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Human Security in Somali Region of Ethiopia after 1991
Abdiwasa Bade

The Politics of Managing Ghana’s Oil and Gas Revenues
Collins Adu-Bempah Brobbey

Immigration, the State of Exception and African Migrants in South Africa
Catherine Musuva

A Gender Analysis of Food Crop Farmers’ Adaption to Climate Change in Cameroon
Christine Ndie Abia

The Nexus between Land-Grabbing, Livelihood Insecurity and Conflict in Ethiopia: The Case of Majang in the Gambella Region
Seyoum Mesfin

The Fragility of Nigeria’s Kogi State: Exploring the Missing Link in the Quest for Sustainable Peace
Timothy Aduojo Obaje
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Making Visible the Invisible: A Glimpse into the History,</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evolution and Current Dynamics of Domestic Work Relationships in Sudan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hadelzein M.E.S. Elobeid</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy at Bay: The Formation and Resilience of</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarianism in Zimbabwe</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gideon Hlamalani Chitanga</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This publication ties together the multi-dimensional links between human security, border conflicts, natural resources management, human migration, food security, climate change, labour, social movements and governance issues in Africa. The central argument is that for human security and conflict transformation to be established in the continent, these interlinked issues have to be addressed. Furthermore, the success of the various national and international efforts to address the effective management of Africa’s natural resources will only be successful if the institutions for managing these issues at all levels understand and appreciate the multiplicity of factors behind them in each of the African countries. The related issues are discussed in detail in the various papers which constitute this publication.

On the issue of Human Security Abdiwasa’s article titled “Human Security in Somali Region of Ethiopia: Post 1991” argues that human insecurity has been the main feature of the Somali region of Ethiopia. It shows that the security prescriptions of the rulers of the central state in Ethiopia towards the region have remained remarkably counter-productive and have shaped the narrowly defined and guarded parameters of the state’s official approach to national security issues. Thus, security in Somali Region has been seen exclusively in terms of national defense-territorial integrity with dire consequences for self-rule, political freedom and economic wellbeing of the people. The article recommends that there is a need to move away from state centered security to people centered security and the need to pursue strategies of empowerment of the people.

Africa is immensely rich in natural resources but its people are among the poorest in the world. This paradox is both the cause and effect of the brutal exploitation of the continent’s resources which has fuelled violent and devastating conflicts including gross human rights violation. The article by Collins Adu-Bempah Brobbey on: The Politics of Managing Ghana’s Oil and Gas Revenues indicates that the discovery of oil and gas in commercial quantities in Ghana in 2007 engendered a widened optimism that Ghana had closed the chapter on the decades of economic hardship. Unfortunately, inadequate oversight system to provide insight into the management of oil and gas revenues coupled with successive governments’ failures to provide reliable information about oil and gas revenues has led to the erosion of Ghanaians’ confidence in their governments. Afro-pessimists argue that the oil and gas revenues would yield insignificant benefit to many, an argument rooted in the resource curse theory. The article reveals that neo-patrimonial proclivity is pervasive and hence obscures transparent management of oil and gas revenues. It thus concludes that institutional incentives are lacking and therefore recommends institutional reforms to insulate the oil and gas sectors from the vagaries of patronage politics.

Like in the rest of the world, migration in Africa with its different forms and reasons has always been an essential element in the historical processes of social, political and economic change.
However, in order to understand the development of contemporary African migration, it is also necessary to take into consideration the rapidly changing global context in which Africans are moving. Despite its weak position, Africa is embedded within the globalized political economy; hence African migration processes are driven by the same broad forces of globalization that shape migration in the rest of the world. As a result, patterns of African migration share many features with those of the rest of the world in that they are becoming more complex, involving a wider range of people moving to more destinations over longer distances encountering diverse experiences. For example, Catherine Musuva’s article: Immigration, the state of exception and African migrants in South Africa, argues that in response to African migration, which has been constructed as a threat to the wellbeing of South African citizens, South African state officials have employed measures which point to a ‘state of exception’ in an attempt to enforce territorial sovereignty. The article draws upon research on the everyday interaction of African migrants with state officials in Cape Town in the processes of applying for residence permits by and the processing and issuing of these by the state. In exercising their sovereign power, the South African state officials reduce many African migrants, particularly asylum seekers and refugees, to a condition in which they reside in South Africa with unstable legal status and little legal protection.

The agriculture sector as the backbone of food security and livelihood in most of Africa is predicted to come under substantial stress from climate change-induced increases in temperature, variability in rainfall and extreme weather events that could trigger crop failures, pest and disease outbreaks, and the degradation of land and water resources. Agriculture supports 70 percent of the Africa’s population and accounts for about 30 per cent of the continent’s GDP. Women play vital roles in ensuring food security and enhancing agricultural productivity. It is increasingly acknowledged that climate change impacts cannot be gender-neutral. This is evident from current experiences of extreme climatic events such as droughts and floods. Men and women have different coping and adaptive capacities that translate to gender-differentiated vulnerabilities to the impacts of a changing climate. Gender-based inequalities in access to assets and gendered social roles are mainly responsible for this difference in adaptive capacities to respond to the effects of climate change. Legal and socio cultural barriers also inhibit women from effectively responding to climatic risk. The empowerment of women and girls is critical for agricultural development and food security.

Christine Ndie Abia’s article: A Gender Analysis of Food Crop Farmers’ Adaption to Climate Change for Food Security in Cameroon, analyses women and men food crop farmers’ adaptation to climate change and its implications on food security in the humid forest and western highland agro-ecological zones of Cameroon. The article suggests that it is critical for policy makers to understand how both women and men farmers recognize and adapt to climate change in order to plan responses that will increase women’s food crop production and prevent food insecurity in the country, given that women constitute 80% of food crop producers in Cameroon.

Inappropriate land policies constitute a serious constraint on economic and social development in Africa, leading to conflicts between social groups and with state institutions. The article by Seyoum Mesfin titled: The Nexus among Land-Grabbing, Livelihood Insecurity and Conflict in Federal Ethiopia: The Case of Majang in Gambella Region examines the deleterious effects of Mechanized Commercial Farming (MCF)
on the livelihoods of the people and the local economy of the Majang community in Gambella Region. The central argument of the article is that government’s MCF development policy is critically inconsistent with the development needs of the people of Majang in that it is negatively undermining the livelihoods of the Majang people.

African countries today face greater challenges to peace and stability than ever before. They are a volatile mix of insecurity, instability, corrupt political institutions and poverty. Alarmingly, most of these countries lack the political will to maintain peace agreements and thus have fallen prey to continuous armed ethnic conflict. It is also shown that most African conflicts are caused by the combination of poverty and weak states and institutions. Timothy Aduojo Obaje’s article: The Fragility of Nigeria’s Kogi State: Exploring the Missing Link in the Quest for Sustainable Peace, analyses the status of Kogi state of Nigeria in relation to the question of sustainable peace. While the state is arguably considered as one of the “peaceful” states in Nigeria, a critical review of the state’s recent history suggests otherwise. The article identifies Kogi state government’s inadequate visibility and engagement in peace-building initiatives as a key factor responsible for such vulnerability to violent conflict.

According to the International Labour Office (ILO) millions of domestic workers provide essential services that enable others to work outside their homes. Thus, domestic workers help to keep labour markets and economies working around the globe. Most of the domestic workers are women and the vast majority are from the poorer sections of society. They work in the homes of others for pay, providing a range of services: they sweep and clean; wash clothes and dishes; shop and cook; care for children, the elderly, and the disabled. Some live in the premises of their employers and other work part-time, often for multiple employers. Domestic workers tend to have lower wages, fewer benefits, and less legal or social protections compared to most other workers. Many factors lead women to enter domestic work. Women from poor households or disadvantaged communities often have few employment opportunities, and may face discrimination based on gender, caste or class, race or ethnicity. Hadelzein M.E.S. Elbeid in the article: Making visible the invisible: a glimpse at the history, evolution, current context and dynamics of domestic work relationships in Sudan, states that in Sudan, as many other countries benefits greatly from domestic work’s contributions in many terms, albeit social or economic, all while marginalization, exclusion and invisibility of domestic workers remain while facts, whereabouts and notions of such controversial and rampant activity are unrevealed. The article attempts to expose the history, evolution and current context of domestic work in Sudan by tracing domestic work’s history in Sudan in relation to slavery where slaves were mainly used as domestic help; then goes through a recount of the evolution of domestic work in Sudan by exploring how domestic workers evolved from slaves to servants and what the contextual set up for such evolution is.

The end of colonialism in Africa brought into existence independent states which lacked both effective government institutions and modern national identities. Postcolonial African leaders were therefore faced by the dual challenges of state building and nation building. Most started out by adopting democratic constitutions copied from their European colonizers, but then quickly descended into various forms of authoritarianism. This is captured by Gideon Hlamalani Chitanga in his article Democracy at Bay: The Formation and Resilience of Authoritarianism in Zimbabwe argues that a combination of multiparty politics, racial reconciliation, socio-economic
and political stability after the liberation struggle positioned Zimbabwe as a beacon of hope and a continental model for post-colonial transition to independence. Indeed even as critical junctures of heightened political competition and regime insecurity since the 1980s generated brutal reaction from the state, there still was hope for transition to democracy. Drawing on a critical review of the relevant literature, this article argues that the Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) regime is inherently authoritarian. Beyond its selective brutality characterized by targeted violence, ZANU PF’s stay in power is anchored on the simultaneous exploitation of patronage, grounded on a well-articulated “indiginist” ideology and policies.

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From the Managing Editor

The nature of the African state and its operational governance architecture remains a primary bulwark in the attainment of its human security requirements. On issues of democratization, while some countries seem to be taking gigantic strides, many others are limping or regressing. In the area of land management similar issues of land ownership, land grabbing and land deprivation seem to plague countries such as Ethiopia, South Africa, Namibia, Zimbabwe, and several other countries. While the discovery of natural resources such as oil and gas should under normal circumstances engender economic growth and prosperity, the absence of strong institutional structures to channel the benefits from natural resource wealth has created an environment where rents are milked by corrupt politicians. The result has been the resource curse prevalent in the continent. The undeniable effects of climate change affects food security in Africa and the inability of the world to unite in fighting climate change has and will grossly affect food security in an already hungry continent. While Africa continues to grapple with the above mentioned challenges the movement of Africans either to Europe in search of a better life or to more stable and wealthier countries has reached crisis levels.

The appropriate response to these issues will not be found solely in the political decision making circles, which in most cases have exacerbated these problems. While political decisions are necessary and warranted, they must be backed by context driven research by the African intelligentsia. UPEACE has been at the forefront of building a new breed of African intelligentsia well versed on issues of governance and security. This special issue of the Africa Peace and Conflict Journal contains ten articles focusing various governance and security challenges in Africa.

As Africa continues the search for solutions to its myriad challenges, various trends seem to emerge, which are derived from global trends. If this montage of energies by the African intelligentsia and political class evoke a trend bedeviled by deeper problems seemingly unsolvable, one wonders where the continent is heading to. The events in Burundi over the last month are symptoms of deeper problems in the democratization process in Africa. The recent approach by Zimbabwe for Western countries to assist with food donations as a result of bad harvests are manifestations of not only climate change but the mismanagement of the economy as well as western sanctions resulting from the strangle hold on power by President Mugabe. The rise in terrorist activities in Nigeria with Boko Haram pledging its allegiance to the Islamic state and expanding its theatre of operations to other countries such as Cameroon, Chad and Niger is a vivid demonstration of the security dilemma faced by African countries in an age of terrorism.

Most research and policy prescriptions for the above challenges are dogmatically derived from the liberal peace paradigm in a continent with its own specificities. The aims of the liberal peace paradigm are simple but familiar: to end armed violence and to establish human rights, democracy and market economies. The intellectual provenance of this paradigm arose from the western enlightenment. It envisions the
United Nations, outside intervening states, state governments, and oppositional factions, undertaking mediation, military intervention, war settlement, disarmament, election monitoring, refugee resettlement and the creation of free government institutions, free markets and a free media. A cardinal virtue is finitude: When will the operation end?

Such an approach is far too narrow. Some of the articles in this issue, which are based on empirical study, demonstrate the narrowness of this approach. While not rejecting human rights, democracy, economic growth or the United Nations, it is abundantly clear that building peace must be contextually driven especially when it comes to Africa. Africa needs a new way of approaching its challenges and evidently Africa has been unable to comprehensively address its state building challenges. Hopefully academics and policy makers will find the articles helpful.

Samuel Kale Ewusi
Managing Editor
Human Security in the Somali Region of Ethiopia after 1991

Abdiwasa Bade

This article argues that human insecurity has been the main feature of the Somali region of Ethiopia. The article is based primarily on the analysis of empirical data, but also makes use of information collected from secondary sources. It shows that the security prescriptions of the Ethiopian federal government towards the region have remained remarkably counter-productive, and have shaped the narrowly defined and guarded parameters of the state’s official approach to national security issues. Thus, security in the Somali region has been interpreted exclusively in terms of defending the territorial integrity of the state, with dire consequences for self-rule, political freedom and the economic wellbeing of the people. The article recommends a shift from a state-centred to a people-centred approach to security. It also makes the case for the adoption of strategies to empower the people of the region.

The Somali region is one of the nine regions of the Federal Republic of Ethiopia. Formerly known as the Ogaden region, it is one of the poorest and most conflict-ridden regions of Ethiopia. Before its collapse in 1991, Somalia had claimed this region as part of ‘Greater Somalia’. Two wars have been fought between Ethiopia and Somalia over this region. Somalia’s territorial claims have generated continued uncertainty and suspicion on the part of successive regimes in Addis Ababa towards the population in the Somali region. In addition to the fear of revived Somali irredentism, an attempted referendum in 1994, led by the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), has exacerbated the suspicion of the federal government in Ethiopia.

Ethiopia’s monarchical and military governments, which enjoyed unrestricted power, had in the past stripped the people of the Somali region of all political, economic and social protection in the name of national security. During this period, Somalis were discriminated against politically, economically and socially, and advocates of the human security of the Somali people were dismissed as ‘anti-unity’, Wenbedes (rebels) or Shiftias (bandits). In the words of Merera, ‘the national inequal-
ity under which the Somalis suffered during those periods was naked. Consequently, the authoritarian regimes’ notions of security included the suppression of anti-discrimination voices and movements.

The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) overthrew the Derg in 1991 and ushered in a new system of ‘ethnic federalism’, with the ostensible objective to ‘give greater autonomy to ethnic communities to manage their affairs’. Since the inception of the federal system, the Somali region of Ethiopia has been one of the constituent units of the Ethiopian federation, which has allowed Somalis to use their own language. The official recognition of the use of the Somali language in administration and education is an important concession that secured a certain amount of good will for the central government. In addition, the new political system has brought some changes in the Somali region of Ethiopia. Although still on a small scale and highly irregular, the provision of public services is now a reality in the region.

However, many of the problems experienced by the Ethiopian Somali population since the 1960s persist. Insecurity and economic hardship continue to be the defining features of the region. Undue intervention by the federal government in the affairs of the region remains; the federal government exerts direct control and influence over the Somali region via its military presence, through the control of the region’s ruling party, and through advisors assigned from the centre. The federal government has undermined the constitutionally guaranteed rights of genuine autonomy and administration, co-opted certain Somali elite and elders, and neglected the human rights of the people. Consequently, the concept of security, as it pertains to the Somali region continues to be interpreted narrowly as state or territorial security. As Medhane notes, ‘successive Ethiopian regimes perceived government action in the region primarily in military rather than civilian terms’.

The study used the qualitative research approach, mainly drawing on the views and experiences of members of the Somali ethnic group of Ethiopia, to understand the problem of insecurity in the region. Interviews and focus group discussions were conducted with members of the community. By exploring the importance of self-rule in the context of state-centric practices of self-determination and security, this article aims to highlight the human security challenges of the Somali region. Although it adopts a human security framework, the focus of the article is mainly on the political aspect of human security. As one of the pillars of the human security model, political security is concerned primarily with the protection and promotion of the human rights and well-being of the people, that is, protection from state repression and the right to self-determination and economic well-being. Thus, political security is a prerequisite for achieving other aspects of human security.

CONCEPTUALIZING HUMAN SECURITY

As a concept, human security transcends the narrow traditional view of state security, and encompasses the security of individuals and communities. This perspective invariably incorporates notions of self-rule, economic self-sufficiency, human dignity, and meaningful participation in the life of the community. In fact, the genealogy of the term ‘human security’ can be traced to the establishment of the United Nations (UN) in 1945, and draws on the views of the then US Secretary of State, Edward R. Stettinius, who argued that ‘the battle for peace has to be fought on two fronts’ – the security front on the one hand, and the economic and social front on the other hand.

According to the Commission on Human Security, human security ‘means protecting fundamental freedoms – freedoms that are the essence of life […]. It means creating political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity’. Thus, human security is a condition of existence in which basic material needs are met, and human dignity, including meaningful participation in the life of the community can be realised. Equally important in this conceptualisation is the freedom from fear of political suppression. Therefore, a shift in focus from the state to the people is central to the concept of human security.

HUMAN SECURITY IN THE SOMALI REGION OF ETHIOPIA

The paper does not dismiss the importance to safeguard the national security of the country; national security is as important as human security. However, there are certain elements that need to be emphasized when discussing the importance of human security in the Somali region of Ethiopia. First, human security is about the everyday security of individuals and their communities rather than the security of the state alone; it is about the security of ethnic Somalis. The concept of human security is appropriate in this context because of serious problems in the Somali region, which make it imperative to construct a strategic framework that goes beyond protecting the national borders of the country. Second, in discussing human security in the Somali region, the social, political and economic dimensions of security are taken into consideration.

Ethiopian politics has for a long time embraced the traditional state-centred notion of security. For successive regimes in Ethiopia, security was taken to mean the security of the state against perceived internal and external threats. The use of military force was a legitimate means of defence against external aggression, but also a widely used instrument for dealing with perceived internal threats. Dissenting voices had no

place in society, and demands for political and economic reforms were considered to be offensive and anti-Ethiopian. Not surprisingly, the concerns of the ethnic Somali population were securitized at all levels. This led to the practice of suppressing the voices that called for genuine autonomy for the Somali people.

The most widely used concept in the Somali region is ‘amni sugid’, which in English means maintaining security. Security is a foundational concept in the Somali region mainly because communities in the region are aware of its centrality in their lives, but also because the concept resonates with the condition of uncertainty that characterizes relations between the region and the federal government in Addis Ababa. The uncertainty of security appears to be a permanent condition of the Somali people. It is an everyday concern that is widely felt and ultimately inescapable, and which defines the existence of the people in the region. The following section discusses how state-centred security strategies and practices have affected the human security conditions of the people living in the Somali region since 1991.

FEAR OF IRREDENTISM AND SECESSION – ‘SECURITY DILEMMA’

Perhaps fearful of the possibility that the Somali regional administration would become too powerful and seek integration into Somalia, the EPRDF government has been meddling in the region’s affairs since 1994. The federal government has used allegations of corruption, nepotism and subversion (referring to the activities of groups such as the ONLF) as pretext to constantly reshuffle the regional administration and maintain a security presence in the region. 8

There is a belief among Ethiopian policymakers and academics that a unified and peaceful Somalia would increase the chances of armed conflict between the two neighbouring states. There is no doubt that the Somali region of Ethiopia would be caught in the middle of such a conflict, although it is unclear where the loyalty of the local population would lie. Fuelling these concerns is the statist perspective of security, which is at the centre of the mistrust between the federal government and the people of the Somali region. The fear and concerns of the Ethiopian government resonate with academic arguments, which suggest that political autonomy intensifies secessionist tendencies by reinforcing regionally based ethnic identities and supplying groups at the regional level of government with the resources to engage in secession. 9

Conversely, the strength of a regional state is the key factor that determines the ability of decentralization to reduce secessionism. Decentralization would reduce secessionism by bringing the government closer to the people, increasing opportunities to participate in government, and ultimately giving groups control over their political, social and economic affairs. 10 This enables regions, as well as ethnic groups clustered

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8. Interview with Somali Intellectual, Jigiiga, 3 June 2013; Interview with civil servant in the regional government, Jigiiga, 9 June 2013; Focus Group Discussion 1, Jigiiga, 23 May 2013; Focus Group Discussion 2, Jigiiga, 29 May 2013.
in regions, to pass legislation at the regional level of government aimed at protecting their various interests and concerns, including language rights, economic development and security. From this perspective, decentralization reduces the incentives for regions to seek their own independent states.

Similarly, as Jacob argues, an irredentist claim cannot succeed if the affected population does not feel somewhat discontented with the policies of the nation-state under whose jurisdiction they live.\textsuperscript{11} Thus, it is usually the exclusionary policies of the state that trigger conflicts, resulting in more elaborate or sometimes desperate solutions. Secessionism and Irredentism emerge as a reaction to those policies. As Saidman and Ayres put it, ‘if ethnic groups are insecure, they will either seek to control the state, create a new state they can control (secession), or join a state where their ethnic group is more secure (irredentism)’.\textsuperscript{12}

Overall, while there is no easy solution, accommodation and compromise through negotiations could be the best strategy.\textsuperscript{13} Accommodation often involves genuine policies of autonomy (cultural, political and territorial) for regional ethnic groups. As the Ethiopian national security strategy document notes, reversing any future threat and safeguarding the unity of the people should be achieved ‘not by denying them options but by helping them recognize and confirm in practice the option based on equality, mutual development and democracy’.\textsuperscript{14}

In principle, the policy of the federal government recognises the imperative to protect human rights, democracy and good governance. It also underlines that the country’s survival is principally predicated on the welfare of its citizens. However, the plight of the people in the Somali region of Ethiopia does not reflect these policy stipulations. The federal government’s interference in all aspects of the Somali region’s affairs, through its advisors and military forces, has resulted in discontent among the people of the region, prompting accusations that ‘the central government’s attempts to tightly control regional political processes undermines the essence of regional self-rule that the federal Constitution mandates’.\textsuperscript{15} Although the central government denies accusations of intervention, the view from local residents is that there is too much federal interference in the administration of the region. Findings from interviews and focus group discussions suggest a strong feeling among the local people that the approach of the federal government does not allow genuine autonomy for the Somali region. Respondents believe that human security should be the principal objective of the federal government’s policies and actions in the region. The majority of the people blame the deadlock in the region on the federal government’s failed policies and its unskilful use of force, which have alienated the region.\textsuperscript{16}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{13} Interview with Somali Intellectual, Jigjiga, June 3, 2013.
  \item \textsuperscript{14} Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2002.
  \item \textsuperscript{15} Abdi Ismail Samatar, ‘Ethiopian Ethnic Federalism and Regional Autonomy: The Somali Test’, \textit{Bildhuun: An International Journal of Somali Studies}, 5 (2005), 44-76.
  \item \textsuperscript{16} Interview with Somali Politician, Jigjiga, 12 June 2013; Interview with a member of the House of People’s Representative and member of the SPDP, Addis Ababa, 5 April 2013; Interview with Somali intellectual, Jigjiga, 3 June 2013; FGD 2, Jigjiga, 29 May 29, 2013.
\end{itemize}
It is important to emphasise that a country’s security policy should focus on protecting its territorial integrity; no country would adopt policies to dismantle its territory. However, protecting the territorial integrity of the state should not be an excuse to undermine the human security and constitutionally guaranteed rights of the people, as is the case in the Somali region. As discussed below, such a statist approach to security has created divisions within the Somali region, especially between the people and their leaders, resulting in frequent leadership crises, the prevalence of patrimonial politics, as well the neglect of the economic and human rights of the population.

**ASPIRATIONS OF SELF-RULE AND AUTONOMY IN THE SOMALI REGION: UNFULFILLED PROMISES?**

The system ethnic federalism in Ethiopia provoked both hope and scepticism from scholars and commentators on Ethiopian politics. It was seen as a mechanism that would allow different ethnic groups to exercise greater autonomy and self-rule, while also serving to resolve long-standing questions of nationality in the country. However, sceptics saw ethnic federalism as a recipe for instability and disintegration. Be that as it may, the new political order in Ethiopia has been considered a radical shift. Turton calls it ‘radical and pioneering’, since the territorial reorganization of the state in Ethiopia was also accompanied by the introduction of the discourse of self-determination on the basis of linguistic and/or ethnic criteria. The introduction of ethnic federalism had implications for the recognition of cultural rights. In this regard, the preamble of the Ethiopian Constitution begins with the phrase ‘We nations, nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia’, as opposed to the usual ‘We the people’. Unlike in the past, the current political system intends to promote mutual understanding among cultures.

Accordingly, in the post-1991 period, the recognition of the Somali culture and language has been welcomed by members of the Somali ethnic group. In addition to quelling emotional tensions, the revival of cultural activities has played an important role in rehabilitating communities and individuals, assisting them to recover from past mistreatment and overcome their mistrust of other Ethiopians. However, the official discourse of self-rule is at a crossroads in the Somali region of Ethiopia. Ethiopian federalism contemplates that regional states will retain a significant degree of autonomy so that their power can serve as a meaningful counterweight to the power of the federal government. For this vision to be realised, states must retain considerable political autonomy. The Ethiopian Constitution grants equal powers and responsibilities to the various regional states, stating in Article 47 that ‘Member States of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia shall have equal rights and powers’. In other words, the Ethiopian federation is constitutionally designed to be a symmetrical system.

Contrary to expectations, the devolution of power is generally missing in the region. According to an official interviewed in the region, federalism has brought few

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political and economic benefits to the region.\textsuperscript{18} There is a general view that very little has been done to put into action the constitutional principles of autonomy and self-rule. This has led some to liken the current dispensation to the Derg regime, which outlined similar rights in its 1987 Constitution and manifestos but never respected them. As noted above, the lack of meaningful progress in the implementation of the principles autonomy and self-rule in the Somali region can be attributed to the federal government’s fear that the region might secede from Ethiopia or become the object of irredentist claims from Somalia. However, by violating the Somali region’s right to self-rule and undermining the human security of its people, the federal government is inadvertently subjecting the Ethiopian state to conditions of insecurity.

**LEADERSHIP CRINES**

Governance in the Somali region has been characterized by an unending blame game, particularly over the failure to provide social services to the people. Members of the Somali community believe that due to the interference of the federal government in the affairs of their region over the last 20 years, the region is without a strong indigenous political class. This has contributed to uncertainty and the absence of peace and stability in the region, as evident in the high turnover of regional presidents compared to other regions in Ethiopia. Since its creation, the region has been led by 10 presidents from three different political parties – the ONLF, the Ethiopian Somali Democratic League (ESDL) and the Somali People’s Democratic Party (SPDP).

Referring to the high degree of institutional instability in the region, Hagmann argues that ‘senior bureaucrats and civil servants have been dismissed and re-appointed at an impressive pace since 1991’.\textsuperscript{19} The regional leadership and its federal government advisors have repeatedly employed the *Gimgama* (self-evaluation meetings) to eliminate any opposition to the status quo coming from the region’s public and private sectors. This has resulted in a high turnover of senior political officials and civil servants at a rate not seen in any other regional state, with serious consequences for the stability and development of the region.\textsuperscript{20}

Somali political parties and politicians are generally considered to be corrupt, incompetent, and answerable only to federal officials. This has disenchanted them in the eyes of the people. The SPDP, which currently governs the region, has been unable to overcome these problems because of the absence of mechanisms for popular participation in the affairs of the regional government. People generally perceive the regional government as being embroiled in the politics of the central government rather than ‘serving the people’, who are rarely consulted about decisions taken on their behalf.\textsuperscript{21}

In October 2008, an Addis Ababa based newspaper, *The Reporter*, published an article

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{18} Interview with a member of the House of People’s Representative and member of the SPDP, Addis Ababa, 5 April 2013.
  \item \textsuperscript{20} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{21} Interview with Somali intellectual, Jigjiga, 3 June 2013; Interview with civil servant in the regional government, Jigjiga, 9 June 2013; Interview with an elder, Jigjiga, 15 June 2013; Interview with a Somali politician, Jigjiga, 12 June 2013; FGD 1, Jigjiga, 23 May 2013; FGD 2, Jigjiga, 29 May 2013.
\end{itemize}
in which it criticized leaders in the region for ‘being a burden on the people’, pointing to the failure of development and security policies in the region. The failure of regional leaders to improve the living conditions of the people has been pointed out in almost every annual review meeting and parliamentary session.

The Somali regional leadership has argued that poor infrastructure and the lack of security are the major causes of all the problems in the region. However, federal government assessments frequently point to what they call ‘lack of committed leadership’ as the major obstacle to the region’s stability and development. Every year the EPRDF sets an aggressive deadline for the region’s leadership to address its shortcomings, and always vows to take necessary action against the SPDP leadership if conditions do not improve in the region. However, such threats are never taken seriously by the local population, and are seen as an attempt by the government in Addis Ababa to cover up its failures in the region, especially since the EPRDF handpicks regional leaders and uses them to impose its will on the people of the region. The situation in the Somali region reflects a larger trend whereby the EPRDF has actively encouraged and supported political entrepreneurs in several regions of the Ethiopian federation to form political organizations, which eventually become ruling parties in their respective regions. As pro-EPRDF formations, these regional parties serve to facilitate the ruling party’s dominance in the entire country. This form of political engineering has been used as a state security strategy, allowing the EPRDF government to establish total control over regional administrations through the agency of so-called ‘friendly’ parties, all of which have remained in power in their respective regions.

In addition, it can be argued that a two-tier patronage system has emerged in the Somali region, involving the federal government and the regional executive and president. The problem of patrimonial politics in the Somali region should be understood from the perspective that in the post-1991 era, the region has been managed essentially as a troubled area that needs to be controlled. This approach has facilitated the emergence of a neo-patrimonial/clientelist type of state, with its core characteristics of personalized power and the use of state resources to buy political loyalty. Thus, there is little public participation in the affairs of the regional government. The social and economic policies of the federal government have heavily supported this kind of system. In order to maintain control over the Somali region, the federal government has relied heavily on divide-and-rule tactics and political suppression, resulting in clan favouritism and an authoritarian administration.

Thus, most of the people interviewed for this study feel that both federal and regional political leaders do not respect the democratic provisions of the Constitution. Instead, they consider national unity and state security as over-riding goals, which are pursued at the expense of genuine self-rule and regional governance. Indeed, they see the pursuit of both genuine self-rule and state security as mutually exclusive goals. Not surprisingly, the federal government has set in motion a series of constitutionally unacceptable processes, which have led to the emergence of a de facto unitary state.

22. Interview with an SPDP member, Addis Ababa, 8 April 2013.
THE POLITICS OF CO-OPTATION AND CLAN MANIPULATION

Political co-optation, rather than genuine self-rule, has increasingly become the defining feature of politics in the Somali region. As Hagmann and Alemayehu note, ‘consecutive Ethiopian regimes have co-opted and partially incorporated customary authorities…in order to uphold security and state interests at the local level’. They add that the EPRDF ‘has actively fostered the emergence of loyal pastoral elite in its lowland regions’. Co-optation has not been confined to politicians and intellectuals, but has also been extended to the only remaining voice of the people, the elders. In the Somali community, it is the responsibility of elders to articulate the interests of communities and defend the rights of their people. When government policies and programmes fail to adequately address the needs of the poor and vulnerable sections of communities, it is the elders who intervene and represent the interests of these groups without fear or favour. Thus, defending citizens’ rights has been an important function of elders in a region riddled with conflict and political crises. Admittedly, performing these functions brings elders into conflict with the government. However, true elders should not relinquish their functions for the sake of mollifying the government.

This is not the case in the Somali region, where elders have been co-opted into the system in exchange for economic and political favours. This practice has undermined the status of elders in local communities, because it compromises their impartiality and limits their ability to play a watchdog role; they are no longer able to articulate and defend the interests of their communities. Elders in the Somali region have lost legitimacy in the eyes of the public because they are unable to make positive contributions to democracy and development in the region.

Politics in the Somali region is anchored primarily in the clan system rather than in ideology. While the clan system can serve as a stabilizing force, the example of the Somali region suggests that it can also become a source of destabilisation. As Mohamed Khalif and Hagmann point out, the clan system has fallen prey to the dynamics of the current political crisis and mismanagement in the region. The region’s elite has systematically manipulated clan identities and politicized clan cleavages by favouring clans that would enable it to maintain authority. This has resulted in deep divisions and suspicious among the different clans and sub-clans in the region. The federal government has also been accused of inciting clan conflicts, using them as a pretext to get involved in the affairs of the Somali region. Inter-clan conflicts in the region reinforce claims by the EPRDF that the regional government needs the support of the federal government. This has created another avenue for the federal government to interfere in the day-to-day running of the regional administration and exert its hegemony in the territory.

26. Interview with Somali intellectual, Jigjiga, 3 June 2013.
THE PREVAILING HUMAN RIGHTS CONDITIONS IN THE REGION

There is a strong link between a sense of heightened insecurity and human rights conditions in the region. The denial of basic human rights such as the right to dignity has exacerbated the security situation of the people in the region. As noted earlier, officials in the Somali region are largely perceived to be corrupt and unaccountable to the people, while public participation in the political system is generally absent. There is also little public confidence in the criminal justice system and the rule of law.\textsuperscript{27} In the absence of effective institutions of democracy, human rights conditions in the region have deteriorated considerably over the past two decades.

Central to the worsening human rights situation in the Somali region is the role of the special police force, commonly referred to as the \textit{Liyu} police. This special police force is just one of many formations that make up the security apparatus of the region. It was established in 2007 to fight the ONFL,\textsuperscript{28} but has since become a source of terror for the local population. According to an officer in the regular police force, the Ethiopia federal government provides training and equipment to the \textit{Liyu} police, to enable it to succeed in the fight against the ONLF.\textsuperscript{29} Both the regional and federal governments have defended the existence of the special police force, arguing that it plays an important role in providing security in the region and defending the entire country from the terrorist activities of groups such as the ONFL and al-Shabaab in neighbouring Somalia. However, the local population holds a different view on the role of the special police force. An informant had this to say about the special police force:

\begin{quote}
They are underage boys. They do not respect the codes of our culture and religion, and do not receive proper training on human rights. \textit{Liyu} police is creating instability in the region, rather than fighting the ONLF. \textit{Liyu} police carries out illegal operations against the people.\textsuperscript{30}
\end{quote}

The special police force is seen as a creation of the federal government, which is used to suppress dissent and maintain order in the Somali region. Having a regional paramilitary force to lead security operations in the region enables the federal government to disguise its security crackdown in the region. The use of the special police force is also seen as a form of psychological warfare waged by the federal government against its critics in the region. The strategy aims to demonstrate to the local population that their own sons and daughters, who constitute the special police force, can be as dangerous as federal troops, if not worse.\textsuperscript{31}

It is true that Ethiopia faces security threats from armed groups operating in the Somali region, such as the ONFL, which require decisive response from both the federal and regional governments. However, the operations of the special police force do

\begin{itemize}
\item 27. Interview with a member of the Ethiopian House of People’s Representative and member of the SPDP, Addis Ababa, 5 April 2013.
\item 28. ONLF is considered as a terrorist group in Ethiopia.
\item 29. Interview with a former police officer, Jigiiga, 8 June 2013.
\item 30. Ibid.
\item 31. Interview with Somali intellectual, Jigiiga, 3 June 2013.
\end{itemize}
not constitute an appropriate response to these threats. If anything, they have contributed to alienating the local population from the EPRDF government. The force has been blamed for committing gross human rights violations in the region, and those who have spoken out against its security operations have been accused by the government of supporting insurgent groups. In fact, talking about human rights violation is a taboo in the Somali region.

**SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AT A CROSSROADS**

The concepts of human security and human development are two sides of the same coin. Thus, in addition to the shortcomings in self-rule and the human rights abuses discussed above, the human security challenges in the Somali region are also closely linked to the lack of meaningful regional development. The Somali region is considered as one of the most economically underdeveloped regions in Ethiopia. Various reports published by the federal government and humanitarian organizations indicate that, compared to the rest of the country, socio-economic conditions in the region have remained largely the same after two decades of supposed self-rule. Access to basic services such as health, education and potable water remain a dream for the majority of the population, including those residing in the region’s capital, Jigjiga. The region’s infrastructure is also in a very poor state.

Although the region has a huge potential for livestock farming, years of neglect and political marginalisation within the Ethiopian federation mean that this potential has not been harnessed. Hagmann argues that the Somali region has remained a periphery state throughout most of its modern history, causing frustration and ill-will of its people towards the government. Similarly, Devereux notes that as a result of the marginalisation of the Somali region within Ethiopia, Somali pastoralists live on the margins of society in almost every sense. An ‘Atlas of the Ethiopian Rural Economy’ published in 2006 by the International Food Policy Research Institute and the Ethiopian Central Statistical Agency also points to the marginalisation and neglect of the Somali region. Several maps in the atlas illustrating the socio-economic and demographic conditions in the different regions of the country, including access to potable water, marital status of household heads and education facilities, did not present any data for the Somali region. This omission resonates with Devereux’s assertion that several years into the 21st century, the Somali region remains an uncharted territory. The absence of data on the region further exemplifies the poor state of development and human security in the region.

33. Interview with civil servant in the regional government, Jigjiga, May 2013.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Despite the adoption of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia, the federal government has failed to demonstrate the political will necessary to translate the values and principles contained in the Constitution into effective policies and programmes that promote self-rule and the socio-economic welfare of the people in all regions. Due to the fear of secession and irredentist claims, the federal government has engaged with the Somali region of Ethiopia in a manner that has undermined human security in the region. As part of its security strategy in the region, the EPRDF-led government has propped up corrupt regional leaders, co-opted regional elders and generally overlooked the human rights of the people. As a result, people in the Somali region have been subjected to a life of poverty, instability and injustice. This has in turn given rise to deep-seated mistrust in the region towards the federal government.

Going forward, there is need for the Ethiopian leadership to realise that a state-centric approach is inadequate to provide security for its citizens. Human security concerns, including the protection of human rights, the strengthening of self-rule, and the promotion of the economic wellbeing of the people, should form part of the national security calculus. The Somali region and the rest of the country share an interest in surviving against all odds, and should therefore harmonise their security policies. This will help improve the security of the Ethiopian state and that of its Somali population. Finally, the regional and federal governments should work towards the realization of the rights guaranteed in the Constitution. In this regard, the federal government should stop meddling in the affairs of the Somali region. It should also dismantle its patrimonial relationship with the region, and promote cohesion among the different clans in the region.
The discovery of oil and gas in commercial quantities in Ghana in 2007 engendered widespread optimism that the country will soon emerge from decades of economic hardship. However, inadequate oversight over the management of oil and gas revenues has led to the erosion of public confidence in the ability of the government to use these resources to develop the country. Inspired by the resource curse theory, pessimists have argued that the exploitation of these resources will not yield any significant benefits for the Ghanaian people. Using secondary data and in-depth interviews, this article argues that owing to the prevalence of neo-patrimonial tendencies in the Ghanaian political system, there has been little transparency and accountability in the management of oil and gas revenues. The article therefore makes the case for institutional reforms, which will contribute to insulating the oil and gas sector from the negative effects of patronage politics.

The 2007 discovery of offshore oil and gas in commercial quantities in Ghana brought great relief to Ghanaians, who saw it as a tremendous opportunity to stimulate economic growth and development. Ghana's emerging oil and gas sector has been embraced a driver of change, which will enable the nation to transform its relatively weak and static economy into a middle income economy. However, the initial euphoria that accompanied the discovery of these resources has gradually faded away. Optimism that the discovery of oil and gas will transform the Ghanaian economy has been replaced by uncertainties about the management of revenue from these resources. Generally, there are growing concerns that rather than contribute to trans-

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forming the Ghanaian economy, the emerging oil and gas sector would fall prey to the ‘resource curse’ that has destroyed many African countries.³

The uncertainty surrounding the management of Ghana’s oil and gas revenues was ignited by the controversy over the deal signed between the previous administration of President John Kufuror and the US-based oil exploration company, Kosmos Energy, over the Jubilee oil fields. Public opinion in Ghana suggests that the terms of the deal were less favourable to the Ghanaian government, and that successive administrations have not properly managed the revenues that have accrued from the exploitation of oil and gas in the Jubilee Fields.⁴

A number of questions have dominated public debates on the oil and gas sector in Ghana. These include: why are successive governments persistently failing to show good faith in the management of the Jubilee Fields’ revenues? What accounts for the lack of transparency in the management of oil and gas revenues in Ghana? Is patronage politics responsible for the lack of transparency in the management of the oil and gas revenues? If it is, how could the oil and gas industry be insulated from the effects of patronage politics so that it does not become another case to confirm the resource curse theory?

Very few linkages have been observed between the gas and oil sector and other sectors of the Ghanaian economy. This has prompted a national debate on the potential of the sector to transform the traditional structure of the Ghanaian economy by generating resources for increased agricultural productivity and stimulating greater industrialization for accelerated job creation.³ Optimists believe that Ghana’s oil and gas industry will not only provide much needed revenue to support the government’s national development agenda, but will also have spillover effects on other sectors of the economy, thereby contributing to the diversification of the Ghanaian economy.⁶

On the contrary, pessimists draw from the resource curse theory to argue that oil and gas revenues will not yield any significant benefits to the people. Proponents of this view contend that there is a relationship between the ‘resource curse’ and nepotrimonal politics, adding that the latter serves as an impediment to legal-rational bureaucratic rule,⁷ simultaneously spurring crony capitalism and negating the transparent management of Ghana’s oil and gas sector. Ghana’s political system and culture

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are characterized by institutionalized and predatory neo-patrimonial practices, which are inimical to the transparent management of state revenues.8

Using data from interviews and other primary and secondary sources such as newspaper articles and official speeches, this paper analyses the effects of neo-patrimonial tendencies on the transparent management of Ghana’s oil and gas revenues. It begins by conceptualizing neo-patrimonialism before developing an analytical framework, based on David Easton’s ‘authoritative allocation of scarce resources’ and Harold Laswell’s model of ‘who gets what, when and how’.9 These theories are premised on the economic concept of scarcity, which holds that public resources are short in supply relative to their demand. The paper uses this framework to analyse the role of the logic of neo-patrimonialism (patron-client networks) in the process of authoritatively determining ‘who gets what, when and how’ of Ghana’s oil and gas revenues.

CONCEPTUAL ISSUES

Neo-patrimonialism is derived from Weber’s construct of ‘patrimonialism’,10 which he defines as a traditional form of rule, usually an autocratic or oligarchic regime, where all power flows directly from the leader. Such a regime is characterized by a merger of the public and private sectors, political exclusivity, as well as absolute personal power maintained through the use of political favours. Patrimonialism is used to describe political systems where leaders, serving as patrons, use state and private resources to secure the loyalty of clients in the general population.11 Unlike traditional patrimonialism, neo-patrimonialism co-exists with bureaucratic systems and at least a pretence of legal-rational legitimacy.12 In neo-patrimonial regimes, the leader’s political legitimacy is contingent upon the ability to deliver rewards and favours to the clients rather than resorting to legitimate authoritative means of allocating resources.

Ghana is characterized by two forms of neo-patrimonial regimes namely; regulated neo-patrimonialism (a regime where the public space and public policy are important aspects of society) and predatory neo-patrimonialism (a regime where the political elite primarily seeks personal wealth, resulting in the failure of institutionalization). Both forms undercut ethics; while the former seeks mutual accommodation to advance development (yet still allowing the political elite to hold onto power), the latter is defined by a political elite that is chiefly bent ‘on maintaining’ power (while privatizing public resources for personal gain and for the benefit of their respective ethnic communities). In such personalized regimes, leaders usually resort to traditional or informal authority instead of legal-rational authority. This tendency runs contrary to Easton’s concept of ‘authoritative means of allocating resources’. Likewise personal-

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11. Ibid.
ized regimes often rise and fall, depending on the capacity of the leader to persuade the critical mass of potential challengers that they are better off relying on his political leadership and management rather than seeking to access power themselves.  

It is perhaps for this reason that pessimists have concluded that Ghana is not only becoming a virtual democracy, but the state is also relatively weak and highly dependent on foreign aid. This has encouraged crony capitalism, repression, and anti-developmental tendencies. Pervasive neo-patrimonialism in the Ghanaian body politic has allowed leaders to hold onto power by maintaining monopoly over political appointments and continuously using appointments to bribe or provide favours to their acolytes and friends. For example, former presidents John Kufuor and John Atta Mills used to appoint their long-time friends to governmental positions. The main threat to a neo-patrimonial state is the mobilization of the urban sector that receives no favours from the president or other top public officials.

The consolidation of modern state power has always been indissolubly linked to the expansion of trade and the diffusion of capitalism. A neo-patrimonial bureaucracy is therefore the administrative instrument of an underdeveloped economy with limited trade and a large subsistence sector. The unlimited penetration of a neo-patrimonial logic into the Ghanaian economy constitutes a serious impediment to the appropriation of resources by the centre. Hence, the development of an efficient and ‘modern’ oil and gas revenue administration is problematic. The next section of the paper problematizes the structure and composition of the Jubilee oil field.

STRUCTURE AND COMPOSITION OF THE JUBILEE OIL FIELD

The Ministry of Energy has the sole oversight responsibility over the oil and gas sector. It also oversees the Energy Commission (EC) and the Ghana Petroleum Regulatory Authority (GPRA). GPRA is a regulatory body for the extractive industries and works in collaboration with the Public Interests Accountability Committee (PIAC), composed of traditional and religious leaders, as well as representatives from Think-Tanks, Advocacy Groups and Professional Associations. Members of the PIAC are appointed by the government. Although the PIAC has the onerous task of evaluating government priorities for investment and budget spending, and investigating oil management procedures, income and activities, it is plagued by conflicts of interest.

As indicated above, the Ministry of Energy is supposed to conduct oversight over the entire energy sector, including the operations of the state-owned Ghana National Petroleum Company (GNPC). However, the Petroleum Exploration and Protection Law (PEPL) of 1984 (PNDC Law 84), which governs all petroleum companies in Ghana empowers the GNPC to operate, and even enter into association with foreign

14. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
partners, without any significant oversight from the government. There are concerns that this law gives the oil and gas industry too much leverage, which, together with entrenched patronarial politics, undermines transparency and accountability in the management of the revenues that accrue from the sector. In the case of the Jubilee oil fields, although the state, the GNPC and foreign companies have signed a ‘Production Sharing Agreement’, this agreement does not contain any mechanisms that could serve as checks and balances on the operations of the different actors involved. This serves as a disincentive for reporting accurate information on the production and distribution of oil and gas in the Jubilee fields will.

**IS TRANSPARENCY A REALITY OR A MYTH IN GHANA’S OIL AND GAS SECTOR?**

The issue of transparency in the management of oil and gas revenues has provoked a major debate in Ghana’s body politic. The term ‘transparency’ seems to be enigmatic in the context of public management in Ghana. Ghanaian citizens are often cynical about the will of politicians to promote transparency, and this distrust is not unfounded. Although politicians often talk about the need for transparency in pursuit of the national development agenda, this rhetoric is hardly been accompanied by concrete action in that direction. For example, in his State of the Nation Address in 2011, former President John Atta Mills unambiguously stated that his government was committed to ensuring that the oil and gas sector is managed in a transparent manner. In his speech, President Mills declared that:

_As we join the ranks of oil-producing countries and thank the Almighty for the many gifts he has bestowed upon this nation, I assure Ghanaians that this government will account for every pesewa of the oil revenue._

However, President Mills and his government later signed a secret agreement with China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (Sinopec) to complete the first phase of the gas and oil infrastructure project without prior approval by Parliament. The award of the contract to Sinopec without the government following an open and competitive tender process caused a public outcry in Ghana, especially because other companies interested in the project had proposed better offers. As noted by one of the interviewees, the promise of inclusive deliberations for the development of a fundamental policy and master plan for the oil and gas sector (the Upstream Petroleum Authority Bill of 2008) was never realised. This prompted the Dialogue and Advocacy for Good Governance and the National Petroleum Authority to request the GNPC and other government officials to disclose the details of the agreement. However, Sinopec failed to disclose the agreement.

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18. Ibid.
23. Interview with informant, Ghana Integrity Initiative, Accra, 8 July 2013.
Governance Office of the Ghana Catholic Bishop’s Conference to recommend in December 2008 that details of oil contracts should be put in the public domain because the public has the right to know about them.

According to an energy expert, public dialogues should constitute a core element of the process of developing any future national legislation and policy to regulate the oil and gas sector in Ghana. He adds that it is the responsibility of the government to ensure that oil and gas deals benefit the country and its people. For this to be achieved, government officials have to rise above the practice of self-accountability and ensure that payments made by oil and gas companies are duly published. Such measures are necessary if Ghana is to avoid the fate of other resource-rich African countries like Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea and the Democratic Republic of Congo. This perspective is supported by a Ghananian parliamentarian who argues that civil society organizations, including the media, have a responsibility to use international mechanisms such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative to demand accountability from the country’s leaders. It is only through such activism that Ghana’s oil and gas sector can be safeguarded against the ‘resource curse’ that has bedevilled other oil-rich nations.

CHALLENGES IN GHANA’S OIL AND GAS SECTOR

Even before Ghana started producing oil and natural gas, there were intense public debates on how the revenue from these resources should be expended. This excitement was perhaps fuelled by the knowledge that the Jubilee field was the largest offshore oil discovery in West Africa over the last decade. It is believed to have estimated reserves of about 490 million barrels. Such proven reserves put Ghana on par with neighbouring Cameroon (400 million barrels), and above Cote d’Ivoire (100 million barrels), but below Nigeria (36.2 billion barrels).

The discovery of oil and gas often brings many promises and raises high expectations for the future. However, it also often comes with major challenges. An example of these challenges is the tendency for powerful individuals and groups to capture the proceeds from these resources to satisfy their personal interests, to the detriment of the interests of the larger public. For instance, in the case of Ghana, the oil company Tullow is reported to have prevented the use of electronic seals, which are installed on flow metres for independent verification of oil exports, on the grounds that these devices were not factored into the design of its Floating Production Storage and Offloading vessel (FPSO). Moreover, the onshore centre established by the Ghana Revenues Authority (GRA) to receive data from electronic seals has been largely ineffective because of the absence of an independent verification mechanism that is able to establish the authenticity of the information received by the GRA on oil and gas quantities and revenues.

In the light of the above, energy experts have suggested that the Ghanaiian government should be more proactive in the design of the new FPSO that will be used for

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25. Interview with a member of an advocacy group on energy efficiency in Ghana, Accra, 23 July 2013.
26. Interview with a Member of Parliament’s Select Committee on Energy, Accra, 19 July 2013.
28. Interview with an official, Ghana Revenue Authority, Accra, 10 July 2013.
production at the Tweneboaa-Enyera-Ntomme oil fields. This would ensure that provisions are made for the installation of the GRA’s electronic seals to allow for independent verification of oil production and exports. Given the weakness of the GRA to use its own mechanisms to assess and collect revenues from the export of oil, new measures have been adopted to empower the Commissioner of Taxes or her agents to enter any premises without prior notice for the purpose of assessing and collecting taxes due to the state. However, emphasis should be placed on the need for the government to strengthen its surveillance strategies to ensure the security of oil and gas revenues. It should be noted that in early 2010, civil society organizations in many resource-rich developing countries welcomed the Dodd-Frank Act, which was passed by the US Congress. The Act mandates all companies listed on the New York stock exchange to report all payments made to the governments of the countries in which they operate, and even break down the payments to the level of individual projects. This Act and other international initiatives such as the Publish What You Pay campaign, which calls for extractive companies to publish what they pay to governments, could be used to support efforts towards greater accountability and transparency in the oil and gas sector in Ghana.

The next section of the paper employs a multi-dimensional framework of neo-patrimonialism to show how politicians tend to deploy different forms of patronage to distribute state resources to their cronies and sympathisers in exchange for political legitimacy. The analysis focuses on two major manifestations of neo-patrimonialism: the transfer logic and the transformational logic. The transfer logic of neo-patrimonialism can take at least three forms, depending on the prevailing circumstances. The first, the ‘big man’ logic, is used in situations involving relatively few people. This entails the transfer and distribution of money and other material benefits by political leaders to their loyal clients in exchange for political authority. Where contact involves large numbers of people, populist politics is often deployed. This entails the use of specific public policy selectively designed to benefit a particular ethnic or religious group, or region. The programmatic appeal is often used in cases involving very large target groups. This takes the form of credible promises to supply certain resources to the target group. These promises are often contained in the manifestos of ruling parties.

The transformational logic of neo-patrimonialism refers to the selection criteria used by the political elite to choose its leaders during primaries. It consists of two strategies, which involve either a relatively small selectorate, which has the sole responsibility to choose who becomes the leader, and whose decision is often resolute, or a relatively large selectorate (made up of party delegates), which decides who becomes a leader. Evidence shows that Ghana is characterized by all these neo-patrimonial logics, hence the use of a multi-dimensional framework of neo-patrimonialism to analyse the management of oil and gas revenues in Ghana.

30. Interview with an official, Ghana Integrity Initiative, Accra, 3 July 2013.
32. Ibid.
33. Staffan I. Lindberg, “‘It is Our Time to Chop’: Do Elections in Africa Feed Neo-Patrimonialism rather than Counter-act it? Democratization, 10:2 (2003), 121-140.
NEO-PATRIMONIALISM IN THE MANAGEMENT OF OIL AND GAS REVENUES

Ghana’s energy sector is perceived to be the backbone of the nation’s socio-economic development. However, the management of the oil and gas sector requires major institutional reforms to unlock the socio-economic potential of the sector. Evidently, the sector is being challenged by pervasive nepotism, paternalism and conflicts of interest. For instance, politicians often employ relatives or close friends to occupy positions for which they are not qualified. While serving the neo-patrimonial interests of the hegemonic elite, this practice compromises the national interest. The level of paternalism in the Ghanaian body politic is so high that almost every public official is addressed as ‘Wofa’ (Uncle) or ‘Numo’ (Big man).34 In the context of pervasive patronage politics, there is little regard for the imperative to judiciously use the country’s mineral wealth for the benefit of the people.35 However, with growing public awareness of and debate on the mismanagement of the country’s oil and gas wealth, there is optimism that the activism of civil society organizations would result in greater oversight over the operations of this industry.36

As a result of the link between the logic of neo-patrimonialism and corruption in government, the personal interests of politicians often trump the public interest. Moreover, patronage politics spurs rivalry and unhealthy competition among clients, as they compete keenly for scarce resources and the patron’s favour. This results in official lines of responsibility being overwritten by patronage and clientelism. In order words, the boundaries between public role and private interests become unclear, with public office representing an important mechanism for private rent-seeking. State resources, and the state’s ability to shape resource flows, are used to lubricate patron-client networks. At the same time, the state’s ability to extract resources and regulate behaviours creates conditions for the manipulation of the supply of and access to scarce revenues.37

In such cases, politicians pursue programmes that are usually inconsistent with the national policy agenda, and this invariably results in management malfeasance. In other words, leaders often tie their personal interest to particular policies. For instance, former President Kufuor insisted on signing a contract with Kosmos Energy even though the company made the least competitive bid.38

Mistrust over the government’s commitment to ensure openness in managing oil and gas revenues has in recent times been fuelled by a series of contradictory statements and reports on oil production figures. On 9 November 2011, Tullow Oil Company indicated in a press statement that over 22 million barrels of oil were exported by 21 oil cargoes. However, the government’s 2012 budget statement indicated that actual production for the same period (January – September 2011) was 17.42 million barrels, while total oil production for the entire year was 24.78 million barrels.39 This disparity

34. Ibid.
35. Interview with Mr. Kwesi Jonah, Political Scientist, University of Ghana, Legon, 7 July 2013.
39. Ibid.
constitutes a serious breach of public trust, raising further doubts over the actual volumes of crude oil being shipped put of Ghana. In a related rent-seeking practice, the installation of calibrations on the production line metres of FPSOs was not properly verified by the Ghana Standards Authority, causing huge financial loss to the state. Incidents like these encourage perceptions that the management of oil and gas revenues is bedevilled by widespread cronyism and patronage politics.40

PROJECTION OF CITIZEN’S SHARE OF THE OIL AND GAS REVENUES

Diagram 1 shows the expected revenue to the government from oil and gas production for the period 2011-2020. Based on a 10-year average oil price of $65 per barrel, the expected revenues were US$490 million in 2011. This is expected to rise to about $2 billion in 2017, and then fall to about $1.2 billion in 2020. The prediction is that government revenues may be about $800 million on average per year between 2011 and 2029. Diagram 2 shows approximately how much each Ghanaian is expected to receive if oil revenues were to be distributed directly to individuals. Working with a 10-year average price of $65 per barrel, all things being equal, each Ghanaian would have received about $20 in 2011, which should rise to about $75 in 2017. The projections in both diagrams assume that Ghana will produce a total production of about 500 million barrels of oil over a 20-year period.

Diagram 1: Total Projected Revenue from Oil and Gas

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40. A. Othere-Darko, News Conference at the International Press Centre Danquah Institute, Accra, 21 December 2011.
The reality, however, is that most Ghanaians are not privy to information regarding the quantity of oil produced from the different oil fields. There is equally little disclosure on oil revenues or how they are actually used.\textsuperscript{41} Governments in Ghana are usually quick to disclose their expenditures but are not disposed to making public the revenues they receive and how these are disbursed. The management of oil and gas revenues is not an exception. For example, the government disclosed that the total cost for developing infrastructure to commercialize natural gas from the Jubilee oil fields exceeded US$ 1 billion. It even provided a breakdown of the infrastructure development project, which includes the construction of a pipeline from the Jubilee fields to the Osagyefo Power Barge (Phase 1), and the construction of another pipeline to connect the Takoradi Thermal Power Complex and the West African Gas Pipeline (Phase 2). However, a loan agreement signed between the government and the International Financial Consortium (IFC) involving about US$100 billion for the execution of both phases of the infrastructure development project was not approved by parliament, neither was it disclosed to the Ghanaian public. A similar loan agreement worth US $100 million was also signed between the government and Kosmos Energy Company. This rent-seeking behaviour has resulted in the government accumulating a debt of over US$ 215 billion.\textsuperscript{42} It is alleged that the signing of these loan agreements does not only allow government officials to receive illicit payments, but also enables the lenders to become partners in the management of the oil and gas sector.

\textsuperscript{41} Interview with Jonathan K. Dotse, Energy Expert, Tema Oil Refinery, Tema, 17 July 2013.

\textsuperscript{42} Interview with informant, Ghana National Petroleum Company, Tema, Accra, 13 July 2013.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The nascent oil and gas industry in Ghana has the potential to transform the country’s economy and improve the living conditions of its people. However, this article has demonstrated that the prevalence of neo-patrimonial politics and rampant corruption have undermined the effective management of revenues derived from the production of oil and gas. In particular, the article notes that there is little transparency and accountability from the Ghanaian government with regard to gas and oil revenues. The absence of transparency and accountability is attributable primarily to the fact that the oil and gas sector in Ghana has been captured by neo-patrimonial networks. This has prompted fears that rather than bring development to the Ghanaian people, the discovery of oil and gas is going to put Ghana in the league of African countries that have become victims of the ‘resource curse’. Based on this conclusion, the article makes the following policy recommendations:

• To ensure the effective management of oil and gas revenues, the government should facilitate the flow of information on the activities of the industry, and media activists should be properly trained to provide informed analyses of the sector.
• Parliament should expedite action to pass the Right to Information Bill, which would empower Ghanaians to have access to information pertaining to oil and gas production and revenues. Policy makers should also adopt the US’ Dodd-Frank Act and apply it in the Ghanaian context.
• Revenue Transparency should collaborate with Transparency International and the Revenue Watch Institute to ensure that information on oil and gas revenues is put in the public domain. This could be done by publishing periodic reports on the activities of this sector.
• Measures should be taken to put in place adequate institutional incentives that would insulate the oil and gas sector from the effects of patronage politics.
• Finally, the government should ensure greater synergy between the oil and gas industry and the rest of the economy. This would guarantee that the exploitation of these resources leads to broad-based development that meets the needs and aspirations of the people, especially those residing in resource-rich areas.
This article argues that in response to African migration, which has been construed as a threat to the wellbeing of South African citizens, South African state officials have employed measures which point to a ‘state of exception’ in an attempt to enforce territorial sovereignty. The state of exception, espoused by Giorgio Agamben, denotes a situation in which the law is suspended but still remains in force or is regarded as an instrument for constraining migrants. The article draws upon research on the everyday interaction of African migrants with state officials in Cape Town in the processes of applying for and issuing of residence permits. In exercising their sovereign power, state officials reduce many African migrants, particularly asylum seekers and refugees, to a condition in which they reside in South Africa with unstable legal status and little legal protection.

Since the end of apartheid, South Africa has become a major migration destination for Africans from other parts of the continent seeking a better life. Africans constitute over 72% of the migrant population in South Africa. There are approximately 998,000 African migrants in South Africa. The presence of African migrants in the country has been viewed in broadly negative terms and has translated into strong xenophobic sentiments. Fears abound that migrants are taking benefits that are meant for previously marginalised South Africans, and they are often blamed for exacerbating the country’s socio-economic problems.

International migrants challenge the triad of state-territory-citizen, on which the modern state is founded, and are thus construed as a threat to national security. The state, by definition, exists to serve its citizens and is characterised by a bias towards citizens. On the other hand, states also have obligations towards non-citizens. Increasing international migration, both forced and voluntary, means that the state must confront the changing composition of its population and the threat – real or imagined – that this poses to established notions of citizenship and belonging. It is within this context that this article explores how states regulate the entry of interna-

tional migrants into their borders and how they respond to the presence of migrants in their polity, using the case of South Africa.

International migration is a matter of state sovereignty, as sovereign states have the right to determine under what conditions they permit or prohibit the entry of non-citizens into their jurisdictions. The economic considerations reflected in immigration policies mean that foreign investors, entrepreneurs and certain categories of skilled workers are generally welcomed in other countries, as long as they are controlled. Differential treatment is accorded to migrants on the basis of their legal status, with professionals and the highly skilled that are in possession of work and permanent resident permits being favoured over refugees and asylum seekers. The former are often able to claim citizenship-like entitlements and benefits based on their legal and socio-economic status. On the other hand, the latter are often seen to be lacking such tradable competence or potential, and are therefore considered less desirable and become vulnerable to exclusionary practices.

Immigration to South Africa is regulated by the Immigration Act of 2002 and the Refugees Act of 1998. The Immigration Act deals with economic migrants and mainly gives priority to migrants with skills that are in short supply in South Africa. The Refugees Act deals with persons forced to flee their home countries due to a range of circumstances and South Africa’s obligations under international law to host such people. It gives effect to the relevant international legal instruments, principles and standards relating to refugees. South Africa is a signatory to the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. It has ratified the 1969 Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa and is party to the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

The Refugees Act guarantees migrants a broad range of human rights and legal protections. With regard to asylum seekers, the Act provides for their right to remain in South Africa pending the outcome of their application for asylum; protection from unlawful arrest or detention; and the right to work. The Act also provides for non-refoulement, which prevents individuals from being returned to their country of origin or any other country where their life or liberties may be at risk. With regard to refugees, the Refugees Act entitles them to: permanent residence status after five years of continuous residence in South Africa from the date asylum was granted and they are certified to remain a refugee indefinitely; identity and travel documents. They also have the right to work, as well as to access basic healthcare and basic primary education. Section 29 (1) protects refugees from arbitrary detention and arrest. An amendment to the regulations of the Social Assistance Act 13 of 2004 in 2012 extends social assistance to impoverished refugees. In addition, the Refugees Act grants refugees all the rights set out in Chapter 2 of the Constitution, except the right to form or support a political party, and that to vote and stand for public office.

5. A. Ong, Neoliberalism as exception: Mutations in citizenship and sovereignty (Durham, Duke University Press, 2006), 16.
The rights referred to in the Constitution, which also extend to other legal migrants, are contained in the Bill of Rights, and include the following: the right to equality; dignity; life; freedom and security of the person; privacy; fair labour practices; freedom of religion, belief and opinion; freedom of expression, assembly, demonstration, picket and petition; freedom of association; and freedom of movement and residence. Everyone in South Africa is also given a range of socio-economic rights, such as the right to housing, healthcare, food, water, social security, and education.\(^8\) The right to access information, the right to just administrative action, and access to courts are also granted. Consequently, South Africa is regarded as having one of the most expansive right frameworks for migrants in the world.\(^9\)

The state’s decision to admit or exclude foreigners is not only made in designated ports of entry. It constantly occurs in other spaces within the national territory where state officials interact with migrants in the course of implementing immigration policies meant to enforce state sovereignty. In this article, the offices of the Department of Home Affairs (DHA), the lead government agency for all immigration matters in South Africa, are examined in order to reveal how frontline DHA officials exercise their sovereign power to make decisions on migrants residing in the country.

**METHODOLOGY**

The experiences of migrants with state officials were gathered during qualitative research conducted in Cape Town from July to September 2013. The focus was on migrants’ experiences with DHA officials in acquiring residence permits and other immigration documents at DHA offices and the Refugee Reception Office (RRO) in Cape Town. The former provides services to temporary and permanent residents who are commonly referred to as economic migrants, while the RRO deals exclusively with asylum seekers and refugees.

In-depth interviews were conducted with African migrants from 13 countries. Interviews were also conducted with South African organisations that work on migration issues. The interviews were semi-structured and guided by broad open-ended questions. Purposive sampling was used to select a heterogeneous group of migrants reflecting differences in legal status, socio-economic class, nationality and gender. The migrants included hold one of the following immigration status: permanent residents, temporary residents (work and study permit holders), illegal foreigners, asylum seekers and refugees. The migrants, who must have lived in South Africa for at least one year, were identified using the snowball method. A total of 40 face-to-face interviews were conducted with African migrants. In addition, seven interviews were conducted with representatives of organisations that work with migrants. Key informants from these organizations were selected because of their familiarity with issues affecting

\(^8\) With respect to the rights to housing, healthcare, food, water and social security, the Constitution requires the state to 'take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of each of these rights.' See Section 27 (2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act No. 108 of 1996.

migrants. The three DHA offices that serve migrants in Cape Town were also visited in order to observe the conditions and processes through which immigration services are provided.

Giorgio Agamben’s political theory on the state of exception provides a useful analytical tool for interpreting the practices of DHA officials as narrated by African migrants. Agamben’s theory is discussed below, followed by an explanation of how it was operationalized in the South African context. Thereafter, the evidence of measures which point to a state of exception in immigration practices in South Africa is presented.

**AGAMBEN AND THE STATE OF EXCEPTION**

Agamben’s state of exception is concerned with the law and the conditions of its application or suspension. It describes a situation in which ‘the state’s habitual nature and culture is suspended’. Agamben observes that those caught up in this suspension are ‘not simply set outside the law and made indifferent to it but rather abandoned by it, that is, exposed to and threatened on the threshold in which life and law, outside and inside, become indistinguishable’. Agamben conceives of the integration of life and law as bound by the logic of sovereignty. For him sovereignty is the limit of the juridical, and it ‘names the power that withdraws and suspends the laws’. When the state annuls its own law, this is ‘an operation of sovereign power, or, rather, the operation by which a lawless sovereign power comes into being or, indeed, re-emerges in new form’. According to Butler, ‘sovereignty’s aim is to continue to exercise and augment its power to exercise itself; in the present circumstance, however it can only achieve this aim through managing populations outside the law’.

The state of exception is an increasingly common mechanism used by sovereign states to exert power over populations in order to protect the state from threats. The state of exception allows extra-legal practices to occur without the violation of the law. It is equivalent to a space that is devoid of law, in which law is emptied of its content. Agamben adds that not only is there a suspension of the law, but there is also a corresponding suspension of the administration of justice. Agamben’s writings on the state of exception constantly and provocatively emphasise the transformation

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10. Agamben takes up and extends the concept which originates from Carl Schmitt.
15. Ibid, 61.
16. Ibid, 98.
of the state of exception today into a topology of rule, which results in increasingly large sections of the population being deprived of political rights and reduced to bare or naked life.20

Bare life is the form of subjectivity produced by and captured in sovereign power. Those reduced to bare life are biologically alive but ‘lacking almost all the rights and expectations that we customarily attribute to human existence’.21 Agamben concludes that ‘the fundamental activity of sovereign power is the production of bare life’.22 Sovereign power then is about bodies and not only about territories.23 Agamben proceeds to argue that bare life is embodied by the figure of the refugee which throws into question the notion of human rights and the order of the state. The refugee reveals how sovereign power and the state of exception operate to define the life of the state’s citizens from others. The structure of the state of exception ‘is such that bare life is included in the sovereign sphere precisely through its exclusion from it’.24

In this article, Agamben’s theory is applied to the South African state’s management of its foreign population and the condition of migrants living in South Africa, to identify recurring practices of sovereign power that are constitutive of the state of exception. What follows is a description of how Agamben’s framework is operationalized in order to identify evidence of a state of exception.

AGENTS, TARGETS AND SPACES OF THE STATE OF EXCEPTION

Jones notes that ‘sovereign power operates as a few particular agents of the state make the decision to target a few particular individuals for the exception, a process that occurs in a few particular places much more frequently than others’.25 She proposes that in order to understand the state of exception in a given context, it is critical to identify the agents, the targets and the spaces where the practice of sovereign power occurs.

In this case, the agents of the exception are identified as frontline state officials stationed at the DHA offices in Cape Town. The targets are African migrants of different nationalities and immigration status living in Cape Town. The spaces of exception are the spaces of interaction between state officials and African migrants, which are the DHA offices in Cape Town, including the RRO, where decisions are continuously made about the status of migrants.

An operational definition of the state of exception is that it is the implicit authorisation of state officials to operate outside the law in order to protect the state from

20. G. Agamben, Means without end: Notes on politics, Translated by V. Binetti and C. Casarino (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 133.
22. Ibid, 181.
23. V. Das and D. Poole, ‘State and its margins: comparative ethnographies’ in V. Das and D. Poole (eds.), Anthropology in the margins of the state (Santa Fe, School of American Research Press, 2004), 10.
threats posed by migrants. The African migrant is seen as a threat to the national identity, security and well-being of the South African state. This declaration of the state of exception endorses practices in which the law itself is either suspended or regarded as an instrument that state officials may use to constrain and monitor the African migrant population. The state of exception impacts negatively on the lives of migrants.

The research findings show that the experiences of African migrants with DHA officials differ based on their legal status in South Africa. Broadly, these experiences can be broken down into two sets. On the one hand, undocumented migrants, asylum seekers and refugees have similar experiences of the sovereign power of the DHA. On the other hand, those with temporary and permanent residence permits also share similar experiences. The experiences of the first group differ substantially from those of the second group. The measures that constitute a state of exception were most apparent in the RRO, which deals only with asylum seekers and refugees, in contrast to the two other DHA offices in Cape Town, which cater for those with temporary and permanent residence permits. This differential treatment suggests a ranking of migrants, which views asylum seekers and refugees as less desirable than economic migrants. This is so, in spite of a broad range of rights that are enshrined in the Constitution and which apply to all migrants, and the existence of specific safeguards for asylum seekers and refugees contained in the Refugees Act. This differentiation narrows the places in which the state of exception takes place. So while the state of exception was mostly visible in the Cape Town RRO, DHA officials at the head office in Pretoria who work on immigration affairs are also implicated.

The state of exception is identified in the practices around applications for residence permits and identity documents by migrants and the processing and issuing of these documents by the state. Das and Poole note how state documents which are supposed to secure identities often operate in ways that undermine these same identities and assurances.26 The state of exception is characterised by the following practices of DHA officials: barriers to accessing the RRO; non-compliance with court orders relating to the provision of immigration services to migrants; production of illegal migrants; lack of administrative justice in making decisions; delays in processing claims, permit applications, identity and travel documents; and inconsistent procedures for extension of permits. Evidence of each of these practices is presented below.

**EVIDENCE OF A STATE OF EXCEPTION**

The practices below, emerging from the research, collectively point to the flouting of laws relating to migrants, overstepping the bounds of state authority and abuse of discretionary powers by DHA officials in their interactions with African migrants and in reaching decisions on permit-related issues. These practices impact on the lives of asylum seekers and refugees, and generally serve to exclude migrants from having secure residency rights and accessing a number of services while in the country. They

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26. Das and Poole, 'State and its margins', 16.
also show how Agamben’s bare life is produced as some lives are treated as if they are either not worth living or not worth protecting.27

**BARRIERS TO ACCESSING SERVICES AT THE RRO**

Every migrant in South Africa has to visit a DHA office at one point or another to regularise his/her stay or for some other permit-related issue. A visit to a DHA office, especially the Cape Town RRO, can be a very stressful experience and the more frequently a migrant has to visit a DHA office, the more stressed they feel about it. Such visits are much more frequent for asylum seekers as their permits are valid for a limited period of time, mostly between one and six months. Disorder, long queues and bureaucratic indifference have come to characterise the RRO, thus presenting serious barriers to accessing the services they provide. Migrants often have to make multiple visits before they are eventually served. The queues are often so long that asylum seekers frequently spend the entire day in a queue. As a result, some migrants have resorted to spending the night outside the RRO, hoping to be guaranteed a good spot in the queue the following morning. The RRO does not have sitting facilities, neither does it make provision for clients to be sheltered from the sun and rain. While there are a few portable toilets on site, these are regularly filthy. Moreover, no provisions are made to ensure that migrants visiting the office have access to potable water. The reception areas and corridors of the RRO are often crowded and stuffy.

Some days can be quite chaotic outside the RRO, with migrants being physically assaulted by security guards. There have been instances of people fainting and pregnant women collapsing due to dehydration and being exposed to the sun for long hours. There are also reports of migrants dying, after being beaten by security guards.28 While these incidents have prompted some improvements at the RRO, these changes tend to be short-lived.

Migrants visiting the RRO on any given day are not guaranteed service. It is not unusual for people who have been on the queue for the whole day to be turned away and asked to return the following day to face the same uncertainty. Sometimes, it takes a full week for migrants visiting the RRO to have their permits renewed. In addition, migrants are often ill-treated by state officials. Respondents gave examples of immigration staff being condescending towards them, abusing their authority and displaying xenophobic attitudes. Although the RRO in Cape Town is no longer required to serve new asylum seekers, this reduced workload has not translated into efficient and expedient services for asylum seekers wanting to renew their temporary permits. Migrants interviewed for the study bemoaned the continued slow pace of service even after the RRO was relieved of some of its functions.29

Staying legal in South Africa can therefore be a very time-consuming exercise, with a dehumanising experience at RROs. Overall, conditions at RROs are unlike those in any other government office in the country’s metropolitan areas, including other

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28. Interview with Burundian woman, Cape Town, 31 July 2013.

29. Interview with Ethiopian man, Cape Town, 13 September 2013.
DHA offices, which provide services to South African citizens. The appalling conditions at RROs suggest an official bias against foreigners in the provision of services. It seems that the state views asylum seekers as less deserving of government services than citizens or other categories of migrants who are served in different offices. What is more, migrants, especially asylum seekers, see these barriers as deliberate measures to frustrate them, rather than as an expression of the administrative inefficiencies that the DHA has come to be associated with. This perception is fed by a number of factors, including the observation that the process of renewing temporary permits is an uncomplicated bureaucratic task, which does not require any specialised skills and should not be time-consuming. Other factors include the evident lack of political will to decisively address these problems even after they have been brought to the attention of the relevant authorities, as well as the fact that reduced workload resulting from a recent drop in new arrivals of asylum seekers has not translated into efficient and speedy services.

The physical abuse experienced by migrants at the hands of state officials impinges on the right to freedom and security enshrined in the South African Constitution. Section 12 of the Constitution affords protection against a range of abuses such as cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment. While other barriers to accessing immigration services are not explicitly extra-legal, the sloppiness that migrants are subjected to goes against the spirit of the law. Asylum seekers and refugees are not able to enjoy their legally guaranteed rights because of the barriers that the DHA has erected. Migrants are treated as if they are unworthy of the same rights that others are entitled to in the Constitution, and are therefore vulnerable to Agamben’s state of bare life.

Non-Compliance with Court Orders

The DHA has a record of failing to comply with court orders. Non-compliance with court orders has impacted negatively on asylum seekers and refugees. Two examples of the DHA being in contempt of court are discussed here. In the case Scalabrini Centre Cape Town and 8 others vs the Department of Home Affairs and 4 others, the DHA was taken to court by civil society groups for the sudden closure of the Cape Town RRO in 2012.30 The court ruled that the closure was unlawful and ordered the department to resume issuing asylum seeker permits to new applicants from July 2012. However, the DHA did not comply with the court order and instead lodged an appeal against the ruling. In the meantime, the Cape Town RRO remains closed to newcomers. One migrant explained the current situation thus: ‘they are using the appeal process to say we are stopping for now to see what the outcome is, but in reality they are not supposed to stop because the original order exists until it is either overturned or maintained’.31

Asylum seekers and refugees also face challenges when they try to renew their permits at an office that is different from the one where the initial application was lodged. DHA officials have been reluctant to undertake this exercise because it entails the

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30. Scalabrini Centre, Cape Town and Others v Minister of Home Affairs and Others 2013 (3) SA 531 (WCC).
physical transfer of files from one office to another. This practice has been contested in court several times, and each time the court has ordered the DHA to renew permits issued at any RRO in the country. In a recent case, the University of Cape Town law clinic took the DHA to court on behalf of some refugees who wanted to extend the validity of their permits in Cape Town but were sent back to the RROs where they initially applied for the permits. The court ruled in favour of the students and the DHA was compelled to renew these permits in Cape Town regardless of where they were initially issued. However, this was an isolated case of compliance, as the DHA continues to violate court orders dealing with the welfare of asylum seekers and refugees.

The policy that forbids the processing of new applications for asylum in Cape Town violates the Refugees Act, which grants any foreigner arriving in South Africa without a valid visa the right to apply for asylum. Similarly, the closure of RROs can be viewed as an attempt to discourage foreigners from seeking asylum in South Africa. The refusal of DHA offices to renew permits issued elsewhere in the country has adversely affected the freedom of movement of asylum seekers and refugees, a right protected in the Refugees Act and the Constitution. It can be argued that this policy seeks to confine asylum seekers to the cities where their original applications were lodged.

Production of Illegal Migrants

The closure of the Cape Town RRO to new asylum seekers has contributed to a rise in the number of illegal migrants in South Africa. In addition, as a result of inefficiencies in its application processes, the DHA contributes to rendering migrants who have been residing legally in the country illegal. For example, a Malawian asylum seeker who has been living legally in South Africa for nine years became an illegal migrant in 2012 when the RRO lost her file and could therefore not extend the validity of her temporary permit. Another asylum seeker was rendered illegal in May 2013, six years after residing legally in South Africa, because his application was arbitrarily rejected. According to the migrant, the RRO’s decision to deny him asylum was procedurally flawed, as he was not grant a hearing and the right to appeal. As a result, he is challenging the DHA’s decision in court on the grounds that he was denied the right to administrative justice. Section 24 of the Refugees Act details the process to be followed in making a decision on an asylum application. Among other stipulations, it states that while considering an application a Refugee Status Determination Officer (RSDO) must do so in line with section 33 of the Constitution, which grants everyone the right to just administrative action.

Being undocumented has major implications for migrants’ lives, as they are unable to access various services and opportunities, which in turn threatens their very exis-

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32. See for example, Ahmed Adbi Aden and Others v Minister of Home Affairs 2001 (CPD); Patrick Eric Nahimana and Others v Minister of Home Affairs and Others 2001 (CPD); Asha Bille Hirsi and Others v Minister of Home Affairs and Others 2008 (CPD); Mahad Bashir Abdulaahi and Others v The Director-General of the Department of Home Affairs 2013 (WCC).

33. Interview with the Head of Field Office at the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) South Africa, Cape Town, 9 September 2013.
tence in South Africa. They also live in constant fear of arrest, as it is an offence to be in the country illegally. The examples cited here point to a situation where instead of facilitating the documentation of immigrants, the operations of the DHA serve to undermine this process.

**Lack of Administrative Justice**

As noted above, section 24 of the Refugees Act directs that the processing of applications for asylum must take into account section 33 of the Constitution, which grants everyone the right to just administrative action. However, according to a researcher at the African Centre for Migration and Society (ACMS), the asylum system in South Africa has been unable to accord protection to those who require it through the refugee status determination process. She notes that:

> The asylum system is not really functioning. Officials do not listen to individual claims, neither do they conduct proper assessments and investigations before making decisions on applications. They simply issue rejections. It is just a mechanism for rejecting people and getting them out of the country.34

This disregard for procedures, she explains, stems from an underlying belief in the DHA that most of the applications for asylum are not made by individuals who genuinely need protection. It is argued that the asylum system is being exploited by economic migrants who want to gain entry into the country. Indeed it is possible to pose as an asylum seeker in South Africa without having a genuine cause to do so. One of the reasons for this is that corrupt DHA officials fraudulently issue permits in exchange for a bribe. Another reason relates to the delay in adjudicating applications for asylum. Instead of the stipulated six months, it could take up to 10 years for an application to be finalised. This delay creates incentives for desperate migrants who do not meet the criteria for refugee status to use the asylum system as a temporary entry point to regularise their stay in the country. A more efficient process would not only deter individuals seeking to exploit the system, but would also guarantee that those genuinely in need of asylum are dealt with within the confines of the law.

**Delays in Permit-Related Processes**

There are enormous delays in adjudicating asylum claims, hearing appeals of rejected asylum applications, issuing refugee identity and travel documents, and processing permanent residence applications of refugees. According to the Regulations of the Refugees Act published by the Minister of Home Affairs, the whole process of determining whether an asylum seeker can be granted refugee status should not exceed 180 days. However, this is rarely the case in practice. As noted earlier, inefficiencies in the system means that the adjudication of asylum claims can sometimes take up to 10 years. During this time, an asylum seeker is given a temporary permit, which must be renewed regularly, usually after three months. Although this temporary status

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34. Interview with researcher at ACMS, 29 October 2013.
comes with the right to work and study, it is nonetheless an unstable status. Even after using temporary permits for years, most asylum seekers have had their applications rejected. For example, out of 78, 142 applications for asylum that were received in the 2012–2013 financial year, only 3,908 were successful.\footnote{35. ‘Annual report 2012–2013’, Department of Home Affairs, Pretoria, 2013, 90.}

If a claim is rejected as unfounded, the asylum seeker can lodge an appeal with the Refugee Appeal Board within 30 days of receiving the decision. In terms of administrative law, an appeal hearing should take place within a reasonable time. However, this is rarely the case as the DHA is said to have built up an enormous backlog over the years. The appeal hearing backlog in 2013 stood at 10,553 cases.\footnote{36. Ibid.} Some migrants have been waiting for an appeal hearing for over three years. However, while waiting for an appeal hearing migrants can renew their temporary asylum seeker permits.

With regard to refugees, section 30 of the Refugees Act states that a refugee can apply for a refugee identity book after being issued with a refugee permit. These identity documents are critical as they are more widely accepted by institutions and employers than permits. However, it can take up to two years for applications for identity documents to be processed. Although refugees in South Africa are also entitled to travel documents, the process of applying for these documents is also fraught with delays. In principle, it should take the DHA three months to issue a travel document. However, the experiences of refugees interviewed for this study suggest that in reality it takes longer to receive travel documents, and in some instances these documents are not issued at all.

Section 27 of the Refugees Act provides that a refugee who has been in the country for five years can apply for permanent residence if the Standing Committee on Refugee Affairs certifies that he/she is likely to remain a refugee indefinitely. The criteria used to determine whether an applicant will remain a refugee indefinitely are not outlined in the Act. However, this is another area in which the DHA has amassed a backlog. The process of certification, which is expected to take six months, can take up to three years. According to one respondent,

The Standing Committee is an extraordinary body, which is very reluctant to provide asylum seekers with a section 27(C) Certificate...It is difficult for refugees to be granted permanent residence because the Standing Committee is not efficient. The Committee is sitting with a huge backlog and presently only has two members; the Chairperson and one other member.\footnote{37. Interview with attorney at the Legal Resources Centre, Cape Town, 20 September 2013.}

In cases where refugees have been certified and have applied for permanent residence, their applications have often been lost in the system, or they have been delayed indefinitely. Although no fixed timeframes are stated in the law for processing permanent resident applications, DHA officials should be guided by the preamble of the Immigration Act. The Act strives to ensure that ‘permanent residence permits are issued as expeditiously as possible and on the basis of simplified procedures and objective, predictable and reasonable requirements and criteria.’\footnote{38. Republic of South Africa (RSA), Immigration Act 13 of 2002 (Pretoria, Government Printer, 2002).} However, some migrants
have been waiting for their permanent residence permits for four years, and within that time some have had to re-submit their applications after finding out that the DHA could not trace the initial applications. The DHA has set a target of processing permanent residence applications within eight months but is far from achieving this target.  

The huge backlogs highlighted above are indicative of serious deficiencies in the DHA’s National Immigration Branch. Delays create uncertainty for migrants as they are subjected to living in a state of limbo. They are denied the peace of mind that a stable and predictable status provides. This state of affairs not only makes it difficult for them to plan their lives beyond the duration of their temporary permits, but it also disadvantages them economically. For example, migrants in this situation face difficulties securing housing and jobs. Even when they acquire a more stable status, it is often difficult for refugees to extend the validity of their permits. Permanent residence, which is the most secure status, is almost impossible to acquire even for those refugees who meet the criterion of having lived in the country for more than five years. The delays characteristic of the DHA’s application processes can be seen as a way of denying migrants access to the rights that come with different immigration status. This serves as a barrier to the integration of migrants into the South African society.

**Inconsistent Procedures for Extension of Permits**

There are also ambiguities in the procedures of the DHA, which create confusion for migrants and allow officials to act in unreasonable and unpredictable ways. These ambiguities relate primarily to the processes of renewing expired permits. Migrants with expired permits are liable to an administrative fine. However, there seems to be no clarity on when asylum seekers are expected to report at the RRO to extend the validity of their temporary permits. Yet officials are quick to impose fines on migrants whose permits have expired by a day, including holders of permits that expired during the weekend when RROs are closed. Rather than support the efforts of migrants to stay within the bounds of the law, DHA officials often resort to ‘power games’, probably to remind migrants of the power that the state wields over them. Some corrupt officials have also found a way to enrich themselves by extorting money from migrants in exchange for renewing their permits instead of imposing the official fine.

Another area of ambiguity is the duration for which permits could be renewed. According to the Refugees Act, initial asylum seeker and refugee permits are issued for a period of six months and two years respectively. However, there is no consistency or predictability in renewing permits after their initial period of validity has expired, and the law is silent in this respect. The arbitrary manner in which this process is administered means that sometimes asylum seeker permits are renewed for only 30 days while refugee permits are renewed for three months. By extending the validity of temporary permits for only short periods, DHA officials contribute to overcrowding conditions at RROs. This practice also negatively affects the livelihood and welfare of refugees and asylum seekers. These migrants sometimes have to abandon their occupations for the better part of the day and incur transportation costs to make regular

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visits to the RRO. Moreover, the tendency by DHA officials to renew permits for a limited duration has been interpreted as a way to deny refugees access to government social grants. It is worth noting that a 2012 amendment to South Africa’s Social Assistance Act 13 of 2004 extends this welfare programme to refugees living in the country. However, as noted by a key informant:

Your refugee permit must be valid for at least three months before you can apply and receive social grant. So, what does the Department of Home Affairs do? They start issuing refugee permits with a validity of three months instead of four years.40

The actions of DHA officials on matters relating to the renewal of permits make it difficult for migrants to retain their legal status over an extended period of time. These actions can be construed as a calculated strategy to keep migrants in a continuous state of uncertainty and deny them access to basic services and other rights.

**CONCLUSION**

Although South Africa has firmly committed itself to uphold the rule of law and protect human rights in its legal system, the practices of some of its state officials depart from this commitment. This article has identified measures that constitute a state of exception in the way the South African state deals with African migrants, who make up the majority of its migrant population. African migrants are perceived as a threat to South Africa’s security. In order to address the migrant ‘problem’, officials of the DHA routinely withdraw and suspend the Immigration Act, the Refugees Act, and the Constitution when exercising their sovereign power to decide the immigration status of asylum seekers and refugees. It appears that this tendency has little to do with the constraints facing state institutions, neither could it be attributed to the excesses of a few unruly officials. Instead, it speaks to a deliberate strategy endorsed by the DHA, which allows officials to step outside of the law with impunity in the name of protecting South Africa from the danger of migrants and to deny the latter their rights and an existence in South Africa.

This article has highlighted the gap existing between the rights promised to migrants in South Africa’s Constitution and domestic legal framework, and the actual treatment of migrants by the state. The latter has succeeded in denying migrants a sense of belonging to the South African community. As a result, the majority of foreigners reside in South Africa with little practical legal protection and few residency rights.41 Ironically, it is the most vulnerable category of migrants, comprising asylum seekers and refugees, which are denied legal protection. The evidence presented in the article does not imply that the state of exception is legitimised in the entire polity. It is a mechanism that is most likely to be applied by state institutions such as the DHA and the police, which come into direct and regular contact with migrants. By virtue of their mandate and level of direct interaction with migrants, some state institutions are able to exert more power over the lives of migrants than others.

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40. Interview with the Director of the Cape Town Refugee Centre, Cape Town, 19 July 2013.
A Gender Analysis of Food Crop Farmers' Adaption to Climate Change in Cameroon

Christine Ndie Abia

This study analyses food crop farmers’ adaptation to climate change, and the implications for food security in two agro-ecological zones in Cameroon. Interviews were conducted with 199 male and female farmers using a questionnaire with open and closed-ended questions. The data was analysed using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS version 21). The findings reveal that farmers in the two agro-ecological zones experience climate change as rising temperatures and a decrease in rainfall. The effects of climate change on crops include a decrease in crop yields, increased incidence of pest and disease attacks, yellowing and wilting of leaves, and tuber rot. Farmers employ a variety of measures to mitigate the effects of climate change on food crops. These include irrigation, shifting of planting dates, use of pesticides and fertilizers, mulching, and planting of trees. Although both men and women endeavour to adapt to climate change, there are gender differences in preferred adaptation measures. The majority of men use irrigation, which is most suitable for increasing water levels for crops, resulting in increased agricultural production. Adaptation measures employed by the majority of women (shifting planting dates, mulching, and planting of trees) are still climate-dependent, leading to a decline or stagnation in agricultural production on the part of women farmers. It is critical for policy makers to understand how both women and men farmers experience and adapt to climate change in order to adopt policies that will increase women’s food crop production and prevent food insecurity in the country, given that women constitute 80% of food crop producers in Cameroon.

According to Ching, agricultural production in most of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is predominantly subsistence in nature and highly dependent on rain. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reports that rain-fed agriculture is one of the sectors that are most vulnerable to climate change. The IPCC defines climate change as, ‘any change in climate over time, whether due to natural variability or as a result of human activity’. Ngigi reports that climate change threatens agricultural production through higher and variable temperatures, as well as changes in rainfall

1. L. L. Ching, Climate Change Implications for Agriculture in Sub-Saharan Africa (Rome, FAO, 2010).
patterns. According to Ching, these factors may affect agriculture ‘through reduction in crop yields and agricultural productivity; increased incidence of pest and disease attacks; limited availability of water; reduction in soil fertility; and wildfires in drier regions’. These negative effects on agriculture are likely to reduce food production in SSA. For example, Ringler observes that wheat production is likely to disappear from Africa by 2080 as a result of climate change. In addition, Fischer opines that climate change is likely to cause a decline in some subsistence crops, such as sorghum in Sudan and Ethiopia, maize in Ghana, and groundnuts in the Gambia.

Smallholder farmers are key stakeholders in the debate on climate change and agriculture. However, according to Nzeadibe, their knowledge about climate change is limited. Climate change awareness is therefore important to stimulate initiatives for adaption. Maddison reports that farmers’ adaptation to climate change, using strategies such as new crop varieties, cropping systems, and agricultural management, is important to prevent unpredictable and undesirable outcomes. As reported by the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), women engaged in food crop production are important stakeholders in agriculture because they produce between 60 to 80% of the food consumed in SSA.10

PROBLEM STATEMENT

The IPCC defines climate change as fluctuations in the patterns of the climate over long periods, whether due to natural variability or as a result of human activity. It also notes that this change has negative effects on agriculture.2 Both women and men are involved in agriculture, and Babugura et al. suggest that they are likely to be impacted differently by climate change.11 Existing inequalities in areas such as access to resources and power relations may affect their ability to adapt to climate change.

4. Ching, ‘Climate Change Implications’.
Manata and Papazu support this view, arguing that the international community has failed to perceive climate change as a ‘multifaceted socio-ecological problem’, which calls for a differentiation between men and women in the climate change process.\(^\text{12}\) Concurring with these positions, Nampinga adds that the activities carried out by women and men farmers differ significantly, and that their perception and response to climate change may also differ.\(^\text{13}\) Therefore, a gender perspective is useful in understanding the challenges that men and women face as a result of climate change.

At the core of the ongoing debate on the implications of climate change is the issue of food security. Climate change acts as a threat multiplier, making the challenges of sustainable food security much more difficult to address. The FAO and the World Food Programme (WFP) report that the ability of people to maintain food security in the face of climate change will depend significantly on their adaptive capacity, which is significantly influenced by access to and control over critical resources, ‘such as information and knowledge on climate change, natural resources such as land and water for agriculture, and opportunities for earning sustainable income’. Consequently, adaptation to climate change is critical for the sustainability of farmers’ livelihoods, and for the supply and availability of food within the household and the larger community.\(^\text{14}\)

The agricultural sector in Cameroon, as reported by Molua and Lambi, is important for economic growth, as it employs nearly 70% of the national labour force and contributes about 35% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP).\(^\text{15}\) Endeley and Sikod add that although both women and men grow food crops, women produce 80% of the output and contribute nearly all the labour input in this agricultural sub-sector in Cameroon.\(^\text{16}\)

Food crop production in Cameroon is largely rain-fed and highly dependent on the climate. Given that food production is critically dependent on local temperature and rainfall conditions, any change in the climate would affect the quantity and quality of the food produced.\(^\text{13}\) Accordingly, as Apata et al. argue, there is need to understand what both women and men farmers know about climate change, in order to offer adaptation practices that would enhance food production and prevent food insecurity.\(^\text{17}\)


Research on farmers’ perception of and adaptation to climate change in Cameroon is scant, and previous research has predominantly used heads of households (usually men) as the unit of analysis.\(^8\) Owing to the dominance of patriarchal inheritance patterns, heads of households in Cameroon are predominantly men. Thus, differences between women and men have largely been ignored in the discourse on climate change and agriculture. There is insufficient knowledge about gender differentiated perception of and adaptation to climate change, and how it impacts on food production and food security in Cameroon. This observation is supported by Lambrou who argues that ‘gender aspects in climate change are often not self-evident, and there is little data, research, or case studies clarifying and exemplifying the linkages between gender justice and climate change’.\(^18\) This study intends to bridge this gap by analysing women and men farmers’ perception of climate change and the measures they adopt to mitigate the effects of climate change on the production of food crops. It also examines the implications of these responses for food security.

**METHODOLOGY**

The study was conducted in two agro-ecological zones in Cameroon – the humid forest zone with mono-modal rainfall and the western savannah highland zone. The humid rain forest zone covers three administrative regions of Cameroon (South West, Centre and South Regions) and is made up of an area of nearly 182,000 km\(^2\). According to Molua and Lambi, the basic characteristic of the zone is heavy rainfall, ranging from 2000 and 4000mm/year.\(^19\) About 76% of this zone is covered by forest. The average annual temperature is approximately 25°C, accompanied by constant humidity of more than 85%, especially during the rainy season. The rainy season extends for almost nine months each year, resulting in a usually short dry season. Typical crops grown in the zone are tubers such as cassava, yams, cocoyam, taro, plantains, maize, and, to a lesser extent, groundnuts. Cereals also grow well in this area, but because of insufficient sunlight and too much humidity, they do not ripen fast enough. Permanent crops like cocoa and coffee, and fruit trees like mango and orange are also planted by smallholder farmers.

The western highland zone covers two administrative regions of Cameroon – the North West Region (NWR) and the Western Region, but the study was carried out only in the North West Region. According to Molua and Lambi, the zone is often referred to as the ‘grass field’ region because it is made up of wooded grasslands.\(^20\) The abundance of grass in this area makes cattle farming a popular activity for the locals. Yengoh adds that the zone consists mainly of valleys and plateaus, which range from 1,000 to 2,300m above sea level.\(^21\) The hilly nature of the area makes it conducive to

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the cultivation of different types of crops. Lowland areas are favourable for tree crops, especially oil palm and tea. The long dry seasons experienced in the zone favour the cultivation of maize and beans, while very high altitudes combined with very low temperatures favour the growth of temperate crops such as potatoes, carrots, and green beans. Upland rice is grown in the wetlands of the zone such as the Ndop plain.

Purpose sampling was used to select two agro-ecological zones and two village communities in each zone. The communities are Mbei-Santa and Jakiri in the western highland savannah zone, and Malende and Besongabang in the humid forest zone. In addition, the cluster sampling method was used to select 199 farmers (99 men and 100 women) from the four village communities. This method was used because of the large size of the population, which made it difficult for every farmer in the selected communities to be included in the study. Cluster sampling entailed dividing each of the four communities into clusters called neighbourhoods. Each neighbourhood was further divided into clusters of women and men, and respondents were selected from the different clusters using simple random sampling. Following this exercise, 101 farmers (49 men and 51 women) were interviewed in the humid forest zone, while 99 farmers (50 men and 49 women) were interviewed in the western highland savannah zone. A questionnaire with mainly open-ended questions and a few closed-ended questions was administered to respondents through the face-to-face interview technique. This technique was chosen because of low literacy levels in the rural communities that were selected. Farmers interviewed were at least 25 years old, with enough experience in food crop production and some exposure to changes in the climate. Data were analysed using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS version 21). Descriptive statistics consisting of frequencies and percentages, and the Pearson chi square were used to test for significance and differences between variables.

FARMERS’ PERCEPTION OF A CHANGE IN TEMPERATURE

Figure 1 reveals that in the past 20 years, 70.5% of women farmers and 53.1% of men farmers in the humid forest zone perceived an increase in temperature, while 25.5% of women farmers and 34.7% of men farmers perceived a decrease in temperature. In addition, 2% of women farmers and 8.2% of men farmers indicated that they have experienced fluctuating temperatures, while 2% of women farmers and 4% of men farmers indicated that they have not noticed any change in temperature. The difference between women and men farmers’ perception of changes in temperature in this zone is statistically significant ($\chi^2=8.20$ df=3, $P=0.042$).

In the western highland savannah zone, 93.3% of women farmers and 86% of men farmers noticed increasing temperatures, while 2% of both women and men farmers noticed decreasing temperatures. Fluctuations in temperature were noticed by 4% of men farmers, while 1% of women farmers and 4% of men farmers noticed no change in temperature. The difference between men and women farmers’ perception of changes in temperature in the western highland savannah zone is not statistically significant ($\chi^2=7.02$; df=3; $P=0.071$).

Comparing between agro-ecological zones, a higher percentage of farmers in the western highland savannah zone (89.7%) perceived increased temperature than in the humid forest zone (61.8%). This difference is statistically significant ($\chi^2=77.961$;
df=9; P<0.01), conforming to Ayonghe’s argument that temperature trends over Cameroon have been on the increase since 1930, and that the temperature increases steadily from the coastal areas to the savannah and then to the arid regions.22

FARMERS’ PERCEPTION OF CHANGE IN RAINFALL

Figure 2 reveals that in the humid forest zone, 30.7% of men and 27.5% of women have observed an increase in rainfall. Decreasing rainfall was perceived by 62.7% of women and 57.1% of men. While 7.8% of women and 10.2% of men have noticed fluctuating rainfall, 2.0% of both women and men have not noticed any change in rainfall. The difference between women and men farmers’ perception of change in rainfall in this zone is not statistically significant (χ²=7.23 df=3; P=0.065).

In the western highland savannah zone, 8% of men and 2% of women observed increasing rainfall. Decreasing rainfall was observed by 81.7% of women and 72.0%

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of men, while 16.3% of women and 20% of men observed fluctuations in the pattern of rainfall. The difference between gender perceptions of change in rainfall in this zone is not statistically significant ($\chi^2 = 4.69; \text{df}=3; P=0.196$).

Between agro-ecological zones, the majority of farmers (77.0%) in the western highland savannah zone perceived decreased rainfall than their counterparts in the humid forest zone (60.0%). The difference is statistically significant ($\chi^2 = 96.709; \text{df}=9; P<0.001$). The difference in perceptions of changes in rainfall patterns between the two agro-ecological zones can be attributed to the existing rainfall and temperature regimes of the country. As Kenga et al. note, rainfall is highest in coastal areas but diminishes steadily towards the north of the country, while temperatures decrease at higher latitudes and altitudes. 23 This implies that farmers in the western highland zone must make greater effort to adapt to changing pattern of rainfall than those in the humid forest zone (near the coast) where rainfall is higher. Farmers’ perception of

decrease in rainfall also corresponds to Ayonghe’s observation that since 1930, rainfall levels have decreased in all agro-ecological zones in Cameroon.24

Overall, the majority of women and men farmers in both agro-ecological zones perceive climate change as increase in temperature and decrease in rainfall. This finding corresponds with Maddison’s report on farmers’ perception of climate change in 11 African countries.8

Temperature and rainfall are the most important climatic variables that affect crop production in Cameroon. Davis and Ali posit that a good amount of rainfall is essential for food crop production. However, they also note that of even greater importance to farmers is the rainfall pattern. That is, if rain falls in the right amount but ceases for a long period before the next rain, the long dry spell can be destructive to crops. Crops will wilt and dry out, becoming more vulnerable to pests and diseases. However, if rain falls in small amounts but at the expected time and spreads over the entire cropping period, crop yields will increase and infestation of pests and diseases will reduce.24

Although not statistically significant, the link between perceived climatic changes (temperature and rainfall) and the gender of the respondents is important because, as Endley argues, women engage in food crop farming more than men in Cameroon.25 Women constitute most of the agricultural labour force, and are involved in almost every stage in the crop production process; from preparing the land to the storage of farm produce. They are therefore better able to perceive changes in the climate or other factors affecting agricultural production than men.

EFFECTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON FOOD CROP PRODUCTION

The information presented in Table 1 is based on qualitative and descriptive responses given by both women and men farmers to questions about the effects of climate change on food crops in both agro-ecological zones. The data are not disaggregated by gender or agro-ecological zone because women and men farmers gave similar responses (though in different words) to questions about the effects of climate change on crops in all instances. Given that farmers could not differentiate between the effects of change in temperature from the effects of change in rainfall, the two categories are expressed as ‘effects of climate change on food crops’.

Table 1 reveals that reduction in crop yield is the dominant effect of climate change on maize (30.6%), cassava (54.2%), cocoyam (39.7%), plantain (47.2%), potato (40.0%) and haricot beans (43.6%). These findings support Anyawuyi et al.’s claim that the effect of climate change on agriculture mostly takes the form of low crop yields.26

25. J.B. Endley, ‘Women farmers’ perception or the economic problems influencing their productivity in agricultural systems: Meme Division of the South West Province Cameroon’, (PhD dissertation, Ohio State University 1987).
Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effects of climate change</th>
<th>Maize (N=111)</th>
<th>Cassava (N=83)</th>
<th>Cocoyam (N=63)</th>
<th>Plantain (N=36)</th>
<th>Irish potato (N=20)</th>
<th>Haricot beans (N=62)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reduced crop yield</td>
<td>34 (30.6%)</td>
<td>45 (54.2%)</td>
<td>25 (39.7%)</td>
<td>17 (47.2%)</td>
<td>8 (40.0%)</td>
<td>27 (43.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yellowing and drying of leaves, withering of crops</td>
<td>43 (38.7%)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>12 (19.0%)</td>
<td>10 (27.8%)</td>
<td>5 (25.0%)</td>
<td>18 (29.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pests and diseases attack</td>
<td>30 (27.1%)</td>
<td>10 (12.0%)</td>
<td>25 (39.7%)</td>
<td>7 (19.4%)</td>
<td>4 (20.0%)</td>
<td>10 (16.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuber Rot</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>20 (24.1%)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>2 (10.0%)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased yield</td>
<td>3 (2.7%)</td>
<td>3 (3.6%)</td>
<td>1 (1.6%)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1 (5.0%)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No effect</td>
<td>1 (0.9%)</td>
<td>5 (6.0%)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>2 (5.6%)</td>
<td>— (11.3%)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Author’s field data)

Yellowing and drying of leaves, stunted growth and eventual withering of crops, was cited as the effect of climate change on maize (38.7%), cocoyam (19.0%), plantain (27.8%), potato (25.0%), and haricot beans (29%). These findings correspond with Ayanwui et al.’s observation that climate change causes stunted growth of crops in Nigeria.  

Increased incidence of attacks by pests and diseases was reported as a significant effect of climate change on maize (27.1%), cassava (12.0%), cocoyam (39.7%), plantain (19.4%), potato (20.0%) and haricot beans (16.1%). The major pests and diseases reported were stem borer in maize, cassava mosaic disease (caused by the white fly), root rot disease (Pythium myriotylum) in cocoyam, weevils in plantain, and blight in potato and haricot beans. Tuber rot was also cited for cassava (24.1%) and potato (10.0%). These results are in line with Kalungu et al.’s findings in Kenya, which argue that climate change causes an increase in pest and disease attacks on crops due to variability of rainfall.

The effects of climate change presented above correspond with the projections of the IPCC, indicating that climate change will affect agriculture through reduction in crop yields and increased incidence of pest and disease attacks. Knox et al. add that

27. Ayanwui et al., ‘Farmers Perception of Impact’.  
in Cameroon, with a temperature increase of 2°C and a decrease in rainfall of 20%, maize productivity will decrease by 11-14%. Moreover, Hijman reports that globally potential potato yield will decrease by 18–32% without adaptation to climate change, and by 9–18% with adaptation measures in place. Such decline in food crop yields will aggravate the problem of food security situation and expose farmers whose livelihood depends on agriculture to greater poverty.

**ADAPTATION MEASURES TO MITIGATE THE EFFECTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON FOOD CROP PRODUCTION**

Figure 3 shows that in the humid forest zone, 45% of men and of 5.0% women practice irrigation, while 55% of men and 50% of women use pesticides. Moreover, 40% of men and 38.9% of women use fertilizers. Shifting planting dates, as a form of adaptation, is employed by 25% of men and 100% of women, while 55% of men and 88.9% of women employ mulching. Meanwhile 20% of men and 66.7% of women engaged in food crop production plant trees in order to adapt to climate change.

In the western highland savannah zone, irrigation is employed by 94.6% of men and 7.9% of women, while 8.1% of men and 76.3% of women make use of pesticides. Additionally, 13.5% of men and 63.2% of women use fertilizers, and 32.4% of men and 100% of women shift planting dates in order to mitigate the effects of climate change. Finally, 21.6% of men and 52.5% of women practice mulching, while 0.0% men and 5.3% women plant trees to mitigate the effects of climate change on food crops.

Gender differences exist in the use of irrigation, shifting planting dates, mulching and planting of trees as adaptation measures in the humid forest zone. Farmers’ ability to employ irrigation measures necessitates access to productive resources such as land, labour and capital. The information in Table 2 (see appendix at the end of the paper) indicates that more than half of the women in the zone (62.7%) do not own the land on which they farm. This serves as a disincentive for employing durable adaptation measures like irrigation. This is in line with Carney’s argument that women lack independent access to and control of resources such as land, which enable long-term adaptation. Conversely the majority of women farmers in the zone tend to employ those adaptation measures which do not require access to secure land tenure rights, but which are climate-dependent, for instance, shifting planting dates, mulching (with soil and grass) and planting of trees (non-permanent leguminous shrubs). Women farmers’ propensity to shift planting dates can be attributed to their long experience in food crop farming. As reported by Nchemachena and Hassan, ‘shifting of planting dates ensures that critical, sensitive growth stages do not coincide with very harsh climatic conditions’. Men farmers’ low propensity to shift planting dates

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(25.0%) can be attributed to their limited experience in food crop production, since men are primarily involved in the production of cash crops such as cocoa. The majority of men who currently grow food crops are new entrants into the business and do so primarily for marketing purposes.

Many women farmers tend to allocate both financial and labour resources to mulching and planting of leguminous tree species aimed at conserving moisture and cooling the farm. Leguminous trees also contribute to nitrogen fixation by augmenting soil fertility. Nevertheless, mulching, planting of trees, and shifting of planting dates do not guarantee that harsh climatic conditions would be completely avoided, especially if it fails to rain for extended periods. Long dry spells cause mulch to dry up and the leaves of trees to fold, shrink and eventually wither. This diminishes the cooling effect that mulching and trees are supposed to have on plants, and increases water evaporation from the soil.

The findings in the humid forest zone do not reveal any major gender gap in access to capital and labour (see Tables 2 and 3 in the appendix). There are also no significant differences between men and women in the use of pesticides to mitigate the effects of increased pest and disease attacks on crops, as well as the use of fertilizers to increase soil fertility and crop yields. However, it should be noted that long periods of dry spell diminish the water content of the soil and limit the uptake of fertilizers by plants. The use of fertilizers on dry soil is likely to ‘burn’ the plant, causing a decrease in production.
Significant gender gaps exist in the adaptation measures employed by farmers in the western highland zone. For example, irrigation is used by 94.6% of men and only 7.9% of women farmers. This could be explained mainly by the fact that women lack access to secure land tenure rights (see Table 2), but also by the type of crops cultivated in this area. The prevailing climatic conditions in the western highland zone are conducive for growing exotic vegetables (cabbage, tomato, carrot, green beans). These crops are generally grown by men for the market, and their production requires intensive irrigation and labour. This explains men’s increased use of irrigation in the zone. In contrast, the majority of women grow traditional food crops (maize, beans, potato), with the aim of providing food for the family. Women farmers’ preoccupation with their reproductive responsibility diminishes their ability to grow both traditional food crops and exotic vegetables, as their workload would drastically increase if they attempted to grow both types of crops.

As discussed earlier, climate change increases the vulnerability of crops to attacks by pests and diseases due to variability in rainfall. The limited use of irrigation for traditional food crops grown mainly by women farmers exposes the crops to the effects of rainfall variability and consequently to increased attacks by pests and diseases. This accounts for women farmers’ increased use of pesticides in the zone. As traditional providers of food for the family, women farmers tend to use more pesticides and fertilizers to boost food production, improve household livelihood and prevent food insecurity. On the contrary, few men use pesticides because their crops are irrigated and are less infested with pests and diseases. The majority of men do not shift planting dates because they employ irrigation, which provides favourable conditions (availability of water) for planting and plant growth.

Overall, adaptation to climate change is meant to increase food production, food supply and prevent food insecurity. Although farmers of both genders endeavour to adapt to climate change, the majority of men farmers employ irrigation, which is most suitable for increasing water levels for crops, resulting in increased productivity. Most of the adaptation measures employed by women (shifting planting dates, mulching, and planting of trees) are climate-dependent. This often results in low production of food crops, a situation that threatens the livelihood and food security of rural people, given that women constitute about 80% of food crop producers in Cameroon. It is essential for policy makers to understand how both women and men farmers experience and adapt to climate change in order to plan responses that will increase women’s food crop productivity and prevent food insecurity in the country.

BARRIERS TO ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE

Although a significant number of farmers in both agro-ecological zones have noticed changes in the climate, more than half of the farmers in the humid forest and one-third of farmers in the western highland savannah zone have not undertaken any remedial action. An analysis of farmers’ perception of and response to climate change in the humid forest and western highland zones of Cameroon reveals five major constraints to adaptation. These are lack of knowledge about adaptation, lack of credit/capital, insecure land rights, lack of farm equipment, and the belief that climate change is a natural and uncontrollable phenomenon (see Figure 4). These barriers are
similar to those identified by Deressa in the context of Ethiopia. For instance, lack of credit/capital makes it difficult for farmers to acquire the modern technologies for effective adaptation to climate change. This explains why many women resort to traditional adaptation methods such as mulching and shifting planting dates, which are not always effective.

The lack of knowledge about adaptation can be attributed to a dearth of research on climate change in Cameroon. This means that farmers have little information about climate change, a situation which also explains why some farmers believe that climate change is a natural and uncontrollable phenomenon. Although access to information on climate change through agricultural extension services can increase farmers’ uptake of adaptation techniques, these services are inadequate in Cameroon.

Insecure land rights limit the ability of farmers to undertake long-term adaptation measures such as irrigation. Access to secure land tenure allows farmers to invest in

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adaptation. However, smallholder farmers in Cameroon are generally poor and landless, making it difficult for them to acquire sophisticated technologies for effective adaptation to climate change.

CONCLUSION

This study analyses women and men farmers’ adaptation to climate change over the past 20 years in the humid forest and western highland agro-ecological zones of Cameroon. The analysis reveals that farmers in both agro-ecological zones recognize that temperatures are increasing and rainfall is reducing. The gender difference in perceptions of changes in temperature and rainfall within each agro-ecological zone is not statistically significant. However, the difference in perceptions of changes in temperature and rainfall between the two agro-ecological zones is statistically significant. This can be attributed to the natural rainfall and temperature patterns in Cameroon, which require farmers in the western highland zone with naturally higher temperatures and lower rainfall to make greater effort to adapt to climate change than their counterparts in the humid forest zone where rainfall is naturally higher. The analysis further reveals that climate change affects the production of food crops mainly by contributing to low crop yield, increased incidence of pest and disease attacks, yellowing and withering of leaves, and tuber rot.

The main adaptation strategies employed by farmers in both agro-ecological zones are irrigation, use of pesticides and fertilizer, shifting of planting dates, mulching, and planting of trees. The majority of men farmers in both zones employ irrigation measures to adapt to the changing climatic conditions. On their part, women employ both climate-dependent adaptation measures (shifting planting dates, mulching and planting of trees) and relatively capital-intensive adaptation measures (use of pesticides and fertilizer). Women’s traditional responsibility of feeding the family pushes them to use both categories of adaptation measures to increase food production and prevent food insecurity. It is essential for policy makers to understand how both women and men farmers experience and adapt to climate change, in order to plan responses that will increase women’s food crop productivity and prevent food insecurity in the country.

APPENDIX

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Distribution of Farmers by Access to Land</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Humid Forest</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Women (N=51)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Access to Land</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own Land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rent or borrow Land</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Author’s field data)
### Table 3: Distribution of Farmers by Access to Labour

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Access to Labour</th>
<th>Humid Forest Zone</th>
<th>Western Highland Savannah Zone</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Women (N=51)</td>
<td>Men (N=49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self only</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>25.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Labour</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>35.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>41.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hired Labour</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>41.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(P=0.003)</td>
<td>(P=0.006)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Author's field data)

### Table 4: Distribution of Farmers by Access to Credit

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Access to Credit</th>
<th>Humid Forest Zone</th>
<th>Western Highland Savannah Zone</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Women (N=51)</td>
<td>Men (N=49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank Loan</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Njangi</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>72.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Savings</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>21.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(P=0.253)</td>
<td>(P=0.173)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Author's field data)

### Table 5: Distribution of Food Crops Grown in the Humid Forest Zone

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crops</th>
<th>Humid Forest Zone</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Women (n=51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cassava</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yam</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cocoyam</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plantain</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egusi</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indigenous Vegetables</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground nut</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

χ² = 62.317, df = 7, P < 0.001

*Multiple responses (Source: author's field data)
## Table 6

### Distribution of Crops Grown in the Western Highland Zone

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crops</th>
<th>Western highland Savannah Zone</th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Women (n=49)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Men (n=50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haricot beans</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>67.3</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>61.2</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish Potato</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yam</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cassava</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green spices**</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carrot</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabbage</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tomato</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plantain</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cocoyam</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground nut</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indigenous Vegetables</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$\chi^2 = 108.089$, df = 12, $P < 0.001$

Multiple responses

**Green spices include celery, parsley and leek (Source: author’s field data)
The Nexus between Land-Grabbing, Livelihood Insecurity and Conflict in Ethiopia: The Case of Majang in the Gambella Region

Seyoum Mesfin

This paper examines the deleterious effects of mechanized commercial farming (MCF) on the livelihoods of the people and local economy of the Majang community in the Gambella region of Ethiopia. Although carried out under the guise of development, the short- and long-term results of MCF have been negative in numerous instances. The findings of the paper show that the livelihoods of the Majang people are inherently attached to the specific environment of the Majang forestland. However, the Ethiopian government has glossed over the plight of these vulnerable people by promoting MCF projects, which are increasingly threatening the livelihoods of the Majang people. These projects have already displaced many people from the Majang community and destroyed their forest at an alarming rate, spurring local protestations. The central argument of this paper is that the government’s MCF development policy is critically inconsistent with the development needs of the people of Majang in that it undermines the livelihoods of the Majang people. The research used in-depth interviews, focus group discussions (FGD) and observation, in addition to secondary sources.

Ethiopia is currently undergoing a transition towards a federal system of governance, which embraces cultural diversity and self-governance. This period coincides with the development of two agricultural policies. The first one, introduced from 1991 to 2000, is the government land policy that was considered ‘peasant friendly’, and which favoured smallholders.¹ The second agricultural policy relates to the government’s strategic focus that has shifted slowly from smallholders to MCF since the 2000s. Currently, the 2011-2015 Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) provides the economic rationale for the primacy of exports and foreign earnings to


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stimulate economic growth in the country. Consequently, the government has begun to lease tracts of land for MCF. In the new GTP, the government has a plan to lease more than 3 million hectares for MCF by 2015.

The shift in government policy from smallholder agriculture to MCF exhibits a characteristic element of ‘spatially differentiated agrarian policy’. In the lowland emerging areas, state policies rely on a more ‘naked assertion of the plenipotentiary powers of the state to allocate land and determine its use’. In stark contrast, in the central highlands ‘the mechanism of social change has been greater market dependence than forced dispossessing and displacement’. In other words, the social form of market dependence has taken a differentiated pattern of smallholder commercialization in the highlands and large-scale enclosures in the lowlands. The government aims to transform the ‘underdeveloped periphery into an agro­industrial powerhouse’, despite the fact that these areas are environmentally and culturally sensitive.

The government claims that the leased land is ‘free-land’, which the regions have submitted to the federal land bank. In relation to this, the State Minister of Agriculture recently indicated during an interview with the Ethiopian public broadcaster (ETV) that: ‘The land leasing does not cover forest areas. It excludes forests, reserved areas. Whenever we found that the interest of Large-Scale Commercial Agriculture (LSCA) conflicts with natural resources, we always compromise LSCA’. In practice, however, the government has leased out up to 500,000 hectares of communal land in the Gambella region to commercial agricultural investors. These areas include forests, water resources and wild habitats. As a result of these government actions, the peripheral or ‘emerging regions’ have experienced livelihood insecurity. As one observer has noted, ‘The Ethiopian government is not demonstrating the capacity to ensure that its people are not harmed by foreign agricultural investment projects’.

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2. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid, 8.
9. Interview with Tefera Deribaw, Minister of Agriculture on ‘MEET-ETV Talk Show’, Addis Ababa, 16 May 2014.
11. In most of the literature, Ethiopia’s peripheral lowland regions of Gambella, Benishangul-Gumuz, Somali and Afar are normally referred to as ‘emerging regions’.
The Gambella region is at the forefront of land grabbing in Ethiopia,\textsuperscript{13} having transferred more than 1.2 million hectares of land to the federal land bank in 2011.\textsuperscript{14} Specifically, the Majang Nationality Zone (MNZ) has experienced serious problems such as land tenure and livelihood insecurity due to unprecedented land grabbing.\textsuperscript{15}

Currently, the problem of leasing land for commercial purpose is a hotly debated issue in Ethiopia. This article thus investigates the negative impacts of this practice on the livelihoods of the Majang people living in several local communities in the Gambella region. The study focuses on the land policy in the MNZ. The literature on land transfers for MCF and their economic, social and environmental impact in Ethiopia has been quite limited.\textsuperscript{16} In particular, the impact of MCF on the livelihood of the local community in the Gambella region has not been seriously considered or addressed empirically. Very little is known about what happens to the Majang people in relation to MCF. Notable exceptions are the works of Dessalegn\textsuperscript{17} and Pearce,\textsuperscript{18} which deal with land grabbing in the Gambella region. However, even in these cases, the Majang phenomenon is discussed in a rather fragmented manner.

Data for this study came largely from primary sources and was gathered through extended fieldwork in the MNZ from February 2013 to June 2014. Data collection involved in-depth interviews, focus group discussions and personal observation. Seven focus group discussions and 55 in-depth interviews were carried out with diverse stakeholders, including the local leadership, civil servants, victims of displacement, and community elders. Besides, to validate and ensure the reliability of data collected from primary sources, the researcher also used both published and unpublished secondary sources. All respondents voluntarily consented to participate in the study but the names of some of participants have been withheld to protect their identity.

**SELF-RULE AND LAND SOVEREIGNTY IN ETHIOPIA**

To its credit, the incumbent government has developed a constitution that entrenches ethnic groups\textsuperscript{19} as sovereign entities in the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia

\textsuperscript{13} This paper follows the 2011 Tirana Declaration of land grabbing. Accordingly, land grabbing occurs when the transfer of land is undertaken under one or more of the following: i) violates human rights; ii) is not based on the free, prior and informed consent of the affected land-users; iii) is not based on a thorough assessment, or is in disregard of social, economic and environmental impacts; iv) is not based on transparent contracts that specify clear and binding commitments about activities, employment and benefits sharing, and; v) is not based on effective democratic planning, independent oversight and meaningful participation. See www.landcoalition.org/about-us/aom2011/tirana-declaration.

\textsuperscript{14} Rahmato, ‘Land to Investors’, 51.


\textsuperscript{17} Rahmato, ‘Land to Investors’.

\textsuperscript{18} Pearce, ‘Gambella, Ethiopia: Tragedy in the Commons’.

\textsuperscript{19} For the sake of expediency, the terms ‘nation’, ‘nationality’, ‘people’ and ‘ethnic groups’ are used interchangeably throughout the article.
(hereafter FDRE),\textsuperscript{20} with rights over land and natural resources.\textsuperscript{21} The 1995 Constitution of the FDRE provides protection for both communal and individual rights to land. By taking into account their unique way of life and communal ownership of land, the Constitution also guarantees pastoralists the right to free land for grazing and cultivation, as well as the right not to be displaced from their own land.\textsuperscript{22} It also calls for the protection of peasants against eviction from their possessions.\textsuperscript{23} Moreover, to protect minorities from external encroachment, the Constitution prohibits land sale or other means of exchange.\textsuperscript{24} In this regard, the government is required by law to consult the people with respect to policies and projects affecting livelihoods in local communities.\textsuperscript{25} Additionally, the Constitution obliges the federal government to provide special assistance to least advantaged ethnic groups in their economic and social development.\textsuperscript{26}

Indeed, this radical approach is an important pledge for ethnic minorities in Ethiopia, designed to address historical injustices related to land use, tenure and ownership. Besides, it has brought the government closer to local communities to promote the empowerment of people living in these communities. For instance, local empowerment of the isolated Majang community is expressed in the establishment of the MNZ. It has given the Majang people the opportunity to administer their own affairs, as well as the power to preserve their unique life style, identity, history and culture. Despite this unprecedented political empowerment, with the introduction of multicultural federalism, the Majang people are faced with livelihood insecurity due to land displacement because of MCF projects. It is an important development which deserve greater scholarly and policy attention.

**COMMERCIAL FARMING IN THE MAJANG NATIONALITY ZONE**

The Majang reside in the MNZ, which is one of the three zones of the Gambella region, located in the south-western part of Ethiopia, about 302 kilometres to the south of Gambella town. The zone has two administrative woredas (district), namely Godere woreda and Mengesh woreda, and 67 kebeles.\textsuperscript{27} According to the 2013 Zonal Bureau of Agriculture report, forests dominate the landscape of the MNZ, covering about 63\% of the total land size of the zone. Majang contains one of the most forested areas and the last bastion of the tropical rainforest in Ethiopia.\textsuperscript{28} The forest is incredibly rich in biodiversity and wildlife. The Godere River and several streams, which are tributaries of the White Nile River, irrigate the area. For this reason, the area has one of the most fertile lands in the region.

\textsuperscript{20} Article 8 of the Constitution of the FDRE, 1995.
\textsuperscript{21} Article 39 of the Constitution of the FDRE, 1995.
\textsuperscript{22} Article 40 (5) of the Constitution of the FDRE, 1995.
\textsuperscript{23} Article 40 (4) of the Constitution of the FDRE, 1995.
\textsuperscript{24} Article 40 (3) of the Constitution of the FDRE, 1995.
\textsuperscript{25} Articles 43(2) and 92(3) of the Constitution of the FDRE, 1995.
\textsuperscript{26} Article 89(4) of the Constitution of the FDRE, 1995.
\textsuperscript{27} Kebele is the lowest unit of administration in Ethiopia.
Traditionally, the livelihood of the indigenous Majang people is linked to the forest. The Majang have lived for centuries in the forest, making a living through shifting cultivation, bee-keeping and hunting.\textsuperscript{29} They are naturally inhabitants of the forest.\textsuperscript{30} About 90% of the Majang live deep in the thick forest.\textsuperscript{31} Thus, most of the people are employed in forest activities. Indeed, wild edible plants and animal flesh are part of the regular meal of most indigenous people in the area. They are also valuable foods in times of famine and crisis in the MNZ. The forest does not only provide food for the Majang people, but is also a source of marketable products, mostly honey. According to a 2012 report by Pact Ethiopia, there are about 29,345 bee-hives in the Godere woreda alone.\textsuperscript{32} Livestock farming, except for poultry farming, is the least popular economic activity of the indigenous population, although this is different for those living in the highland areas.\textsuperscript{33} Overall, the forest constitutes the habitat of the Majang people, and their routine activities include the collection of honey, hunting and gathering, and the practice of shifting cultivation.\textsuperscript{34} The forest also serves as a source of traditional medicine and a place of worship.\textsuperscript{35}

Despite the fact that social changes are taking place within the Majang community, the local people still keep and strengthen their cultural traditions, particularly their rich traditional forest life.\textsuperscript{36} Therefore, to lose the forest is equal to losing not only their livelihood but also their identity. In this regard, the Majang self-description is related to the forest in an existential phrase: “The Majang out of the forest is like a fish out of water”.\textsuperscript{37} This saying echoes the strong connection that the Majang people have with the forest and its resources. However, as the subsequent sections illustrate, the Majang’s century-old forest-based livelihood is being threatened by MCF.

Recently, the area under study has been facing the challenge of a high rate of deforestation due to the intrusive activity of MCF. The findings of this study indicate that mechanized farming has increased so quickly and dramatically that almost 90% of commercial farms obtained land within the last five years. Up until 2009, there were very few MCF projects. The Zone has so far attracted at least 20 investment projects and logging companies. Apart from logging areas and unregistered landowners, the Zone has permitted a registered total area of 21,523 hectares of land with a lease period of 50 years.\textsuperscript{38} Local people argue that the size of the land under investors’ control is wider and larger than what has legally been registered. Up to date, no one could tell exactly how much land from the area has been leased to investors, given that the ongoing process of land deals is surrounded by mystery and lacks transparency. According

\textsuperscript{29} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{33} Ibid, 132-133.
\textsuperscript{34} Feyissa, ‘The Interface between’, 13.
\textsuperscript{35} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{36} Sato, ‘Christianization through Villagization’, 574-575.
\textsuperscript{37} Focus Group Discussion (FGD), Meti, 11 May 2013.
\textsuperscript{38} Field findings, 2014.
to the Atlas of Ethiopia on livelihoods, the Zone in question is suitable for the production of cash crops such as Arabic coffee, honey and cereal. Most MCF projects are dedicated to growing high value export commodities such as coffee, rice, bio-fuel plants and trees for lumber or timbering. Table 1 shows the status of land investment in the MNZ.

The first large-scale commercial farming project in the MNZ was the government-owned Tapi Coffee Plantation, established in 1988 in Abiy 03, Abiy 04, Kabo, Gilishi and Gubati kebeles. In November 2012, the company became the Green Coffee Estate Share Company, a joint venture of the Ethiopian government and private investors of Green Coffee Agro-Industry, which owns 51% of the shares. Previously, the company owned 8,933.00 hectares of coffee land. However, according to local residents, the company has been expanding its land size aggressively, up to 2 km in all directions. Since the company was previously owned by the government, there is no Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the company and the local administration. As a result, it is immune from local accountability. Currently, the company employs 6,533 people. Out of this number, 2,085 are permanent workers, 52 are contract workers, while 4396 are temporary labourers. However, there is no single indigenous person employed in the company. Although it principally produces coffee, the company also produces palm oil, spices, fruits and honey. The company also has palm oil plantations in Abiy 04 and Gilishi kebeles. The company sells Arabica specialty coffee to both domestic and foreign markets. Other products such as palm oil, fruits and spices are cultivated for the domestic market.

The largest foreign holding MCF project in the MNZ is owned by the Indian-owned Verdanta Harvest PLC. In April 2010, the company obtained permission from the Ethiopian Ministry of Agriculture to establish the ‘Tea and Allied Crops’ plantation. It took 3,112 hectares of land in Gumari and Kabo kebeles for a 50-year lease in the highly contested traditional homeland of the local community, allegedly without the consent of the people. The area was once recognized as a ‘reserved forest area’ in 2005 by the Zone Bureau of Agriculture.

There are also domestic investors, who engage largely in the cultivation of coffee. The prominent domestic investors are Getachew, Sirage, Gebremedhin, Kiene and Yigzaw. The land transferred to some of these investors is predominately forestland that was under the ownership of the community. There are also numerous medium- and small-sized commercial farms scattered throughout Majang, which grow coffee and annual crops such as maize and sorghum. Besides, local people confirmed that new employees of large-scale commercial farming enterprises are penetrating deep

40. Feyissa, 'The Interface between'.
41. Ibid.
42. Interview with Milkamu Milkamu, Head of Finance, Abiy 03, 1 July 2014.
43. Ibid.
45. Letter from the President of the Gambella regional state to Godere woreda, Gambella, 19 November 2011.
46. Interview with an expert in Godere woreda Bureau of Agriculture, Meti, 22 June 2014.
47. Data obtained from Godere woreda Bureau of Agriculture, 2014.
into the vast unoccupied forestland, occupying large tracts of land with no restraint. For instance, most of the *kebeles* in the MNZ, such as Kabo, Yari, Shone, Akashi, Gumari, Goshene and Gubati, have become under the control of employees of commercial farming enterprises.

The picture painted here illustrates the extent to which the people of Majang have been marginalized, both socially and economically. This goes to confirm the assertion made earlier in this article that the Ethiopian government has little regard for the indigenous people of Majang. In what follows, we examine the negative consequences of MCF on the people of Majang.

### ADVERSE EFFECTS OF MECHANIZED COMMERCIAL FARMING

One of the catastrophes of MCF in Ethiopia is the threat it poses to the livelihood security of the Majang people. The government’s problematic land leasing policy, under which it owns and frequently leases farm and forest land, creates livelihood

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**Table 1: Land Under the Control of Investors in the MNZ**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name of the Company</th>
<th>Land size in ha</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Location (Kebele)</th>
<th>Activities engaged in</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Verdanta Harvest PLC</td>
<td>3112</td>
<td>Foreign</td>
<td>Gumari and Kabo</td>
<td>Tea</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Albert Menjot PLC</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>Foreign</td>
<td>Gelishi</td>
<td>Palm Oil</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Sirage</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>Chemi</td>
<td>Coffee</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Sirage</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>Shone</td>
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<td>–</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Gebremedhin</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>Kabo</td>
<td>Coffee</td>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Kinfe</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>Yari and Kabo</td>
<td>Coffee</td>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Yigzaw</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>Kabo</td>
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<td>2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Tekalign</td>
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<td>Kabo</td>
<td>Coffee</td>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Haile and others S.C</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>Kabo</td>
<td>Coffee</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>Domestic Coffee Association</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>Kabo</td>
<td>Coffee</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Samuel</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>Kabo</td>
<td>Coffee</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Alemu</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>Chemi</td>
<td>Coffee</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Getachew</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>Akashi</td>
<td>Coffee</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
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<td>14</td>
<td>Kabo Medical Association PLC</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>Kabo</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Kassa PLC</td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>Green Coffee Estate S.C</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>Majang Agro-Industry</td>
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(Source: Field Findings, July 2014)
insecurity for the Majang people. In terms of the government’s rhetoric, mechanized agricultural projects are implemented to benefit the people. However, this is not the case in Majang. Instead of creating jobs and bringing other benefits to the local community, MCF projects are taking large chunks of the forest lands that are central to the people’s livelihoods.49 Up until now, hardly any economic or other benefits have accrued to the Majang people from MCF projects. For example, infrastructural and social investment projects that could benefit the local community are almost absent. Besides, although the above-mentioned projects have opened employment opportunities to more than 8,000 people in the area, almost all the employees come from outside the zone. In fact, working as daily labourers on the land they have owned for centuries for a very low wage is not acceptable in the mind of the local community.50 This section discusses the livelihood problems caused by MCF in the MNZ.

To start with, MCF has led to land tenure insecurity among indigenous people. Although land use rights are protected by the Constitution and other proclamations,51 the government is giving the usufruct rights of smallholder farmers to commercial farmers, displacing quite a large number of the former. Many Majang interviewed said the land transferred to investors and the federal land bank belongs to the local community. The local communities have also been displaced from their fertile farmlands and pushed into remote unproductive places.52 The Majang first experienced displacement when the state farm displaced people from land belonging to four kebeles without their knowledge, financial compensation or the provision of alternative livelihoods.53 It was not possible to obtain accurate figures of the displaced. However, local people estimate that the Tapi Plantation Company displaced about 4000-5000 indigenous people in Abiy 03, Abiy 04, Abiy 05, and Gubati kebeles.

Currently, the Indian-owned Verdanta Harvest PLC has displaced a significant number of local communities from their traditional lands. The establishment of Verdanta commercial farming directly affected more than 340 and 420 households in Gumari kebele and Kabo kebele respectively.54 The company map shows that the whole Kabo kebele, including sub-kebeles such as Gisho Beri, Worgamba, Dochia, and Dawi, is included in the company’s landholding. According to officials of Gumari kebele, the area is a farm and residence land for 794 local people. In addition, a number of Majang in other areas have been dispossessed of their lands by local investors.55 In 2011, approximately 1,000 households were evicted from their land following a land lease agreement between the government and highlander investors, who wanted to establish a coffee plantation in Yari, Shone and Kabo kebeles.56 The majority of informants displaced from their land by MCF confirmed that this happened without their informed consent and compensation. Furthermore, according to participants at one of the focus group discussions, the government relocates people from the forest to

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49. FGD, Meti, 2014.
50. FGD, Goshene, 2014.
51. Deribaw, ‘MEET-ETV Talk Show’.
52. FGD, Meti, 2014.
53. Ibid.
54. Interview with an official at Godere woreda Security Administration, Meti, 2014.
56. FGD, Meti, 2014.
villages with little consultation, and usually under strong pressure to prepare land for investors in the name of villagization. 57

As mentioned above, MCF has also attracted considerable highlander migrant workers who are also partaking in land dispossession. For instance, Green Coffee Estate SC has employed about 7,000 highlanders. Consequently, land is now becoming scarce for the indigenous people due to huge population pressure. 58 According to the 2011 population projections, Godere and Mengesh woredas of the MNZ have population densities of 76.2 and 14.3 persons per sq.km respectively, which are above the regional average of 10.5 persons per sq.km. 59 This has resulted in imbalance in land ownership. Official statistical data also confirm that there is a visible land ownership gap among the different woredas in the Gambella region, as well as between the indigenous people and immigrants. For example, about 64% of male-headed households and 67.9% of female-headed households in Godere woreda possess from 0.51-1 hectares of land while households in woderas such as Abobo, Gog and Jur occupy larger areas of farmland ranging from 1-1.2 hectares. 60 MNZ respondents fear that private investment and continued immigration could cause them to lose their land. 61 Indeed, with the current trend of land acquisition, access to land will become difficult for the indigenous community. Results of a socio-economic survey conducted by Pact Ethiopia also indicate that 70% of respondents from MNZ are hopeless with regard to the prospect of keeping possession of their land in future, while 95% of respondents from Gog, Jur, Wantewa and Abobo are confident that they will retain possession of the land they currently occupy in future. 62

In addition to displacing the local community from their ancestral land, MCF has also caused environmental degradation in the form of deforestation, tremendous loss of biodiversity, depletion of soil fertility, loss of productivity, and changes in the pattern of rainfall. 63 Commercial farmers have exploited the forest more intensively than the host communities used to do. This intensive land exploitation has left most of the Majang territory completely deforested. 64 The destruction of the forest puts the livelihoods of the local community in jeopardy.

The fertility of forestland is highly dependent on forest soil that practically exists only with the presence of foliage and litters that drop down from the trees in the area. 65 Trees that are necessary for soil fertility such as Ficus sycomorus, Milletia ferruginea, and Ficus vasta are endangered due to deforestation for timber and agricultural land. One key agriculture expert in MNZ underlined that, ‘…The soil is blessed with a gift of fertility from a forest. Fertile soil in the forest is there because the forest kept it there…This being the case, soils change when their close relative, the forest, is

57. FGD, Kabu, 2013.
58. Interview with an expert at Godere woreda Agriculture, Meti, July 04 2014.
60. Ibid, 117-118.
61. Ibid, 115.
63. FGD, Meti, 2014.
64. Ibid.
removed’.66 Currently, soil degradation and soil erosion constitute a serious problem affecting productivity.67

In-depth interviews with experts and community elders revealed that, because commercial farmers have taken the most fertile forest coverage and water sources of the MNZ, small streams of water have dried up, while edge-dwelling animal and plant species have almost disappeared. Clearing of forests has changed the flow of water. For example, the Verdana Harvest PLC is cultivating on an area, which is the origin of about 12 streams flowing into the Gilo and Alwaro rivers. The forest is the source of several micro and ‘critical watershed’ in Godere wodera. In addition, the type of crop selected by the company is not forest-friendly, since the cultivation of tea involves greater deforestation as it is a sun-loving plant.68 Coffee farming also disturbs the biodiversity of the virgin forest, since the entire understory made up of different species of plants has to be cleared in order to plant coffee.69 This practice is also contributing to the disappearance of endangered plant and animal species.70 The disappearance of many species of wild animals such as antelope, warthog, buffalo and bushbuck is symptomatic of the new ecology that the local community has been subjected to, and the termination of century-old traditional practices of hunting, gathering, and production of traditional medicine in the MNZ.

Informants also noted that deforestation leads to weather fluctuations and climatic disruptions such as erratic rainfall that adversely affect the production of coffee, millet and corn.71 The rainy season in Majang has traditionally begun in mid-January. However, today the season sometimes begins in April.72 The shortening of the rainy season has adverse effects both on the environment and on the livelihoods of the community in the area.73

Moreover, deforestation and MCF have also affected the productivity of local honeybee farms. Key informants indicated that there is a substantial decline in honey production by local farmers because of deforestation and competition from large-scale commercial farmers in the neighbouring Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples Regional State (SNNPRS).74 For example, most farmers in the area have lost their bees as a result of the modern farming method adopted by the Ethiopian billionaire, Mohammed Al-amoudi, in his mechanized flower farm. Pact Ethiopia’s report also shows that, ‘The major problem encountered regarding beekeeping in the district is deforestation, which led to the loss of some important flowering trees, used for honey production’.75 In fact, the widespread disappearance of honeybees and flowering plants is a cause of concern for the Majang people, as it decreases the productivity of

67. Ibid.
68. Interview with Yared Gebremariam, Godere Woreda Agricultural, Meti, 6 June 2013.
69. Pact Ethiopia, Forestry and Wildlife, 33.
70. Interview with Shibiru Zerihun and Melkamu Abike, Melca Ethiopia, Meti, June 30 2014.
71. FGD, Meti, 2013.
72. Ibid.
74. Interview with informant, Meti, 2013.
their bee farms significantly. Generally, sources of food in the forest such as *Meti, Kokoman, Luya, Cachy, Geboza* are under threat.76

The aforementioned impacts of commercial farming (landlessness, ecological damage and decrease in productivity) seriously affect the livelihood of the indigenous people in the MNZ. For instance, soil erosion and infertility resulting from deforestation has contributed to a decline in crop yields, which in turn leads to food insecurity. In most cases, inadequate and erratic rainfall also causes crops to wilt and dry up, resulting in very low productivity.77 Leasing huge tracts of forestland to investors has caused indigenous people to lose their privileges to access land, forest and forest resources, thereby reducing their food security. Having been restricted to small areas of land, the indigenous people have lost the opportunity to practice their century-old traditions of shifting cultivation, easy mobility, hunting and gathering, as well as apiculture. Even the use of reserve land by local communities is restricted, as the government considers this land to be vacant land. Out of pain and disappointment, an elderly informant who has spent his entire life in the forest had this to say:

> Although the land belongs to us as ‘owner nationalities’ of the Zone, we do not have land to hand over to our children. We do not have adequate land and forest to grow millet, go for hunting and collect honey; we will not have food to eat. MCF projects clear vast forestlands and extinguish wildlife. Certainly, the old ways of living and our culture will be lost.78

This concern is shared by an expert in the Zone Bureau of Agriculture, who describes the impact of MCF on the local people and the environment as follows:

> Our forest and plots of land have been unlawfully grabbed. It is not only an agricultural land but it is also the place the Majang go for hunting and honey collection. The companies do not care because they have a license from the government. If investors continue to clear land for tea and coffee plantation, there would be no space to grow millet. For the Majang, bee-keeping, growing millet and hunting are very important activities of their culture and livelihood. Now, we do not have sufficient land and forest to grow millet, go for hunting, or collect honey. Therefore, we will not have food to eat eventually. In short, Majang is a community pushed to the edge.79

Additionally, when driven out of the forest and displaced from their land, local people have faced difficulties adapting to the modern way of life. Only a few Majang have been successfully integrated into the modern way of life. For example, they are almost absent in the zone economy. Almost 99% of traders and those engaged in other business activities in the area are highlanders.80 As a result the indigenes continue to be victims of not only social uncertainty but also of bitter poverty. In these circumstances, the ability of small farmers to generate income and provide for their families is severely

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76. FGD, Meti, 2013.
77. Ibid.
78. Interview with informant, Yari, 12 May 2013.
79. Interview with informant, Meti, 16 May 2013.
constrained, forcing some individuals to resort to criminal activities.\textsuperscript{81} Furthermore, growing food insecurity has also significantly increased the health risk of the local community. For example, a high prevalence of HIV/AIDS, resulting from rising prostitution, has been reported in the area. According to data obtained from the zone’s HIV/AIDS Secretariat, while the national and regional averages of HIV/AIDS prevalence are 1.5\% and 6.5\% respectively, the prevalence in the MNZ is more than 13\%.\textsuperscript{82}

Indeed, the findings show that commercial farming has placed many burdens on the Majang people and rendered most of them hopeless and vulnerable. Part of the response of the Majang to their plight has been persistence resistance, which in some instances has resulted in violent conflicts. The next section of the article analyses some of the violent conflicts that are prevalent in the area.

**COMMERCIAL FARMING AND ESCALATION OF VIOLENT CONFLICT: THE CASE OF VERDANTA HARVEST PLC**

As mentioned above, the forest is everything to the local community. Consequently, any threat to the forest is unacceptable to the Majang people. Evidence from the field indicates that in almost all areas under investments, there are clashes and conflicts between investors and local communities. From the outset, the people of Majang protested against the land lease deal with the Indian company to grow tea and other export crops. The locals organized a series of proactive meetings to take their case to the federal government in December 2011. The community was able to send a representative to Addis Ababa to take the case to the former president of the FDRE.\textsuperscript{83} The then president wrote a strong letter to the Environmental Authority and the Ministry of Agriculture protesting the transfer of forest land to an investor and echoing the concerns of the communities concerned.\textsuperscript{84} This triggered a debate within the government. The Environmental Authority argued that the remaining forestland should not be turned into agricultural land as the long-term negative impact on the community and the country is greater than the income generated from tea plantations.\textsuperscript{85} In contrast, the Ministry of Agriculture argued that the land leased to the investor is not a forestland but a bush that will have no negative impact on the community if cultivated. However, in reality, Gumari forest is the densest portion of the Godere forest, which has been described as the ‘Water Tower’ of the region.\textsuperscript{86}

The local people consider their land and its resources as collective assets. For instance, the Majang have a unique form of right over the trees on which bee hives are hung. This form of entitlement is known as ‘Jang’ ownership, and is respected by everyone in the community. In essence, the forest is common property in which indi-

\textsuperscript{81} FGD, Meti, 2014.
\textsuperscript{82} Majang Nationality Zone HIV Secretariat Office, Meti, June 2014.
\textsuperscript{83} Letter from clan leaders and elders addressed to the President of the Ethiopia Government, Gambella, 26 Ginbot (May) 1996.
\textsuperscript{84} Letter from the Office of the President of the FDRE to the Environmental Protection Office, Addis Ababa, 26 April 2011.
\textsuperscript{85} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{86} Interview with informant, Meti, 2013.
individuals hold rights over the trees on which they place their hives. In recent times, the Majang zone and woreda cabinets have split over this practice. In particular, there has been a debate between the Zonal Administration and the Zone Bureau of Agriculture over the choice of crops planted by commercial farmers. The latter argued that the type of crop selected by the Verdanta Harvest PLC is not forest-friendly. Experts have also pointed out that while coffee is a moisture-loving plant that needs shade, the cultivation of tea involves greater de-forestation, as tea is a sun-loving plant.

Local informants also noted that there were no direct consultations with affected communities prior to the approval of the project, as required by the federal Constitution [Article 43(2)]. The people’s representative, Tamerat Ambelu, was quoted in the media saying that ‘Though the government has no right to grant land to investors without our consent, we were not consulted in the process. We are ostracized by our own government.’ Besides, although the MNZ is an environmentally sensitive area and the FDRE Investment Proclamation No.769/2012 provides that any investor ‘shall give due regard to environmental protection’, environmental assessments are either totally absent or insufficient. It seems that environmental impact assessments have been intentionally ignored in this case. Furthermore, there has been no transparent monitoring process in the zone until now.

Although the zone’s Bureau of Agriculture has acrimoniously objected to the leasing of land to the Indian company, the zone administration supported by the former president of the region went ahead to sign the agreement. Consequently, the investor continued clearing the forest. Rather than addressing the legitimate concerns of the community, the regional and zonal governments continued their pressure on the community to accept the land-use change. For instance, the local authorities have detained a number of activists suspected of being protest leaders. There is also anecdotal evidence to suggest that the zonal leadership has been bribed by investors.

Finally, disregarded by the state and the local government, the local community has manifested its grievances through violence against the company’s belongings. First, tea seedlings on the nursery site were destroyed by an unknown group of people who were however suspected to be discontented members of the community. Afterward, these grievances translated into a major violent incident in October 2013, when unidentified people opened fire on security guards of the company, and set fire on its storehouse, fuel depot, two tractors and one excavator. The property destroyed was worth roughly 140,000.00 USD.

Following these incidents, nine members of the Gumari kebele leadership were reportedly arrested and physically abused by the woreda and regional governments for

88. Interview with an expert, Godere Woreda Agricultural, Meti, 06 June 2013.
89. VOA Amharic, 8 January 2014.
90. Interview with informant, Meti, 20 May 2013.
91. FGD, Meti, 2013.
92. Ibid.
93. Rahmato, Land to Investor, 31-32.
94. FGD, Kabo, 2013.
96. Interview with Manager of Verdanta Harvest PLC, Tapi, 2014.
failing to expose the criminals. Experts in the Godere woreda Bureau of Agriculture who were firmly opposed to the forestland transfer were also detained. Such government repression has driven leaders of the community, such as the chairperson of Gumari kebele, into exile. There are also reports of violent confrontations between the company’s armed guards and the local community. Local residents revealed that the investors’ guards have repeatedly fired several rounds of bullets to scare residents and forcibly occupy land belonging to local residents. All the aforesaid events and processes show that the government gives priority to commercial farming rather than preserving the forest. Consequently, the threat of further confrontation and violence looms over the area. It was observed that the federal government has deployed the federal police force in the area to protect the company’s belongings.

CONCLUSION

The study attempted to establish the relationship between land-grabbing, livelihood insecurity and conflict in the Gambella region of Ethiopia. The Ethiopian government’s policy of ‘development by dispossession’ has firmly affected the livelihood of the Majang people. The analysis in this article reveals that the MNZ is a vivid example of places in Ethiopia that are most affected by MCF. The government is trying to accelerate ‘national development’ at the expense of the livelihood of the people in local communities. Land-grabbing has brought deleterious effects on people’s livelihoods and the local economy. It also has a long-term harmful impact on the way of life of the Majang people. The study found that MCF is weakening the cultural practices of the Majang people by limiting the availability of land for traditional shifting cultivation, hunting and gathering, as well as bee-keeping, which form the basis of the Majang’s livelihood. The paper also reveals a lack of effective consultations with the community in the planning and implementation of development projects that adversely affect their lives. The land is supposed to be controlled by the local people. Nevertheless, the indigenous people were not sufficiently consulted when their forestland was transferred to investors. When local communities have reacted and tried to assert their rights, they have suffered intimidation, physical abuse, and imprisonment from investors and government authorities. The government land lease policy has extinguished the land tenure rights of local communities, which is a clear violation of the constitutional rights of indigenous people. This policy also undermines the constitutionally entrenched principles of devolution of power and self-governance, and has contributed to escalating conflict between and land-grabbers and local communities.

To address the livelihood threats facing the Majang people, the government has to look at alternative strategies of development. Forest-friendly programs such as tour-

97. FGD, Kabo, 2013.
98. FGD, Gumari, 2013.
ism promotion and modern apiculture could be made part of the government’s agenda to develop the region. A quantitative study of the extent and economic costs of deforestation in south-west Ethiopia indicates that ‘the value of benefits from land converted from forest to farm land is much lower, being less than 10% of the value of keeping the forest’.\textsuperscript{100} The commercialization of land and farming in the context of federalism, and its wide-ranging impacts on host communities should be reasonably debated in a bid to reverse the impact of MCF on livelihoods and the environment.

The Fragility of Nigeria’s Kogi State: Exploring the Missing Link in the Quest for Sustainable Peace

Timothy Aduoyo Obaje

This article analyses the question of sustainable peace in Kogi state, Nigeria. Although Kogi state is generally considered as one of the ‘peaceful’ states in Nigeria, a critical review of the state’s recent history suggests otherwise. A review of scholarly literature, reports, and newspaper articles reveals the susceptibility of the state to violent conflict. The propensity of the dominant ethnic groups to engage in violence, the politicisation of ethnic differences, and the fatal consequences of unsatisfactory public service delivery, question the peaceful status often accorded to the state of Kogi. The paper identifies the state government’s inadequate engagement in peace-building activities as a key factor responsible for the state’s vulnerability to violent conflict. Consequently, the paper makes a case for more proactive initiatives for the sustainability of peace in Kogi state.

To work for peace is to work against violence; by analysing its forms and causes, predicting in order to prevent, and then acting preventively and curatively since peace relates to violence much as health relates to illness.¹

Since independence on 1 October 1960, Nigeria has witnessed various forms of violent conflict, including the Tiv riots of 1962 and 1964, the 30-month civil war (1966 – 1970), the Kaduna and Jos crises, and most recently the Boko Haram insurgency.² As a result of a history of conflict between various ethnic groups, Nigeria was restructured from three regions at independence to the current 36 states.³ Kogi state was created under this process in August 1991. Geographically, the state is located in the North Central geopolitical zone of Nigeria, though frequently referred to as the middle-belt.

Kogi state shares boundaries with eight other states and the Federal Capital Territory of Abuja. Its creation united three dominant ethnic groups – the Igalas, Okuns and Ebiras. The 2006 population census indicates that the state has an estimated population of 3,841,884 people. The Igalas occupy the Eastern Senatorial District, while the Ebiras and the Okuns populate the West and the Central districts respectively.

As a result of its geographical location, Kogi state has been largely unaffected by the large-scale violent conflicts that have befallen its surroundings. This situation has contributed to creating the impression that the state is peaceful. Relying mainly on secondary data sources – scholarly publications, reports and newspaper articles – this paper re-evaluates the common perception that Kogi is a peaceful state. Drawing insight from various theories and conceptions of peace and peace-building, the paper exposes the fragile nature of Kogi state, underscoring its high propensity to violent conflict. The paper concludes with the argument that there is need to adopt a holistic and proactive view of peace and peace-building, suggesting that the establishment of institutions that facilitate the adequate implementation of peace-building programmes will enhance sustainable peace in the state.

CONCEPTUALISING PEACE AND PEACE-BUILDING

Peace, along with other concepts such as ‘truth’, ‘beauty’, and ‘love’ is considered by Sandy and Perkins as the most frequently uttered word. Similar to these other concepts, there are numerous understandings and definitions of peace. The concept is endowed with an inherent ability to simultaneously represent different realities to different people. Reflections and debates about peace and its meaning are always intertwined with issues of conflict, in its various forms. Our reflection of peace in Kogi state would thus also grapple with issues relating to the nature and causes of conflicts.

Peace is often considered as a state of tranquillity. It may be a state of internal or psychological tranquillity within a person or amongst a group of people, or a state of security and freedom from civil disturbance in a nation-state. Akin to concepts such as ‘truth’ and ‘love’, peace is always employed to express a human desire; that which is perceived as good and ought to be ultimately pursued. This is reflected in the early Greek philosopher’s characterisation of peace as the ‘the greatest good’ and more recently, in Galtung’s assertion that ‘peace makes sense to many people precisely because it corresponds with their experiences and they can endow it with the meanings that to

7. Conflict within the context of this paper is understood as violent conflict except where stated otherwise.
them are most important.'

This approach to the comprehension of peace, according to Galtung, 'has hardly furthered peace thinking. On the contrary, it has probably contributed to the widespread idea that peace is something irrational, diffuse and intangible, which cannot be researched and hardly even analysed — like some type of nirvana concept'. For peace-building to be successful in places like Kogi state, there is need for a well-articulated conception of peace. Efforts devoted to advancing a clear understanding of the meaning of peace and the processes through which it is acquired ought to address issues of human rights, justice, employment opportunities and civic participation. Some of these issues shall guide our exploration of the meaning of peace in subsequent sections.

Renowned peace scholars such as Johan Galtung, John Paul Lederach, Alfred Bonish and Kai Schmidt have attempted to offer clarity on the meaning of peace. As a leading figure in peace studies, Johan Galtung has highlighted different impressions of peace. His illustration of the long-standing idea of peace as a synonym for stability or equilibrium was widely embraced, as it resonates with psychological and religious perceptions of peace, which relate to the internal state of a human person. The primary features of such perceptions, which also constitute their weakness, are their subjectivity and compatibility with violence, given that an individual could be very stable or 'at peace' inwardly, while being caught up in a violent and tense environment. Galtung, however, expounded this concept in the prelude to the first edition of the *Journal of Peace Research*, where he engages the concept from two perspectives: negative and positive peace.

Negative peace is defined by Galtung as the 'absence of organized or collective violence'. It is the 'the absence of organized collective violence...between major human groups; particularly nations, but also between classes and between racial and ethnic groups because of the magnitude internal wars can have'. Within this school of thought, an end to violence is the supreme goal of peace initiatives, without much interest in the means to achieving this goal. Historical facts point to military action as the default preference of national governments in their quest for peace. More often than not, such actions are state-centric, with little or no regard for the welfare of the people. The understanding of peace in Kogi state resonates with this negative conceptualisation of peace. Hence, the general contentment with the stable outlook of the state, notwithstanding the gross structural violence embedded in the state's institutions and political environment as a whole. According to Richmond, 'the pluralist world-society/human-needs school argued that such state-centric approaches only replicate the very issues at the roots of the conflict and pointed to the need to include citizens in bottom-up peace processes'.

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10. Ibid.
13. These are the social, economic and political conditions embedded in the social structure, which systematically contribute to violence, inequality, injustice, or lack of access to social services. These in turn lead to the death, poor health, or repression of individuals or groups of individuals within a society.
The need for a bottom-up and human-needs approach to peace-building in Kogi state can be met by adopting a more positive conception of peace. This leads to Galtung’s idea of peace which is summarized as ‘the integration of human society’ in harmony. Galtung’s idea of positive and negative peace was inspired by the relationship between health and disease in health sciences. From a ‘negative’ perspective, health is understood as the absence of diseases; while it is also construed positively as making the body capable of resisting diseases. Positive peace aims at the prevention of violent conflicts through the integration of human society in all its dimensions. It is the ‘presence of the conditions for a just and sustainable peace, including access to food and clean drinking water, education for women and children, security from physical harm, and other inviolable human rights. The idea of positive peace introduces a paradigm shift in the discourse of peace, from the mere absence of somatic or direct violence, which could be achieved via military deployment, to the absence of structural violence in all its forms.

**PEACE IN KOGI STATE?**

With the advent of democracy in Nigeria came the expectation for a better life and the actualisation of the various democratic ideals for a peaceful livelihood. Some of these ideals include accountability to the people, fairness, as well as equity and justice for all, irrespective of their creed, political alignment, race, ethnicity or religion. Contrary to this enthusiastic expectation, governance in the state of Kogi has largely been characterised by undemocratic practices, including denying people the right to basic services. Kogi state remains one of the few states, if not the only state, in Nigeria where the monthly salaries of public servants are unpredictable, both in terms of when they are paid and the actual amount that is paid. This is because the government has a tendency of arbitrarily reducing or deferring the payment of the salaries of public servants. The government has a responsibility to protect the people and advance their basic human rights, including the right to access basic education and good health facilities. The reality of life in Kogi state, however, demonstrates that public education and health facilities – schools, libraries, hospitals, clinics and other related facilities – are in a constant state of deterioration. The arbitrary manner in which the salaries of public servants are handled and the dearth of quality education and health facilities in the state deny people access to relevant resources that will enhance their potentials. Such deprivation is what Galtung calls structural violence. He conceptualises structural violence as a situation where ‘human beings are being influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realisations are below their potential realisation.’

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18. Ibid.
violence is considered present when a person is denied access to needs such as quality education, good and efficient health services, and security, given that such deprivation makes the victim incapable of realizing their full potential.

Factors that hinder individuals from realizing their full potential could either be personal or structural. Structural violence (also known as indirect violence) is a form of violence that cannot be traced to the direct actions of a perpetrator. Anderson defines it as ‘those social, economic and political conditions embedded in the social structure that systematically contribute to violence, inequality, and injustice, or lack of access to social services that contribute to the death, poor health, or repression of individuals or groups of individuals within a society’. Conditions that accelerate structural violence include poverty, illiteracy and insecurity. Galtung describes these conditions as social injustice, and their presence in the state signifies the existence of some form of violence. Stability in Kogi state is therefore not the same as the concept of positive peace discussed above. The state may have experienced an absence of large-scale direct violence (negative peace), but this form of peace, as pointed out earlier, is not sustainable and leaves much to be desired. A constructive peace-building effort in Kogi state will entail the eradication of the conditions that promote structural violence, including poverty, illiteracy and all forms of insecurity. The eradication of such conditions is an important step towards the advancement of the features necessary for positive peace. Positive peace is the ‘presence of the conditions for a just and sustainable peace, including access to food and clean drinking water, education for women and children, security from physical harm, and other inviolable human rights’. Until Kogi state addresses or begins to take proactive steps in addressing the conditions that breed structural violence, the state will remain in a perpetual state of violence, notwithstanding its supposed stability.

VIOLENT CONFLICT AND ITS CONSEQUENCES IN KOGI STATE

Irrespective of the increasingly stable outlook of the political system in Kogi state, its predisposition to violence cannot be overlooked. Since the return to democracy in Nigeria in 1999, politics in Kogi state has been riven with ethnic and political suspicions. This section reviews the major incidents of violent conflict in the state and examines the implications of these incidents for the sustainability of peace in the state.

High Susceptibility to Intra-ethnic Violence

A critical review of the geography and political landscape of Kogi state suggests that the state is a microcosm of Nigeria; it shares many similarities with the country as a whole. As noted above, the state is dominated by three ethnic groups – the Igals in the Eastern district, the Ebiras in the Central district, and the Okuns in the Western district. Discourses of conflict and peace in Kogi state can no longer ignore the possi-

22. Ibid, 170.
bility that ethnic tensions could someday degenerate into violent conflict with devastating consequences. In one of her recent publications, Marietu, a leading scholar on conflict in Kogi state, draws attention to the incessant conflicts among the Ebira people in the Central District of Kogi state. These include recurring clashes between rival supporters of Senator A. T Ahmed and the then Deputy Governor Philip Salau, over the political control of Ebiraland. There is also the violent conflict between the Upopuvete and Aniku sub-clans of Adavi Local Government, over the chieftaincy position of Upopuvete. Although these are intra-ethnic conflicts, they have always affected the larger society. As Marietu has argued, these conflicts have assumed frightening dimensions, with significant consequences on social cohesion and stability in the affected area. ‘Most disturbing is the fact that delinquent youth gangs disposed towards aggressive behaviour have emerged all over the land.’

The incidents of violence among the Ebira people, one of the dominant ethnic groups in Kogi state, reveal a potential trend of repeated violent conflicts in a seemingly stable and peaceful state. Although some of these conflicts are currently considered insignificant in comparison with the more volatile states and regions of Nigeria, they nonetheless pose a serious threat to the state’s stability. They could be seen as a catalyst for the further decline of the ‘peace’ enjoyed by the state and its inhabitants.

### Inter-ethnic Conflicts and the Politicisation of Ethnic Differences

In addition to intra-ethnic conflicts, the politicisation of ethnic identities and cultural differences stands out as another primary cause of violent conflict in Kogi state. Since the creation of the state in 1991, it has experienced a fierce struggle for political dominance and control of state resources amongst the three major ethnic groups in the state. Given the numerical superiority of the Igalas over the Ebiras and Okuns, they have dominated political power in Kogi state, occupying most of the strategic offices of the state since the inception of democracy in 1999. Other ethnic groups in the state have objected fiercely to this domination. In her analysis of the 2007 electoral processes in Kogi state, Omotola draws attention to the political battle-lines that were drawn between the Igalas, on the one hand, and the Ebiras and Okuns, on the other hand. Each of the clusters was prepared to go to any length to acquire political power and exercise domination in the state. This quest for domination has led to the emergence of what may be called an Okun-Ebira coalition that has sought to wrestle political power from the Igalas at all costs.

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27. Omotola, ‘Democratization’.
29. Ibid.
Resentment towards the political dominance of the Igalas in Kogi state was made apparent during celebrations of Democracy Day on 29 May 2005. An armed group believed to be loyal to Senator A. T. Ahmed, a strong critic of the political dominance of the Igalas, disrupted the official celebrations at the Kogi state stadium in Lokoja. When Senator Ahmed died in 2006, embittered youths did not allow the state governor, an Igala, and his entourage, to take part in the funeral ceremony. It should be noted that the late senator was from the Ebira ethnic group in Kogi Central. Table 1 shows other incidents of violent conflict that have been recorded in Kogi state. Politics in Kogi state is driven not by opposing manifestos and political visions, but by the rivalry amongst the three major ethnic groups, which all compete for the domination of the state. This approach to politics is a breeding ground for recurring incidents of violent conflicts. Recurrent violence has the potential of undermining the ability of communities to develop structures and processes for resolving conflict peacefully. This has been the case in the Plateau state of Nigeria. Once known as the ‘the city of peace’, Plateau state is now synonymous with violence due to the inability of communities in the state to resolve their differences amicably. The example of Plateau state serves to highlight the urgent need for measures to promote sustainable peace in Kogi state. Moreover, violent conflicts are capable of tearing the state apart, especially when they stem from rivalry between two or more dominant ethnic groups in the state. Finally, the audacity of a few young people to hold the governor to ransom, notwithstanding his status in the state, underscores the frailty of the state’s security, and its vulnerability to violent conflict. This action could have degenerated into an ethnic war, had the youth from the rival ethnic group responded violently.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nature of conflict</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Parties involved</th>
<th>Status of conflict</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dispute over ownership of Ajaokuta; Dispute over chieftancy stool of Onu Ajaokuta</td>
<td>Ajaokuta</td>
<td>Ebira and Igala ethnic groups</td>
<td>Partially resolved but potentially volatile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Struggle for political control of Ebira land</td>
<td>Okene (Ozuwayu/ Iruvuchebe)</td>
<td>Senator A.T Ahmed and Deputy-Governor Philip Salau</td>
<td>Recurred until the death of Senator A.T Ahmed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict over ownership of oil well in Ibaji land</td>
<td>Ibaji, Anocha</td>
<td>Obale people of Ibaji and Agulere people of Anambra</td>
<td>Recurring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict over ownership of land and its resources</td>
<td>Ogbogbo, Odolu and Okpakkata</td>
<td>Farmers and indigenes of Igalamela/ Odolu Local Government</td>
<td>Recurring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dispute over ownership of recently discovered oil well</td>
<td>Odeke and Echeno</td>
<td>Anambra and Odeke of Ibaji Local Government</td>
<td>Recurring</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Adapted from Omotola, 2005; Marietu, 2009 and Tenuche, 2002).

32. Ibid.
Lack of Accountability and Poor Service Delivery

A review of the nature of peace in Kogi state also needs to take into account the government’s failure to provide adequate services to the people. Fitzsimmons and Fitzsimmons stress that ‘services lie at the very heart of economic survival and sustainable peace in any country.’ The adequate delivery of basic services such as education, health care, good road networks, safe drinking water and security is a fundamental responsibility of every government. However, in Kogi state more than 70% of the rural population does not have access to the basic necessities of life. This deficiency largely results from entrenched corrupt practices by public office-holders, incompetence and undue political interference in technical and administrative processes for personal gain. The inadequate and sometimes complete absence of basic services corresponds with Galtung’s notion of structural violence, defined as a condition where human beings are constrained from realising the full potential. It is almost certain that without adequate education, good health services and security, the chances of self-actualisation diminish significantly. From this perspective, and taking into account the government’s dismal performance in the delivery of basic services to the people, it can be argued that structural violence is a reality of life in Kogi state. This has been made possible by the institutionalisation and internalisation of practices such as corruption, undue political interference, and rewarding incompetence, which deprive citizens of opportunities to live a better life.

The Role of Boko Haram in Kogi state

In recent years, Kogi state has also fallen victim to the activities of the insurgent group, Boko Haram. In 2012, gunmen suspected to be members of Boko Haram killed at least 19 people during an attack on a church in the town of Otite. A suspected suicide bomber was intercepted in July of the same year before he could denote his explosives at another church in the Okene Local Government area of Kogi state. The violent crises in Kaduna (1999-2002) and Jos (2001) are testimony to the fact that religiously motivated attacks such as these can spell disaster for Kogi state. In an already volatile environment, continued attacks by Boko Haram in the name of Islam could provoke retaliation from other religious groups and plunge the state into full-blown inter-religious violence.

Other security reports allege that the state security service (SSS) uncovered a number of hideouts and bomb factories in Kogi state, several of which were supposedly owned by Boko Haram insurgents. It was recently reported that the SSS dismantled a Boko Haram cell in Kogi state University, arresting five suspects who

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34. Johan Galtung, ‘Violence’.


were accused of planning an attack in the south-central part of the state. Suspicions that insurgents are operating within the community of scholars raise serious concerns; they are an indication of the extent to which the seed of conflict, violence and disaster is being sowed in the state. This suggests that Kogi state could become a safe haven for members of Boko Haram and related groups, a possibility that threatens the peace and security of the state. It also raises questions about the existence and effectiveness of early warning systems that should alert the government and other relevant stakeholders of these activities before they take root in the state.

THE MISSING LINK IN THE QUEST FOR SUSTAINABLE PEACE

It is worthy of note that a state such as Kogi, which has been consistently under the menace of ethnic and political tensions, has no portfolio mandated to map out strategies necessary for defusing conflict before it erupts into violence. The state has largely relied on the deployment of military force for its stability. Arguably, the use of military force in conflict situations can contribute to restoring social order and stability in the short run. However, this paper disagrees with a long-term reliance on the military approach to peace-building, giving that it most often gives rise to extra-judicial killings, rape and further violence. The absence of a portfolio dedicated to peace-building, such as a special advisor to the governor, and the state’s overdependence on military force for stability do not resonate with the state’s aspiration for sustainable peace in the land. The state government has not done much to inculcate a culture of peace amongst the people. Rather it has adopted a laid-back approach to issues of peace-building in the state. Government-led initiatives to incorporate civil society organizations into the campaign for peace are yet to be seen. In line with the popular saying that the failure to plan is in fact a plan for failure, this paper holds that the failure of the state to adopt a proactive peace-building plan is in fact a plot to fail in its effort to enhance peace in the land. The dearth of state-instituted peace-building initiatives leaves the state vulnerable and without much leadership or the necessary support structures for peacebuilding. In view of the government’s irreplaceable agency in the state, its insufficient visibility and engagement in peace-building initiatives creates a void, which is responsible for the high vulnerability of the state to violent conflict. The lack of a peace-building portfolio mandated to facilitate the development of a culture of peace echoes the sentiment that the government has adopted a passive attitude towards peace-building in the state. This gap in leadership creates incentives and opportunities for terrorists, insurgents and other potential instigators of violence to carry out their schemes in the state.

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STRENGTHENING MECHANISMS FOR PEACE-BUILDING IN KOGI STATE

The concept of peace-building was pioneered by the former Secretary-General of the United Nation (UN), Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in his 1992 report titled, *An Agenda for Peace*. In this report, Boutros-Ghali proposed a couple of strategies through which the UN could manage and deal with issues of contemporary conflicts around the globe. Envisaged strategies included concepts such as preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and post-conflict peace-building. The report defined preventive diplomacy as ‘actions to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur’. On its part, peacemaking is understood as ‘actions to bring hostile parties to agreement essentially through peaceful means’. Meanwhile, peacekeeping is defined as the ‘deployment of a UN presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all parties concerned, normally involving UN military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well’.

Although peace-building is a relatively new concept (since 1992), it has enjoyed widespread recognition. Despite the remarkable interest in this concept, like many other social concepts, it remains vaguely construed amongst scholars and practitioners. Tschirgi, Barnett et al., and Udofia echo this view in their claim that, despite the attention it has enjoyed, peace-building remains a less-than-clear concept and that there is no commonly agreed post-conflict peace-building theory. For instance, Judy Cheng-Hopkins, the Assistant Secretary-General for UN Peace-building Support, understands peace-building as ‘a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or escalating into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development...’ Meanwhile, in his paper, *Localising Peace-building in Sierra Leone*, Karbo defines peace-building as ‘a complex, long-term and fundamentally value-laden process that involves core decisions about how to construct a peaceful society’. This paper adopts Lederach’s conceptualisation of peace-building as a ‘comprehensive concept that encompasses, generates, and sustains the full array of processes, approaches and stages needed to transform conflict towards more sustainable, peaceful relationships’. Embedded in this definition is the idea that peace-building is a pro-

41. Ibid.
cess, involving complex elements and multiple actors. This paper focuses on the role of the state government and its different agencies, considered to be indispensable actors in the peace-building process.

A sustainable approach to peace-building in Kogi state therefore needs to be aligned with Lederach’s ideas of peace-building, without losing sight of the state’s unique social and political identities. Hence the state, through its policies and activities, ought to reflect and promote a variety of processes, approaches and stages that positively contribute to the transformation of conflicts and promote peaceful coexistence amongst its people. Such approaches include establishing the necessary institutions for peace in the state, re-orienting the security sector, introducing peace education in the society, and providing livelihood opportunities for all individuals living in the state.

The Role of Peace-Building Institutions

To enhance the process of building of sustainable peace in the state, there is need for the creation of a government portfolio that is principally responsible for coordinating state-led peace-building initiatives. This could take the form of a special advisor to the governor on peace-building matters. Corresponding with the aims and vision of the UN Security Council as espoused by Boutros-Ghali, this office should be mandated to develop a clear vision, objectives and strategies to guide the state’s peace-building efforts.48 This is in addition to being responsible for identifying potentially violent situations and undertaking the necessary interventions to prevent their escalation. A prospective peace-building office should also work with local communities to re-build trust and harmony between groups that were formerly in conflict, while also facilitating the realisation of the UN Security Council’s vision of addressing structural violence in all its forms: economic despair, social injustice and political oppression.49

Education for Peace

Brock-Utne defines the concept of peace-oriented education as a form of ‘education or socialization that results in more peace in the world or that at least has as a result the greater likelihood that peace will be the existing condition than the case would have been without that education.’ 50 It is acknowledged that there are a variety of educational formats across the globe, including cultural forms of education, informal education and formal education. Education in the context of this paper refers to formal education. Formal education refers to a ‘mass schooling system that is regulated, financed, and provided (in theory) as a universal public service to all citizens by the

49. Ibid.
state, on an equal basis.’ 51 Education has been applauded by scholars and practitioners as an enduring tool for transforming conflict and building lasting peace. 52 For example, the peace agreement that ended years of civil war in Liberia guaranteed the right of all citizens to education, and called for basic education to be made free and compulsory. The agreement also stressed that both sides of the conflict should not impede the right to education by taking over and controlling education institutions, abducting students and teachers, or turning schools into barracks. 53 The emphasis on education in peace agreements underscores the exceptional role of peace education in the peace-building process.

Similar education policy reforms should be undertaken by the Kogi state government as a conflict prevention measure in the state. Such policy reforms ought to speak to the quality of the content of the school syllabus, with special emphasis on equipping students with relevant skills for the promotion of peace in the society. They should also address the ongoing dilapidation of government schools, in a bid to make them attractive to the masses. Failure to do so would amount to the state denying the underprivileged in society the right to quality education. Schools present opportunities for people from different ethnic, religious, social and political backgrounds to meet and interact. Socialisation that takes place within the context of peace-oriented education facilitates the development of positive values and a culture of peace, which in turn equip individuals with the skills needed to constructively interact with people subscribing to different belief systems. This view is supported by Cairns, who argues with reference to Allport’s contact hypothesis that inter-group prejudice – and thus the potential for conflict – would be reduced through contact between groups, resulting in positive attitudes towards and improved understanding of other groups. 54 Reducing inter-group prejudice and strengthening the ability of individuals to interact healthily with others will enhance the chances of peaceful co-existence in Kogi state.

CONCLUSION

Kogi state may not have experienced widespread violent conflict, but empirical evidence and theoretical insight suggest that it is vulnerable to lethal conflict. The nonchalant attitude of the government and society towards the root causes of structural violence, and the many incidents of direct violence highlighted above are compelling indicators of the state’s vulnerability to widespread violence. Therefore, this paper has argued that until the root causes of direct and structural violence are addressed, peace in Kogi state will continue to be a mirage.

The paper further maintains that the state government’s overreliance on the military or the use of force generally, is not a sustainable peace-building approach. It is imperative for the government to explore and proactively utilize other options for

53. Dupuy, ‘Education for Peace’.
promoting sustainable peace in the state. Some of the recommendations put forward include the creation of a state portfolio responsible for promoting a culture of peace, while also working to manage existing conflicts and prevent them from escalating into violence. The paper also highlights the need to reform the state’s education policies, with the aim of improving the school syllabus and using the education system to endow students with conflict management skills.
Domestic work is defined by the International Labour Organization (ILO) as work performed in or for a household within an employment relationship. Domestic work has largely been an invisible and mysterious occupation, considering that this kind of work takes place in private homes. Like many other countries, Sudan benefits greatly from the social and economic contributions of domestic workers. However, very little is known about the marginalisation of domestic workers. This article attempts to analyse the history, evolution and current context of domestic work in Sudan. It traces the history of domestic work to the practice of slavery in Sudan, when slaves were mainly used as domestic helpers. It then analyses the contextual factors that influenced the evolution of domestic workers from slaves to servants before examining the current political, legal, economic, and socio-cultural context in which domestic work takes place. The article concludes with empirical findings on the relationship between domestic workers and their employers in Sudan.

SUDAN IS LOCATED IN THE NORTH-EASTERN PART OF AFRICA. IT is the most neighboured African country, sharing boundaries with ten other countries: Egypt and Libya to the north; Uganda, Kenya and South Sudan to the south; Chad, Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to the west; and Ethiopia and Eritrea to the east. Sudan has over 500 tribes, which speak over 400 different dialects. These tribes form two major ethnic and racial groups; the Arabs and Africans. Most of the population adheres to Islam or Christianity.

1. Hadelzein M.E.S. Elobeid is a Sudanese PhD. candidate at Sudan University for Science and Technology. Her PhD. focus is on labour rights in the informal economy; specifically on identifying local measures for the implementation of the ILO’s concept of decent work on domestic work in Sudan.
THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT: SLAVES, SERVANTS OR WORKERS

A slave is universally defined as a person who works without proper remuneration or appreciation, and who is excessively dependent on and controlled by someone else. A servant, on its part, is a person who performs duties for others, especially a person employed in a house to carry out domestic duties. Meanwhile a worker is anyone who holds a paid job, with a stable contract (explicit or implicit) on a continuous basis with a specific employer. In many cultures and communities, the term ‘servant’ is a synonym for a slave. This is particularly true in Christian communities and most of the Arab world. Given its negative connotation and association with slavery, the term ‘servant’ has over time fallen out of favour and replaced globally with ‘worker’. However, in Sudan ‘servant’ remains the preferred terminology for denoting persons working in households universally recognized as domestic workers. The discussion below traces the historical roots of the modern practice of domestic work in Sudan.

The practice of enslavement in Sudan can be traced to the pre-colonial period from 1885-1898, when members of the noble class controlled political and economic power while the enslaved, known as ‘subjects’ provided labour and paid tribute to the former. Nobility implied a relief from performing menial labour even on one’s own land or at one’s own home. Institutions of slavery were more effective along the Nile River, where slaves provided labour for agriculture and domestic work. Domestic slavery became more common in Northern Sudan during the Turko-Egyptian rule. In the beginning of British colonization from1898-1955, slavery continued to support the formation of the colony. British authorities maintained good relations with powerful Sudanese figures, including slave traders. This posture undermined the administration’s resolve to end slavery in Sudan, in spite of the fact that Britain was at the forefront of the global anti-slavery campaign. One of the factors that contributed to the continuance of slavery was the perceptions of the British administrators towards the practice in Sudan. The British believed that a sudden termination of slavery would lead to social problems such as moral decay, vagrancy and prostitution. They reasoned that the continuation of slavery presented a win-win situation for all parties, as it guaranteed shelter and employment for slaves. However, the British colonial administration eventually came up with a strategy for the abolition of slavery in all its colonies. In Sudan this strategy came in the form of a series of bills among which were:

• The Vagabond Act of 1905, which assumed that freed slaves would either be criminals or prostitutes. It accordingly made provisions for punishments that included arrests and lashing, or even returning slaves to their ex-masters if they would take them back.
• Domestic slaves’ guidelines issued by the British authorities in 1919, which included 15 provisions. This bill unified the terms ‘domestic servant’ and ‘domestic slave’ into one category, namely Sudanese servant, which was defined as: ‘persons who were enslaved or assumed to be’.

THE EVOLUTION OF DOMESTIC WORK IN SUDAN

Domestic work is considered to be degrading and physically demanding, and therefore not suitable for relatively affluent urban families. It is also associated with the notion of slavery. Not surprisingly, domestic work has often been left to marginalized ethnic groups, such as people from the Nuba Mountains; South-West African migrants (Falata tribes); as well as migrants from Ethiopia, Eritrea and Asian countries. The different phases of the evolution of domestic work in Sudan are outlined below.

1898-1955: Attempts by British Colonizers to Abolish Slavery

British colonial authorities had to manage the abolition of slavery in accordance with international principles and standards aimed at regulating the use of labour. Accordingly, the British administration issued freedom documents to slaves, who were mostly domestic workers. This action led to rampant unemployment, which resulted in the adoption of the Vagabond Act. Among other things, the Act prohibited movement without permission.

1960s: Scarce Domestic Work

During colonization and throughout the 1960s, extended family members assumed the role of domestic workers; thus there was little need for hired domestic workers. This practice still takes place in most rural areas in Sudan. During this period, male domestic workers were mostly employed by government officials who worked in missions away from their extended families. However, given the conservative nature of the Sudanese society, it was considered a taboo for men to employ male domestic workers. Moreover, the practice of employing domestic workers during this period was largely informal because the relationship still resonated with slavery and domestic workers often came from marginalized minority groups.3

1970s: The Rise of the Nuclear Family, inception of Regulation and the Influx Migrants

With more women going into the workforce and a corresponding increase in independent nuclear families, domestic work became more of a necessity than a luxury. As part of efforts to regulate the practice in the early 1970s, employers were required to issue ‘domestic workers cards’ to their employees. This was in effect an upshot of the Vagabond Act. In the mid-1970s, an influx of Ethiopian and Eritrean refugees into Sudan, due to famine in these countries, injected abundant and cheap labour into the Sudanese society. A large pool of vulnerable and obedient young women was now available to serve as domestic workers. The arrival of young and hardworking women from neighbouring countries also provided a solution to the problem of social taboo associated with employing male domestic workers. Yet, the informality of domestic

3. Interview with Elmustafa Mohammed Yousif, Associate Professor, University of Khartoum, Khartoum, 12 February 2013.
employment relations continued because formal domestic employment meant more responsibilities for the employer and the government, in the form of providing protection and care to domestic workers, while also being exposed to the scrutiny of the international community.4

1980s: Dominance of Informality and Absence of Regulation

Until the late 1980s, the employment relationship between employers and domestic workers was regulated. However, regulation and formality vanished towards the end of the 1980s and has not been restored even today. In the 1980s, displaced people fleeing drought and conflict in the west and south of the country, as well as the Nuba Mountains and the Blue Nile altered the dynamics of domestic work in major cities such as Khartoum. The influx of large numbers of unemployed Sudanese into the capital city increased competition for domestic work, as the supply of domestic labour far outweighed its demand. This in turn resulted in a decline in wages and the quality of working conditions. These new dynamics also contributed to entrenching domestic work as a predominantly informal occupation in Sudan.5

1990s-2000s: A New Phase of Domestic Work

In the late 1990s and early 2000s, Sudan witnessed another influx of migrants, mainly Filipinos, Bangladeshis, and Indonesians. Some of these migrants were affluent migrants returning from the Gulf region. Others arrived in the country with the help of employment agencies, which acted as intermediaries between domestic workers and prospective employers. Employment agencies also contributed to undermining the rights and working conditions of domestic workers. This era also witnessed the emergence of a rich upper class, which tended to perceive and practice domestic work as an act of flaunting and imitation.6

CURRENT DYNAMICS OF DOMESTIC WORK IN SUDAN

This section provides as an extensive discussion of the current context of domestic work in Sudan. It attempts to expose the political, legal, economic and socio-cultural dynamics that shape the domestic work sector in Sudan. The analysis in this section draws largely from interviews conducted with scholars, politicians, activists, civil servants and religious leaders.

4. Interview with Elmustafa Mohammed Yousif, Associate Professor, University of Khartoum, Khartoum, 12 February 2013.
5. Ibid.
6. Interview with Albatthani Atta, Associate Professor, University of Khartoum, Khartoum, 16 November 2013; Interview with Elmustafa Mohammed Yousif, Associate Professor, University of Khartoum, Khartoum, February-August 2013; Interview with Humeida Omer, Teaching Assistant, University of Khartoum, Khartoum, 17 November 2013; Interview with Khalifalla Mohammed, Professor, Nilein University, Khartoum, 5 January 2014; Interview with Kholajli Mohamed Ali, Labour Studies Scholar, Khartoum, 12 December 2013.
Political Influences on Domestic Work

Historical evidence of the politicization of domestic work in Sudan can be found in a speech by Father Philip Ghabosh back in the 1960s in which he argued that his people from the Nuba Mountains were restricted to serve solely as domestic workers, with no support from the government or any prospects of climbing up the social ladder. The politics of domestic work has over the years been a rather grey area, usually mingled with legal, economic and socio-cultural aspects. This has prompted Atta Albatthani to argue that ‘[the] political aspect of domestic work in Sudan is not visible’.8

Another dimension of the politics of domestic work is the government’s reluctance to ratify and implement international labour standards. Sudan has been a member state of the ILO since 1956. It has so far ratified 14 of the 101 conventions of the ILO. In 2011, the ILO adopted a distinct regulatory instrument for domestic work titled ‘Decent work for domestic workers’.9 Only 15 countries have ratified this convention, and Sudan is not one of them. Even in cases where Sudan has ratified ILO conventions, ratification has not always been accompanied by measures to domesticate conventions. There is also a noticeable neglect of the Ministry of Labour, when compared to other government ministries such as those of Defence, the Interior and Education. This situation has contributed to weak governmental regulation of and support for the domestic work sector.

The Legal Dimension of Domestic Work

In Sudan, domestic work is supposedly regulated by state labour offices, which are supervised by the Ministry of Labour. Until the late 1980s, there were designated sections within each labour office for handling issues relating to domestic work. These dedicated units used the 1955 Sudan Domestic Servants Act as their guide. Although state labour offices continue to deal with issues of domestic work, they no longer have separate units dedicated to this form of employment. A new law, the Khartoum State Domestic Service Act, was passed in 2009 and now serves as the basis for regulating domestic work. However there is almost complete ignorance of the provisions of this law on the part of major stakeholders, including domestic workers, their employers, and even lawyers.10 Like many other African countries, Sudan suffers from the problem whereby the adoption of laws is not matched with efforts to implement these laws. Additionally, Sudanese laws often fail to take into account the socio-economic and cultural context in which they are meant to be applied. These two ‘syndromes’ are even more pronounced in the legal framework dealing with the informal economy and informal employment.

7. Father Philip Abbas Ghabosh (1922-2008) was a political activist and advocate for the rights of the Nuba people, and the marginalized and vulnerable in general.
8. Interview with Albatthani Atta, Associate Professor, University of Khartoum, Khartoum, 16 November 2013.
9. Interview with Elmustafa MohammedYousif, Associate Professor, University of Khartoum, Khartoum, February and August 2013.
10. Interview with Abdelhmeed Zakaria, Head of Khartoum State’s Labour Office, 12 December 2013.
**Domestic workers’ lack of awareness and knowledge leads to abuse**

Domestic workers are not aware of their rights and are therefore inclined to accept employment on an informal basis. This situation often leads to the abuse and marginalisation of domestic workers. Accordingly, domestic workers in Sudan do not enjoy labour rights and do not even demand them. In addition to having to work without paid leave, they are often subjected to harassment and long working hours. Domestic workers also usually accept employment offers without written agreements.11

Foreign women are the most vulnerable in this situation. This category of domestic workers are often subjected to what Elsadig Elmahdi calls ‘double oppression’, because of the natural abusive attitude of society towards women and foreigners.12 Maryam Takas reinforces this point with her assertion that: ‘Most domestic workers have dual precariousness; they are mostly women, refugees or displaced persons who do not have any personal identification documents, who are uneducated and accordingly are ignorant of their rights and obligations’.13

**Absence of Regulation**

The domestic work sector in Sudan is currently not subjected to any meaningful regulatory framework, resulting in the arbitrary treatment of domestic workers. This situation undermines domestic work as a decent form of employment.14 In the words of a law enforcement officer:

> Until the late 1980s, there was a solid process of registration, record keeping and statistics of domestic workers, including a process of liaison between the police and the Ministry of Labour. Each domestic worker had to be issued an identity card with important information such as their name, address and telephone number. Now it is a hassle, with neither regulation nor statistics of domestic work.15

As a result of the absence of proper regulation, most domestic workers do not receive after-service benefits they are entitled to, neither are they compensated for any unused leave.16 It is worth noting, however, that some form of regulation takes place through employment agencies, which import domestic workers from Asia (mostly Indonesians and Filipinos). Domestic workers brought in from Asia are usually employed by diplomats and wealthy households that can afford the expensive fees charged by employment agencies. When a diplomat wants to employ a domestic worker, a contract is usually signed at the embassy and later reviewed and certified by

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15. Interview with Mohamed Elsheikh, Police Captain, Khartoum, 4 January 2014.
the Ministries of Labour and Foreign Affairs. All complaints and issues arising from this contract are normally resolved through the labour office, while the employment agency handles relations between the domestic worker and his/her employer.\(^{17}\)

In an ideal situation, the constitution should outline principles that guarantee inclusive human rights, which are then translated into a set of laws and standards. A culture of respect and recognition of the rights of all persons should emerge naturally from this legal framework. However, in developing countries like Sudan, there is always a disparity between the provisions of the constitution, legislation and the prevailing culture in society, often to the detriment of vulnerable groups.\(^{18}\) It is not surprising therefore, that domestic workers in Sudan are often reluctant to report abuse mainly because they are ignorant of their rights, but also out of fear of losing their job. This situation is illustrated in the following anecdote:

Domestic workers are in a very vulnerable stand; I remember an incident of a female domestic worker who came to me in a very bad psychological state, complaining that she quit her job and when she asked for her after-service benefits her employers accused her of theft. Eventually she gave up her rights because she cannot fight for them. By the way, this is a common scenario.\(^{19}\)

The absence of an effective legal framework to regulate the domestic work sector has encouraged all kinds of abuse. The most recent form of exploitation comes from the activities of so-called informal agents. These individuals position themselves as middlemen for domestic workers, and are usually their acquaintances or relatives. They hold negotiations with employers on behalf of their ‘clients’, receive complaints, and give domestic workers instructions on how to perform their jobs. Resonating with the practice of human trafficking, these informal agents, locally referred to as brokers, exercise complete authority over domestic workers under their control. They determine the duration for which domestic workers would serve a given employer, using deceitful methods to rotate their ‘clients’ from one household to another in a bid to make more money.\(^{20}\)

**Economic Dimension of Domestic Work**

In economics, opportunity cost refers to the value that is sacrificed in order to acquire the next valued alternative.\(^{21}\) Domestic work represents a case of dual opportunity cost in that on the one hand, the domestic worker sacrifices personal and family time

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to work for other families, and on the other hand the employer sacrifices her income
to afford domestic care. The rise of nuclear families along with challenging economic
conditions has resulted in the need for multiple sources of income on the part of
many households. This has created incentives for more women to move into the
workforce, a phenomenon which has resulted in the greater need for domestic work­
ers. In this context, making use of the services of domestic workers has become more
of a necessity than luxury. Given the high levels of unemployment precipitated by the
economic crisis, many people have turned to domestic work as an alternative form of
employment, including engaging in the activity on a part-time basis. However, as
pointed out above, domestic workers find themselves in a labour market that is not
regulated, and which is completely dominated by employers. Other economic factors
affecting the conditions of domestic workers include the imbalance between the sup­
ply and demand of domestic workers, as well as the economic hardship prevailing in
the country, which dissuades households employing domestic workers from guaran­
teering decent work conditions such as the provision of minimum wage and social
security. It is also worth noting that the value and contribution of the domestic work
sector to the national economy is yet to be fully recognised.22

Socio-Cultural Dimension of Domestic Work

The dominant values and cultural practices in the Sudanese society also play an im­
portant role in determining the norms underpinning domestic work. In fact, it has
been observed that the ‘rules of the game’, as they pertain to the relationship between
domestic workers and their employers, are often established during informal conver ­
sations at social gatherings. It is mostly during these informal encounters that infor­
mary on domestic workers is exchanged and common employment standards are
set, including the appropriate minimum wage and how domestic workers should be
treated. The poor working conditions and general exploitation to which domestic
workers are subjected are therefore a reflection of the contradictions and moral deca­
dence in the Sudanese society. Maysoon Elnigoumi captures the contradictions in the
Sudanese society in the following rhetoric question:

What does it mean to be linked and connected to upbeat technologies, to have our
Facebook profiles full of applications of the Prophet Mohamed, or to claim civilization
and modernity if we continue to treat our domestic workers with disrespect and inde­
cency, and even brag about it?23

It is worth noting that although Christianity and Islam are the dominant religions
in Sudan, none of these religions support the indecent treatment of domestic workers.
In fact, the teachings of both religions encourage employers to treat their servants and

22. Interview with Humeida Omer, Teaching Assistant, University of Khartoum, Khartoum, 17
November 2013; Interview with Khalfalla Mohammed, Professor, Nilein University, Khartoum, 5 January
2014; Interview with Kholaiki Mohamed Ali, Labour Studies Scholar, Khartoum, 12 December 2013; Interview with Elagraa Mutassim, Economist, Khartoum, 20 January 2014; Interview with Umbada S.,

suffrages the precarious conditions of domestic workers as follows: 'Do not take advantage of anyone or rob him. Do not hold back the wage of someone you have hired, not even for one night.' Similarly, the Prophet Mohammed had this to say about the way employers should relate to their servants and slaves:

Give the hired worker his wage before his sweat dries. Fear God in the matter of your slaves. Feed them with what you eat and clothe them with what you wear, and do not give them work beyond their capacity. Those whom you like retain, and those whom you dislike, sell. Do not cause pain to God's creation. He caused you to own them and had He so wished, He could have caused them to own you.

On the one hand, the exploitative relationship between domestic workers and their employers can be understood from the perspective of the history of slavery in Sudan. On the other hand, this relationship is emblematic of the culture of unprofessionalism and informality that is embedded in the Sudanese society, and which makes it difficult to set rules and standards. Another dimension relates to the influence of conservative 'Eastern' culture, which sees domestic work as a 'private' activity, to be subjected neither to societal nor governmental regulation. Such conservative mentality hinders the implementation of the key pillars of a decent work programme. This suggests the need for a paradigm shift in the way in which production relationships are understood in the Sudanese society. Such fundamental change is essential for the emergence of a decent culture, for as Nabil Adeeb correctly points out, 'a culture of indecency towards vulnerable groups, such as domestic workers, prevails in the Sudanese society, resulting in abuse and the denial of the basic right of being human.' This abusive and exploitative culture can also be inferred from the works of prominent Sudanese literary personalities such as Taha Jafar and Mohamed Elshiekh Medani. For example, in one of his poems title 'In need for a fine-tune', Medani exposes the misfortunes and sufferings of marginalised and minority groups in Sudan. A section of the poem describes the precarious conditions of domestic workers as follows:

We are silence
We die, when chosen — within the trade-off- by the houses
Our blood colour escapes us...
And so do poems
Or they exchange impartiality
In silence, the path converses with us
While the country’s ways desert us

27. Interview with Nabil Adeem, Lawyer, Khartoum, 20 December 2013.
THE DYNAMICS OF DOMESTIC WORK RELATIONSHIP: AN EMPIRICAL OVERVIEW

This section presents the empirical findings of household interviews conducted with employers of domestic workers. The findings were derived from an analysis of the general themes underlying (decent) domestic work. Household interviews were conducted in Khartoum State, which is made up of three main towns: Khartoum, Khartoum North and Omdurman. Residential areas in the towns were divided into three categories (A, B and C), on the basis of their socio-economic status:

– Category A represents affluent areas with high incomes.
– Category B represents the upper middle class, with above average affluence and incomes.
– Category C represents the middle class with average affluence and incomes.

As depicted in Table One, a total of 20 interviews were conducted for each category in a number of residential areas selected through a random process.

Khartoum

Most of the heads of household interviewed referred to their domestic workers as Shaghalin, the Arabic word for a worker, as opposed to one interviewee who uses the term Khadamin (servant) to refer to domestic workers. This difference could be attributed to differences in the level of education and profession of the respondents. Most of the interviewees indicated that they were not familiar with the concept of decent work. Most domestic workers in Khartoum are females of Ethiopian origin, and perform typical household chores such as cleaning, washing and cooking. These foreign domestic workers are mostly employed through informal brokers who monopolize negotiations with household heads. Negotiations cover issues such as ‘the

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29. Thematic analysis is a rich description of the data set where themes are an accurate reflection of the content of the entire data set. See Guest Greg, Kathleen MacQueen and Emily Namey, *Applied thematic analysis* (California, Sage Publications, 2011).
market-rate wage’, the nature of the work environment, and the agent’s commission. Such negotiations are concluded without any written agreement. It was also observed that most of the female domestic workers recruited from Ethiopia by informal brokers do not serve for a long period, as opposed to their Sudanese counterparts (mostly Falata, Nuba and Darfurians) who tend to stay in the same job for an extended period of time. Most of the domestic workers interviewed indicated that they do receive annual increments whenever the prices of goods and services increase. Household heads described the nature of the relationship they have with their domestic workers as falling along a continuum, which ranges from ‘close integration with respect and trust’ to ‘respect for redlines and boundaries’. It is worth noting that there were a couple of households which employed foreign domestic workers (mostly Filipinos and Ethiopians) on the basis of written contracts, copies of which were given to the employees.

Khartoum North

Most of the heads of household interviewed in Khartoum North refer to their domestic helpers as ‘workers’, while a few call them ‘servants’. It was also discovered that households in this town knew nothing about the concept of decent work. Compared to Khartoum, the ratio of domestic worker to household members is lesser in Khartoum North. However, most domestic workers in this town carry out the same chores as their counterparts in Khartoum. The majority of domestic workers are Ethiopians, who perform chores such as cleaning, washing and cooking. There is also a fair share of Sudanese domestic workers (mostly Nuba and Darfurians), who serve mainly as guards and drivers. The areas studied in this town are also familiar with the concepts of informal agents, verbal contracts, and market-rate wages with fluctuating annual increases. In terms of the social relationship between domestic workers and their employers, there seems to be a strong preference for the options of ‘no integration’ and ‘integration with respect for limits’.

Omdurman

Seven areas in this town, representing three socio-economic classes, were included in the study. The household heads in this area were mostly housewives who refer to their domestic workers as ‘servants’. Interviewees did not know anything about the concept of decent work. Most domestic workers are females from Ethiopia, who perform indoors chores such as cooking and cleaning, while Sudanese males from the Nuba Mountains and Darfur perform outdoor chores such as gardening and laundry. One of the areas studied is dominated by Falata domestic workers, who perform every domestic chore. The concept of ‘neighbourhood-rate wage’ is used in Omdurman as opposed to that of ‘market-rate wage’, which is common in other areas. However, the practice of annual increments subject to increases in prices is also practiced here. Finally, there seems to be a higher level of social integration between domestic workers and their employers in Omdurman than is the case in the other two towns.
CONCLUSION

This article analysed the historical and current dynamics of domestic work in Sudan. It has been argued that most domestic workers are still unable to exercise their basic rights, including the right to free movement, the right to retain possession of their identification documents, or the right to negotiate better working conditions. This situation is encouraged by an almost complete absence of law enforcement. Accordingly, the predominant relationship between domestic workers and their employers continues to be one of servitude (master/servant) rather than a formal workplace relationship (employer/employee). This relationship is also characterised by exploitation and the indecent treatment of domestic workers.

Findings from household interviews with employers were also used to illustrate in greater detail the contemporary dynamics of the relationship between domestic workers and their employers. In addition to highlighting additional concepts and practices that are common in the domestic work sector, such as the use of neighbourhood-rate wage and annual increments based on price increases, the findings from the household interviews also revealed that both domestic workers and their employers were not familiar with the concept of decent work. Arguably, this revelation explains why very few employers and agents treat domestic workers with decency and respect.

Going forward, there is need for more pragmatic efforts in the administration and regulation of domestic work. First, the government should re-establish the special units in state labour offices, which were dedicated to regulating the domestic work sector. Second, in order to move towards decent domestic work in Sudan, more empirical studies should be conducted to better understand the dynamics of the sector, and the government should work closely with the ILO in implementing the decent work agenda. Moreover, both the National Assembly and the Khartoum State Legislative Council should consider reviewing, and where necessary, amending existing legislation dealing with domestic workers in order to address any loopholes. Finally, measures should be adopted by the government and civil society to raise awareness about the rights and obligations provided in these pieces of legislation.
Democracy at Bay: The Formation and Resilience of Authoritarianism in Zimbabwe

Gideon Hlamalani Chitanga

How has a promising democracy mutated into a resilient authoritarian regime? What has sustained this authoritarian regime in power since 1980? A combination of multiparty politics, racial reconciliation, as well as socio-economic and political stability after the liberation struggle positioned Zimbabwe as a beacon of hope and a continental model for post-colonial transition to independence. Even as critical junctures of heightened political competition and regime insecurity since the 1980s generated brutal reaction from the state, there was still hope for transition to democracy. Drawing on a critical review of the relevant literature, this paper argues that the regime of the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) is inherently authoritarian. Beyond its selective brutality characterized by targeted violence, ZANU-PF has stayed in power by simultaneously exploiting systematic patronage, a well-articulated ‘indigenist’ ideology, and land policies under the dominant persona and office of the president. The over-arching formal and informal powers of the president override democratic norms and institutions, rendering them symbolic. The institutionalization of concentrated and centralized political power has sealed Mugabe’s dominance of the hegemonic party-state, masking its authoritarianism with democratic pretentions and regular but flawed elections.

Zimbabwe attained its independence in 1980 under the leadership of the ZANU-PF, after several decades of armed struggle against the settler regime. The first 15 years of independence were characterised by intense socio-economic and political contestation due to factors emanating from the contradictory legacy of colonialism and the politics of state formation after independence. Although academics and politicians do not agree on the extent to which colonial and post-colonial political dynamics could explain the state of contemporary politics in Zimbabwe, there is no doubt that the quest for democracy has stirred intense political contestation. The concentration of political power in the person and office of the president has systematically eroded the autonomy of democratic institutions, thereby locking the state into thoroughgoing authoritarianism. Mugabe has dominated state institutions and civil society, effectively using his discretionary powers to secure the perpetuation of his authoritarian leadership.
There are two diametrically opposed views about the state of governance and the nature of the ruling regime in Zimbabwe. Pro-ZANU-PF academics argue that the country is a democratic state; a vanguard of African nationalism defending its sovereignty from the assault of Western and domestic opponents who are driving a regime change agenda.1 Thus, the state invokes the need to defend national sovereignty against external aggression as the basis for the subordination of democratic institutions. This discourse is also used to justify the nature of the political system in Zimbabwe and the character of the state. The state’s posture is that institutions such as the judiciary, parliament and security structures must defend the security of the state and the ZANU-PF regime against illegal external aggression.2

The ruling party accuses domestic opposition political parties and civil society organizations of working with external enemies, who are opposed to its land reform and indigenization policies, to destabilize the country.3 For ZANU-PF, domestic political opposition is not seen in the context of legitimate democratic competition for political power and accountable governance. It is considered as a threat to national security and stability, justifying legal and extra-legal means of thwarting political opponents.

Academic and political proponents of the statist ZANU-PF position refer to the contested socio-economic and political situation in Zimbabwe as an unrecognized revolutionary moment.4 Taking a position based on Pan-Africanism and solidarity with the marginalized, they accuse their critics for pandering to neo-liberal Western views of governance and human rights, in what they call ‘intellectual structural adjustment’.5 They further argue that Western critique of Zimbabwe has been based on dubious theories and Western stereotypes, which reduce African politics and the state in Africa to endemic corruption and patronage while overstating the virtues of neo-liberal good governance. However these academics are oblivious to how the state has become increasingly authoritarian, using its ‘indigenist’ ideology and redistributive land reform policies to exclusively bolster its hold on power.6

Authoritarianism and democracy are contested terms whose meanings are fluid. Brazenly authoritarian regimes seek to manipulate the conceptual fluidity and ambiguity of the term ‘democracy’ by claiming that their regimes are democratic. The ZANU-PF leadership in Zimbabwe claims that its democratic credentials cannot be faulted given that the country holds regular elections, which allow the people to

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2. ZANU-PF has single-handedly ruled the country since independence, except when it was forced to govern with its opponents in two Governments of National Unity, first from 1980 to 1987 and later from 2008 to 2013.
5. Ibid.
6. While land reform has been at the center of anti-imperialist and anti-neo-liberal policies, redistribution was broadened to include mining ventures and other sectors after 2000.
overwhelmingly vote and retain the party in office. This claim does not take into account the irregularities consistently cited by opposition political parties in rejecting electoral outcomes. While elections are held after every five years in line with the national Constitution, they are characterized by violence and a lack of transparency and accountability.

Critics of the regime apply the transition paradigm to identify and describe the excesses of the regime, arguing that the state is going through a blocked transition characterized by bad governance; violations of human rights, rule of law, and constitutionalism; violence; tyranny and dictatorship. The core views raised in the transition literature have shaped self-fulfilling expectations for change, hindering a critical contextual examination and appreciation of ZANU-PF’s authoritarian rule. Such authoritarian rule revolves around the subordination of critical state institutions, including the ruling party itself, to the person and office of the president. President Mugabe is therefore the personification of persistent authoritarianism in Zimbabwe.

These polarized positions have framed much of the academic and political debate in a manner that subjects rationality to emotions, hence the need to soberly revisit the question of authoritarianism in Zimbabwe. The ZANU-PF regime has raised the tempo of repressive politics while retaining a modicum of civility, shallow democratic rule and out of necessity institutional moderation. The regime has equally maintained its legitimacy by fitting its goals and interests into constitutional and legal requirements such that the courts of law and the judicial system are pressed to serve as partisan gatekeepers.

**A PROMISING BUT FALSE START**

Post–independent Zimbabwe emerged amidst immense optimism for democratic development, having been founded on a negotiated constitution and the promise of reconciliation at independence. The transition from the colonial state to independence was based on the Lancaster House Constitution, which was the outcome of a multi-party negotiation. The Constitution aspired to uphold democratic norms and values based on a power-sharing government, racial reconciliation and a multi-party political system. However, before the end of the first decade of ZANU-PF rule, key signs of a slide to authoritarianism were becoming evident, with President Mugabe demonstrating increased intolerance.

Democracy is at bay in Zimbabwe as authoritarianism looks to continue for a long time. Since 2000, the outcomes of regular elections have been rejected by the opposition.

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tion, Western institutions and civil society players. The African Union (AU) and the
Southern African Development Community (SADC) added their voices in rejecting
the outcomes of the 2008 general elections, sighting serious irregularities. They went
on to recommend an inter-party political dialogue, which resulted in the signing of
the Global Political Agreement (GPA) and the formation of the Inclusive Government
(IG) in 2008. ZANU-PF controversially won the 2013 elections to retain sole control
of the state.

ZANU-PF has fostered a perpetual culture of incumbency based on repression, and
formal and informal presidential control. President Mugabe, who is 90 years old, is the
oldest and third longest sitting president in Africa. He has led Zimbabwe for 34 years,
controversially winning every election since 1980. Mugabe appears to be set for a life-
presidency, dying at the helm of both his party and the state. Unsurprisingly, all the
top leaders of ZANU-PF, such as former Vice Presidents Joshua Nkomo, Simon
Muzenda, Joseph Msika, and John Nkomo, were only replaced after they died in office.

Regular elections are held to shield the regime from criticisms that it is not ac-
countable to the people. Given that the ruling party often obtains a majority of the
votes in these elections, ZANU-PF tends to invoke their outcomes to demonstrate its
popularity and support for its policies. Any political preference other than the status
quo or interest in regime change is brutally blocked. In 2008, ZANU-PF blocked po-
litical transition after losing the elections to the opposition Movement for Democratic
Change (MDC). By all means, electoral cycles largely appear ritualistic as they do not
provide the ordinary people with any realistic opportunity to freely choose their pre-
ferred leaders or to change the government.

THE CHANGING NATURE OF AUTHORITARIANISM

It should be noted that both authoritarianism and democracy depend on certain lev-
eels of control and submission. The difference between authoritarianism and democ-
rcy is that authoritarianism is built on systematic control. Arguably, contemporary
authoritarian regimes are highly sophisticated; they assimilate many features of mod-
ern democracy instead of completely subverting them, triggering unique dynamics of
authoritarian persistency. Democratic institutions such as national constitutions,
elections, and representative institutions have come to tenuously exist with institu-
tions of dictatorship as long as they confer a modicum of legitimacy on the status quo
without creating real opportunities for political contestation or change.

11. Since 1980 the political opposition has disputed the outcomes of elections. However, it was only
after the 2000s that world opinion took notice of the problem.
12. Simon Badza, ‘Zimbabwe’s Harmonized Elections, Regional and International Reaction’ in Eldred
13. ZANU-PF lost the parliamentary elections and the first round of the presidential elections to the
opposition.
15. Ibid.
Authoritarian regimes are flexible and adaptable. They rely on the political dexterity of erudite drivers of the political system, as well as skilful and powerful actors. Working as a cartel, these actors create political regimes that are adaptable to emerging democratic norms, appear to meet domestic and international requirements for political legitimacy, but still serve to strengthen their hold on the state. They exploit grey areas between democracy and authoritarianism, holding and winning flawed elections. In order to confuse their citizens and critics, they also enact new constitutions, and promote state-controlled non-governmental organizations and other civil society formations to compete with independent civic movements and actors.

Authoritarianism mutates depending on the challenges of the moment, and is shaped by the domestic socio-historical conditions and contradictions of the state. The threat perception, short and long term goals of authoritarian elites, as well as their interest in retaining and consolidating their hold on power are crucial to understanding the character of authoritarianism. To ensure the survival of the regime, authoritarian elites are willing to embrace democratic pretensions, such as a semblance of credible elections, for purposes of maintaining a veneer of political legitimacy.16

Revisiting Authoritarianism: Authoritarian Hybridity

The concept of authoritarianism is an opaque one, as its definition tends to be opinionated, political and value-laden. Its meaning should therefore be understood through the lens of changing socio-historical experiences, contextualised in changing political norms and values. This is important because the character of authoritarianism and the behaviour of authoritarian regimes continue to change, pushing the boundaries, for example, of what is democratically acceptable or objectionable while testing the level of societal sympathies and solidarity. The sense of what is politically acceptable or legitimate (although still an area of continued contestation) depends on the dominant political norms and values at a particular historical moment and socio-political context.

Authoritarianism refers to a coercive governmental or political system. It is a system in which democratic practices and freedoms are taken to be completely subordinate to the power of the state, a ruling individual, or a clique of rulers.17 Authoritarian systems are characterized by absolute acquiescence to authority and power under a dominant state that prevails over civil society.18 There are many types of authoritarian regimes, all of which are characterised by systemic concentration of political power in one person, an ultra-constitutional clique, or a cartel, whose formal and informal influence overrides the proper functioning of democratic institutions and legitimately elected officials.19

16. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes.
Authoritarianism is characterized by limited pluralism and constrained political autonomy for political parties, institutions and interest groups. Powerful emotional mobilization, constructed on the perceived need for the regime to combat an identified societal problem such as underdevelopment, is used to legitimize policies and to rally key constituencies behind the regime. Far-reaching arbitrary executive powers are often used to repress opponents of the regime and control their activities. Although the leadership in authoritarian regimes could be elected, the citizens cannot freely remove such leaders from office as elections are treated as mere political rituals meant to legitimize the system. Political competition is constitutionally permitted but practically scuttled. The regime exercises arbitrary discretion over civil liberties, which leads to extreme intolerance of any meaningful political opposition.

It is apparent that the polarized and murky debate about the nature of the state in Zimbabwe prevents a critical focus on authoritarian governance, while the survival mechanisms of authoritarian regimes are difficult to pin down. The focus on the material needs of the citizens, the main point advanced by pro-ZANU-PF political players and academics, has been used to mask thoroughgoing authoritarianism and the limitations of the post-colonial regime in Zimbabwe. Such scholarship fails or deliberately overlooks the question of authoritarian persistence based on the mutation and adaptation of authoritarian regimes.

THE LIMITS OF HEGEMONIC MILITARIZATION AND VIOLENCE

Discussions on the persistence of ZANU-PF’s authoritarian regime have focused on control, coercive violence, militarization of the state, and violations of human rights. Hegemonic coercive violence used by the political-military alliance to enforce political consent has been identified as the main anchor of the Mugabe regime. Coercive political violence is instrumental to the survival of ZANU-PF, but it should be understood within its limits.

Security structures and agents of political violence are controlled and used by the executive to maintain its hold on state power. Only three years after independence, Mugabe deployed the military in the Matabeleland region in a conflict that cost more than 20,000 civilian lives within four years (1983-1987). In 2005, the government launched Operation Murambatsvina, destroying many informal urban dwellings and dispersing thousands of people who were seen to pose a potential threat to stability.

20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
24. Lloyd Sachikonye, When a State Turns on its Citizens, 60 Years of Institutionalized Violence in Zimbabwe (Johannesburg, Jacana, 2011).
and public order.\textsuperscript{26} In reality, this was arguably done to neutralise the increased support of opposition formations resulting from the worsening socio-economic crisis. In 2008, the state machinery unleashed almost the same magnitude of violence in a bid to reverse the outcome of both the parliamentary and the presidential elections, which were won by the opposition.\textsuperscript{27} The country has experienced other incidents of state-perpetrated political violence, mostly during national elections. Such acts of violence range from harassment of leaders of opposition parties and civil society organizations, to incidents of beatings, arson, murders, rape, and disappearances targeted at their followers.\textsuperscript{28} 

The security structures at the behest of the political elite have been at the forefront of instigating political violence. ZANU-PF political elite sealed a historical alliance with the military elite, mutually protecting their interlocking economic and political interests.\textsuperscript{29} This led to the creation of a quasi-securocratic state through the simultaneous militarization of the state and the politicization of the military.\textsuperscript{30} ZANU-PF used state resources to exclusively reward loyal political and military elite through rents such as prime land, stakes in the mining and manufacturing sectors and inflated salaries in parastatals.\textsuperscript{31} The state distributed shares in companies targeted by the government under the state’s indigenization policy to reward military and political loyalists.\textsuperscript{32} Some observers therefore argue that these relations account for the military’s incursion into partisan politics to protect and further ZANU-PF rule. Security structures and agents retain huge interest in the survival of ZANU-PF under Mugabe’s leadership, hence their continued interference in key political institutions and processes.\textsuperscript{33} 

Critics of the state have pointed to the sustained militarization of society, politics and state institutions, which has allowed the military to block democratic transition.\textsuperscript{34} Indeed, this process has seen the military-security establishment hijack the civilian policy-making role and become the centre of government’s socio-economic and po-


\textsuperscript{31} Ibid.


political policy.35 The interference of the military in party politics takes place with the tacit encouragement of the executive. Mugabe has used patronage to build a totally loyal military that bears no threat to his leadership of ZANU-PF and the state. He has ensured that the military elite have a stake in protecting his leadership.36 As much as the military is an important factor in ZANU-PF’s authoritarian persistence, it has in no way diluted Mugabe’s grip on both the state and ZANU-PF.

THE EXECUTIVE ASSAULT ON DEMOCRATIZATION

The executive has ensured the persistence of ZANU-PF within the state by usurping the power and autonomy of other arms of the state. Analyses from the perspective of civil–military relations have explored how the process of politicization of the military dating back to the liberation struggle has created partisan security institutions that seek to advance a political party project instead of advancing national security. Such politicization is passively accepted within the security structures and systems as it is based on the conflation of ZANU-PF with the state. Actors in the security sector cannot disobey Mugabe’s leadership in ZANU-PF without violating his leadership of the state.

The president uses the Joint Operations Command (JOC) as an extra centre of power under his control to subvert electoral processes. The JOC has become prominent for generating ZANU-PF election strategies since 2000. Although the activities of the JOC pose a threat to civilian authority, they happen with the full knowledge, support and instigation of Mugabe. The JOC has been implicated in organising and perpetrating electoral fraud and coercive violence to punish members of the opposition and civil society formations.37 Mugabe has effectively used his status as Commander-in-Chief of the Zimbabwean Defence Force (ZDF) to ensure loyalty and unchallenged control of the state within and outside the military.38

The simultaneous militarization of society and the politicization of the military is a strategic choice by the political elite.39 ZANU-PF has remained beholden to the liberation war tradition and political culture which allows Mugabe to rely on the military.40 The party has continued the historical alliance with its liberation cadres, calling on their active support and political mobilization when needed. The president clearly controls both the military and the civil authorities in his party and government. Mugabe could deploy the military to protect ZANU-PF interests as the interests of the military elite have become conflated with those of the party and the state.

35. The JOC is a security policy think tank combining heads of the army, police, prisons, intelligence, ministers of the security cluster and the president.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
through complex historical, personal and ideological linkages. Accordingly, the military has become a key factor in domestic politics and the continuation of ZANU-PF authoritarianism.

ZANU-PF has managed to foster a security psychology that venerates liberation war veterans and its political elite as the sole national custodians of Zimbabwe’s future. The fusion of professionally trained members of the armed forces with retired veterans and auxiliaries to deal with internal domestic political competition is strategic. Although these institutions should be structurally autonomous and politically neutral, they have been strategically co-opted to protect the status quo. This has ensured that the military has a political and material stake in the perpetuation of ZANU-PF without becoming a threat to the political establishment.

The abuse of security structures to buttress political power has a long history, starting with the Fifth Brigade, a ruthless partisan wing of the national army trained by North Korea, and the ‘Green Bombers’ in the 2000s. ZANU-PF trained and unleashed the Green Bombers to attack opposition activists and leaders, sending shock waves through orgies of violence and intimidation in rural areas. Their violent activities were justified in the language of defenders of nationhood against oppositional traitors, which is used to frame the national political discourse and political competition in favour of ZANU-PF.

Mugabe has previously appointed former and serving military officials to serve in the Electoral Supervisory Commission and the Delimitation Commission, gradually facilitating the militarization and politicization of electoral institutions. Senior military officials have also publicly stated that they would not recognise any elected leader to the country’s presidency unless that candidate had served during the liberation struggle. Put in context, military involvement in politics can lead to certain institutions being hijacked for particular political goals and interests. It can also spread fear, despondence and undermine confidence in the political process. Yet, it would require massive efforts by the military, and at very high cost to the regime, for it to forestall the momentum for democratization.

**ZANU-PF’s AUTHORITARIAN HYBRIDITY**

Authoritarian hybridity is a chief characteristic of ZANU-PF authoritarianism. The phrase ‘authoritarian hybridity’ refers to the practice whereby authoritarian regimes draw from democratic practices; thinly assimilating democratic norms and values to legitimize their stay in power. Militarized coercion is only one of the pillars of ZANU-PF’s authoritarian architecture, which also includes exclusive ideological claims, shallow democratic pretensions and hegemonic concentration of power.

43. ‘Green Bombers’ is a name coined to refer to bands of youth who were trained by the state under a national service programme largely despised as partisan. These youths were allegedly deployed in rural areas for political mobilization, where they reportedly committed serious acts of violence and intimidation.
45. Ibid
Underlying the selective use of violence by the ZANU-PF regime is an ideological commitment to the goals of the liberation struggle dubbed the ‘Third Chimurenga’.\textsuperscript{46} The Third Chimurenga was a discourse constructed and effectively deployed to bolster partisan control of national history, as well as socio-economic and political power.\textsuperscript{17} The same ideology has been effectively used to define outsiders and insiders, citizens versus aliens, and those who should benefit from state resources. ZANU-PF has used this discourse to justify its policies and rally support behind the party-state and its leadership. The Third Chimurenga has been the fulcrum around which ZANU-PF constituencies have crystallized to sustain the party in power and protect Mugabe’s legacy. Land reform resonates with rural ZANU-PF constituencies, which depend on peasant agriculture for subsistence.\textsuperscript{48} As urban constituencies shifted their support to opposition political parties, rural constituencies became the bedrock of ZANU-PF perpetuation.

**THE MAKING OF THE HEGEMONIC PARTY-STATE**

The fusion of the party and the state under Mugabe’s pervasive powers has locked the state into authoritarianism. Such a system violates the principle of separation of powers by subordinating the judiciary, parliament, and security institutions under the person and office of the president. Arguably, over the years Mugabe has become a de facto supreme leader, dominating civil society and state institutions.\textsuperscript{49} ZANU-PF has always projected political competition and opposition as a national security threat, if not treason. This view of political competition has shaped their ruthless short-and long-term strategic and tactical responses to political opponents and competition.

President Mugabe has consolidated power by criminalizing and liquidating political opposition and competition within his party and the state. Mugabe has used an overwhelming majority in regular but disputed elections to legitimize his leadership. Many of his political opponents such as Ndbaningi Sithole of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), Joshua Nkomo of the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU), and Morgan Tsvangirai of the Movement for Democratic Change-Tsvangirai (MDC-T) were at some stage harassed, intimidated, arrested and prosecuted.

The civil conflict in Matabeleland ended with the Unity Accord of 1987 under which Mugabe seized full control of state institutions. The accord resulted in the co-optation of ZAPU’s political elite into the ZANU-PF dominated state,\textsuperscript{50} leaving weak opposition political parties. The Unity Accord sealed ZANU-PF’s hegemony over the state and Mugabe’s authoritarian dominance of his party and the state. It helped ZANU-PF to establish a single-party dominant state, similar to a de facto one-party state.

\textsuperscript{46} Chimurenga is a Shona term that means liberation struggle. Since 2000 it has been used as an ideological term by ZANU-PF.


\textsuperscript{48} Ian Scoones, et al., *Zimbabwe’s Land Reform: Myth and Realities* (Harare, Weaver Press, 2010).

\textsuperscript{49} ‘Mugabe is My Father’, News Day, 11 November 2011.

\textsuperscript{50} The Unity Accord is the pact that was signed between ZAPU and ZANU in 1987, which led to the formation of ZANU-PF and a unity government.
The fusion of executive and parliamentary powers subjects parliamentary-executive relations to informal politics largely dominated by a powerful president. The concentration of political power in one person and office is problematic. For ZANU-PF, the problem is less the executive powers in themselves than their use to reinforce societal control by entrenching political power. Mugabe has used his power to emasculate, dominate and override other countervailing institutions of the state, like the judiciary and parliament, deliberately violating the principle of separation of powers and political accountability.

Like any other hegemonic single-party state associated with a long incumbency, the boundaries between the party and the state have become blurred, resulting in the formation of a hegemonic party-state, which is characteristically repressive and authoritarian. With such a party-state moulded around the persona and office of the executive president, this case shows that the agency of political elite plays a critical role in rolling back democracy, and is equally a force behind authoritarianism. These authoritarian elite dominate all institutions of the state, reducing them to mere vehicles for the propagation and legitimation of their rule.

ELECTIONS UNDER EXECUTIVE DOMINATION

The effective manipulation of political competition through the de facto powers of the president has ensured authoritarian persistence. Mugabe enjoys plenary powers to make whatever regulations he considers necessary to cope with any situation that needs to be dealt with in the interest of the state and the general public.51 The use or abuse of the powers of the president has dominated debates about democratic regression in Zimbabwe as political contestation intensified after 2000.

Opposition parties have complained that ZANU-PF has ever the years resorted to the same law, which grants the president unrestricted powers, to unilaterally amend election laws, impose election dates or make strategic appointments to key institutions without consulting other interested parties.52 Mugabe declared the dates of the 2008 and later the 2013 elections using this law in spite of on-going negotiations with other parties.53 Presidential powers became the most arbitrary tool Mugabe used at critical junctures, such as during elections, to give his party advantage over his opponents. The whole electoral legal-regulatory framework is subordinate to the office of the president; hence Mugabe has unilaterally made several appointments and changed regulations at short notice without the consent of other parties.54

In practice, the presidential powers infringe on the principle of separation of powers and the autonomy of other arms of government. Given the context of authoritarian politics, political appointees tend to overplay their roles in order to please those who have appointed them. For example, the disputed process of re-counting votes in the 2008 elections and the delayed announcement of results were initiated by the state...

53. Ibid.
with the help of top public servants. The conflation of the role of public servants, the executive and the military seemed to fit into a premeditated election strategy to delay the election results, while ZANU-PF re-organized itself to re-establish its sole control of the state.

MUGABE, ZANU-PF AND AUTHORITARIAN CONSOLIDATION IN ZIMBABWE

The executive presidency has become the backbone of the ZANU-PF party-state. In the past, Mugabe has unilaterally made questionable and undemocratic decisions with recourse to both the Constitution and legal statutes. Such decisions include senior appointments to strategic government institutions, or declaring election dates without consulting other parties. The president is largely free from all limiting constitutional devices, particularly those pertaining to a rigid separation of powers. The judiciary and legislature, like all other institutions of government, are subordinated to the executive and the ruling party. They are continuously aligned with presidential political goals, as is the case in many African countries.

The office of the president and his persona overshadow all legal and political authority in Zimbabwe. In a social context pervaded by weak institutions and weak rule of law, this has fostered authoritarianism. In truly democratic political systems, legal and political authority resides with the people and is expressed through multi-party processes and regular free and fair elections. Authoritarianism in Zimbabwe is further buttressed by the erosion of checks and balances, partisan emasculation of autonomous institutions of governance, and an unfair and undemocratic electoral system, which is mostly characterised by a winner-takes-all politics. The president violates the canons of separation of power when it suits him, neutralizing or turning the legislature into a mere ceremonial institution.

The power of civil and security institutions, the judiciary and parliament has been consistently eroded and neutralized. The same institutions are manipulated in a partisan manner through the deployment of presidential appointees, partisan recruitment and partisan promotion in the civil service. The role of state institutions has been conflated with that of the party, creating overlapping relations between the party and the state, while subordinating the state to the party to advance and buttress the hegemonic party-state project.

Using a pliant parliament, ZANU-PF has further arrested democratization by adopting laws, which undermine the freedom of expression and association, thereby totally crippling citizens’ self-expression, social mobilization and free interaction. In addition to wanton attacks on private media practitioners and partisan control of the public media, ZANU-PF imposed laws such as the Access to Information and

56. In terms of the GPA, which instituted the Inclusive Government, the president was required to make major appointments and decisions in consultation with the Prime Minister.
Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) and the Public Order and Security Act (POSA), whose main object was to control public meetings, restrict the political space, and gag the private media.

**ELECTIONS AND ZANU-PF AUTHORITARIANISM**

The effective manipulation of political competition through the de facto powers of the president has ensured authoritarian persistence. Democratization in Zimbabwe has been constrained through elections that are marred by intimidation and institutionalised political violence. Regular elections have been used as an instrument of domination and regime legitimation, in line with the general trend of democratic stagnation and reversals in Africa. The president has used his domination of the polity to tilt the institutional and legal framework of elections in favour of ZANU-PF. He has appointed political allies to lead the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) and ensured that members of the ZEC secretariat were drawn from the military, police, prisons, and intelligence sectors, which are all embedded in ZANU-PF and totally loyal to the president.

There is no doubt that Zimbabwe is run under systematic authoritarianism, whose resilience and persistence rests with the concentration of power in the person and office of the president. This has been supported by loyalties cultivated by rent-seeking and the partisan largesse of state land and mining concessions. The formal and informal concentration of power in the persona and office of the president is the anchor of ZANU-PF’s authoritarian persistence. Thus, as much as other factors may sustain authoritarian resilience, Mugabe’s executive powers give his authoritarian regime the democratic ambiguity which it needs to justify and legitimize the system against its critics, even as it violates all democratic norms and values.

**CONCLUSION**

On the surface, Zimbabwe resembles a democratic state, replete with all the formal characteristics of a multiparty democracy. However Mugabe has totally dominated state institutions; conveniently overriding, ignoring or manipulating them to sustain his hold on political power. Thus, the resilience of ZANU-PF authoritarianism is anchored in the complex intersection of the concentration of power in the persona and office of the president and the consistent emasculation of the opposition and civil society. This has given rise to a dysfunctional multiparty system. Without disentangling the state from such authoritarian hybridity and personal control, there is no gainsaying that systemic authoritarianism, hidden in semi-democratic constitutionalism, will persist for a very long time in Zimbabwe.

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