaries.³ Some of these inconsistencies were not addressed during the colonial period and thus were inherited by African states upon independence. Some states settled them, but others did not, leading to interstate border disputes. It is against this background that this study uses the Tanzania-Malawi border to show how inexact cartography caused disputes and to suggest ways to address the problem.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

During the partition of Africa, boundaries between neighboring colonial territories were often defined by treaties, demarcated on the ground, and recorded on maps by an international boundary commission. The records of the boundaries were preserved among the archives of the colonial powers for reference, consultations, and evidence of territorial claims. T. J. Basset describes the nexus between cartography and colonization in Africa as follows: ‘Maps served as both instruments and representations of expanding European influence into Africa during the nineteenth century. They contributed to empire building by promoting, assisting, and legitimating the projection of European power. Through the use of cartographical elements such as color, cartouches, vignettes, boundary lines, and blank spaces, mapmakers participated in the conquest and colonization of Africa’.⁴ Thus, cartography both extended European hegemony into African territories and was part of the documentary evidence used to establish claims over protectorates. One major issue associated with colonial cartography is the disparity between the formulation of boundaries during the division of the continent and the translation of these territorial boundaries onto maps.⁵

Maps have long been a primary tool for asserting territorial claims by contending neighboring states. In Latin America, for example, Guatemalan maps invariably show Belize as part of Guatemala, and a 250-page atlas produced in Guatemala in 1929 contradicts the maps produced by the Honduran government for interpreting the boundary between the two countries. In a similar vein, the map used on Ecuadorean postage stamps includes a territory that is at present controlled by Peru. Maps produced in Pakistan attest that nation’s claim to the contested territories of Jammu and Kashmir.

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⁵. Ibid.; Seligman, ‘Maps and the progenitors of territorial disputes’.
The boundary dispute between Kenya and South Sudan is in part the result of cartographic inaptness. Inclusion of an area to which two or more countries lay claim on the maps of the respective countries can both cause and complicate border disputes, with each side maintaining that its marginal territory has been misappropriated.

A. B. Murphy notes how efforts to refute so-called propaganda cartography can lead to escalating wars of rhetoric and symbolism.6 His argument is pertinent to certain postcolonial border disputes in Africa. As concerns, the German colony of South-West Africa and the British territories in Bechuanaland, the treaty used to establish territorial boundaries contains information that is different from that recorded on the maps.7 Nigeria and Cameroon each claim rights over the Bakassi Peninsula.8 These examples also illustrate the role of cartographic ambiguity in provoking interstate border disputes. Although cartographic ambiguity featured in certain interterritorial arrangements during the colonial period, there were few critical violent border disputes at the time.

Mechanisms for resolving interterritorial disputes were set out in the General Act of the Berlin Conference and subsequent bilateral treaties. These treaties, however, did not entirely resolve the process of partitioning the African continent and defining colonial boundaries. There are three plausible reasons why the cartographic ambiguities in the territories presently consisting of Tanzania and Malawi were not resolved during the colonial period: Germany was preoccupied by wars of resistance from the 1890s to 1907; with the change of colonial regimes after World War I, German East Africa and Nyasaland fell under the control of Britain, which did not think that cartography had any bearing on the territorial problems; and at the time of independence, the colonialists and subsequent independent governments paid insufficient attention to what they considered to be less pressing problems, including cartographic issues. Thus unresolved cartographic anomalies, which have caused border disputes on the continent, were inherited by the postcolonial states.9

Most studies of border disputes in Africa have concentrated on economic, political, historical, ideological, and legal factors. Insignificant attention has been paid to cartography and changes in colonial regimes as key factors in contemporary African border disputes. The focus here is, therefore, on cartography and a critique of James Mayall, Ian Brownlie, and institutional authorities.10 They argue that the 1890 Anglo-

7. Seligman, 'Maps and the progenitors of territorial disputes'.
German agreement, which situated the frontier between German East Africa and Nyasaland on the eastern shore of the German territory, exhausted a matter of law and fact. The 1890 agreement indeed defines the boundary between the two territories as the eastern shore of Lake Nyasa, but the contents of the treaty were not reflected in the resulting maps that were drawn. This had a far-reaching impact on the actual practices of Britain and Germany, both of which exercised sovereignty in contravention of the treaty. Each of the countries, chiefly on the basis of scant cartographic evidence, claimed rights to the lake. Studies of the Tanzania-Malawi border dispute have not provided concrete theorization on this matter in terms of cartographic inconsistencies. For instance, Mayall and Brownlie have documented confusion in the original demarcation of the boundary as the eastern shore of Lake Nyasa and the later decision by the British to shift the border from the eastern shore of the lake to the middle of the lake.11

Contemporaneous maps provide inconsistent information. Some situate the border on the eastern shore; others place it in the middle of the lake; and still others show no boundary at all or indicate that the boundary is on each side of the lake. T. Forsberg’s studies of interterritorial disputes based on the ambiguities of treaties that established boundaries (the normative theory) show how cartography can lead to border disputes.12 The normative theory is premised on ambiguities in international treaties being likely to lead to border disputes. This theory has been used in studies of international border disputes between Venezuela and Guyana, India and Pakistan, and China and Russia.13 Using cartography in international border treaties as a tool for analyzing border disputes helps illuminate the complexity of such disputes.

The Tanzania-Malawi border dispute emanates from varying interpretations of the Anglo-Germany Treaty of 1890, cartography produced during the colonial period, and institutional reports on the two countries. Archival materials from the British National Archives (London) and the Tanzanian National Archives (Dar es Salaam) form the basis of the findings here. While maps can be used to establish the history and course of a boundary, they do not provide adequate information for analyzing the myriad issues involved in border disputes. In formulating the research here, maps were supplemented by official reports, Hansards, boundary treaties, provincial and district books, correspondence, diplomatic dispatches, letters, newspapers, and periodicals.

THE TANZANIA-MALAWI BORDER DISPUTE: BACKGROUND

The Tanzania-Malawi border dispute is different from many border conflicts in Africa in that it is characterized by long periods of dormancy and has not erupted into violence. It is therefore little known. The same may be the reason for it being insufficiently theorized.

11. Mayall, 'The Malawi–Tanzania boundary dispute'.
12. T. Forsberg, 'Explaining territorial disputes: From power politics to normative reasons', Journal of Peace Research, 33:4 (1996); Murphy, 'Historical justifications for territorial claims'.
13. Ibid.; Murphy, 'Historical justifications for territorial claims'.
Great Britain, Germany, and Portugal quarrelled over the partitioning of the Lake Nyasa region. The Anglo-Portuguese Treaty of 10 August 1890 placed the boundary on the shore of the lake in Portuguese East Africa (Mozambique). Meanwhile, Article I (2) of the Anglo-German Treaty of 1 July 1890 situated the boundary between German East Africa (Tanzania) and the British protectorate of Nyasaland (Malawi) on the Lake Nyasa border of the German territory:

To the south by a line which starting on the coast at the northern limit of the Province of Mozambique, follows the course of the River Rovuma to the point of confluence of the Msinje; thence it runs westward along the parallel of that point till it reaches Lake Nyasa; thence striking northward, it follows the eastern, northern and western shores of the lake to the northern bank of the mouth of the River Songwe; it ascends that river to the point of its intersection by the 33rd degree of east longitude; thence it follows the river to the point where it approaches most nearly the boundary of the Geographical Congo Basin defined in Article I of the Act of Berlin.\(^\text{14}\)

According to the Anglo-German Treaty, the boundary between German East Africa and Nyasaland consisted of the eastern, northern, and western shores of Lake Nyasa. The eastern shoreline, not the median line, was apparently chosen for the purpose of confining Germany and Portugal’s reach.\(^\text{15}\) What existed on the ground, however, was different from the treaty’s provisions. The course of the cartographic boundary was traced in accordance with a map of the Nyasa-Tanganyika plateau, prepared for the British government in 1889. The map attached to the treaty suggests that there were no specific, partitioned territories. The cartography lacked precision as to the boundary demarcating the British and German spheres of influence.

A later anomaly was revealed in an observation by the British colonial office contained in the War Office General Staff Geographical Section, Lake Nyasa map no. G8432.N9G67 of 1918. The office claims that except in Nyasaland and neighboring Rhodesia, the interior boundaries were unknown with sufficient accuracy. This claim is problematic because if such boundaries were not known with accuracy, then interterritorial boundaries, derived from interior boundaries, could not be known with accuracy either. If this is the case, the work of determining the boundary between Tanganyika and Nyasaland would likely be inaccurate.

There is another cartographic anomaly in the original treaty. The map of the Neu Langenburg district (the southern district of German East Africa bordering Nyasaland) was edited by the German Colonial Office in 1904. It places the shoreline boundary on the German East African side. A map produced by the British War Office in 1918 has the Neu Langenburg boundary there as well. The same map, however, shows the interterritorial boundaries as being on the shores of each of the territories. This suggests that the lake does not belong to either of the territories. A map drawn in 1905 and appended to an official military report describing a topographical section of Lake Nyasa and German East Africa did not indicate whether the boundary was on the German East African or Nyasaland side.\(^\text{16}\) In the same report, a description of the fron-

\(^{14}\) Anglo-German Agreement (Helgoland-Sansibar-Vertrag), no. 1, 1 July 1890, British National Archives, London.

\(^{15}\) The Boundaries of Tanganyika in the Northern Part of Lake Nyasa, acc. no. EAF 130/7/01, 1926, British National Archives, London; Committee on State Succession to Treaties and Other Governmental Obligations, The Effect of Independence on Treaties: A Handbook Published under the Auspices of the International Law Association (London, Stevens and Sons, 1965).

\(^{16}\) General Staff, War Office, Military Report on German East Africa, file no. 51331, 1905, British National Archives, London; see also maps in German Staff, War Office, Military Report on German East Africa, p. 76; Great Britain War Office, General Staff Geographical Section, Lake Nyasa, map no. G8432.N9G67, 1918; British Ordinance Survey, German East Africa, map no. G8430, 3(00).G67 (n.d.).
tier suggests that the lake is shared by the two territories. An undated map produced by British Ordinance Survey describing the Neu Langenburg district shows the same.

Maps produced by Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft and German Kolonialamt in 1905 and 1918 situate the boundary in the middle of the lake, with the implication that German sovereignty extended to the middle of the lake. An examination of the maps produced between 1890, when the treaty was signed, and 1918, when Germany renounced sovereignty, suggests that Germany laid claim to half of the lake. Also, Germans had certain rights to the lake. Two pieces of evidence support this. First, Germans operated a steamboat on the lake from 1898. It is not, however, clear whether certain provisions of the General Act of the Berlin Conference that required the European powers to suppress slavery by establishing steamboats on the inland waters and navigable rivers amounted to an acknowledgement of such rights by the Germans. It is also not known whether such a German presence on the lake was made possible because the same act, which is referred to in Article VIII of the Anglo-German Treaty, allowed navigation and ports to both Britain and Germany. In addition, it remains unclear whether the British consented to Germany’s claim of rights to half of the lake or whether Germany claimed that part of the lake in contravention of Article VII of the Anglo-German Treaty of 1890. In any case, both powers seem to have ignored the provisions of the treaty.

Second, the Germans controlled such islands as Lundo. During German colonial rule and until 1927, Lundo was a leper colony. Under the British mandate, Lundo and the other islands in the area were controlled by Tanganyika. This suggests that the Germans controlled the islands and that British colonial administration, which took over Tanganyika from Germany, inherited them. The documentary record is silent as to whether the islands in Lake Nyasa’s waters lay within the accepted three-mile limit of territorial waters. The alignment of the boundary does not seem to have been carefully determined, with various cartographic anomalies in depicting the frontier. One only sees that a decision reached by a joint boundary commission in 1898 persuaded Britain and Germany to sign an agreement in 1901 defining the lake boundary on the eastern shore, in German East Africa. This fluidity of boundary alignment became the basis of boundary misinterpretation during the British period and after the attainment of independence by the two former colonies.

**TANGANYIKA MANDATE, CARTOGRAPHY, AND THE BORDER QUESTION**

After World War I, the Treaty of Versailles forced Germany to cede its overseas colonies to the Allied and Associated Powers. All former German colonies were accordingly divided among the victors under the arrangement that came to be known as the mandate system. Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations stipulates: ‘To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by people not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the

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17. Committee on State Succession, *The Effect of Independence on Treaties*.
modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization.\(^1\)

In short, the mandate system was used to manage the colonies left by Germany, for the colonies were, it was claimed, incapable of managing themselves. These were French Cameroons, British Cameroons, French Togoland, British Togoland, South-West Africa under the Union of South Africa, Ruanda-Urundi under Belgium, Tanganyika under Britain, and New Guinea under Australia. The Council of the League of Nations confirmed the mandate for Tanganyika on 20 July 1920. After independence, Tanganyika merged with Zanzibar to form Tanzania.

When Britain took over German East Africa in 1920, two critical problems emerged: territory and slavery. Regarding the former, the British government decided to determine the boundaries of Tanganyika. To this end, the Anglo-Belgian Royal Boundary Commission was charged with the settlement of the Tanganyika/Ruanda-Urundi boundary. The commission presented a proposal for boundary determination to the Council of the League of Nations on 5 September 1922 and the council approved it. Britain and Belgium then signed the Milner-Orts Agreement, which provided a corridor for the construction of a railway on the western side of the Kagera River to connect Tanganyika with Uganda.\(^2\) The agreement signed by Belgium and Britain, which was approved by the League of Nations, designated the midstream of the Kagera River as the boundary between Ruanda and Tanganyika.\(^3\)

The Tanganyika Annual Report of 1923 submitted to and accepted by the Permanent Mandates Commission contained a new map of the territory as determined by the Milner-Orts Agreement. The map showed the Kagera midstream boundary, but on the same map the boundary between Tanganyika and Nyasaland is in the middle of Lake Nyasa. This boundary, unlike the Kagera demarcation, was fixed without the consent of the parties. In addition, the provisions regarding the Lake Nyasa boundary were different from those of the original Anglo-German agreement of 1890. The 1923 Tanganyika annual report situates the Lake Nyasa boundary in the middle of the lake, ‘along the centre line of Lake Nyasa to a point due west of the Rovuma River whence the boundary runs east and joins the Rovuma River, whose course it follows to the sea’.\(^4\)

There is a contradiction between the two boundary issues noted above and the general description of the territory: ‘The Tanganyika Territory consists of that portion of the former colony of German East Africa which, under Article 22, part I of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, the Principal Allied and Associated Powers agreed should be administered under a Mandate by his Britannic Majesty’.\(^5\) The Treaty of

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3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
Versailles required that the contracting parties guarantee the maintenance of the territorial status quo and the inviolability of the frontiers as fixed on 28 June 1919. The mandate annual reports on Tanganyika and Nyasaland from the 1920s to the 1930s and the maps appended to them show a center line, which served as the boundary between Tanganyika and Nyasaland. One of the problems under the mandate system is that neither Britain nor the League of Nations resolved the problem of the Lake Nyasa frontier that began under German rule.

The problem of Tanganyika’s sovereignty received public attention when Sir Donald Cameron, the British governor of Tanganyika, declared while opening the Legislative Council meeting in 1924, ‘Tanganyika is a part of the British Empire and it will remain so’. The British secretary of state for colonies, a Mr. Armey, made a similar declaration at a dinner on 25 June 1925 while reporting on the political future of Tanganyika. Not all Britons, however, agreed. Lord Parmoor and a Mr. Ramsden objected in Parliament to the pronouncements made by the governor and secretary of state for colonies. Parmoor stated, ‘The Mandatory power is not in the position of an ordinary sovereign power, having regard to the rights of its own nationals, but in that of a trustee. It is there in order to safeguard the interests of the natives and to do what it can to qualify them to be capable of independent government. Accordingly, their duty is that of trustees, and the League of Nations is a body or authority to whom they may have to give an account of their stewardship’. The government’s position affirmed the declarations made by the governor and the secretary of state for colonies, but the government’s defense was ambivalent. Viscount Cecil of Chelwood, representing the government, paradoxically noted,

As to the question of who is the owner of the territory in a Mandatory Territory, that is an exceedingly difficult question. I do not pretend to have a very decided opinion upon it. What happened? These territories were renounced by Germany, not in favour of the League of Nations, but in favour of the Allies and Associated Powers. . . . The conditions of these Mandates were discussed elaborately, both before the council and before the Assembly of the League of Nations, and I think I am right in saying, were modified in some particulars, and after being modified and discussed, they were accepted by the Mandatory powers as the administrative bodies in charge of those territories. I dare say more skilled international lawyers would be able to give an answer, but personally I do not know exactly where the sovereignty of this Territory [Tanganyika] really lies. It seems to me a very difficult matter to say. Of course, it is of no great importance except from a theoretical point of view.

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27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
The British government obfuscated the question of the boundary it inherited from the Germans and considered the confusion insignificant. One might argue that the contradictory maps and reports were unimportant at the time because both Tanganyika and Nyasaland were under British administration. The British, however, did not recognize that the two colonies had different statuses and that Tanganyika would be granted a separate independence. The British colonial state deviated deliberately from and misconstrued the terms of the mandate; the mandate system as applied to Tanganyika was nothing but legal and political fiction as Lord Parmoor suggests in noting that the British government did not exercise the mandate properly. The British government controlled Tanganyika as an occupied territory instead of adopting a stewardship role as required by the Versailles treaty.

This deviation attracted the attention of the military, which appealed to the British government for the annexation of Tanganyika. The same kind of concern was raised by the British Union of Tanganyika on 10 May 1934. The representative of the military noted, ‘Our delegates wish to place before His Excellency the unanimous feeling that prevails among our members in this matter. That feeling is based on the considered opinion that Tanganyika will never have any political future under the Mandate system’. Military officials, colonial officials, and other British nationals in the colony and in Britain regarded the mandate system as an impracticable form of government, because, it was argued, it impeded British settlement and the inflow of capital for agricultural development. Regardless, no attempt was made to resolve the border question.

This problem was compounded by the government’s defense of its mandatory status. The government claimed that the mandated territories had been ceded by Germany to the Principal and Associated Powers. The Union of British Fascists and Nationals contested this claim and appealed to a joint East African Board in a letter of 20 February 1937: ‘While the Principal and Associated Powers took over these German colonies, these same powers definitely refused to take over the sovereignty of the mandated areas. The sovereignty of these areas was surrendered to the League of Nations under Article 22 of the Covenant, in that the Mandatory powers willingly submit to interrogation by a Mandatory Commission appointed under the auspices of the League of Nations and have to submit annual reports’.

The board supported the government’s position: ‘The League of Nations, being a voluntary association of sovereign states, is not itself a body capable of exercising any sovereignty at all, but each power to which sovereignty or rights of protectorates were ceded in respect of an ex-German policy, Great Britain in the Case of Tanganyika, undertook as a matter of treaty obligation to the other states composing the League of Nations the duty of exercising its rights in a certain manner, that is to say in accordance with what was termed a Mandate, as set forth in Article 22 of the Covenant’.

On the basis of the covenant establishing the mandates, one can conclude that the position of the British Fascists and Nationals made some sense because every decision
had to be acceptable to the Council of the League of Nations. Thus, the mandatory powers only played tutelage roles.\textsuperscript{32} According to the British government, ‘The British occupation of the territory has been complete while that of German was largely military and whole areas of the country were not administered. The development has progressed immensely since its conquest twenty years ago and the increased happiness, prosperity and numbers of the native population bear ample witness to the success of the present Mandate’.\textsuperscript{33} The British regarded self-government or independence as an extremely remote possibility, even though self-government was the basic end principle of the mandate and trusteeship systems.\textsuperscript{34}

As World War II approached, anxiety over the political status of Tanganyika under the mandate arrangement was commonplace because of Germany’s entry into the League of Nations and increasing settlement in the colony.\textsuperscript{35} Moreover, some reports indicated that Nazi and Hitler Youth movements were exhibiting disruptive tendencies and growing influence in Tanganyika. Such a trend threatened British culture in Tanganyika.\textsuperscript{36} The residents of Tanganyika had two primary concerns: the stagnating economy and renewal of German administration in Tanganyika. A British business representative noted, ‘I say that this uncertainty is affecting everyone here in Tanganyika, British and any German, Italian, Greek, and Syrian fellow-citizens and friends to an equal extent. To make the matter clearer I would point out that property transaction alone either sales, leases or mortgages are at a complete stand still. Who could be expected to invest in land or buildings when they may be suddenly given away over our heads?’\textsuperscript{37}

Perhaps anxiety prior to World War II about losing the territory impelled the British to shift the Lake Nyasa boundary from the middle of the lake to the eastern shore of Tanganyika, as attested by maps produced by the Departments of Survey of both Tanganyika and Nyasaland. After World War II, Tanganyika was given United Nations trusteeship status. The agreement was signed on 13 December 1946. According to Article 76(b) of the UN Charter, the trusteeship system was to promote the ‘political, economic, social and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive development towards self-government or independence’. The British Association of Settlers in Tanganyika opposed the trusteeship system, as had been the case with the mandate system. British settlers asked the governor to petition the government to make Tanganyika an integral part of the empire because Tanganyika occupied an important strategic position in Africa, the British


\textsuperscript{34} Thompson, \textit{The Story of Tanzania}.


\textsuperscript{36} Tanganyika Territory Report, acc. no. 10734, 1937, British National Archives, London.

\textsuperscript{37} Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, \textit{The Future of Tanganyika in the British Empire}, vol. 3, press cuttings regarding the future of Tanganyika, acc. no. 26302, Tanzania National Archives, Dar es Salaam.
subjects had fought for Tanganyika in two wars, and settlers had gone to Tanganyika in the hope that it would become a British colony. The petition failed, of course.

Given the lack of clarity over the Lake Nyasa border, the government of Tanganyika sought advise from legal experts. Using maps and other evidence, experts suggested that the governors of Tanganyika and Nyasaland situate the boundary in the middle of the lake, between the Rovuma River and the Songwe River. The British Nyasaland Office rejected this proposal on 1 October 1959. It asserted that the Tanganyika law officer had misinterpreted the British Central Africa Order of 1902 that demarcated the boundaries of Nyasaland. Meanwhile, Nyasaland considered only the 1890 Anglo-German agreement as binding. It also argued that the principle of international law establishing the boundary between two riparian states through the middle of a river or lake should not have been applied because German East Africa and Nyasaland had agreed that the lake was outside the former’s boundaries.

IMPLICATIONS, CONCLUSION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Tanzania and Malawi inherited maps with boundary ambiguities created by the British. Upon independence in 1961 and 1964, respectively, each laid claim to Lake Nyasa. With negotiations in progress, confrontations over the lake took place in 1967. That same year, Malawi changed the name of the lake from Lake Nyasa to Lake Malawi. The dispute persisted until 1975, when cordial relations between the two countries prevailed. Disagreement over the Lake Nyasa border reemerged in 2012, following Malawi’s decision, without consulting Tanzania, to award a license to UK Surestream Petroleum to explore for oil and gas. The two countries have agreed to disagree and have submitted the matter for mediation to the African Forum, under the chairmanship of Joachim Chissano, the former president of Mozambique.

Tanzania maintains that the border is in the middle of lake, claiming that the Anglo-Germany Treaty was inconclusive and should be read with attention to Article VI of the treaty, which calls for boundary revision to accommodate local requirements. Tanzania also contends that throughout the colonial period, the maps, reports, and other documents established the boundary in the middle of the lake and that the 1964 Organization of African Unity Charter on border inheritance does not apply in this case because the boundary was not fully demarcated and the discrepancies from the contradictory maps had not been resolved when the charter was written.

39. Committee on State Succession, *The Effect of Independence on Treaties; The Boundaries of Tanganyika in the Northern Part of Lake Nyasa*, acc. no. EAF 130/7/1, British National Archives, London.
41. Joint Committee of the Council of Ministers for Boundary Issues between Tanzania and Malawi, minutes, Dar es Salaam, 17 November 2012.
Malawi argues that the border runs along the eastern shore of the lake. It claims the Anglo-Germany Treaty was indeed conclusive, as the boundary was delimited and demarcated and never revised. Malawi asserts the eastern shoreline boundary was inherited at the time of independence and that the OAU Charter on boundary inheritance applies. It also argues that most of the maps and legal documents produced from the 1890s to date support its position. Malawi, therefore, wants mediation to affirm that the boundary is on the eastern shoreline.\(^{43}\)

The Anglo-German Treaty, colonial cartography, and the mandate system in Tanganyika all left space for postindependence conflict over the Lake Nyasa boundary. The analysis here has shown that the dispute over the border is cartographically propagandistic in regard to the selective focus on elements of the treaty, reports, practices of colonial regimes, and maps. There is, however, room for diplomacy. E. N. Amadife and J. W. Warhola have proposed certain ‘conditions’ that they believe can lead to the settlement of border disputes in Africa.\(^{44}\) One is the departure of the first-generation elites, coupled with the assumption that the new elites will make boundary adjustments. Mayall and Brownlie propose common exploitation of the resources in boundary zones.\(^{45}\) Thus far, some African border disputes have been resolved by the African Union and the International Court of Justice and others by African heads of state.

With regard to the Tanzania-Malawi dispute, the two countries should form a joint boundary committee to study the relevant treaties, maps, and mandate documents and suggest to the governments where the boundary should be located. The boundary would then be clearly defined on the ground maps, followed by policies and measures formulated for shifting the boundary in case of changes in the course of the lake. Stakeholders at the local level from both sides of the lake should be involved in the process, including missionary representatives, cultural groups, and councils of elders. Their suggestions could then be incorporated into policy formulations by the governments of Tanzania and Malawi.

The two countries should also establish joint committees on defense and security affairs relating to the border and a committee for overseeing joint utilization of resources in the border region. A permanent committee could be given responsibility for reporting on boundary matters and advising the governments on how to resolve any issues that arise. Malawian and Tanzanian presidents, ministers, permanent secretaries, and ambassadors should not take part in the boundary discussions. Instead, they should adopt and implement the policies that the committees draft. If Malawi and Tanzania fail to resolve the dispute on their own, they should seek the assistance of such organizations as the African Union and South African Development Community or engage a reputable international organization to conduct studies and to advise them. The advice of the organization should be accepted and adopted by the two countries.

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Civil Wars and Violent Peace in Africa and Latin America: A General Outlook

Mauricio Uribe-López

Civil wars are not only the most extreme evidence of a polity’s failure but also a devastating source of personal insecurity. The countries that exhibit the highest levels of violence, however, are not necessarily those divided by civil wars. The implementation of peace strategies should therefore take into account the mitigation of horizontal inequalities as a precondition to achieving sustainable peace. Horizontal inequalities are related not only to ethnicity, but also to particular disadvantages among rural workers and low-income urban inhabitants living in conditions of social and territorial segregation. Briefly analyzing a set of characteristics of some African and Latin American and Caribbean countries highlights the importance of successfully mitigating horizontal and vertical inequalities.

Whether restrained or unleashed, potential or actual, violence is ubiquitous in human relationships. When appropriate rules are set, conflicts can be managed. Rules are not spontaneously crafted, however, and do not operate in a vacuum. The social contract presupposes conditions that include people as part of economic and social development and can create an environment in which mutually binding rules govern social relationships. Although an intrinsic and linear relationship between inequality and development remains speculative, connections between the two cannot be dismissed out of hand. In fact, those associations are several in the presence of different grades and types of inequalities and various grades and types of violence.

Possible associations can be used to classify cases according to levels of violence and characteristics of their development. This is accomplished by establishing criteria for classifying security threats resulting from conflict situations—that is, war, post-conflict, or absence of armed conflict—and examining the epidemic character of homicide rates, which highlights the most overt source of personal insecurity, and looking at characteristics in the development styles of selected African and Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) countries.

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DEVELOPMENT CONTEXTS OF CIVIL WARS AND VIOLENT PEACE

Africa and Latin America are not only regions of the world with significant economic inequality, they are also the most violent. Civil wars and societal violence have become salient characteristics in their histories. The two regions exhibit the highest mean homicide rates in the twenty-first century (see Table 1). Asia, despite its diversity, not only has a much lower mean value for homicide rates than other areas, but also exhibits far lower variability.

Violence and war are dynamic processes, and development has particular dynamics as well. As a consequence, it is necessary to analyze the relationship between threats to personal security, such as civil wars and societal violence, in the context of development style concepts. A development style is the way in which a system organizes and allocates human and material resources to determine what to produce, for whom, and how. Grades and types of inequality are features of development styles. They are also critical to the formulation and implementation of development agendas intended to overcome threats to personal security.

So-called sons-of-the-soil rebellions are a type of civil war that is often protracted. These conflicts pit peripheral insurgencies against governmental armies and paramilitary forces. By and large, the insurgents belong to an ethnic minority, while the military and paramilitary forces represent the dominant ethnic group. This kind of conflict usually involves disputes over natural resources or land. James Fearon’s analysis of it suggests that the looting of natural resources and the trafficking of illegal merchandise are intermediate mechanisms along the path from development contexts (such as low per capita income) to the protraction of civil wars.

### Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Number of countries</th>
<th>Minimum homicides</th>
<th>Maximum homicides</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>56.90</td>
<td>16.3943</td>
<td>11.39468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>15.20</td>
<td>3.4922</td>
<td>2.99992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>11.20</td>
<td>2.3930</td>
<td>2.53465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>3.70</td>
<td>82.10</td>
<td>21.5674</td>
<td>17.51127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.80</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>3.4000</td>
<td>2.26274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>13.00</td>
<td>3.3714</td>
<td>3.92398</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*Note:* Most of the homicide rates correspond to 2010. A few correspond to the latest year available between 2004 and 2010.

Some argue that civil wars are the result of looting natural resources. Fearon suggests, however, that pillage is a symptom of development style failures (such as low per capita income), rather than a cause. Rural periphery contexts, horizontal inequalities, and the role and characteristics of the state are units of analysis for the dynamics of sons-of-the-soil rebellions. Identifying units of analysis suitable for exploring the relationships between development styles and societal violence is at least as challenging as in the context of civil wars.

High levels of societal violence reflect critical failures of the state’s capacity to enforce the rule of law. They also are symptoms of deep fault lines within a society. The units of analysis mentioned can be adapted to examine cases of violence other than civil wars. Identifying some of the development style characteristics present in different cases may facilitate the configuration of specific variables applicable to each type of case.

COUNTRY CLASSIFICATION AND PERSONAL SECURITY THREATS

Identifying the particular characteristics of the development styles present among specific threats to personal security is an essential prerequisite to parsing each type of case. Table 2 shows the different types of cases resulting from correlating armed conflict situations and levels of societal violence. The categorization comprises three types of cases: peace, violent peace, and civil war. Another type of case, postconflict, is located at the intersection of peace and violent peace.

Looking at the data series of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) on homicide rates between 1995 and 2010, it is clear that despite some variability, transitions from epidemic rates of homicides to non-epidemic rates, and vice versa, are infrequent. Only 5.1 percent of the countries listed in the data series show maximum and minimum values corresponding to different epidemic levels within the period. The greatest variance values in the series involve El Salvador, Honduras, and Colombia; their minimum values remain far from being non-epidemic. For example, the ten LAC countries with the highest median values in homicide rates between 1995 and 2010 also had the highest homicide rates in 2010 (see Table 3).

Table 4 yields a number of interesting observations. First, it highlights that most of the African countries that were protagonists in the Arab Spring of 2011 had been peaceful societies a year earlier. Only Algeria registered in the Uppsala Armed Conflict Database as an armed conflict situation in 2010. Though deaths were reported in the context of demonstrations in Algeria and Morocco, these protests were not as violent as those in Tunisia and Egypt.\(^3\)

Second, the absence of countries in the peaceful postconflict category—and conversely, with all the postconflict cases corresponding to violent peace—illustrates that ending wars does not necessarily entail ending violence. It also emphasizes the need

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\(^3\) Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 'Arabian Spring 2010–2011', 2011, http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP. Analysis of the latent causes and triggers that precipitated the uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia, however, as well as the short though notorious Libyan civil war, is beyond the scope of this article. The same holds for the recent developments in Africa, like the coup in Mali and the secession war that ensued, and the independence of South Sudan.
to address the development challenges that accompany peacebuilding efforts. Such steps are essential to ensuring a transition from war to peace instead of toward violent peace. Third, there are many cases in the violent peace context that did not suffer a civil war, at least not since 1990. Though it is certainly the most extreme evidence of a polity’s failure, civil war is neither the only source of personal insecurity nor neces-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of cases</th>
<th>Definitions of Situations According to the Type of Personal Security Threats of Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peace</td>
<td>There was not a civil war between 1990 and 2010, and the homicide rate in 2010 was less than or equal to 8.¹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peaceful society</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peaceful postconflict</td>
<td>The war ended between 1990 and 2009, and the homicide rate in 2010 was less than or equal to 8.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent peace</td>
<td>There was no civil war between 1990 and 2010, but the homicide rate in 2010 was greater than 8 but less than 16.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Societal violence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High societal violence</td>
<td>There was no civil war between 1990 and 2010, but the homicide rate in 2010 was greater than or equal to 16.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent postconflict</td>
<td>The war ended between 1990 and 2009, but the homicide rate in 2010 was greater than or equal to 8 but less than 16.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highly violent postconflict</td>
<td>The war ended between 1990 and 2009, but the homicide rate in 2010 was greater than or equal to 16.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil war</td>
<td>In 2010 ongoing armed conflict had already reached a value of cumulative intensity equal to 1, and the homicide rate in 2010 was less than or equal to 8.²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed conflict and</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>peaceful society</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed conflict and</td>
<td>In 2010 ongoing armed conflict had already reached a value of cumulative intensity equal to 1, and the homicide rate in 2010 was greater than 8 but less than 16.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>societal violence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed conflict and</td>
<td>In 2010 ongoing armed conflict had already reached a value of cumulative intensity equal to 1, and the homicide rate in 2010 was greater than or equal to 16.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>high societal violence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s elaboration based on the Armed Conflict Dataset maintained by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) and the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), http://www.prio.no/Data/Armed-Conflict/UCDP-PRIO.

Note: This classification is basically a snapshot from 2010. Although it considers both the cumulative intensity (see below) of the armed conflicts and postconflict situations with preceding wars that ended in 1990 or after (up until 2010), the homicide rates correspond to the latest year available from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Homicide Statistics between 2004 and 2010. The year 2010 was chosen for two reasons: First, it is the last year available in the most recent version of the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, and it is also the latest available in UNODC’s homicide datasets. Second, it is difficult to trace homicide rates over time. Indeed, those data are scattered.

¹ All homicides figures are per 100,000 inhabitants.
² Cumulative intensity (CumInt) is an indicator used in the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset: ‘This variable takes into account the temporal dimension of the conflict. It is a dummy variable that codes whether the conflict since the onset has exceeded 1,000 battle-related deaths. A conflict is coded as 0 as long as it has not over time resulted in more than 1,000 battle-related deaths. Once a conflict reaches this threshold, it is coded as 1.’ UCDP/PRIO, ‘Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook, Version 4-2011’, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, 2011, 9, http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp_prio_armed_conflict_dataset.
### Table 3

**Homicide Rates: Median Values, 1995–2010 and 2010**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>64.7</td>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>82.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>58.2</td>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>50.6</td>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>52.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>41.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>41.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>33.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>Saint Lucia</td>
<td>25.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saint Lucia</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>24.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>22.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Table 4

**Classification of Countries by Types of Cases for 2010**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of cases</th>
<th>Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peace</td>
<td>Peaceful society: Argentina, Chile, Cuba, Djibouti, Egypt, Haiti, Libya,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mauritius, Morocco, Niger, Tunisia, Uruguay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Peaceful postconflict: None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent peace</td>
<td>Societal violence: Barbados, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Cape Verde, Comoros,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Costa Rica, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Nigeria,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Paraguay, Seychelles, Surinam, Swaziland, Togo, Zimbabwe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High societal violence: Belize, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Guinea, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mexico,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Namibia, Panama, South Africa, Tanzania, Venezuela, Zambia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent postconflict</td>
<td>Angola, Burundi, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, El Salvador,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ethiopia, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highly violent</td>
<td>postconflict: Liberia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Senegal, Sierra Leone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil war</td>
<td>Armed conflict and peaceful society: Algeria, Peru, Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Armed conflict and societal violence: Chad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Armed conflict and high societal violence: Colombia, Rwanda, Sudan, Uganda,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

sarily the most devastating one. Algeria and Peru, for example, were classified as minor conflict cases by the Armed Conflict Database managed by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) and Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) in 2010. Nevertheless, their conflicts do not seem currently to have pervasive after-effects.

Somalia, with a UCDP/PRIO intensity indicator equal to two, is a singular case. It is the only ‘war’ according to the indicator, yet the most recent homicide rate available (2008) is 1.5 per 100,000 inhabitants. Considering that a civil war usually articulates other manifestations of violence that nurture each other, the extremely low homicide rate is surprising in a country whose war is intense and whose state is considered the world’s weakest. This very weakness of the state, it should be noted, casts a shadow over the reliability of the nation’s statistics.

Fourth, there were few remaining wars in Africa and Latin America at the end of 2010. Colombia is the only Latin American country in such a situation. Despite having reduced the intensity of its war and its homicide rate, Colombia is classified as a case of armed conflict with high societal violence. The duration of the war there has developed manifold connections between civil war and other forms of violence. Perhaps that is why Colombia might be considered the archetype of the reinforcing process between war and societal violence.

TYPES OF CASES AND FEATURES OF DEVELOPMENT STYLES

Certain mechanisms embedded in various aspects of development styles may fuel personal security threats. Grades and varieties of inequalities are defining characteristics of a development style. Of course, inequalities have specific contexts. For example, inequality in a low-income country, such as Haiti, does not have the same social effects as it would in an upper-middle-income country, such as Colombia. Furthermore, the risks associated with having approximately equivalent Gini coefficients are by no means the same in Chile and Rwanda. Thus, to establish relationships between development styles and personal security threats, it is crucial to take into account the context, grades, and types of inequalities.

Peaceful Societies

There are two opposing cases within the peaceful society group: Haiti and Chile, the most unequal countries among this group. Haiti is a low-income country that ranks low on the Human Development Index (HDI) and has a high rate of poverty. Chile is an upper-middle-income country with a high rating on the HDI and a low poverty

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5. According to the latest data available on the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI), Haiti’s Gini coefficient is 0.5921 and Chile’s is 0.5206, http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators.
6. In 2001, according to the WDI, 77 percent of Haiti’s population had incomes below the national poverty line.
In the 2011 Human Development Report, Chile occupies first place in the HDI ranking for LAC countries, whereas Haiti sits in last place. In the connection between inequality and societal violence in Chile is mitigated by the country’s high quality of life and high state capacity. Although income inequality is evident in Chile’s development style, the income gap between the richest and the poorest segments of its population is not as wide as it is in Haiti. In addition, the capacity of the Chilean state has been continually developed since its independence.

In Haiti’s case—although the homicide rate may be underestimated because of the lack of state capacity—the passage from inequality to societal violence is interrupted by mechanisms different from those in Chile. Haiti presents a situation in which the burden of extreme poverty reduces the risk of violence. In fact, in some instances, the alleviation of poverty is considered a factor that could lead to violence. This also applies to Niger, one of the most egalitarian countries in this group but also one of the poorest. The social landscape of this group includes countries that are rather egalitarian but poor, including Niger, Egypt, and Djibouti. Others, such as Argentina and Uruguay, are less egalitarian but also far less poor, with a much higher HDI ranking.

**High Societal Violence**

The high societal violence group is quite heterogeneous, including extremely poor countries, such as Lesotho, and paradoxical states, such as Equatorial Guinea, whose oil revenues make it a high-income country although 76.8 percent of its population lives below the national poverty line. Perhaps the indicator most aptly suited to convey a clear image of Equatorial Guinea’s development style is the number that results after subtracting its position according to its HDI ranking from the position it occupies in income ranking. This number—a proxy of the social bias of the development style—provides an idea about the degree to which a society transforms its revenues into educational and health achievements. This figure in Equatorial Guinea’s case is an extraordinary −91, reflecting a regime that channels wealth toward President Teodoro Obiang and his inner circle.

7. In 2009, according to the WDI, 15.1 percent of Chile’s population had incomes below the national poverty line.
9. Considering the latest WDI available, for 2009, in Chile, the richest 10 percent of the population earned 27.9 times more than the poorest 10 percent. In 2001 for Haiti, the most recent year for which data is available, this figure was 72.2.
12. Even though the incidence of poverty in Egypt is not high (22 percent in 2008, according to the WDI), it is a lower-middle-income country, and its HDI is ‘medium’.
13. This figure corresponds to 2006 and is taken from the WDI.
14. Since 1973, the annual Freedom House indicators of political rights and civil liberties in Equatorial Guinea have been 7 and sometimes 6 (the worst scores on the scale). See *Freedom in the World* (Washington, D.C., various years).
By contrast, this group includes some praised democracies, among them Brazil, with highly unequal income distribution. Both inequality and violence, however, are declining in Brazil. In 2001 its Gini coefficient was 0.639, and in 2009 it was 0.576.\footnote{Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, CEPALSTAT, http://estadisticas.cepal.org/cepalstat/WEB_CEPALSTAT/Portada.asp?idioma=i. Freedom House has labeled Brazil as a ‘free’ country continuously since 2003. The other possibilities are ‘partially free’ and ‘not free’, http://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world.} According to UNDOC, the homicide rate was 31.4 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2001 and fell to 22.7 in 2009. Venezuela, by contrast, represents an intriguing case in which inequality has been declining and violence soaring (Figure 1).

The contrast between Brazil and Venezuela suggests that the effects of reducing inequality on trends in homicide rates may depend on specific methods of redistribution and particular features of political and social contexts as a whole. One salient characteristic of the Venezuelan development style is the deterioration of personal security. This result, however, cannot lead to dismissing the relevance of fighting vertical inequality in building a safer development style. What seems to be clear is that there are different paths toward the redistribution of income and wealth. Each has to be weighed in terms of its effects on personal security.

UNDOC statistics show that Mexico experienced a surge in drug-related violence, especially between 2007 and 2010, when its homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants rose from 8.1 to 21.5, overtaking the 1995 figure of 18.4. Drug cartels might have been taking advantage of increasing rural poverty—which according to the WDI increased from 57.4 percent in 2004 to 60.8 percent in 2010—and rising youth unemployment—up from 6.5 percent in 2000 to 14.3 percent in 2010, based on figures from the CEPALSTAT

Figure 1

**Homicides and Inequality in Venezuela**

Within this group, there are clear cases of vertical inequalities (such as in Honduras) and examples of pronounced horizontal inequalities (such as in South Africa).\footnote{Frances Stewart, ‘Horizontal inequalities: A neglected dimension of development’, Working Paper 1, Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford, 2001.} Honduras seems to be the archetype of an instance of high vertical inequality without intermediate mechanisms inhibiting the violent effects that wide societal gaps might produce. Honduras is a poor country, but not as poor as Haiti. It is a lower-middle-income country, and its HDI belongs to the ‘medium’ quartile. Among LAC countries, however, Honduras’s Gini coefficient is only above Haiti’s.

Taking African and LAC countries together, WDI figures show that in 2009 the magnitude of income for the richest 10 percent of the population exceeded what the poorest 10 percent earned by 98.6 times in Honduras (in 2009). This was the highest among the countries examined. Honduras does not have a violent legacy from a civil war, yet it exhibits the highest homicide rate among this group of countries: 82.1 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants in 2010. Beginning with already high values in 2000, both inequality and the homicide rate soared between 2000 and 2010.\footnote{According to UNODC statistics, in 2000 the rate of homicides in Honduras was 51.1 per 100,000 inhabitants. In 2010 the figure was 82.1. According to the WDI, although its Gini coefficient declined in 2009, it had increased between 2001 and 2008 from 0.5438 to 0.6133.} Whereas Venezuela’s case suggests that not all kinds of redistribution policies make societies less violent, the case of Honduras makes it very clear that a high level of vertical inequality within a weak state is an enormous danger. Rural workers are particularly disadvantaged. According to ECLAC, 78.8 percent of Honduras’s rural population is poor. The distance from the mean income of the rural poor to the rural poverty line, that is, the gap at the rural poverty line, is 45.3 percent.\footnote{CEPALSTAT figures correspond to 2007 and 2010, respectively.}

**Postconflict Situations**

Inequality is particularly dangerous in a violently divided polity. A breakdown of the political amity that binds a nation is not always the immediate consequence of low social development and inequality, as in the case of Libya. Despite Muammar Qadhafi’s authoritarian rule, the country’s development style does not appear to have prompted the bloodshed of 2011. Once war erupts, however, the salient characteristics of a development style may fuel the conflict.\footnote{In the Libyan case, two possibilities must be considered: whether the weakness of Libya as a nation led to it being the only country in North Africa where the uprising ended in a civil war or whether it was because of its previous development achievements that the war ended relatively quickly.} The absence of countries in the peaceful postconflict category is quite eloquent. Forces unleashed by war’s dynamics may survive and even become entrenched after a peace is reached. Sometimes the peace
process itself might inhibit the curtailment of such forces. Certainly, development styles play a significant role in such situations.

All the postconflict cases involve low- and lower-middle-income countries. None of them has a high HDI ranking. In fact, just four out of the thirteen cases have a medium rating. Excluding Ethiopia and Nicaragua, when a country has a Gini coefficient below 0.45, its population in poverty exceeds 50 percent (see Table 5). Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala are the three LAC cases in which civil wars ended after peace processes in which all of the armed actors took part. The implementation of the neoliberal agenda in those countries made the reintegration of former combatants more difficult because of shrinking social expenditures and rising unemployment. Nicaragua is a violent postconflict society, but not a highly violent one. According to WDI figures, the rate of male youth unemployment reached 20.3 percent in 1993 and in 2005 fell to 9.3 percent. Although rural poverty has been reduced since the 1990s, it remained high (67.9 percent) in 2005. In El Salvador, a highly violent postconflict society, rural poverty decreased from a rate of 66.1 percent in 1991 to 46.5 percent in 2009, but the rate of male youth unemployment (15.7 percent in 2010) was almost twice the unemployment rate of the general population.

Guatemala is an example of a civil war followed by a postconflict situation in which horizontal inequalities have played a prominent role. After subtracting Guatemala’s HDI ranking from its gross national income rank (Table 5), it is clear that the country’s postconflict development style lacks the social bias required to build a sustainable peace. WDI data show that its Gini coefficient (0.569 in 2006) was the fifth-highest among LAC countries. Between 1998 and 2006 rural poverty dropped slightly, from 68 percent to 66.5 percent. Between 2002 and 2006, however, the rural poverty gap increased from 30.8 percent to 33.3 percent, according to CEPALSTAT.

Despite the agreements carried out after the peace was signed, land reform was never undertaken. After nine years of negotiations, seventeen separate peace accords were signed. Among them were the Agreement on the Socioeconomic Aspects and the Agrarian Situation and the Agreement on the Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Unfortunately, these two agreements were rejected in a referendum in 1998. In another case, it is not surprising that a mining and oil economy like Angola’s classifies as a highly violent postconflict country once its HDI rank is subtracted from its gross national income rank. Several armed factions advocate the secession of Cabinda province, which produces some 60 percent of the country’s oil revenue.

Regardless of whether grievances related to inequality are at the root of a civil war, once a country begins down the path of civil war, even greater inequalities are usually

20. Carlo Nasi, Cuando Callan los Fusiles: Impacto de la Paz Negociada en Colombia y Centroamérica (Bogotá, Universidad de los Andes, 2007).
activated. The relationship is not simply cause and effect. Rather, it is a vicious circle, as ‘violent conflict tends to raise inequality (and inequality is one factor in a country’s vulnerability to conflict) and high inequalities lower the impact of growth on poverty reduction in the early years of post-conflict reconstruction’.23

### Table 5

**Human Development, Poverty, and Inequality in Postconflict Countries in Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean**

<table>
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<tr>
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<td>0.5864</td>
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<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<td>Low</td>
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<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
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<td>−4</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>0.4252</td>
<td>66.4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Armed Conflicts

There were nine internal armed conflicts in 2010. In the category of armed conflicts and peaceful societies are two minor conflicts, Peru and Algeria. Both are upper-middle-income countries with a high HDI ranking. Peru's Gini coefficient was at its greatest (0.5564) in 2002. It fell to 0.4814 in 2010. In 2001 income poverty affected 54.8 percent of the population. It fell to 31.3 percent in 2010. Algeria has had a protracted civil war involving the government and the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) that began in 1991. Al-Qaeda is also an actor in the Maghreb. Due to a very high rate of youth male unemployment (42.8 percent according to WDI) in Algeria, recruitment among this group by armed actors is made easier than it might otherwise be.

Chad is a very poor country in which an unstable neighborhood led to war even after the signing of peace agreements. With elites strongly averse to the state, Somalia is the weakest state of the world. The nation's elite consists of the leaders of local clans, warlords, real property owners, and businessmen of Mogadishu who have gained some degree of autonomy. Ironically, even though businessmen would benefit greatly from peace, they have rejected every attempt to build a functioning state. Apparently they would rather operate within a suboptimal but familiar environment.

In Rwanda, the 'uneasy coexistence between guilty majorities and fearful minorities' shapes the conflict and has engendered high societal violence. Rwanda represents the epitome of how dangerous horizontal inequalities can become. As Mahmood Mamdani explains, however, Tutsi and Hutu identities are political identities rather than cultural or market-based ones. According to him, 'Political identities are the consequence of how power is organized'. Therefore, a broader nation-based identity needs to be built to break the chain of fear and retaliation that obstructs the building of sustainable peace. The plurality of identities, however, needs to be recognized. Being a citizen of Rwanda should not be at odds with being a Hutu or a Tutsi. A development agenda intended to overcome economic inequalities is a major piece of that process of nation building in Rwanda. Those inequalities soared when an economic slump took hold in the late 1980s, mainly because of the decline in world coffee prices. They were exacerbated by the civil war, the genocide in 1994, and the structural economic adjustment agreed to by the Juvénal Habyarimana government, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank.

In the Central African Republic, where sectarian violence and political instability have been particularly acute as of late, the Gini coefficient rose from 0.435 in 2003 to 0.563 in 2008, and rural poverty reached 64.9 percent in 2008. With Sudan's division into two countries, there are not only signals of an interstate war but also of a new civil war since the Juba regime has been challenged by two rebel groups. Uganda has been involved in the conflicts of its neighbors, and its own conflicts have been prompted by

26. Ibid., 22.
political manipulations of ethnic and regional inequalities. In northern Uganda, whose Langi and Acholi elites once ruled the country, the notorious Lord’s Resistance Army continues to operate, as it does in Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the Central African Republic. In Uganda, the dichotomy between political domination and social and economic differences may have fueled violent conflicts. According to Francis Stewart, ‘There are significant, persistent horizontal inequalities in Uganda in economic and social dimensions. Average incomes are broadly twice as much in the west and centre, and social services substantially better’. Northerners retained political power until Yoweri Museveni seized the government in 1986. By and large, inequality has increased according to WDI. In 1996, the income of the richest 10 percent of the population was 9.4 times larger than that of the poorest 10 percent. In 2009 this figure increased to 15.3.

Colombia has experienced the longest civil war among the LAC and African countries. It is the only upper-middle-income country among the armed conflict and high societal violence cases. Based on WDI numbers, the richest 10 percent of the Colombian population takes in 51.07 times more income than the poorest 10 percent, the greatest difference among all upper-middle-income LAC and African countries. Colombia’s Gini coefficient (0.559 in 2010) is the third highest among upper-middle-income countries after South Africa and the Seychelles.

Although its war is not an ethnic or religious one, there is, in addition to the substantial vertical inequality, a kind of horizontal inequality expressed in terms of an anti-rural bias in the Colombian development style. This bias has been shaped by the historic successive defeats of the rural population. A few figures illustrate that bias. According to the ECLAC, in 2009, 64.3 percent of the rural population was below the poverty line. This is the highest incidence of rural poverty among the upper-middle-income countries of Latin America. The rural poverty gap in 2009 was 31.9 percent, just behind those in Honduras and Paraguay among Latin American countries (excluding the Caribbean).

CONCLUSIONS

The exercise of sorting different combinations of conflict situations and societal violence levels may shed light on their association with certain types of development styles. At the least, it can help in guiding further exploration and specific case studies. The effects of inequality on social cohesion may not be the same in an extremely poor country and in an upper-middle-income country. Other contextual characteristics and trajectories in each case must be taken into account. The specific configuration of variables in each type of case should be identified.

Not all poor and unequal societies have had to deal with a civil war situation or suffered from high levels of societal violence. Such development and political features as significant vertical or horizontal inequalities, social segregation, male youth unem-

29. Ethnicity is not altogether absent in the dynamic of the Colombian war, however. In fact, it has played an important role in the Pacific region, where thousands of black peasants have been forced out of their territories.
30. CEPALSTAT information updated 6 June 2011. The figures available on the latest version of the WDI, though different, are also high: 54.3 percent in 2009 and 50.35 percent in 2010.
ployment, authoritarianism, weak states, and so on serve as conditions for high violence and war. In fact, civil wars and high societal violence are quite scarce among the most developed and egalitarian countries. Identifying sufficient conditions for high violence and civil war nonetheless still seems a tough task.

History matters. Countries that have not experienced a civil war for a long time or do not have a bloody history tend to remain peaceful. Violence in the past informs vulnerability to violence in the present and in the future. A pervasive civil war in the recent past may be a good predictor of risk of a renewed civil war in the future or high societal violence in the conflict’s aftermath. The absence of countries in the peaceful postconflict category supports this assumption.

Horizontal inequalities seem to be more relevant in war and postconflict situations, whereas vertical inequalities seem to be related to high societal violence cases. The exercise carried out here, however, suggests that they may overlap and reinforce each other. Sometimes behind huge vertical inequalities lies a development style’s systematic bias against a population group that is not necessarily defined by religion or ethnicity. Low-income rural populations and segregated youth are two salient examples.

Moreover, the overlap between vertical and horizontal inequalities is not necessarily exclusive to armed conflict and high societal violence situations or to postconflict and high societal ones. Cases of societal violence in which vertical inequalities are conspicuous may have certain manifestations of horizontal inequalities embedded. In some LAC countries different from Guatemala (to mention one prominent example of horizontal inequalities), that may not be obvious, but it is certainly not absent.

Most countries, unlike some of the peaceful ones (i.e., Argentina, Chile, Cuba, Uruguay) are weak states to some degree. In contrast to the European path of state building, the state preceded the molding of the nation in the archetype Latin American or African state. Strengthening the state is therefore required to promote development; security is not enough.

The key dimension of statehood required to implement development agendas toward human security is to promote a broad sense of belonging to the nation. States are endogenous to societies, though they may shape each other. A mutually binding social contract cannot be exogenously imposed. Development agendas should fight inequalities that nurture threats to personal security by contributing to the building of a sound polity.

There is, however, no single recipe. Context must be taken into account. In any case, cooperation for development cannot ignore the importance of nation building. It is necessary to encourage mutual recognition among the different segments of the citizenry. As Sirkku Hellsten asserts, ‘Without any shared, common idea of the good of the nation and without any shared national identity, the smaller internal groups with their own set of values tend to conflict again and again, both with each other and with the state’. The LAC and Africa are the two most unequal regions of the world. Thus, the promotion of shared national identitides is inextricably linked to the implementation of redistributive agendas to help manage the tensions that modifying the status quo may unleash.


32. Sirkku Hellsten, ‘Ethics, rhetoric, and politics of post-conflict reconstruction: How can the concept of social contract help us to understand how to make peace work?’ in Addison and Brück (eds.), Making Peace Work, 90.
Twenty years ago, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali proclaimed his Agenda for Peace, in which he put the relationship between development and peace in a new perspective. Based on values of human and sustainable development, the principle of precaution, and common but differentiated responsibilities, the agenda introduced a framework to contain violent outbreaks within countries due to developmental deficiencies. It also made distinctions among preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding. Preventive diplomacy was defined as action to prevent disputes between parties from arising, escalating, and spreading. Peacemaking was meant to bring hostile parties to agreement through peaceful means. Peacekeeping had the same objectives as preventive diplomacy and peacemaking, but this time by deploying a UN presence in the field, including military personnel. Peacebuilding was considered a postconflict exercise, supporting structures that could firm up peace, avoid a relapse into conflict, and prevent the recurrence of violence. While preventive diplomacy seeks to avoid the breakdown of peaceful conditions, peacebuilding is meant ‘to forestall a re-emergence of cultural and national tensions that would spark renewed hostilities. Without such efforts no peace agreement is likely to last for long.’

Decisions of the UN Security Council and the General Assembly in the last decade have overemphasized peacekeeping missions by military means, consequently neglecting preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peacebuilding. The resulting UN interventions were either too late (in Darfur), too limited (in Congo), too strongly influenced by the interests of major powers (as in Afghanistan and Iraq), or inflicted

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2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.

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too much collateral damage (as in Libya). There was always some harm to the peace process itself. The same reasons for failure cited by Erskine Childers—faulty needs assessments, inadequate resources, bad timing, and ambiguity of mandates—still apply. Preventive diplomacy and peacemaking, which in the Agenda for Peace had been clearly defined as multilateral political strategies, have not been seriously considered.

PEACEBUILDING

If, due to prevailing international political circumstances, preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peacekeeping are either absent or bound to fail, we are left with the fourth option—peacebuilding. In essence, the concept of peacebuilding is based on the recognition that peace, development, and democracy are interdependent.

In all relevant official documents, the four stages—preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding—are clearly distinguished from each other. The ultimate objective, however, is the same: peace. Moreover, the various functions overlap. For instance, should peacebuilding wait until a peacekeeping operation has been finalized successfully, or can it start earlier? Peacebuilding, meant to make peace last, should help avoid a new breakdown descending toward crisis and include ways and means for preventive diplomacy. Conceptual indistinctness among the stages and practical confusion are unavoidable unless strict separations are made. This, however, might result in undue restrictions on the ground.

According to the Brahimi Report, peace operations were meant to ‘reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war’. To that end, peacebuilding was supposed to include activities in the fields of DDR (disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former combatants), demining, restoring rule of law, training police, monitoring of human rights and investigating abuses, providing democratic assistance, preparing for elections, developing anticorruption measures, and implementing quick-impact projects combating HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases. This is a mouthful, but it is explicitly not meant to imply a broad range of activities. On the contrary, in 2007 the UN secretary-general’s Policy Committee concluded that peacebuilding should comprise ‘a carefully prioritized, sequenced, and therefore relatively narrow set of activities aimed at achieving the above objectives’. The operative word here is ‘narrow’.

My own experience, when I was leading the UN Peacekeeping Mission in Sudan (UNMIS, 2004–2007), was rather disappointing. During those years, we were effective as peacekeepers, enabling north and south Sudan to maintain the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), signed in Nairobi in 2005. We, however, lacked the resources to catalyze a peace dividend. The new state of South Sudan would only be established six years later, following a referendum. After decades of war resulting in 2 million

victims and another 3 million displaced, South Sudan emerged as one of the poorest countries in Africa. It certainly had economic potential, but to realize this potential both nation building and state building had to start from scratch, including the mobilization of its own resources.

In such a situation, there is always the risk of flooding a country with foreign assistance, which could then result in new dependencies. In this case, however, quite the opposite occurred. Funds for demining were only meant to clear mines around our own barracks, and land was used for roads to monitor the implementation of the peace agreement, not for farms or school playgrounds. Funding rule-of-law activities was restricted to lecturing the police, rather than equipping them with means of communication. Because of the ongoing forty-year war, no new investment had been made in utilities and sanitation facilities in Juba, the capital. Directly after the signing of the peace agreement, refugees started to return, resulting in a quadrupling of Juba’s population within a couple of months. No resources were foreseen for a reconstruction of crucial basic services. In the rural areas, no beginning could be made whatsoever with primary education or primary health care.

The World Bank and donor countries soon established offices in South Sudan, but the procedures they introduced for programs and projects were utterly bureaucratic. Years were wasted during which the people of South Sudan asked what peace really had in store for them. No wonder that disappointment and frustration got the upper hand. The lack of peacebuilding was not the only explanation, and it was not long before renewed political, ethnic, and criminal violence threatened the security and stability of the new nation.

Peacebuilding, as we have seen, has to be in line with development, which should be broad, comprehensive, and holistic. That is not the same as ‘large’ or ‘a lot’ or ‘everything at the same time’. On the contrary, development can take place gradually and slowly, but it should be homegrown, not determined by priorities set by external forces. Military peacekeeping activities can easily introduce foreign interests, which restrict the domestic ownership of peace, or manipulate parties to a conflict when choosing particular forms of state and nation building. When this goes hand in hand with ample resources made available to finance programs of reconstruction and rehabilitation serving foreign interests, it will lead to a distortion of the conditions for genuine peacebuilding.

**DO NO HARM**

Recent Western interventions in Afghanistan, Darfur, and Libya are unfortunate examples of peacekeeping operations that have strayed from being ‘support structures to build trust and well-being among peoples and bridges between parties to the conflict’.

These failures show that peacekeeping can destroy peacebuilding primarily in four ways. First is when the peacekeeping operation is a narrow exercise, such as a military intervention only. Second, peacekeeping operations can distort peacebuilding when they result in civilian death, rape, or other forms of sexual misconduct. Such actions result in peacekeeping losing its credibility and lead to distrust among parties.

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that must be brought together. Third, a peacekeeping operation can fail to gradually turn into peacebuilding because of partisan behavior by the peacemakers. Peacekeepers who favor one party in a conflict lose their impartiality, thereby depriving peacebuilders of the capacity to build trust and inspire confidence. Fourth, peacekeeping that is wholly imposed from outside, rather than owned domestically, can easily result in a conflict with all parties turning against the operation.

The major objective of peacekeeping operations, after its responsibility to protect (R2P), is establishing a minimum level of security and stability. This is necessary to enable parties in a conflict to jointly work out policies addressing the root causes of their dispute. Peacekeeping does not do the job. Peacebuilding is supposed to do that. Peacekeeping is meant to create favorable conditions for peacebuilding, neither more nor less. So, if a peacekeeping operation for any of the four reasons mentioned above not only fails to create those conditions, but even destroys them, the operation should be fundamentally recast or even halted. The experience of the last two decades, and the examples cited above, demonstrate a serious cause for reconsideration of the design of peacekeeping operations in general, to bring them in line with not only the procedures but also the principles of the Agenda for Peace and associated codes and resolutions.

To avoid harmful consequences of peacekeeping for peacebuilding, however, it is not enough to sanitize the former. The order should be changed. Peacebuilding should not follow peacekeeping. The two endeavors should be an integrated whole. There is no reason to wait with peacebuilding activities until a peace operation has been completed. If peacekeeping is more than a military operation, it should include peacebuilding, and its civilian, political, economic, social, cultural, environmental, institutional, and developmental components, right from the start. Whether all such peacebuilding activities are feasible should not be made conditional on the demands of peacekeeping alone. Conditions should be mutual. A unified approach implies that from the outset, a peacekeeping operation should be designed in such a way that conditions for successful parallel or subsequent peacebuilding can be met. If not, the cart is put before the horse.

We should get rid of the term postconflict peacebuilding. Peacebuilding is not a postconflict operation. It is part of a continuum and cannot start early enough. It is regrettable that in UN documents on peacemaking, an artificial and erroneous distinction is made of ‘before’, ‘during’, and ‘after’ conflict. It is this distinction that has given rise to an unfortunate separation between peacekeeping and peacebuilding.

**TAILOR MADE**

Tailor-made peacebuilding means that the approach should be country specific, catalytic, flexible, and based on true knowledge of the context. It should also be comprehensive, comprised of disarmament, demobilization, reinsertion, and reintegration of combatants; the return of refugees and displaced people; demining of fields and roads; reconstruction of physical infrastructure; reparation of damaged houses and buildings; rehabilitation of utilities (energy, water, and sanitation), food production, and health.

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and education facilities; economic recovery in general; reestablishment of institutions; state and nation building; security sector reform; a halt to impunity; enactment of justice and law; reform of political structures; and fostering reconciliation, and so on.

All the above cannot take place at the same time, or in the same order everywhere, nor does it have to. There is no blueprint. It all depends on the history of the conflict, the specific circumstances on the ground, and the needs and desires of the people. That is why peacebuilding should be homegrown, and why foreign assistance should never take over initiatives. Outside assistance should be nothing more than a catalyst, but also nothing less. Neither peace nor democracy nor development can be imported. To be sustainable, respect for human rights, peace, democracy, and development should be wrought from within, and, as much as possible, from the bottom up. This is difficult, because the domestic forces in favor of peace must confront domestic powers that still have a stake in the conflict. There is no alternative, however, or at least not one that can be brought in from the outside. All these conditions and criteria for homegrown and lasting peacebuilding are similar to those concerning bottom-up sustainable development.

Peacebuilders, whether from outside or within, should be independent and impartial. They cannot, however, be neutral. As with peacekeeping, peacebuilding implies that the responsibility to protect vulnerable people should be a conditio sine qua non. Peacebuilders cannot shy away from taking sides—that is, the side of the ultimate victims, those who have suffered the most. The struggle for a sustainable peace should meet conditions of both human security and human development.

Peacebuilding, addressing all root causes of a conflict, is not only a comprehensive process but also very complex, because those causes are rooted in power structures. Dismantling these is complicated and requires caution and wisdom. A new compact has to be built between the powers and civilians. Bargaining has to take the place of fighting. For all these reasons, peacebuilding may have to go slowly. It does not have to go fast. Speed, shock and awe, will soon turn counterproductive. The aim should be to show that there is some improvement and that there is more to come, gradually but guaranteed. Too high expectations breed frustration and ultimately extinguish hope. Realistic expectations can be kept alive. They can be nourished by demonstrating small but self-sustaining achievements. Ever broader peace, continual development and democratization all along, getting stronger and stronger under their own steam, are more pursuable and credible goals than perfect peace, complete development, and total democracy.

Dag Hammarskjöld was right. Peacebuilding cannot be forced into a straitjacket. It is not a one-size-fits-all operation. Peacebuilding is development, and development is always unique, every time, everywhere.

Intrastate Conflicts for Autonomy: Causes and Strategies for Resolution

Mathieu Bere

Marginalized and frustrated groups sometimes wage wars to claim political autonomy, but a careful analysis of data recorded by the Peace Accord Matrix (PAM) for 1960 to 2005 on conflicts around the world indicates that secession and boundary demarcation, while the most common temptations in intrastate conflicts over territorial control or for autonomy, are not the best solutions for lasting peace. Past experience suggests that powersharing, decentralization, or federalism, along with constitutional and economic reforms, are more helpful in addressing this kind of conflict.

The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) defines conflict as ‘a contested incompatibility that concerns government or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths.’ The UCDP further observes that in most conflicts, the incompatibility cited by the parties, an assertion that might hide other incompatibilities, most often concerns government or territory. These conflicts tend to involve types of political systems, replacement of the central government or change in government composition, or control of a certain territory (interstate conflict), secession, or autonomy (internal conflict).

The focus here is on intrastate conflicts over territorial control as recorded by the Peace Accord Matrix (PAM), the dataset created and maintained by the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame. According to PAM data, intrastate conflicts over territorial control for the period covered represented only about 39 percent of the conflicts waged (or eleven out of twenty-eight conflicts).²

2. The dataset does not include the Biafra war in Nigeria or the secession war of Katanga, in Zaire, now the Democratic Republic of Congo.

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This means that the majority of intrastate conflicts were fought for the conquest, control, and preservation of state power. Although conflicts for control of territory are less frequent, it nonetheless remains an enduring temptation for groups to fight for independence on the land where they live. The 2012 unilateral proclamation of the independence of Azawad, in northern Mali, by the Tuaregs and their allies is the most recent case illustrating the persistence of this temptation despite the paucity of successful secession movements in contemporary history.3

Three related questions guide the investigation: Why do groups feel compelled to claim autonomy for their territories? Is fighting for autonomy the best way to solve an intergroup conflict within a state? If not, what is the alternative? Answering these questions involved analyzing PAM data regarding conflicts over territorial control in Bangladesh, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, East Timor, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Mali, Niger, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, and the United Kingdom (regarding northern Ireland). It is hypothesized that most often, the main motivation of secessionist groups in their struggle for independence is frustration over their cultural, economic, social, and political rights not being fully recognized or fairly upheld. If that is in fact the case, the best way of dealing with intrastate conflict waged for autonomy is not by breaking away or separating through some kind of boundary demarcation, but reforming and improving governance by making political authorities more responsive to the concerns and rights of frustrated groups and by establishing some form of decentralized or federal government.

**WHY BREAK AWAY?**

The following variables were used in testing the hypothesis regarding the true causes of conflicts waged to gain territorial independence: interethnic relations, citizenship, cultural protection, economic and social development, and natural resource usage. These are typically cited by factions as justification for their fighting for autonomy or control of territory.

Among the eleven countries examined, five (i.e., about 46 percent) experienced difficult interethnic relations, which peace accords had to address by establishing councils to mediate talks between the involved ethnic groups or between the ethnic groups and the government. These councils, according to PAM, addressed limited governance aspects or made recommendations on political and legal policies. Citizenship and cultural protection issues were cited 36 percent and 46 percent of the time, respectively, in the outbreak and sustenance of conflicts over territory. Thus, cultural and political rights as well as ethnic identity must be factored into any attempt to understand such conflicts, but the role they play is relatively minor. What is clear from the data is that with an 82 percent rate of incidence among the cases recorded, equity and justice in economic and social development policies in the management of natural resources and in the sharing of its benefits account more than any other factor for the persistence of violent claims for territorial autonomy. Out of the

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3. Since 1990 Mali has suffered several wars of rebellion waged by the Mouvement Populaire de Libération de l’Azawad to gain independence for Azawad, in the north.
Intrastate Conflicts for Autonomy

twenty-eight conflicts waged over territory and governmental control, only six did not include social and economic development issues or the lack of appropriate social, economic, or land reform policies among their root causes. This corroborates the idea that countries with high poverty levels and a high GINI coefficient, that is, a wide gap between have and have nots, are vulnerable to violent conflict.

Civil wars and armed rebellions are not random curses that afflict countries. They most often derive from neglected and poorly managed frustrations of groups or regions where it is felt that the people’s concerns do not receive sufficient attention from the few privileged elites. In regard to the 2012 Tuareg rebellion in Mali, Djibril Bassolé, the minister of foreign affairs of Burkina Faso and mediator in the political and military crisis that divided Mali into a government-run south and a rebel-held north, noted that the insurgency was the result of extreme poverty, joblessness, and despair, which generated extremism and illicit trafficking of weapons and drugs in the vast Sahel region.4

Surprisingly, minority rights do not appear in the data as one of the causes of intrastate conflicts. This suggests that secessionist groups do not claim independence simply because they suffer from a minority complex, but because of a sense of political or economic marginalization. They do not feel treated as full and equal citizens who are afforded fairness in the distribution of resources and power and in respect to recognition of their cultural identity. If this is indeed the case, the question one must ask is whether breaking away is an adequate solution to intrastate conflict.

IS BREAKING AWAY THE SOLUTION?

To assess whether secession or some kind of territorial autonomy helps resolve intrastate conflicts, one can compare statistical data from PAM for variables concerning conflict management strategies: boundary demarcation, independence referendum, international arbitration, decentralization or federalism, powersharing, and the establishment of a transitional government. Assessment involves determining how often each of these strategies was used to resolve intrastate conflicts over territory and how effective they have been in ending the violence and reconciling belligerents.

Of the eleven countries torn apart by intrastate conflicts over territorial control, five (45.5 percent) required a peace accord that determined a boundary demarcation through the creation of autonomous provinces within the state or led to independent states. This was the case with Ethiopia (from which Eritrea separated), the Philippines, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and more recently in 2011, Sudan, from which South Sudan seceded. About 27 percent of intrastate conflicts, over territory and over government, were settled through an independence referendum (East Timor, Papua New Guinea, and the United Kingdom) and 18 percent by international arbitration (Ethiopia and Bosnia-Herzegovina). Thus, it appears quite clear that boundary demarcation, independence referenda, and international arbitration

were not the dominant tradition, or preferred methods, in dealing with intrastate conflicts. One can easily guess why.

States born from secession are rarely stable and peaceful. The secession of Eritrea and South Sudan may be cited as relatively ‘successful’ secessions, but independence did not bring lasting peace or complete satisfaction to the new states. Instead, it generated distrustful relationships, violent confrontations, and degrees of entrenched hatred between the separated states. Worse, tensions and divergences between ethnic groups within breakaway states often lead to further secession, notably in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This country, which became independent from Yugoslavia in March 1992, suffered three more years of violence in which on average 30,571 people were killed annually, until November 1995. Because of tensions between the territory’s Muslim Bosniaks (43 percent), Serbs (31 percent), and Croats (17 percent), the Serbs and Croats fought for independence and created the independent republics of Serbia and Croatia. These new states were not among the most peaceful after their proclamation of independence.

In short, boundary demarcation to create an autonomous province or a new independent state is likely to result in more trouble than solutions. It may leave the root causes of conflict unaddressed or generate new problems. If secession is not the solution, what then is the alternative?

BREAKING AWAY VERSUS POWERSHARING AND DECENTRALIZATION

The data show that the preferred strategies or solutions for dealing with intrastate conflicts so far have been powersharing, usually in the framework of a transitional government (91 percent), decentralization or the adoption of federalism (82 percent), and constitutional reforms (55 percent). Powersharing and the creation of a decentralized or federal form of governance, which put political authorities and the administration closer to the population, making them more attentive to the concerns of the people, have not only been preferred but have also proved to be more effective than boundary demarcation and secession in resolving many intrastate conflicts.

One may wonder why the agreed-upon decentralization of government did not stop armed violence in Mali after the April 1991 signing of the National Pact, a comprehensive peace agreement between the government and the coalition of Tuareg rebel groups. The accord called for a decentralized government—that is, government by regional and local councils with elected assemblies—to provide access to power and resources by politically and economically marginalized groups. It also recommended measures—for example, a special development program for the north—to consolidate national solidarity and unity. This was urgent in a huge country like Mali, one of the poorest in the world, where the Tuaregs, frustrated by extreme poverty and marginalization, had been engaging in extremism, arms and drug trafficking, and fighting for secession. The lofty provisions and recommendations of the National Pact and the creation of commissions to monitor the cease-fire and supervise the implementation of the whole pact were not enough to restore lasting peace and stability. In the face of poor governance, weak and dissatisfied security forces, and the acquisition of sophisticated weapons by Tuaregs from Muammar al-Qadhafi’s collapsed regime in Libya, the Malian government could not withstand the new security challenges and
the arrival of extremist Islamist movements, such as al-Qaida in Islamic Maghreb and Boko Haram in the Sahel region.\(^5\)

Thus, without doubt, powersharing, decentralization, and federalism are not magical recipes or perfect solutions for the management of most intrastate conflicts, but they are more helpful than boundary demarcation. In any case, powersharing and a decentralized government stand to be more effective if strengthened by adequate security policies and forces. Conflict scholars seem now to agree that there is a strong correlation between the risk of armed insurgency or civil war and a state’s capacity. This latter concept refers to a state’s military and policing capabilities, its level of economic development, and the quality of its bureaucratic administration and political institutions.\(^6\) In other words, the capacity of a state is its ability to meet the economic and physical security needs of its inhabitants. A state’s capacity also influences the implementation of a peace agreement signed with a rebel group.

**CONCLUSION**

To summarize, one may draw the following conclusions from this study. First, intrastate conflicts, either waged for the purpose of gaining some degree of autonomy through the control of a territory or in view of conquering and safeguarding state power, have more to do with ineffective and unjust structures of resource allocation and distribution of wealth and power among the various groups or regions than with interethnic and cultural differences. Most countries have multicultural and multiethnic populations, but they do not necessarily experience violent ethnic conflicts. What makes the difference is a state’s capacity to respond satisfactorily to the basic needs of its population and the needs of the various groups for recognition of their cultural identity and political rights.

Second, the management of intrastate conflicts is a very difficult and challenging task for which there is no ready-made, perfect, one-size-fits-all solution. As the data cited in this study suggest, however, one can see that boundary demarcation is rarely a desirable solution. Its effectiveness in ending hostilities between the parties and in addressing the root causes of intrastate conflicts is doubtful. Breakaway states rarely achieve stability and lasting peace after fighting for secession and autonomy. In contrast, countries that chose powersharing, decentralization, or federalism, along with constitutional and economic reforms to manage conflict, see better results in restoring peace and reconciling opposing groups. This is the case because these conflict management strategies allow for an equitable distribution of power and wealth across groups and regions. Better than the simple acquisition of autonomy through boundary demarcation, these strategies help satisfy claims and needs in terms of political, social, economic, and cultural rights, especially of marginalized, frustrated groups. Thus, governance is improved by making it closer to and more accountable to the

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local population and more attentive to their needs through powersharing, decentralized or federal government, and adequate political and economic reforms. These measures have better chances than a war of secession or a boundary demarcation to bring satisfaction to the parties in an intrastate conflict.
Recovering Nonviolent History: Civil Resistance in Liberation Struggles, edited by J. Maciej J. Bartkowski


Reviewed by Jude Kagoro

A GROUNDBREAKING QUANTITATIVE STUDY of resistance struggles from 1900 to 2006 revealed that nonviolent efforts were more than twice as effective as their violent counterparts. This notwithstanding, nonviolent struggles continue to occupy only marginal space in commemorative history while the militarized and violent forms are often mythologized and romanticized. Recovering Nonviolent History: Civil Resistance in Liberation Struggles, edited by Maciej J. Bartkowski, comes at the perfect moment to remind scholars, practitioners, and activists about the historical role nonviolent forms of struggles have played in many national quests for liberation.

This volume sets out to accentuate little-known but important histories of civil resistance, led by ordinary people, in struggles for self-determination and against foreign domination over the past 200 years. An excellent example is provided by Walter H. Conser Jr., who argues that the political independence of the United States from Britain has its roots in nonviolent struggles from 1765 to 1775 before the immortalized battles of Lexington and Concord in 1775.

Recovering Nonviolent History operationalizes nonviolent resistance as a form of conflict in which average people choose to stand up to oppressive structures, including colonialism and unjust governments, with the use of such tactics as strikes, boycotts, protests, and civil disobedience. The concept of nonviolent resistance is used interchangeably with civil resistance and nonviolent struggle.

The contributors delve deep into history to recover strategic nonviolent actions that led to exceptional results in struggles for liberation and self-determination in the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries while simultaneously analyzing on-


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going conflicts. The volume also empirically examines fifteen cases from sub-Saharan Africa (Ghana, Mozambique, and Zambia), North Africa and the Middle East (Algeria, Egypt, Iran, and Palestine), Asia and Oceania (Burma, Bangladesh, and West Papua), Europe (Hungary, Kosovo, and Poland), and the Americas (Cuba and the United States). These chapters are preceded by a well-framed introductory account by Bartkowski that is complemented by Lee A. Smithey’s theoretical analysis into the relationship between the construction of collective identity and the methods of collective action that nonviolent resisters develop and deploy. In the concluding chapter, Bartkowski recounts the foregoing theoretical and empirical arguments. Analysis presented in the selected case studies facilitate answering the volume’s main questions:

What kinds of nonviolence tactics were used in national struggles? What made some nonviolent campaigns successful despite unfavorable conditions and what made others fail or achieve only partial success? What was the impact of diverse acts of civil resistance on the further unfolding of a conflict and its eventual outcomes? How did collective nonviolence actions influence nations, their collective identities, or socioeconomic and political institutions that evolved during the national struggles? Did civil resistance have longer-term consequences on the historical development of these countries? Finally, why do the annals so often ignore the presence and role of civil resistance? (p. 4)

The authors demonstrate how common people have successfully applied a variety of bottom-up nonviolent strategies, some routine in their daily lives, to overcome coercive political authorities. The role of women is particularly emphasized. For instance, in Algeria (chapter 6), women used the common act of wearing veils as a powerful symbol of devotion to Islamic culture and a rejection of the imposed, French culture (p. 35). In Egypt (chapter 7), during the 1805 revolution, women put mud on their hands and hair as a sign of contempt for the politics of the establishment (p. 127). In 1947, some 7,000 women in Buzi, Mozambique, disregarded the Portuguese colonialists’ order to plant cottonseeds and demanded wage increases and more land rights (p. 92).

A wide range of innovative nonviolent tactics has been applied to create psychological dilemmas for coercive adversaries. As this book points out, these include the use of humor, distribution of flowers and food to security forces, and the incorporation of familiar activities, such as prayer, weddings, and musical performances. Mary E. King, in her analysis of Palestine (chapter 9), underscores an assortment of nonviolent maneuvers that have been used against the Israeli occupation. Much of what is popularly understood about the Palestinian struggle involves theocratic justifications and episodes of violence. Challenging these perspectives, King recovers applied nonviolent strategies and tactics used by the Palestinians, revealing that beginning in the 1920s they adopted persuasion, appeals, petitions, noncooperation, and prayers highlighting the dangers facing their society.

In illustrating elements of diffusion and reincarnation in the philosophy and repertoire of nonviolent struggle, Bartkowski highlights that Mahatma Gandhi, the preeminent leader of Indian nationalism, ‘learned among others, from Hungarian civil resistance of the 1850s–1860s and the Russian Revolution of 1905’ (p. 347). Similarly, Kwame Nkrumah’s approach to the liberation of Ghana and Kenneth Kaunda’s to self-determination for Zambia were greatly inspired by Gandhian philosophy. In an analy-
sis of Egypt, Arm Abdalla and Yasmin Arafa present the 2011 revolution against the authoritarian regime of Hosni Mubarak as a reincarnation of the 1919 revolution against British occupation, although the former was leaderless. Both revolutions emphasized unity among all Egyptians, regardless of their faith, by adopting the same flag, with a cross and crescent, involving women and children, and embracing similar repertoires of nonviolent methods, among them humor, art, song, and satire, to express their demands.

All the authors convincingly argue how armed or militaristic struggles tend to be better remembered, cherished, and accounted for compared to civilian-led nonviolence initiatives. For example, Malika Rahal observes that in Algeria, the preambles of the country’s 1963, 1976, and 1987 constitutions stress the outstanding role of the armed struggle in winning independence, present armed resistance as the ultimate liberation tool, and glorify the memory of the shuhada (martyrs). In fact, Algeria is in common parlance referred to as Blad Milyum Shahid—the ‘million-martyr country’ (p. 108). Yeshua Moser-Puangswan points out that in Burma (chapter 10), textbooks focus on the violent rebellions, the warrior kings of bygone eras, and military domination over neighbors. There has been an obvious effort by the army to reengineer history and purge memories of Burmese civil resistance. From 1962 to 2012, education and the media in Burma remained under strict government control and heavy censorship, leaving no room for alternative historical accounts (p. 193). In Poland (chapter 14), Bartkowski illustrates that the tradition of armed resistance is deeply ingrained in Polish culture as exemplified by the capital, Warsaw, which survived a number of wars throughout its history and in 1940 was awarded Poland’s highest military decoration for heroism, the Virtuti Militari, for the siege of 1939. In 2005, the Warsaw Rising Museum, equipped with technology for re-creating a ‘fighting Warsaw’, opened.

The excellent qualities of this volume notwithstanding, there are a few noteworthy gaps. According to the editor, the case studies were selected according to three criteria: relatively under-researched cases of civil resistance, presence of narratives that glorify armed insurrections, and representation of major geographical areas. Based on these parameters, one might not understand why two neighboring southern African states, Zambia (chapter 4) and Mozambique (chapter 5), are included but no cases from Central Africa and East Africa. It would be interesting for example, to recover the nonviolent resistance initiatives in the shadow of the much-immortalized Mau-Mau uprising in Kenya. The case of Ghana as presented in this volume may not necessarily satisfy the criteria (save perhaps the third factor). In the analysis on Ghana (chapter 3), Gail Presbey makes the claim that most accounts of Ghana’s independence struggle focus too narrowly on the leading role of J. B. Danguah and Nkrumah. One would, therefore, expect a different focus, but Presbey fails to correct the omission he sets out to rectify. While explanations for the absence of cases from the Baltics (written about elsewhere) and Latin America (acknowledging that more research is needed) are presented, no explanation is given for the absence of cases from Western Europe.

That nonviolent struggles have been overshadowed by their armed counterparts cuts through the entire volume, so one would have expected to find a thorough theoretical discussion accounting for why armed struggles have produced more iconic figures and more glamorized personalities vis-à-vis nonviolent initiatives. Chapter 2 presents a worthy discussion on the relationship between the construction of collective identity and methods of collective nonviolent action. Unfortunately, however, the
chapter fails to engage the central argument. In the concluding chapter, Bartkowski endeavors to provide a general explanation of why armed struggles have overshadowed nonviolent forms, but limits the discussion to masculinity, asserting, ‘Changing entrenched views about the effectiveness of armed resistance is particularly hard as they are usually rooted in a warrior psychology that is shaped by violent masculinity and patriarchy’ (p. 341). This should be considered a beginning, as the discussion only consists of two pages. Perhaps, Frantz Fanon’s thesis of the therapeutic nature of violence against adversaries, such as colonialists, deserves further examination. If Fanon is right, what are the possible mechanisms that can shape shared perceptions that rightly view nonviolence as a superior form of resistance?

The volume is intended to pay more attention to agency than to structure, but as Pierre Bourdieu famously argued, the two—agency (subjective) and structure (objective)—are homologous and have an unconscious relationship; neither can be understood without the other. It would seem to be important that each chapter featuring an empirical case provide a theoretical explanation of how agency and structure interact to suppress a critical history of nonviolent resistance, but this is only done in chapter 16, on the United States, where Conser cites two major factors—ignorance and psychosocial—as accounting for both structure and agency. To explain ignorance he states, ‘Thousands of school children in the US are drilled on the sacrifices of soldiers. Few learn of . . . nonviolent resistance’. On the second factor, he argues, ‘Another more psychological factor is emotional ethos associated with dramatized, glamorized, and often anti-septicised images of war versus the view that nonviolent resistance is submissive and passive’ (p. 315).

Overall, Recovering Nonviolent History contributes profoundly to the emerging distinct academic discipline of civil resistance struggles, especially in the wake of ongoing changes in the Maghreb. This volume will go down in academia as a pioneer in recovering nonviolent history.