AFRICA PEACE AND CONFLICT JOURNAL

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Editorial Note

The range of topics in these articles include the implication of ethno-religious crisis and peace-building in Nigeria, social unrest and school effectiveness in Cameroon, corruption and anti-corruption governance in Somaliland, regional security in Central Africa, the media in African conflicts and peace efforts, and gendering the AU’s peace and security architecture. Using observations, qualitative and quantitative (primary and secondary data) analysis, the authors have arrived at their findings and made conclusions.

Abosede Omowumi Babatunde examines the implications of ethno-religious crisis for post-election peace-building in Nigeria. He argues that the prevailing ethno-religious tensions and crises may derail Nigeria’s democracy. Drawing on extant studies and observations, he concludes that democratic consolidation and positive peace may remain elusive if the ethno-religious crises are not effectively addressed using much more innovative strategies than is presently the case.

Using a survey research design, qualitative method, purposive, stratified and simple random sampling techniques to select the study area and 133 participants, a likert scale questionnaire and data analysis using SPSS version 20.0 to compute frequencies and proportions. Sophie Ekume Etomes and Fonkeng Epah George, writing on the impact of social unrest of schools originating from the Anglophone crisis in Cameroon observe that school environment, students’ absenteeism, ineffective teaching and parent withdrawal from school activities have negatively affected school effectiveness in the ongoing Anglophone crisis in Cameroon. The authors have concluded that social unrest in the North West and South West of Cameroon has greatly affected the smooth functioning of schools and that even if this crisis (social unrest) were to come to an end, time and resources will be needed to bring back the school system to normal, with the implementation of concrete government action.

Annual Budget Corruption and the pursuit of effective Anti-Corruption Governance System in Somaliland is the topic put forward by Hamdi I. Abdulahi which focuses on the government expenditure side of annual budgets. Making use of both primary (interviews with members of the Somaliland Parliament, House of Representatives, Public accounts Committee and Somaliland Good Governance and Anti-Corruption
Commission) and secondary (desk-based document review analysis) data, the author attaches himself to the Princhett et al. led argument on the institution-focused anti-corruption fight, and proposes a repositioning of current approach to local context, after finding out that the current anti-corruption institution and legal systems are inadequate to deal with the local realities in Somaliland.

According to Barkhad M. kaariye, ‘the media has a clear and effective role in radicalization across Somali territories in the horn of Africa’. This is the scholar’s finding as presented in his article; - The Role of Media in Radicalization: the Somali context. Observing the actions of radical Islamic movements, particularly Al-Shabbaab, the scholar has presented that radicals have been using the media to attract sympathizers and influence the recruitment of young people, and this activity has increased simultaneously with the infiltration of modern technology in Somalia, especially with the advent of social media and its other affiliates.

Any peace and security discussions, whether for academic and/or policy making purposes, that is not mindful of both the negative and positive role of the media is bound to be incomprehensive; is the path that Mkong Immaculate Kelighai has followed, in The Role of the Media in African Conflicts and Peace Efforts to demonstrate the influence of the media during conflicts and its social role in post-conflict scenarios and peace processes. Sourcing data from both primary and secondary sources, the researcher adopts Marie Soleil Frere's argument that media has played and continues to play key roles (positive and negative) in escalating conflicts in Africa, yet has also been instrumental in fostering peace building processes in the continent in east and west Africa, Kenya, Rwanda and Cameroon. She concludes in agreement with Jok that the role of the media in conflicts is indeed a double edged sword given its ability to incite, exacerbate yet quell tension. In fact, depending on the degree of freedom it is allowed to exercise, the media can make or mar peace.

Nothando Maphalala, in, Gendering the African Union’s Women, Peace and Security Architecture has used the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 OF 2000 and its four (4) pillars to show how women, peace and security is firmly lodged in the public
The scholar observes that UNSCR 1325 is perhaps the most significant political success of women peace activists because it globally asserts the role of women in peace building processes. But, her argument continues that the realization of UNSCR 1325 needs to be taken with awareness that women’s participation in public affairs is a fairly recent phenomenon in Africa where traditional cultural practices and stereotypical gender roles are still obstacles to women’s participation and recognition.

In a policy paper by Koffi Sawyer on Elections and Conflict Resolution in Africa and how international organizations can assist African countries in forestalling electoral and post electoral violence, the former UN officer and now political Affairs Officer at the Commonwealth Secretariat, he argues that, beyond technical assistance and election observation, the international community must deepen its political engagement in electoral peacebuilding using high-level diplomatic channels to assist with building effective long-term structures for inclusivity and conflict resolution to forestall electoral violence in the conflicts in Africa.
Social Unrest and Effectiveness of Schools: An Analysis of The Impact of the Anglophone Crisis on Education In Cameroon

Sophie Ekume Etomes¹ And Fonkeng Epah George²

Abstract

This paper sought to examine the impact of social unrest on the effectiveness of schools originating from the Anglophone crisis in Cameroon and linked to the All Anglophone Teachers’ Strike Action. It started on the 21st of November 2016 and has greatly affected the effectiveness and efficiency of schools in the North West and South West Regions of Cameroon. The study was guided by four research objectives and adopted a survey research design of quantitative method. The study area was the South West Region but data was exclusively collected from Fako, Meme and Manyu Divisions of the South West Region. The sample of the study included 13 principals, 40 teachers, 40 students and 40 parents, given a total of 133 participants. Purposive sampling was used to select the three divisions in the South West region while stratified and simple random sampling techniques were used to select students, principals,

1 Sophie Ekume Etomes is an Assistant Lecturer in the Department of Educational Foundations and Administration at the Faculty of Education, University of Buea.
2 Fonkeng Epah George is Professor of Educational Administration, Former Deputy Vice Chancellor in charge of Teaching, Professionalization and Development of Information and Communication Technology, University of Buea
teachers and parents for the study. A likert scale questionnaire was used to collect data from participants. Data was analyzed using SPSS version 20.0 to compute frequencies and proportions. The results showed that school environment, students’ absenteeism, ineffective teaching and parents’ withdrawal from school activities negatively affected school effectiveness during the Anglophone crisis in Cameroon. Therefore, it was concluded that social unrest in the sphere of education caused by the teachers’ strike action in the Anglophone regions (North West and South West) of Cameroon has greatly affected the smooth functioning of schools especially students who are the major stakeholders of formal education. Even if this crisis were to come to an end, a lot of time and resources will be needed to bring back the school system to normal. Concrete governmental action is necessary to seek a lasting solution to the Anglophone crisis so that teachers, students, administrators and other stakeholders in the educational community can function normally in an enabling environment that is void of fear and threats.

Introduction

The Anglophone crisis in Cameroon can be traced from the period of independence in Cameroon. Before independence, Cameroon was administered first by the Germans and after the First World War (1919) as mandated territories under the League of Nations by the French and British Governments. It was later governed under the United Nations Trusteeship after the Second World War in 1945. East (French) Cameroon gained independence on 1st January 1960 from the French government and was called the Republic of Cameroun. The following year on the 11th of February 1961 through a plebiscite, Southern (English) Cameroon voted overwhelmingly in favor of reunification with the Republic of Cameroun and consequently gained independence; thus, leaving the British Empire and forming the Federal Republic of Cameroon with two federal state governments, East and West Cameroon3. The first constitution of 1961 of the independent Federal Republic of Cameroon stipulated that the “official languages of the Federal Republic shall be English and French”4. This made Cameroon a bilingual country and

3 E.G. Fonkeng, The History of Education in Cameroon, 1884-2010, (Maryland Printers, Bamenda, 2010)
4 ibid
unique in Africa, second to Canada in the world.

Eleven years later, there was an amendment of the constitution that changed the name of the country from the Federal Republic of Cameroon to the United Republic of Cameroon following a referendum on May 20th 1972\textsuperscript{5}. The constitution was again amended in 1984 by a presidential decree, Law No. 84-1 of 4\textsuperscript{th} February 1984, changing the name from the United Republic of Cameroon to the Republic of Cameroon\textsuperscript{6} which is maintained till date. Today’s Cameroon has ten regions with eight made up of Francophones (East Cameroon) and two made up of Anglophones (West Cameroon). The Anglophones have long term grievances on the administration of the country which to them is more in favor of the Francophones as they complain of being marginalized in terms of employment opportunities, infrastructural development, the use of English language as an official working language and management of the judiciary, amongst others.

Crisis is a critical event or point of decision which, if not handled in an appropriate and timely manner (or if not handled at all), may turn into a disaster or catastrophe\textsuperscript{7}. This definition suits the situation of the Anglophone crisis where we have witness social unrest expressed in school boycott and other economic malaise as examined below.

The All Anglophone Teachers’ Strike action that started on the 21\textsuperscript{st} of November 2016 has caused disorder within the sphere of education and its environment and has negatively affected the effectiveness of schools in the Anglophone regions of Cameroon. Of all factors that affect school effectiveness, the role of the teacher cannot be overemphasized. According to the International McKinsey report on world school systems, the quality of an education system cannot exceed the quality of its teachers. The report clearly shows that if one should remove all equipment (computers, interactive boards, chairs and tables) from a classroom, and be left with nothing but a dedicated educator, education will still take place. Education, therefore, is not possible without the

\textsuperscript{5} ibid
\textsuperscript{6} ibid
\textsuperscript{7} Business Dictionary, 2018. www.businessdictionary.com
educator (teacher)\textsuperscript{8}.

After a prolonged strike action, stakeholders in education are still in a dilemma with regards to the effectiveness of schools as we observe continuous calls for boycott of schools, kidnapping of school authorities, threat on the lives of pupils, students and teachers who promote schooling, being the order of the day.

**Context and Justification of the Study**

Since 21\textsuperscript{st} November 2016, there has been an unprecedented social unrest in the Anglophone educational sub-system; in North West and South West Regions of Cameroon, which had almost crumbled the very foundation of the educational system. Some of the reasons for the social unrest as put forward by the teachers’ syndicate as grievances of English – speaking Cameroonians of the North West and South West Regions of the country as far as education is concerned are as follows:

1. Children who pass the General Certificate of Education Examination with good grades cannot enter the professional schools of their choice, while those who perform poorly fill all the spaces;
2. Francophones outnumber Anglophones in the professional schools in Anglophone universities of the North West and South West Regions;
3. As a result of this policy of discrimination and marginalization, government does not train Anglophone technical teachers, and even the few Anglophone teachers who are trained are sent to work in Francophone areas;
4. Government continuously sends Francophones who do not master English language to teach in Anglophone schools;
5. The Universities of Bamenda and Buea have been Francophonized and admission into key Faculties have been taken to Yaounde;

6. Children are compelled to write CAP, Probatoire and Baccalaureat Examination (which are French Public Examinations), with a tradition of poorly translated questions and massive failure on their part⁹; amongst others.

In its effort to bring the strike action called by the teachers’ syndicate to an end and find solutions to teachers’ grievances, the following decisions and actions were put in place by the Cameroon government¹⁰:

1) An Ad-hoc committee was put in place to examine and seek solutions to Trade Union’s (teachers’) grievances;

2) Catch up classes were organized and the academic calendar was modified;

3) A mechanism was put in place to ensure the smooth running of all official examinations especially the Cameroon General Certificate of Education Examination (GCE);

4) Government encouraged teachers to respect their engagement as government functionaries and to carry out their duties irrespective of the challenges and enrolment they may have in class.

The above measures seemingly led to an improvement in the teaching-learning process and schooling in general. However, more has to be done for things to get to normal as they were before. Children cannot learn effectively in an environment full of threats and uncertainty as well as teachers and other educational administrators cannot be effective in performing their duties under such working conditions.

**Problem**

It has been observed that the effectiveness of schools in the English-speaking regions of Cameroon have witnessed a steady decline in the last two years. This is characterized by a drop in school attendance, poor pass rates in both public and internal examinations, poor syllabus coverage amongst others. This has negatively affected the internal efficiency of the school system; hence the goals of education cannot be achieved, constituting serious educational wastage. Social unrest caused by teachers’ strike action does not only disrupt the school calendar,

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but has far reaching consequences on the way students learn and the psychological state of the learner not leaving out the community. The present study seeks to explore the relationship between social unrest and school effectiveness, specifically, the extent to which social unrest in these regions manifested by insecurity around the school campus, irregular attendance of students in schools, ineffective teaching and learning and withdrawal of parents from school activities affects school effectiveness.

Objectives of the Study

The general research objective is to examine the extent to which social unrest affects school effectiveness.

The specific research objectives examine the extent to which:

i. Unsafe school environment affects school effectiveness.
ii. Students’ absenteeism affects school effectiveness.
iii. Ineffective teaching affects school effectiveness.
iv. Parents’ withdrawal from school activities affects school effectiveness.

Methodology

The study adopts a survey research design of quantitative study. The study area was the South West Region, but data was exclusively collected from participants in Fako, Meme and Manyu Divisions of the South West Region. 133 participants made up of Principals, Teachers, Parents, and Students were selected using stratified, purposive and simple random sampling techniques in the three divisions of the Region. Purposive sampling was used to select the three divisions in the South West region while stratified and simple random sampling techniques were used to select students, principals, teachers and parents for the study. This was to ensure that certain sub-groups or strata are included in the sample in the proportion they appear in the accessible population. Data was collected using a likert scale questionnaire. The sample consisted of 13 Principals, 40 Teachers, 40 Parents, and 40 Students. Data was analyzed using SPSS version 20.0, frequencies and proportions.
Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

The English-speaking regions of Cameroon for close to two years now have witnessed lots of instability in its social, economic and political activities: businesses, schooling, burning of personal and community properties and loss of lives as well as threats caused by actors of the Anglophone crisis. The teachers’ strike action has led to social unrest in these regions which has greatly destabilized the educational system. Social unrest in the sphere of education caused by teachers’ strike action has far reaching effects on students and the society at large.

Teachers’ Strike Action

Strike as defined by Edinyang and Ubi, is workers’ refusal to work as protest for inadequate service or poor condition\textsuperscript{11}. In the education sector, teachers’ strike can be compared to students’ examination malpractice, corruption and other social vices in the society\textsuperscript{12}. Within the context of this study, teachers’ strike action is referred to the decision by teachers to stop teaching and the performance of other academic duties involved in the teaching learning process for some period of time because of some grievances. Teaching and learning is the major activity of the educational organization and teachers are at the center of this activity. If teachers stop teaching, the goals of education cannot be attain since teacher makes the greatest difference in the outcome of students’ learning process.

Social Unrest

Social unrest from a system or functionalist point of view can be conceptualized as risk (posing threats to the society) but also an opportunity for positive change or development. Once social unrest manifests itself, it triggers further consequences and leads to secondary risks outside the area in which the unrest originally occurred\textsuperscript{13}. This is


\textsuperscript{12} ibid

\textsuperscript{13} O. Ren, A. Jovanovic and R. Schroter, Social Unrest’, OECD/IFP Project on “Future Global Shocks”. European Institute for Integrated Risk Management
the situation of the teachers’ strike action which has not only affected the effectiveness of schools, but the society at large. Social unrest can also be referred to as the disturbance of public peace by a group of persons in order to convey their discontent to the government or to oppose certain government action\textsuperscript{14}. Social unrest in education can be referred to disturbances and actions that have negative consequences on effective school functioning. These disturbances and actions may include strike action by students, teachers and other actors of education and threats which disturb the effective functioning of schools. According to Schoter, Jovanovic and Renn\textsuperscript{15}, the manifestation of social unrest appears as unexpected, unplanned, often spontaneous, as well as unconstrained or uncontrollable within the fundamental system within which it occurs. Social unrest is associated with protest in the form of peaceful as well as violent demonstrations, strikes and acts of civil and political violence\textsuperscript{16}. Activities associated with social unrest are often linked to unconventional political participation. This activity, according to Kaase\textsuperscript{17} includes signing of petitions, demonstrations, boycotts, traffic blockades and wild strikes while Schoter, Jovanovic and Renn\textsuperscript{18} say some of the causes of social unrest are demonstrations and riots, disruption of economic activities and hence obstacle to economic development.

As a result of the teachers’ strike action, persistent threats on the lives of school administrators, teachers, students, parents; burning of school and personal properties and insecurity in the school environment has greatly distorted the general functioning of schools within these

\begin{flushright}
(2011), Stuttgart, Germany.
\end{flushright}

\textsuperscript{14} Almer, C., Laurent-Lucchetti, J. and Oechslin. Income Shocks and Social Unrest. JEL Classification: D75, O17, (2012).

\textsuperscript{15} R. Schoter, A. Jovanovic and O. Renn, Social Unrest: A Systematic Risk Perspective. GRF Davos Planet @Risk, 2:2, (2014), 125-34.

\textsuperscript{16} ibid

\textsuperscript{17} M. KaasePolitische Beteiligung. In Greifenhagen, M. and Greifenhagen, S. (ed.) Handwörterbuch zur politischen Kultur in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Westdeutscher Verlag (2002), 350-355

\textsuperscript{18} R. Schoter, A. Jovanovic and O. Renn, Social Unrest: A Systematic Risk Perspective. GRF Davos Planet @Risk, 2:2, (2014), 125-34.
regions. These include irregular attendance of students and teachers, students’ dropout, parents’ withdrawal from school activities and non-payment of school fees by students amongst others. With this scenario, schools cannot be effective, as such; the goals of education cannot be attained.

**School Effectiveness**

School effectiveness is the extent to which the school is able to meet with the goals and aspirations of which it is established\(^19\). Nath, Nwuyu and Egu explained that the goals of the school are not only to make learners acquire good grades and certificates, but also to socialize the learner and produce all round developed individuals\(^20\). In the view of Scheerens,\(^21\) school effectiveness is the level of goal attainment of a school. Schools cannot be effective in an environment that is full of threats, fear and uncertainty as the case of the Anglophone crisis in Cameroon tends to reveal. School effectiveness includes all the contextual variables related with school such as teaching, learning, administration, students’ motivation and community involvement\(^22\). Other attributes of school effectiveness include enhancing conditions of schooling and output measures mostly achievement of students\(^23\); classroom behavior, students participation rates and attitudes towards learning\(^24\); quality, time for learning and opportunity for students\(^25\);

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20 Ibid


23 ibid


25 B. Creemers, Towards a theory of educational effectiveness in the effective
Given the attributes of school effectiveness mentioned above, social unrest in the sphere of education has far reaching effects on the effectiveness of schools. Social unrest has many causes but in the present context, it is caused by the teachers’ strike action which has negatively influenced the effectiveness of schools in the Anglophone regions of Cameroon.

**Systems Theory**

The systems theory is used in this study to explain the effects of social unrest on school effectiveness. Tamajong and Fonkeng\(^{27}\) describe a system as a collection of parts working interdependently to achieve a common goal. The society is viewed as a system; a group of elements organized in a specific manner that interact with each other to function as a whole, as explained in Jackson and Checkland\(^{28}\). Therefore, the systems theory views the society from a holistic point of view where each part has a pivotal role to play for the society to function effectively. In this line, if one part is dysfunctional, the entire system of society is affected. The school is a structure or a part of the society and anything that affects the school has a multiplier effect to the entire society. Human, financial and material resources in the school come from the environment and the product of the school who are graduates go back to the environment. This gives a strong link between the school and the society. Mooney, Knox and Schacht\(^{29}\) report that the functionalist theory of sociology examines the society as a system of interconnected parts that work together in harmony to maintain a state of balance and

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social equilibrium for the whole and each part of the society influences and is influenced by the other parts. This explains the role that the school plays in the society. Education or schooling enables children of the society to uphold societal values, have better jobs which go a long way to reduce crime wave in the society. In addition, if parents are not involved in the education of their children, the school system cannot be effective. Social unrest caused by teachers’ strike in the Anglophone regions of Cameroon has caused schools to be dysfunctional and has greatly affected other sectors of the society. Mooney, Knox and Schacht\textsuperscript{30} explained that, elements of the society are functional if they contribute to social stability and dysfunctional if they disrupts social stability.

**Findings and Discussion**

**Demographic Characteristics of Participants**

A total of 133 people were sampled for the study that employed a cross-sectional survey design to appraise the effects of social unrest in education caused by teachers’ strike action on the effectiveness of schools in the Anglophone Regions of Cameroon.

**Figure 1: Distribution of participants’ gender**

Both the male and the female were well represented in the sample with proportions 57.9\% (77) and 42.1\% (56) respectively as depicted in figure 1 above.
Occupation

Table 1: Distribution of Participants’ Occupation and Return rate of Questionnaire

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Principals</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>30.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parents (PTA, SMB)</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>30.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>30.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>133</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1 above shows the different groups of participants that were represented in the study and the return rate of questionnaire. These include Principals, Teachers, Parents, and Students and the return rate of questionnaire was 100%.

Research Objective 1: To evaluate the relationship between school environment and school effectiveness.

Table 2: Distribution of views of Principals, Teachers, Students and Parents on the relationship between school environment and school effectiveness.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>s/n</th>
<th>Questions</th>
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<th>Collapsed</th>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SA</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>The presence of the forces of law and order in school campuses during the strike action disturbed students and teachers psychologically.</td>
<td>62.4% (83)</td>
<td>15.0% (20)</td>
<td>12.0% (16)</td>
<td>10.5% (14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>The teaching-learning process was disturbed during the teachers’ strike action.</td>
<td>82.7% (90)</td>
<td>11.3% (15)</td>
<td>3.0% (4)</td>
<td>3.0% (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>During the strike action, teaching-learning process was more effective in urban than rural schools.</td>
<td>63.9% (85)</td>
<td>18.0% (24)</td>
<td>11.3% (15)</td>
<td>6.8% (9)</td>
</tr>
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Threats and fear negatively influenced school attendance and teacher effectiveness.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly Agree (SA)</th>
<th>Agree (A)</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree (SD)</th>
<th>Disagree (D)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Threats and fear</td>
<td>86.5% (115)</td>
<td>7.5% (10)</td>
<td>3.7% (5)</td>
<td>2.3% (3)</td>
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<td>negatively</td>
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<td>attendance</td>
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<tr>
<td>and teacher</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>effectiveness.</td>
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</table>

The insecurity within the school environment encouraged parents to withdraw their children from school.

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly Agree (SA)</th>
<th>Agree (A)</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree (SD)</th>
<th>Disagree (D)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>54.9% (73)</td>
<td>30.8% (41)</td>
<td>5.3% (7)</td>
<td>9.0% (12)</td>
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<tr>
<td>The insecurity</td>
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<td>within the</td>
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<td>school environment</td>
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<td>encouraged</td>
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<tr>
<td>parents to</td>
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<tr>
<td>withdraw their</td>
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<td>children from</td>
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<td>school.</td>
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N=133 Strongly Agree (SA) Agree (A) Strongly Disagree (SD) Disagree (D)

Results revealed that the school environment negatively affected school effectiveness given that most of the variables showed positive correlation; above 70% (see table 2 above). The presence of threats and insecurity warrants the presence of the forces of law and order in school environment which disturbed teachers and students psychologically. In such an environment and state of mind, students and teachers cannot concentrate on the teaching–learning process for fear of the unknown. Isangedighi and Iheanacho agree that effective learning is achieved when students are emotionally and psychologically stable. Furthermore, 85.7% of the participants agree that insecurity within the school environment caused most parents to withdraw their children from school.

This is an indication of a drop in school attendance and repetition. When students stay away from school for a very long period of time which is not a holiday, there is a probability that all may not resume. Therefore, with prolonged non-schooling, the educational system will not only have a problem of students’ repetition but dropouts which does not meet the objectives of education. It is easy for students to drop out of school especially at the level of primary and secondary

education because they have not yet seen the benefits or opportunities that education can offer, especially those in semi-urban and rural areas (see point 3, table 2 above). In addition, their aspiration for education is being driven by their parents. The situation becomes worse if their parents are illiterates and farmers who see their children as part of their farm labor force. Repetition and dropout is an indication that investment in education does not give commensurate return, as such both money and human resources are wasted. This has unfavorable consequences on the individual and the nation. By implication, the goals and objectives of education have not been attained.

**Research Objective 2: To examine the effect of students’ absenteeism on school effectiveness.**

**Table: 3: Distribution of views of Principals, Teachers, Students and Parents on the relationship between students’ absenteeism and school effectiveness.**

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<th>s/n</th>
<th>Questions</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SA</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>SD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Threats and fear during the teachers’ strike action caused irregular</td>
<td>80.5%</td>
<td>16.5%</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>attendance of students.</td>
<td>(107)</td>
<td>(22)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>There was a poor participation of student in official examination during</td>
<td>66.9%</td>
<td>29.3%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the teachers’ strike action.</td>
<td>(89)</td>
<td>(39)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Irregular attendance of students negatively affected their performance.</td>
<td>52.6%</td>
<td>39.1%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(70)</td>
<td>(52)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Students’ absenteeism may likely lead to school dropout.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly Agree (SA)</th>
<th>Agree (A)</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree (SD)</th>
<th>Disagree (D)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>51.9% (69)</td>
<td>32.3% (43)</td>
<td>4.5% (6)</td>
<td>11.3% (15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>51.1% (68)</td>
<td>3.8% (5)</td>
<td>22.6% (30)</td>
<td>22.6% (30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>17.3% (23)</td>
<td>17.3% (23)</td>
<td>36.1% (48)</td>
<td>29.3% (39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>46.6% (62)</td>
<td>39.1% (52)</td>
<td>5.3% (7)</td>
<td>9.0% (12)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=133 Strongly Agree (SA)  Agree (A) Strongly Disagree (SD) Disagree (D)

Majority of the participants (Principals, Teachers, Students and Parents) agree that students’ absenteeism negatively affected school effectiveness given their responses on the various indicators of students’ absenteeism on table 3 above. 97% of the participants agree that there was irregular attendance of students during the teachers’ strike action while 91.7%, especially teachers and principals agree that irregular attendance of students negatively affected their performance. Effective teaching cannot take place in an environment where students’ attendance is irregular. It becomes difficult for students to assimilate concepts and more difficult for teachers to evaluate students’ achievements and to follow-up students learning. Time factor is very important in students’ learning because it provide students the opportunity to learn and understand new concepts. Carroll cited in Teodorovic\textsuperscript{33} postulated

\textsuperscript{33} J.B. Carroll,. A model of school learning, Teachers College Record, 64(1963), 723-733. In J.Teodorovic,. School Effectiveness: Literature Review. борник
that, students’ learning depends on time needed to learn (determined by a student’s aptitude, ability to understand instruction, and quality of instruction) and time spent in learning (determined by the time allowed for learning and the student’s perseverance).

The results also revealed that, while some students were irregular in class attendance, others stayed away from school for a period of time or an academic year; prolonged non-schooling may affect students’ interest in schooling and competence (see table 3 above). According to Malcolm, Thorpe and Lowden cited in Pehlivan\(^{34}\), absenteeism make students to get weaker in their learning ability which is distinctly observed in lessons that can be learned through cumulative knowledge such as mathematics; the student that misses certain classes have difficulty in learning the others and has to put in more efforts. Absenteeism of students also affects teachers’ effectiveness especially the new and inexperienced teachers; teachers have to revise previous lessons taught and it takes a long time to get students back on track\(^{35}\). Irregular attendance of students and absenteeism in general may have a spillover effect on other regular students which affects the teaching-learning process. Furthermore, students staying out of school may encourage them to join other activities such as stealing, scamming, amongst others that may have adverse effects on them, their family and the society at large.

While 54.9% agree that the crisis affected students’ interest in school, 85.7% agree that children are excited to go back to school. This implies that social unrest caused by the teachers’ strike action affected students’ absenteeism and to a lesser extent, students’ interest in schooling. Therefore, despite the insecurity within the school environment,

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a majority of the students are still willing to go to school. Statistics from the 2017/2018 Beginning of Year Report, Regional Delegation for Secondary Education, South West Region\textsuperscript{36}, shows that there is a movement of students from other divisions of the South West region towards Fako Division which is considered to have a more secured environment for schooling. Therefore, with the presence of security, parents are ready to send their children to school while students are also ready to pursue their academic career.

Students who did not attend classes and did not sit for the examinations had to repeat or suspend the academic year or semester in the case of some higher education institutions like the University of Buea. However, summer classes were organized by the administration of the University of Buea for some courses that were not properly taught during the normal session and students were later evaluated. In the same line, students in primary and secondary education within these regions (North West and South West) were given remedial classes\textsuperscript{37}.

With respect to the above circular letter, catch up classes were organized for the lost periods from the 4\textsuperscript{th} of September to the 11\textsuperscript{th} of November 2017; the 15 weeks of classes that were lost was compressed and covered within 10 weeks; classes were extended from 7:30-3:30 unlike 2:30 that was the normal school time table and Saturday classes from 8:00am to 12:00pm which was not part of the normal school calendar. A diagnostic evaluation was carried out for students at the end of the catch up classes. Due to the remedial classes, the new academic year started on the 13\textsuperscript{th} of November 2017 instead of September\textsuperscript{38}.

\textsuperscript{36} Regional Delegation of Secondary Education: Beginning of Year Report for the 2017/2018 academic year. Service of School Map, Guidance Counselling and School Assistance.

\textsuperscript{37} Circular Letter No. 14/17/L/MINESEC/IGE of 13\textsuperscript{th} August 2017 for School Administrators in the North West and South West Regions: Catch up Classes and Coverage of School Programme during the 2017/2018 Academic Year.

\textsuperscript{38} Circular Letter No. 14/17/L/MINESEC/IGE of 13\textsuperscript{th} August 2017 for School Administrators in the North West and South West Regions: Catch up Classes and Coverage of School Programme during the 2017/2018 Academic Year.
Research Objective 3: To assess the role of ineffective teaching on school effectiveness

Table: 4: Distribution of views of Principals, Teachers, Students and Parents on the relationship between ineffective teaching and school effectiveness

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<tr>
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<th>Questions</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SA</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>The strike action negatively affects students’ performance (pass rates) and competence</td>
<td>67.7% (90)</td>
<td>5.0% (20)</td>
<td>6.0% (8)</td>
<td>11.3% (15)</td>
<td>71.7% (110)</td>
<td>17.3% (23)</td>
<td></td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Teachers’ output (punctuality, assiduity, poor coverage) was affected during the teachers’ strike action.</td>
<td>65.5% (87)</td>
<td>16.5% (22)</td>
<td>7.5% (10)</td>
<td>10.5% (14)</td>
<td>82% (109)</td>
<td>18% (24)</td>
<td></td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>There was a fundamental breakdown of the teaching-learning process during the teachers’ strike action.</td>
<td>80.5% (107)</td>
<td>12.7% (17)</td>
<td>5.3% (7)</td>
<td>1.5% (2)</td>
<td>93.2% (124)</td>
<td>6.8% (9)</td>
<td></td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Teachers’ effectiveness (punctuality, assiduity, course coverage) can contribute to effective schooling.</td>
<td>45.1% (60)</td>
<td>30.1% (40)</td>
<td>11.3% (15)</td>
<td>13.5% (18)</td>
<td>75.2% (100)</td>
<td>24.8% (33)</td>
<td></td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Students’ were not properly evaluated during the teachers’ strike action.</td>
<td>15% (20)</td>
<td>19.5% (26)</td>
<td>30.1% (40)</td>
<td>35.3% (47)</td>
<td>34.5% (46)</td>
<td>65.5% (90)</td>
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<td>133</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=133 Strongly Agree (SA) Agree (A) Strongly Disagree (SD) Disagree (D)
Results indicate that, teaching was not effective which led to a fundamental breakdown of the teaching-learning process caused by the teachers’ strike action (93.2%). Teachers were not effective (punctuality, assiduity, course coverage) during this period (75.2%) and students’ performance and competence was low (71.7%). To a lesser extent, students were not properly evaluated (34.5%) (See table 4 above). Irregular attendance of teachers also encourages students’ absenteeism. When students know that the teachers are not always there, and even when the teachers are there they do not take lessons seriously, students will lose interest in attending classes. In such scenario, teaching and learning cannot be effective. Teachers are at the center of teaching and learning and their roles greatly determine the effectiveness of schools which is seen in students’ achievement. If teaching is ineffective, schools cannot be effective. Ko, Sammons and Bakkum39 explain that, teachers are one of the key elements in any school and effective teaching is one of the key propellers for school improvement. A teacher is effective if he/she can accomplish the planned goals and assigned task in accordance with school goals. Therefore, without effective teaching, it may be impossible for the school to attain its goals and objectives.

Research Objective 4: To examine the extent to which parents withdrawal affects school effectiveness

Table 5: Distribution of views of participants on the relationship between parents’ withdrawal from school activities and school effectiveness

<table>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SA</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>SD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>The catch-up classes, the mock and the GCE motivated parents to encourage students to continue schooling</td>
<td>20.3% (27)</td>
<td>45.1% (60)</td>
<td>15.8% (21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Fear and threats reduced parents’ participation in school activities (e.g PTA meetings, payment of fees, etc)</td>
<td>26.3% (35)</td>
<td>30.8% (41)</td>
<td>24.8% (33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Fear and threats encouraged parents to withdraw their children from school</td>
<td>45.1% (60)</td>
<td>39.8% (53)</td>
<td>7.5% (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Parents educational background affects their view on children’s’ schooling.</td>
<td>38.3% (51)</td>
<td>27.8% (37)</td>
<td>22.6% (30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Parents are willing to send their children to school after the strike action.</td>
<td>37.6% (50)</td>
<td>25.6% (34)</td>
<td>24.8% (33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Parents felt that the school environment was not safe for their children.</td>
<td>34.5% (46)</td>
<td>30.1% (40)</td>
<td>13.5% (18)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=133 Strongly Agree (SA) Agree (A) Strongly Disagree (SD) Disagree (D)

Results revealed that, fear and threats encouraged parents to withdraw their children from schools during the Anglophone crisis (84.9%) because parents felt that the school environment was not safe for their children (64.6%). This reduced parents’ participation in school activities especially payment of school fees (57.1%). School fee is one of the sources of educational financing in Cameroon; if just 30% of the students fail to pay their fees, the school cannot function effectively. With such a situation, it becomes difficult to pay part-time teachers and to provide other necessary materials for effective teaching and learning.
Nevertheless, parents are willing to send their children back to school (66.2%) and the catch-up classes, the mock and the GCE (General Certificate of Education) Examination motivated parents to encourage students to continue schooling (65.4%). This indicates that despite the problems faced by the school community, parents and students are still willing to acquire education.

Looking at the school as a social system, the role of the parents in school effectiveness cannot be overemphasized, especially at the level of primary and secondary education where learners depend so much on their parents. Learners’ progress and development in school do not only depend on teachers and the school curriculum, but also on parental commitment on the education of the child through Parents-Teacher Association, parents’ relationship with the child’s teacher, payment of school fees and provision of other school needs for the child. According to Fullan (2001, p. 198)\textsuperscript{40}, the closer the parent is to the education of the child, the greater the impact on the child’s development and educational achievement while the research work of Nana, Milondzo and Adjei (2008)\textsuperscript{41} reveals that, parents have a very significant role to play in the affairs of the school which include parent-teacher relationship, monitoring learners progress, punctuality of learners, learners discipline and make learners take their studies seriously. Parents therefore play a very important role in the success of a school.

**Conclusion**

The research has shown that, social unrest in the sphere of education caused by the teachers’ strike action in the Anglophone regions (North West and South West) of Cameroon has greatly affected the smooth functioning of schools especially students who are the major agent of formal education. Even if this crisis comes to an end, it will take a lot of time and resources to bring the school system back to normal, especially

\textsuperscript{40} M. Fullan, *The New Meaning of Educational Change (3rd ed)*. New York: Teaching College Colombia University (2001), 198.

students who have dropped out of school. Insecurity within the school environment caused irregular attendance of teachers and students on school campuses while some parents withdrew their children from school. In addition, teaching and learning was not effective while dropout and repetition plagued the educational system. Education lays the foundation of economic development of every country: if there is a breakdown of the educational system, it will have a spillover effect on other sectors of the economy. No matter what happens, depriving a generation of children of education cannot solve any problem. Instead, it will lead to poverty; more unrest, underdevelopment amongst others. For example, the burning down of private and public property, poor turn over in business activities in affected areas etc. insecurity also scare away home and foreign investors who have the capacity of developing the country and reducing unemployment rate. It should be noted that, teaching is a profession that gives birth to other profession. Concrete governmental action is therefore necessary to seek a lasting solution to the Anglophone crisis so that teachers, students, administrators and others in the educational community can function normally in an environment that is void of fear and threats.

**Recommendations**

On a general note, a joint committee of government representatives, teachers, parents and other stakeholders in education should be set-up to deliberate on the solution of the teachers’ crisis. Decisions made should be final and binding to the government and the teachers.

Specific recommendations include:

1. The government should put-up strategies such as scholarship award, amongst others for learners who have dropped out of school for the goals of education to be attained.

2. Teachers’ union should explore other ways in engaging the government in yielding to their demands other than depending on strike action. While teachers have the right to strike, the right to education is an inalienable right of children.

3. The government should put in place strategies to ensure meritocracy in schools. Learners should be given opportunities in education based on merit.
4. The government should ensure decentralization in education for effectiveness and efficiency.

5. The government should organize an education forum to restructure the English Sub-system of education, especially technical education. This will address most of the problems put forward by the Teachers’ Trade Union.

6. The government should put in place strategies to train more Anglophone Technical teachers to teach in technical schools.
The Role of Media in Radicalization: The Somali context

Barkhad M. Kaariye

Abstract:

Islamic movements and radicals have been operating in the Horn of Africa, the Somali territories in particular with different objectives. Violent extremism and radicalism have emerged as a result of their operation and correlation with international radical groups. Media plays an effective role in the radicalization process and that influences the perception of the people living in these countries. The use of media by the radicals, both individual and groups, to influence and recruit the youth and other sympathizers have been simultaneously increasing in the region as modern technology infiltrates with Somalis. With regards to these issues, the present article will initially explore and accentuate how Somalis – both those living in Somali territories in the Eastern Africa and beyond, have been radicalized through media –traditional and modern media. The article illustrates how some Somalis go from ‘radical of thought’ up to ‘radical of action’ that drags them to the involvement in violent extremism across the region.

1 Barkhad Kaariye is a doctoral candidate in Peace, Governance and Development at the United Nations Mandated –University for Peace.
Introduction:

The term Radicalization has been widely used worldwide but is not defined enough\(^2\). Radicalization is divided into two major dimensions, ‘radicalization of thought’ and ‘radicalization of action’\(^3\). The term is referred to ‘as the process of developing extremist ideologies and beliefs’ and violent radicalization ‘as the acceptance and adaptation of violent ways to reach an ideological objective’.\(^4\) Radicalization is also defined as the process by which people support or participate in terrorism and extremist activities and groups.\(^5\) In terms of both radicalization dimensions correlation, the radicalization of action and that of perceptions are linked but are not dependent to each other.\(^6\)

The East African countries are victims of radical Islamist movements which mostly involve violent extremism which culminates in attacking governmental institutions and civilians with live ammo, explosions and other self-suicidal practices. These movements have a negative impact on these countries, including the radicalization of people in a very attractive radicalization process\(^7\). With regards to these issues, the present article explores and accentuate how Somalis – both those living in Somali territories in the Eastern Africa and beyond, have been radicalized through media – traditional and modern media. The article


\(^4\) Ibid, 12


emphasizes how Somalis go from ‘radical of thought’ up to ‘radical of action’ that drags them into violent extremism across the region.

A Somali-American from Minneapolis (USA) once blew himself up in Hargeisa (Somaliland) in 2008 after he had been radicalized through media by Al-Shabaab. Shirwa Ahmed was not the only radicalized Somali who lived overseas, others were also being radicalized and trained in other countries, including Afghanistan. Given that the Somalis are a pastoral society known to move from place to place, the only suitable communication mechanisms for them is oral communication. Radio is therefore the most appropriate tool used by Al-Shabaab, Al-Qaeda-linked group operating inside and outside Somalia to radicalize the people, mostly youngsters. Social Media, on the other hand, is another tool that enables the extremist groups to radicalize the youth globally. In that regard, media is seen to be the tool that radical and extremist groups use as recruitment and radicalization channels by delivering messages that urge them to join the movements. The role of media in radicalization is therefore illustrated in this article from a Somali perspective. Both primary and secondary data were employed in the article. Literature review and interviews were conducted. In the finding, the paper presents a core argument that media has a role to play in the radicalization process.

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8 *Al-Shabaab* is Al-Qaeda affiliated radical group based in Somalia that conduct explosions, strikes and other self-bombing attacks in East African countries.


Methodology:

This study reveals the role of media in radicalization, from the Somali context perspective. Both primary and secondary data were collected from various sources. In primary data, key informants from academia, journalists, university lecturers and Communications specialists were interviewed. With regards to secondary sources, books, journals and reports relating to the subject were used to further buttress the arguments.

The role of Media: From global to Somali arena

In media, messages that target groups of people are always delivered in appropriate manners and suitable formats. According to ExploreNet12, ‘Media can be broadly defined as communication that is delivered through some type of medium (TV, radio, newspaper, computer)”

Broadcast and new media are the main sources of information engineered by extremists and radical groups across the globe. Radicals use online media platforms to provide lectures to influence young students living in the western countries. Some of these students end up being radicalized and react violently. ISIS, Al-Qaeda and other internationally-allied organizations have been spreading dozens of media contents mostly videos, documents and other messages throughout media, (including social media) for radicalization purpose and call to on sympathizers to join them.13 Even though Internet has positive impact on societies around the globe, it has also become a new opportunity for violent extremists to spread their words and use it as a catchment for the radicalized recruits.14 Despite the effectiveness and the role of the new media in society, the radical and violent groups

use it as recruiting podium for young people whom they convince to join and fight for them. These groups envision the vulnerable and later radicalize people for these options as the complement of their faith.\textsuperscript{15} Al-Qaeda and its affiliates use media in general, the new media in particular to influence the depressed and isolated youth across the world and radicalize them by showing them the violent ideology as the only way out. Most of the radicalized people in various countries are employed for home terrorism operations.\textsuperscript{16}

These groups’ activities have been regularly observed from Lake Chad Basin countries to East African countries, South Asia countries up to Western Europe and other countries in other continents where radicalization and violent extremism has been a routine.\textsuperscript{17} In Somali territories (Somalia, Somaliland, Djibouti, Somalis in Ethiopia and those in Kenya), were also targeted and victimized by these actions and ideologies. In Middle East and Northern Africa, almost 96% of young Muslim men are radicalized and recruited via interpersonal commutations which is part of African traditional media outlets.\textsuperscript{18}

In Somali history, after the radical Islamic movement of Sayid Mohammed Abdillahi Hassan that fought against the British Empire in Somaliland back 1903-1920, a new Islamic movement began in 1969 with Wahdad Al-Islam Al-Shabaab by Islamic scholars and young and energetic students. Ansaru-Din, another Islamic movement, had also been operating in the country. In the early stages, the movements had been able to feed their ideologies on Islam-based ruling system to the youth by creating learning centers. The military coup of October 1969 brought aggressive and repressive system against their objectives. The government declared ‘Scientific Socialism’ as the adopted system

\textsuperscript{15} Antosz, M. (2016). The Somali diasporain the united states and their impact on the American domestic, social and security situation. African Studies. 3(42), 364-375. DOI: 10.12797/Politeja.13.2016.42.20
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid
of governance but the Islamic movements opposed and saw it as an ‘Imported and Anti-religious’ system. These movements were not violent until 1991, after the central government of Somalia collapsed, and they started fighting against the rebellion leaders who fought against the government in Mogadishu and elsewhere in the country\textsuperscript{19}.

Radical ideologies among Somalis goes back to history and has been grown in Somalia, but most of the violent extremist were influenced, manipulated and trained in other countries, including USA, Afghanistan, Pakistan among others, where they lived either as asylum seekers or for Islamic knowledge-seeking purposes. Somalis became sympathizers of Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab, inspired by propaganda engineered by these groups using the consequences of wars led by western powers as an evidence that seemed to be, from their perspective, a ‘War against Islam’\textsuperscript{20}. Foreign nationals from USA and other western countries were attracted to Al-Shabaab through media. Somali diaspora populations were also attracted and provided financial and other logistical support to Al-Shabaab\textsuperscript{21}. Americans are radicalized through online forums by Al-Shabaab like their would-be source of weapons. A US native named Daniel Maldonado, was captured fighting alongside al-Shabaab forces on the Somali-Kenyan border, and was later convicted by a U.S. court and sentenced to ten years in prison for fighting with an Al-Qaeda-linked group\textsuperscript{22}.

**Deceptive calls to receptive Audiences:**

In Somalia, a vast majority of the country is directly or indirectly governed by Al-Shabaab, an Al-Qaeda affiliated group, which despite attacks on several countries in eastern Africa, collects extorted money as tax. It recruited dozens of both Somali and non-Somali radicals

\textsuperscript{19} Interview with Somali Islamic Movements founders’ member and researcher, Hargeisa, 3 February 2019.


from America, Europe, Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa. Media was and still is their main tool for recruitment through the release of multi-lingual videos. Most of their target audiences live abroad, beyond Somalia’s borders.\textsuperscript{23} They use both poetic and non-poetic messages, including rap. Omar Hammami, a radicalized non-Somali US citizen and Alabama native, who later became a senior propaganda commander in Somalia’s Al-Shabaab group, released a rap video for recruitment purposes. This musical beat went viral on internet\textsuperscript{24}. For the newly recruits, they screen videos for schooling and radicalizing purposes on the group’s ideologies in many local mosques, schools, training camps and madrassas in Somalia.\textsuperscript{25}

The gun battles, explosions and other direct wars between UN-backed Somalia government and Al-Shabaab also added the patrol to the fire ignited by Al-Shabaab propagandists using the media. That’s how they used to get sympathizers involved. Learning about the deaths of their family members through media or other communication mechanisms, the young people were keenly and massively joining Al-Shabaab hoping they will die as martyrs. Before Somalis in Somalia got the chance of having mobile phones, fast speed internet facilities and other technological capabilities, Al-Shabaab’s top leaders who were trained in Afghanistan and other countries would copy and duplicate their propaganda tapes and screen them in Cinemas whereby more people were fascinated and bought them to watch in their homes. That’s how these radical and violent ideologies spread and gained foothold in Somalia.

Aside calls for radicals, Al-Shabaab also uses media as stage to show its affiliation with international organizations, like Al-Qaeda by presenting videos of their top leaders acknowledging and praising the Al-Qaeda’s aid to them. Having a well-prepared media strategy by Omar


\textsuperscript{25} Ibid
Hammami shows that Al-Shabaab and other similar radical organized groups are aware of the significance of media in their campaign and target recruits. 26

Ethiopian troops intervened in Somalia in 2006 and that led Al-Shabaab’s top leaders calling for Muslims, both Somalis and non-Somalis, to come to Somalia and join them to oust the foreign troops. They used media, both internet and Radios in Mogadishu and other cities in Somalia. Following these calls, Al-Qaeda’s number-two top leader, Ayman Al-Zawahiri released an audio message via media asking radicals to join Al-Shabaab. That’s when Al-Shabaab attracted more fighters, all thanks to Al-Qaeda’s endorsement calls through media. Inspite measures to tackle radical ideologies by governments and media companies, Al-Shabaab still could manage to send their pleas and messages via pro-radical media outlets, like blogs, websites and other radio stations in Somalia and over the globe. They also established their own roving radio stations in Mogadishu and other rural areas in Somalia. It became harder for the governments to find and shutdown their channels of communication and propaganda, because of the parallel channels they used – verbal, poetry and other oral messages to feed Somalis in the region. Misleading and misinterpretation of Islam for those who do not fully understand Islam and Quran verses were also part of their appeal and recruitment techniques. The target audiences of Al-Shabaab were Somalis living in the region and abroad, including US and Europe. Some young Somali-Americans were killed during the fighting against the government and other rivals in Somalia and other countries, while others defected from Al-Shabaab for fear of being killed because of their ideological change.27

In October 2007, Omar Hammami appeared on Al-Jazeera Television and as usual for Al-Shabaab, urging his fellow-Americans to join him and his group. The following years, international TV stations interviewed Al-Shabaab leaders and members who used these channels to appeal for recruitment and construct their argument for waging wars and

26 Ibid
attacks against their opposing governments. Pre-recorded interviews of bombers just before they blew themselves up, videos recorded during the fighting and other messages were part of their campaign to fascinate and hook new recruits. The videos, messages and other media contents were posted on Social media, YouTube and other outlets. Though some of them were later removed, their messages were delivered.28

In December 2009, they were highlights and indications that Al-Shabaab’s calls fell on receptive ears. In that year, a university graduation ceremony in Mogadishu was turned into a pool of blood after a Somali-ethnic and Swedish-raised suicide bomber blew himself, killing twenty-five people, including three ministers, graduates and other scholars. The bomber was recruited by Al-Shabaab while he was in Sweden through radicalization messages and videos via media. In that year alone, at least twenty Swedish citizens, including some top leaders like Fu’adShangolle, were in Somalia fighting alongside Al-Shabaab29. Most of its new recruits were employed within Somalia, specifically in the rural areas, because they still controlled the area.30

On October 14th, 2017, Somalia experienced one of its deadliest attacks when a truck bomb blew up in Mogadishu, killing over six hundred people and injuring more than three hundred31. Though, Al-Shabaab neither claimed nor declined responsibility, the government blamed Al-Shabaab for the attack.

Radicalization Awareness Network32 expresses the impact of media content distributed by the radical groups as;

28 Ibid
29 Ibid
“Content produced and distributed on social media is received and consumed by young people who, under powerful aesthetic and emotional impressions are motivated to get involved and go on to imitate the kinds of behaviors they see online. While incipient research has been produced on the topic, it is still largely unknown how visuals and audio material influence individuals on their radicalization path.”  
(RAN Research 2016, P.2)

Operating beyond borders

Al-Shabaab and its recruits are serious threats not only to Somalia but also its neighbors in the region though some countries’ situations are more critical than others. Al-Shabaab has managed, with the help of media propaganda, to recruit non-Somali citizens across East African countries, including Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia while radicalizing Somalis to operate in other Somali territories and countries, like Djibouti and Somaliland.

In Somaliland, two British aid workers were killed by radicals in Sheikh Village, near the coastal town of Berbera on October 2003. Though that was not the first attack inside Somaliland, in 2006, Somaliland government charged 15 suspects of terrorist acts, illegal importation of arms and explosives after injuring three policemen in 2005, six of them were in absentia including Al-Shabaab top leaders Ahmed Abdi Godane and Ibrahim Jama Afghani. Most of them were convicted and sentenced to between 20 and 25 years in prison. Al-Shabaab media propaganda that targeted young Somalis living overseas

34 Somaliland - The first Somali territory that gained independence from Colonial power, Britain in 1960. In same year it unified with Italian Somalia to form ‘Somali Republic’, but 30 years withdrawn from the union and reclaimed its independence, but no country recognizes as independent country.
seemed to be successful after Shirwa Ahmed, a Somali-American, flew to Somaliland and carried out one of the deadliest attacks by radicals in Somaliland on October 29th 2008. On that day, three suicide bombings targeted three different important places in Hargeisa; the presidential palace, the Ethiopian trade office and the regional UN offices. Six suicide bombers, one of them from Somaliland, were involved in the attacks while others were from Somalia. The main reason was to interrupt upcoming elections in March 2009. Since that time, Somaliland has been working against the spread of radical ideologies.

Al-Shabaab has carried out attacks on African Union troops present in Somalia (AMISOM) in rejection of their presence in the country. In Kenya, Westgate Shopping Mall in Nairobi was also attacked; killing 72 people and injuring over 200 with the attack lasting for four days. The attackers were speaking in Swahili language. Four Kenyan-born and raised citizens carried out the attack.

Al-Shabaab and its affiliates have conducted several attacks in Kenya, including the execution of passengers on a Mandera-Nairobi bus. Despite the Kenyan government’s plan and implementation of a 200 km-long wall on the Kenya-Somalia border to prevent Al-Shabaab members from crossing, the threat remains high. On April 2nd, 2015 Al-Shabaab attacked Garissa University College in Garissa, Kenya, killed 148 and injured dozens of others. These attacks were simplified or carried out by radicals either recruited by Al-Shabaab or other allied

indigenous movements that take advantage of the economic situation of Kenyans living in coastal and North-East provinces. Despite Al-Shabaab’s English speaking contents that go viral on social media, the group has attempted to increase its production into publications by producing a magazine entitled *GaidiMtaani*, which means “Street Terrorist” in Kiswahili. Some attracted and compromised Kenyan native radicals are trained in Somalia by Al-Shabaab and sent back to Kenya and other neighboring countries to either be operatives or execute suicidal missions. One other attack masterminded by Al-Shabaab members was the attack which happened in Nairobi on January 15th, 2019. The attack which claimed the lives of 21 people and wounded others targeted a luxury Hotel in the capital.

In Uganda, on the night of the Football World Cup finals in July 2010, several blasts rocked the capital, Kampala. The twin attacks by Al-Shabaab left 74 people dead and 70 others injured. One of the bombers targeted an Ethiopian restaurant owned by Ethiopians in Kampala. Investigations proved that the attackers were Al-Shabaab members who operated in Somalia, Uganda and Kenya. The masterminder of these attacks was identified as thirty-three-year-old Ugandan that was


radicalized by Al-Shabaab\textsuperscript{47}. The bombers from Uganda and Kenya were recruited via Al-Shabaab’s produced magazine published in Kiswahili; a language not spoken in Somalia but in Uganda and Kenya\textsuperscript{48}. They urged Muslims living in these countries to join them. Al-Shabaab also established its own media outlets, particularly online platforms that distributed their productions. Some of the videos are subtitled in Swahili and English for non-Somali speakers living in these countries\textsuperscript{49}. The magazine was adjourned in its first two editions.

Djibouti was among the victims of violent extremism in the region as Al-Shabaab members attacked a restaurant in May 2014 and killed three people, including two security officers and wounded eleven others. Foreign nationals including French were among the victims.\textsuperscript{50} Ethiopia has been under the focus of Al-Qaeda and its affiliates, like Al-Shabaab since 2004, they were looking at the formation of ‘Mujahideen Ethiopia’ with main objective to expand their style of Islamic rule to Ethiopia\textsuperscript{51}. Several explosions have happened in Ethiopia at different times, with a case being the May 2008 explosion that killed six people including one Israeli citizen after explosives were planted in a mini bus in Addis-Ababa. The government blamed the incident on terrorist groups. \textsuperscript{52} In 2013, there was another suicide bombing that targeted the Football World Cup qualifying match in Addis Ababa but accidently


\textsuperscript{49} Ibid


exploded and killed the terrorists themselves.\textsuperscript{53}

Al-Shabaab sympathizers in Kenya were not only accepting the radicalization plea, but also organizing themselves as cells and networks online via internet and mobile applications\textsuperscript{54}. These radicals have had the courage to publicly discuss the radical ideologies on social media and influence others\textsuperscript{55}. Radicalization and terrorism, however, are interrelated and dependent on one another. The radicalized aggrieved youth in Somali territories are easier to commit terrorist acts. Like other countries, the young Somalis living in the US are radicalized because of two main reasons;

- “Economic exclusion – poverty is very often the cause of many instances of extreme behavior.
- Social exclusion – sometimes the feeling of social exclusion plays an even more important role than the economy. In the United States, this is related to the difficulties in cultural adaptation and acceptance by peers as well as racism.” (Antosz 2016, p-372).\textsuperscript{56}

After huge pressure and global campaigns against radicals and terrorists travelled across the globe, a new technique of radicalization has emerged, including ‘self-radicalization’ and ‘self-activation’ methods. This means that online radicalized and motivated recruits are operating inside their countries to plan and execute attacks\textsuperscript{57}. That’s where radicalization and terrorism meet as evolving stages from radicals to extremists. Most of the radicals were firstly radicalized before they

\textsuperscript{54} Ibid
\textsuperscript{55} Ibid, 31
\textsuperscript{56} Antosz, M. (2016). \textit{The Somali diaspora in the united states and their impact on the American domestic, social and security situation}. \textit{African Studies}. 3(42), 364-375. DOI: 10.12797/Politeja.13.2016.42.20
become extremists; violent extremist in particular. For instance, in 2010 a university student stabbed British MP Stephen Timms after she was influenced, motivated and radicalized by online lectures issued by Anwar Al-Awlaki, a Yemeni-American preacher whose videos went viral on YouTube. Several elements are considered to be contributing factors that help a person become an extremist, including an unhappy childhood. Violent terrorism has an impact on the socioeconomic life of the population and was estimated to cost approximately USD 89.6 billion in 2015.

The aforementioned attacks, media productions and radicalization techniques by Al-Shabaab are supporting the core argument of this article; that media has an effective and potential role in the radicalization process up to violent extremism activities.

**The Somali Media: The roles, rules and radicalization**

Regarding the psychological situation of the societies, radical and extremist groups use media for three different objectives;

“Firstly, terrorism attempts to gain the public’s attention, secondly, it tries to gain sympathy for its cause and, thirdly, terrorism aims to spread concern and terror in the general public and thereby effect political change.” (Spencer, 2012, P.8)

In broadcast media, the first Somali-speaking radio, Radio Hargeisa was established as Radio Kudu. It began as an experiment in 1941 under the British administration in Somaliland. In 1944 Radio Kudu was renamed Radio Somali and Radio Hargeisa later. In the print media, the first weekly Arabic-written newspaper was seen and distributed in Hargeisa in 1950. Al-Ummah (The Nation) was printed in Aden, South Yemen.

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60 Ibid

because of lack of printing facilities in Somaliland British Protectorate where the other newspapers was printed. The establishment of Radio Mogadishu and BBC Somali Service followed years later in 1951 and 1957, respectively\textsuperscript{62}. Other media outlets were followed as source of information to the Somalis.

The first time that Islamic movement got access to media was in 1974, during the Somali republic government era\textsuperscript{63}. They had a radio program via Radio Hargeisa to broadcast Islamic lectures named ‘Islamic behavior’\textsuperscript{64}. The content was not directly against the system; rather the Islamic good conduct and behavior were the focus. They targeted the youth and presented lectures at schools and Mosques, asking them to come to their centers for further information and Islamic learning. Roving teams played the role of media among the Islamic movements in order to reach the target audiences and extend the content through lectures. With this, convincing the attracted youth to join the movement and take part in the campaigns were the last stages of recruiting them, because no one could assure who was ready and when. In 1978, the military government took steps that later cracked down the movement by arresting the youth. The next years, in 1981, the speed of the movements was slowed by the pressure and repressive actions of the government. During these years, the Islamic movement of Wahdad Al-Islaam Al-Shabaab was fragmented due to inner conflict. Conflicts and division between the movements were the starting point of pure radicalization and the rise of radicals. Since there was no media outlet to use and the lack of modern technological facilities, the Islamic movements would get information from houses and indoor meetings\textsuperscript{65}.


\textsuperscript{63} The Somali Republic was the result of the union between Somaliland, former British Protectorate, and Italian Somalia in 1960. That union dissolved thirty years after the union in 1991, after Somaliland proclaimed its independence from Somalia.

\textsuperscript{64} Interview with Somali Islamic Movements founders’ member and researcher, Hargeisa, 3 February 2019.

\textsuperscript{65} Ibid
The history of Somali media started from that period until when the modern technological facilities reached the Somalis, including internet and other media outlets. In recent years, Somali-speaking media on which Somalis in the Horn of Africa and beyond rely for information and news have had their role in the radicalization process. They help radicals and extremist groups to spread propaganda and misinform the society, given that spreading false propaganda against the governments and other radicals’ rivals are always considered as the contributing factor to radicalization\textsuperscript{66}. When the radicals’ plea, victory claiming and other information are broadcasted via the media including the social media, it contributes in shaping the public and audience’s perception by presenting insurgency activities as right and the correct option. Somali media and journalists interview the radical and extremist organizations and then distribute the content because of two main reasons; firstly, they believe it as the right path and secondly, they see it as a religious sacrifice and are terrified of being killed or targeted\textsuperscript{67}. Somali media gives extensive coverage to the radicals and are used as a tool for transmitting their ideology. Some of them use the media for their interest in the name of Islamic religion\textsuperscript{68}. In 2010, Somalia’s all radios stations gave live coverage to Al-Shabaab’s top leaders including Godane, the late emir of the group and he used them as engaging space to the public. Before Al-Shabaab’s expansion, they used to pay the media so as to get live coverages of their leader’s lectures and petitions but later resorted to media harassment and actions against them, including killing those who opposed their orders. All these caused the media to hesitate reporting against Al-Shabaab. In 2011, the media in the coastal town of Bossaso, north of Somalia’s regional administration of Puntland ordered journalists not to report about Al-Shabaab although the command was short-lived. That is why media in Somalia have a role in radicalization\textsuperscript{69}.

\textsuperscript{66} Interview with Communication Specialist and University lecturer on Journalism and Mass Communication, Hargeisa, 7 February, 2019.
\textsuperscript{67} Interview with Somali Islamic Movements founders’ member and researcher, Hargeisa, 3 February 2019.
\textsuperscript{68} Interview with Human rights defender and Lawyer, Hargeisa, 5 February, 2019.
\textsuperscript{69} Interview with Senior Journalist and Media trainer in Somalia, Mogadishu, 28 January, 2019.
The impact of the role of media in radicalization is always disastrous. The media space given to the radicals negatively influenced young Somalis and the repetition of the propaganda made some Somalis in the Horn of Africa vulnerable to believe it as the right and accurate information from Sheiks. For instance, before Al-Shabaab-claimed attack in Galkacayo town of Somalia\textsuperscript{70}, aggressive propaganda against the later killed cleric was spread throughout the media and this resulted in the strike that was welcomed by some of the public\textsuperscript{71}.

From legal perspective, therefore, crime is an action against the law. Crime, both violent and non-violent, is also defined as an act that breaks the law with classification. However, circulating wrong news and information is considered a crime\textsuperscript{72}. It is legal for media to cover radical activities, but illegal and disastrous to shape and exaggerate content as some of Somali media did and still do. Shaping radicalization content as religious by the media is what convinced people to become radical. It is for this reason that media has a role in radicalization process\textsuperscript{73}. In addition, recruiting youngsters and under age youth for radical and violent purposes is criminal according to the laws of Somalia, Somaliland and other countries in the region. Therefore, assisting radicals to recruit youths and juveniles by circulating their pleas is criminal.\textsuperscript{74}

\textsuperscript{71} Interview with Communication Specialist and University lecturer on Journalism and Mass Communication, Hargeisa, 7 February, 2019.
\textsuperscript{73} Interview with Human rights defender and Lawyer, Hargeisa, 5 February, 2019.
\textsuperscript{74} Ibid
Conclusion:
In accordance to the key findings and the core argument of this article, media has a clear and effective role in radicalization across the Somali territories in the Horn of Africa. Having laws and Acts against extremism and radicalization is not the only solution, but educating Somali media practitioners, owners and other journalists on how to prevent radicalism, extremism and other violent ideologies is also significant in the de-radicalization process. Increasing journalists’ understanding of these topics and their impact on societies and life in whole is important as well. Giving the media space to analysts with full understand of radicalization and its consequences could be part of critiquing these ideologies which most of the audiences have not yet to be clarified on. The media’s knowledge and understanding of Islamic ideologies, sects and other related topics will contribute in avoiding the spread of violent, radical and extremist believes.
The Role of the Media in African Conflicts and Peace Efforts
Mkong Immaculate Kelighai¹

Abstract
The media has risen to a pride of place in world politics given its contribution in transforming international power struggle and the rise of the rest against Western Hegemony. The global media landscape is increasingly pressing for unbounded press freedom along with the halting of all forms of injustices done to media practitioners especially those in conflict affected nations the world over, more so in Africa which plays host to the largest proportion of global conflicts. Studies on the outbreak and domino effect (spill over) of the Arab spring in 2010 and other emerging conflict trends like terrorism and pro-democracy uprisings especially in Africa in late 20th running through into the 21st century, are important pointers to the primordial role the media plays in National and International politics, as well as conflict transformation and peace-building processes. However, media is still being accorded such limited attention in contemporary peace and security studies. This paper argues in line with Frere (2008), that media played key roles in escalating conflicts in Africa, yet have been instrumental in fostering peace building processes in the continent. The paper illustrates how the media have contributed to conflicts in East and West Africa, notably, Kenya, Rwanda and Cameroon, and would subsequently agree with Jok (2015) that the role of the media in conflicts is indeed a ‘double edged sword’, with a huge potential to either make or mar peace efforts. The writer holds that any Modern Conflict and Peace Studies void of discussions on the power of the Media in exacerbating,

¹ Mkong Immaculate Kelighai is a PhD Candidate in Global Studies, Peace and Security in Africa at the University of Leipzig/Institute for Peace and Security Studies (AAU).
preventing and/or transforming conflicts is incomprehensive. She joins Bratic and Schirch (2007) to conclude that cooperation between Media and Peace and Security professionals is essential since using media in peace-building is a new practice and everyone has a lot to learn.

KEY WORDS; MEDIA, AFRICAN CONFLICTS, PEACE EFFORTS

Introduction
The 21st century has been described as the “digital age” considering that today’s media constitutes an integral part of globalization. This is so as the global media landscape is increasingly pressing for unbound press freedom along with the halting of all forms of injustices done to media practitioners especially those in conflict affected nations the world over, more so in Africawhich plays host to the largest proportion of global conflicts. A case in point is the Republic of Cameroon whose long serving President Paul Biya has referred to the Cameroonian youths as the “Android Generation”, calling on them to double efforts in ensuring that the country achieves a stronger, stable and more sustainable growth.

Despite the limited attention that is still being accorded to the media in present day peace and security studies, the media has risen to a pride of place in world politics as it has contributed to the transformation of international power struggle and has enabled the rise of the rest against Western Hegemony. Communication Theorists like McCombs and

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3 Feliz Coban (2016) The Role of Media in International Relations: From the CNN Effect to the Al-jazeera Effect. American Research Institute for Development; Journal of International Relations and Foreign policy.
Shaw (1968) in their Agenda Setting theory demonstrate the ability of the Media to influence public agenda. Although this argument was challenged by Bulmer and Katz (1974) in the “Uses and Gratification theory” which suggests that media users have control over the media and decide what they accept or retain from them. This notwithstanding, the outbreak and domino effect (spill over) of the Arab spring in 2010 and other emerging conflict trends like terrorism and pro-democracy uprisings especially in Africa in the late 20th running through into the 21st century, are important pointers to the primordial role the media plays in the international scene. Based on the foregoing, it has become all the more evident that any peace and security discussions, whether for academic and/or policy making purposes, that is not mindful of both the negative and positive role of the media is bound to be incomprehensive.

While focusing more on Africa, it is worth highlighting that, in this time of Internet communication and mass media overflow, especially with the advent of New Information and Communication Technologies (NICTs) and the Social Media, reports on Africa have been largely based on prejudgments and superficialities; a situation that Cameroonian professor, Enoh Tanjong (2006) carefully decries. Marie-Soleil Frère (2008) further synthesizes the interaction between the mass media and conflicts in Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Rwanda, Congo-Brazzaville, the Central African Republic, Chad, Cameroon, Gabon and Equatorial Guinea, explaining case by case, the media boom that has taken place in these central African countries since 1993 and media influence during conflicts, and its social role in post-conflict scenarios and peace processes.

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This essay argues in line with Marie Soleil Frere that media has played and continues to play key roles (positive and negative) in escalating conflicts in Africa, yet have also been instrumental in fostering peace building processes in the continent. This writer will benefit from both primary and secondary data; books, articles, seminar and lecture discussions as well as personal observations to illustrate how the media have contributed to conflicts in East and West Africa, notably, Kenya, Rwanda and Cameroon. This writer concludes by agreeing with Jok (2015) that the role of the media in conflicts is indeed a ‘double edged sword’ given its ability to incite, exacerbate yet quell tension as seen in the case of South Sudan. In other words, this paper validates the potential of the media to either make or mar peace, depending on the degree of freedom they are allowed to exercise.

Role of Media in the 1994 Rwandan Genocide

The media play an important role: shedding light on events and calling for action to stop the death or injury of innocents. However, the media can also play an opposing and less virtuous role, fuelling conflict and promoting violence. And both before and during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, this was the case in Rwanda. The genocide in Rwanda and its aftermath is an extreme example of the power which media hold as McCombs and Shaw (1972) carefully explain in the ‘Agenda Setting Theory’.

There was no media law in Rwanda before 1991 and Rwanda at the time had five public media companies, three of which were publically

6 JokMadutJok (2015). The Role of the Media in War and Peace in South Sudan. The Sudd Institute. Policy Briefs
7 https://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/read/74294 viewed on Friday May 17, 2019 at 12:30pm
8 Maxwell MaxCombs and Donald Shaw (1972) ‘The agenda Setting Theory’ Public Opinion Quarterly
owned, while the other two were owned by the Catholic Church. In 1988, when Vincent Rwabusingi created the first private paper ‘Kanguka’ (Wake Up) in 1988; it was received with much euphoria, indicating how hungry people were for information. A businessman, Valence Kajeguhakwa, who, apparently, had problems with President Juvénal Habyarimana, decided to support the paper financially. The success of Kanguka led to the rise in 1990 of another paper named ‘Kangura’ (To awaken) which was sponsored by Hutu extremists, initially as a response to Kanguka. In October 1990, Kangura published the infamous ten Hutu commandments which explicitly promoted discrimination against the Tutsi. The eighth commandment, for example, called on all Hutus not to have any mercy on Tutsis. The commandments called for unity against a “common enemy”, so killing Tutsi was considered self-defense and by implication, those who did not hate the Tutsi were traitors, deserving a similar fate.

During the genocide, the media were presented with two options, the option to hurt and the option to heal. Sadly, most Rwandan media outlets at the time chose to hurt and succeeded in doing so just fine. Kangura was not the only publication preaching the Hutu ideology. Other papers, both public and religious owned, did so too. Orinfor, which managed state-owned Radio Rwanda, Imvaho and La Nouvelle Relève, all called on the Hutu to rise against the Tutsi, as did the dozen or so private publications. No media strayed from spreading messages of hate.

Prior to the genocide, a popular radio station called Radio-Television Libre des Milles Collines, known as RTLM, predicted that “a little
something” was going to happen in April. It even claimed in one of its broadcasts that a Nairobi-based human rights organization had discovered a plan to kill Hutu politicians and start a reverse-genocide on the Hutu ethnic group. RTLM was well known for rabble-rousing broadcasts, promoting the murder and torture of Tutsis.

The Kangura bi-monthly, run by Hassan Ngeze, proprietor of RTLM, was used in addition to RTLM broadcasts to mobilize the Hutu and promote violence against the Tutsi. According to the U.N. Tribunal, the paper “poisoned the minds of readers,” while the radio station actively participated in the call for their extermination, even going as far as calling out the names of individuals that they were seeking. Félicien Kabuga, the main bankroller of both Kangura and RTLM, called the radio station the “defender of Hutu Power” which was the ideology behind the Genocide.

Media such as this spewed hateful propaganda throughout an already-struggling country. Journalists such as Hassan Ngeze, Ferdinand Nahimana and Jean Bosco Barayagwiza threatened those they considered traitors, urging “the faithful Hutu” to ‘cut down the tall trees and finish them all off since “the graves are not yet full!, referring to the Tutsi”. This only furthered sectarian violence within the state and virtually eliminated any possibility of the violence coming to a peaceful conclusion.

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13 ibid
14 ibid
15 ibid
In many forms, the media in Rwanda was entirely responsible for uprooting preexisting racial tensions and transforming them into a full-blown genocide. The United Nations’ Special Rapporteur to the Commission on Human Rights, B.W. Ndiaye, believed that Radio Rwanda “played a pernicious role in instigating several massacres.”16 Hassan Ngeze, Ferdinand Nahimana and Jean Bosco Barayagwiza were convicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) for incitement to genocide and crimes against humanity, and RTLM presenter Valerie Bemeriki was convicted through the Gacaca courts (traditional system of justice) and is serving a life term.

The Rwandan press paid a high price; apart from those who were imprisoned, half the number of journalists in the country was killed while others either disappeared or fled during the genocide. The profession was destroyed. Printing-houses were heavily damaged. The newcomers and the population’s main concerns were daily survival. The press sector was not a priority17. This supports the argument that no amount of freedom of expression should allow for the propagation of hate speech and incitement to war or genocide.18

Media in Rwanda after the Genocide

According to Hizkias Assefa, widely known conflict mediator and Professor of Conflict studies, negotiations for peace after the Rwanda genocide started underground without the involvement of the media. But somewhere along the line, information about negotiation efforts

16 ibid
leaked and both national and international media focused on mediation activities. The involvement of France, Belgium and Britain in the peace negotiation process gave it more international attention and coverage. Thanks to the media, the international community was more involved in the negotiation process. The mediating delegation and the OAU were pressured to bring an end to the violence as soon as possible and this led to the signing of the *Arusha accords* between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandan Patriotic Front in 1993, to end a three-year Rwandan Civil War.

Although the RPF and the Rwandese government represented the main actors in the conflict, Mayerl (2008) argues that the exclusion of other key actors such as the representatives of mass media made the peace process less effective, and the discussions to reach an agreement were critically slowed down.\(^{19}\)

After the genocide, the Rwandan press suffered grave censorship and mistrust from the government, civil society and the general public given their role in inciting the violence. A written press emerged again thanks to external initiatives such as Reporters sans Frontières’ and newspapers like Kinyamateka, Rwanda Rushya (Tutsi), and Le Tribun du Peuple (close to the RPF) were published. The national radio recommenced its programs but with a different tone this time. Following the Arusha Accords, the new government comprised various political parties as opposed to the former regime and the RPF. The objectives of the new regime were unity and reconciliation which became the new editorial line of Radio Rwanda.

The new staff was made of RPF (Rwanda Patriotic Front)-journalists from Radio Muhabura and former Radio Rwanda journalists who returned after fleeing during the genocide. Topics related to the genocide were considered taboo topics for media discussion or reporting.20

**Media in the 2007 Post Election Violence in Kenya**

On February 28th, 2008, Kenya’s president Mwai Kibaki and opposition leader Raila Odinga signed a power-sharing agreement after two months of violence that followed the controversial presidential election results. The clashes left over 1000 people dead and 500,000 displaced.21 The disputed results of the 2007 presidential elections sparked the post-election violence in Kenya. But a careful examination of this conflict revealed that ethnicity based grievances such as perceived marginalization made the post-election violence in Kenya inevitable. This is a perfect reflection of Collier and Hoeffler’s (2004) argument that greed and grievances are the major causes of civil wars22, however, the media in Kenya, particularly the community-based radio stations, played critical roles before and after Kenya’s general elections. While in some cases they provided important information on the election, the Kenyan media, particularly local language radio, have been accused of being responsible for fuelling ethnic hatred and violence in the aftermath of the 2007 presidential elections.

Early results published by the Kenyan media gave Raila Odinga a narrow lead of votes against Kibaki in 69 of the country’s 210 constituencies, but the final contested presidential results put Kibaki in the lead by

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200,000 votes. Raila Odinga’s Orange Democratic Movement protested the results, accusing Mwai Kibaki’s PNU party of electoral manipulation. They said the process of releasing results had been tailored and the Electoral Commission had “doctored the results” and called for a recount of the votes.

Shortly after Kibaki was proclaimed winner on December 30th, 2007, the Kenyan internal security minister John Michuki announced the ban of live broadcast. The ban had been ordered “in the interest of public safety and tranquility. Just before the proclamation of Kibaki as president, opposition leader Raila Odinga announced his victory in a public briefing. Some media had already published the first results showing Odinga as winner. They later replaced these results with the new ones, and then, went into silence during the five-day ban. Although some foreign media continued to broadcast live, local media did not dare to resist the ban.23 The sudden National media blackout left the population in a limbo for days before the official declaration of the disputed results.

Given the news blackout, many Kenyans turned to other means of getting and relaying information. One such means was the use of short messages services (SMS) from mobile phones. People used mobile phones to communicate and circumvent the media blackout. SMS messages were used to share news and feelings, but the ability to send mass SMS had been disabled by the government to prevent people from sending what it deemed to be “provocative messages”.24 The Ministry of Internal Security warned about circulating SMS that may cause public unrest. Social media tools like wikis, blogs, Facebook, Flickr, YouTube, Twitter and mash-ups were increasingly used to organize and share in-


24 ibid
formation about the crisis, violence, and raise funds. There were alert maps and SMS services to inform about the critical spots of violence. The controversial manner in which the results were announced by the ECK chairman, Samuel Kivuitu further fuelled suspicion, anger and violence. Samuel Kivuiti said “I don’t know who won the election”, yet he declared Kibaki as winner of the presidential polls. The position of Chairman of the ECK in Kenya was appointed by the president, so the immediate interpretation was that Samuel Kivuiti was forced to declare Kibaki as winner for fear of losing his job. All these happening with wide international media coverage and analyses further contributed to the violence that followed the proclamation of Results.

Kenya enjoys relative press liberty and freedom of expression in Africa; however, local language radio stations in Kenya have been accused of being partisan and unethical. Talk shows provided the greatest opportunities for hate speech during and after the 2007 presidential polls and talk show hosts accused of lack of training in conflict reporting or moderation.

**Media and Peace building process in Kenya**

As clashes between the Taliban and the Mugiki armed groups continued after the 2007 presidential election in Kenya, many more people in the conflicting ethnicities were killed. The question of who was the legitimate president came up again and again in both public and media debates. The fact that the ODM party of Raila had more seats in Parliament (99 as opposed to 58 seats by the PNU) made Kenya ungovernable. However, most local language stations (and much of the rest of the media) appeared to have been playing an important role in calming

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26 *ibid*

27 *ibid*
tension and promoting dialogue. The press predicted that the situation could lead to genocide as was the case in Rwanda and pressurized political leaders to call on their people to stop the violence and accept negotiation. Some discussion forums aimed to promote peace and Kenyan unity were created online. There was the Kenya Elections site in Flickr.com and relevant video files in YouTube.com

Thanks to pressure from the media, the conflicting parties agreed to have a coalition government as proposed by the mediation team headed by former UN Secretary General-Koffi Annan. A prime ministerial position was created and Raila Odinga became the executive prime minister. The institution of a power sharing system of government copied from Tanzania quelled the violence.

Note must be taken of the key role played by mainstream, local, international and social media in instigating negotiation. It was difficult for the conflicting parties to agree on the kind of prime ministerial position to be instituted (whether appointed or executive). Due to this, the head of the mediation team, Koffi Annan announced a cancellation of the mediation process due to lack of collaboration from the parties. Press publications picked on this and strongly criticized the government of Kibaki for not being able to cooperate with the mediators. This pressurized Kibaki and his delegation to accept having an executive prime ministerial position and to give room for more negotiation; bringing an end to the violence. During the crisis the “social media” functioned as an alternative medium for “citizen communication” or “participatory journalism”. This experience has important implications for the process of democratization in Kenya

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29 Ibid
The Role of Media in the Cameroon Anglophone Crisis

The ongoing crisis in Cameroon has in many ways been fuelled by local, national, international and social media. It should be noted that what is today referred to as the ‘Anglophone Struggle’ is a latent socio-political crisis that developed into an armed conflict between government soldiers and the ‘Ambazonia fighters’, and the role of the media in bringing the crisis to where it is today cannot be ignored.

The Southern Cameroon Broadcasting Service (SCBS) in Nigeria was created particularly to broadcast information on the Anglophone struggle, though it was banned from operating in Cameroon by the Cameroon government.

The arrest of English speaking Journalists like Mancho Bibixy of Afrique Nouvelle Radio in Bamenda, Atia Tilarious of the Sun Newspaper in Buea, Amos Fofung, South West Correspondent of The Guardian Post Newspaper, Akumbom McCarthy of Abakwa FM Radio in Bamenda and most recently Mimi Mefo of Equinoxe Television in Douala, amongst many others, for crimes related to their publications on the Crisis, further demonstrates attempts by the Cameroon government to either check or suppress the role of the Media in the context of the on-going conflict. However, the massive media campaign calling for the release of arrested journalists, and their eventual release, highlight the power of the press, especially given that international media like the BBC and RFI were very much involved.

There is a huge disparity between private media reporting in Cameroon and reports done by state owned media like the Cameroon Radio Television - CRTV and Cameroon Tribune (CT) Newspaper, whose editorial policies forbid them from broadcasting or publishing anything against government interest.
The total militarization of the North West and South West Regions of Cameroon led to violent clashes between the state military and separatist fighters, otherwise known as ‘Ambazonia fighters’, resulting in untold loss of life, burning down of villages, mass arrests, rape, etc. forcing hundreds of thousands to flee their homes. All these have been unfolding amid a juxtaposition of new media and mainstream media in reporting all the events that were taking place. Government officials used state and private media, to condemn the leaders of the Anglophone struggle, calling them ‘rebels’ and ‘dogs’ on different occasions and promising severe sanctions on any one found guilty of calling for school boycotts and inciting violence. These Media utterances further angered Anglophone Cameroonians who now saw more reason to hate and resist the French regime.

Journalists in Cameroon are today caught between two extremes and are being pushed out of their true roles because of exerted pressure from these extremes. The principle of objectivity and fairness are no longer evident in reporting and readers seem to be dictating the tune to reporters, based on which side they stand. Anything reported that runs counter to a held position in the ongoing Anglophone Crisis is easily described as fake, lies, amongst others. According to Kum Leonard, a Cameroon based journalist, many on all sides want journalists in Cameroon to take up the activist role, forgetting that, journalists are supposed to remain objective, giving a fair hearing to both sides. “Each side wants information disseminated to consistently blame the other side for obvious reasons. Such is not our role... We are reporters and not activists!!!!!! We can’t be referees and players of the same match. Pushing us to always tell the story your way is eroding the core values on which our profession stands”\textsuperscript{30}.

\textsuperscript{30} Kum Leonard’s post on his facebook page on May 16, 2019.
On the 20th of May, 2019, a four month-old baby was shot dead in Muyuka, a sub-division in the restive South West Region of Cameroon. The killing of this baby coincided with National Day celebrations in Cameroon. A video showing the baby in a pool of blood and a grieving woman recounting that the baby had been killed by government soldiers, was immediately released and went viral on Social media. Two days after, a journalist working with a private press organ in Douala did a report from the scene of the incident, where neighbors and family members of the deceased child recounted that the state military had raided the area and killed the baby. The minister of Communication, Rene Emmanuel Sadi later released a communiqué saying that the baby had been killed by Separatist fighters as a means of warning the child’s father who according to the minister is a former Ambazonian fighter. The controversial and inconsistent narratives that followed the killing of the baby made it tricky and risky for journalist in Cameroon to report on the issue. One of the first journalists to do a report on the issue, Meme Domini Nwakimo was accused of being an ally to the separatist fighters and some government officials called for his immediate arrest and interrogation. This forced the journalist to go undercover for a while, and also scared other journalist from reporting the issue. The state broadcaster however focused their reports on the minister’s communiqué, suggesting that the baby had been killed by the ‘Ambazonian terrorist group’. The socio-political situation in the English speaking regions of Cameroon has exposed the press to public scrutiny and made journalism risky for practitioners. Journalists themselves now scrutinize and question the credibility and objectivity of one another, given the multi-dimensional and conflicting treatments given to news events, especially those linked to the ongoing crisis.

Print media outlets in Cameroon have continued to publish articles about the crisis with a few of them taking firm and critical positions against government’s approach towards bringing the crisis to an end. Papers like The Post and The Rambler published by Wache Francis and Charley Ndichia respectively have

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31 Broadcast of CRTV’s 5pm radio news cast on the 22nd of May, 2019
been described as pro-Ambazonian papers, while others like the English Daily, The Guardian Post Newspaper of Christian Ngah have been accused of allowing government officials to use the paper to promote selfish agendas. Commenting on an online post on the need for Cameroonian journalist to be objective in their reporting of the Anglophone crisis, AtehReal, noted ‘I really wander the kind of journalism some of these print media are now practicing; newspapers have become a means of propagating their personal and party political ideologies. I pity The Guardian Post which has become an instrument for CPDM big wig, Ngala Gerald’32. It is quite interesting to observe pro-government stance taken by less popular newspapers like ‘Orphelin’ which in its May 28th edition published front line stories accusing Mimi Meffo, (Cameroon journalist on self-exile) for collaborating with Anglophones in the diaspora to cause violence back home. It is even more interesting to notice the conflicting angles given to issues concerning the crisis by the different press organs in Cameroon, which can be hastily judged as a representation of the publisher’s or reporter’s stance as far as the crisis is concerned.

**New Media in the Southern Cameroon Crisis**

The profoundness of new media in political activism, whether in the realm of contentious politics or social movements need to be recognized in a changing world where citizens are shifting their participation in activism from physical to social media platforms. These dynamics are evident in the Southern Cameroon Anglophone Movements. As Asangwa (2016) rightly puts it, the advent of digital media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, WhatsApp has made it possible for citizens to create and circulate posts and videos instantly without restriction. In the case of Southern Cameroon, Facebook and WhatsApp have given a tremendous assistance to the people of Southern Cameroon to circulate videos and posts updating people on the

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32 This was made as a comment on this writer’s facebook wall on a post ‘Balancing the Report Theory’. on the 22nd of May 2019. link: [https://www.facebook.com/mkong.imma](https://www.facebook.com/mkong.imma)
evolution of the crisis in Southern Cameroons\textsuperscript{33}.

By late 2017, a group of Anglophone Cameroonians in the diaspora had over-taken the leadership of the struggle, demanding for an independent state of “Ambazonia”. They used and continue to use social media platforms like Facebook, twitter and WhatsApp to call for school boycotts and ghost towns in the Anglophone Regions as ways of pressurizing the government to heed their demands. This resulted to the total militarization and the shutting down of internet services in the entire Southern Cameroons by the Republic of Cameroun from the 17\textsuperscript{th} of January, 2017 to the 20\textsuperscript{th} of May, same year. It was re-instated following international pressure. Internet was interrupted again in Southern Cameroons from September 30th, following the strong online campaign to hoist the Southern Cameroons flag in Buea, the supposed capital of Southern Cameroons, on 1\textsuperscript{st} of October, to commemorate Independence Day\textsuperscript{34}.

Worthy of mention here is the fact that most of the leaders of the ongoing Anglophone struggle are trained journalists who own Newspapers and web pages on which they propagate their agenda. Two of the leaders, Eric Tataw and Tapang Ivo are graduates of the Department of Journalism and Mass Communication in the University of Buea. Eric Tataw is publisher of the \textit{National Telegraph Newspaper} through which information about the struggle is also published. These Journalists; now activists also use their web pages to further radicalize followers and galvanize support for their course via live videos and posts. During a live video on his Facebook wall on May 18, 2018, Tapang Ivo Tanku, now acting as the Ambazonian Defense Forces-ADF spokesperson called on Anglophone Cameroonians in the diaspora to contribute

\textsuperscript{33} https://www.academia.edu/34863504/The_role_of_Digitalization_and_social_media_in_the_Southern_Cameroons_Crisis_2016 viewed on Sunday, March 24, 2019 @4PM

\textsuperscript{34} ibid
funds to purchase better weapons for fighters on the ground, “Ground Zero-GZ”. He used the image of a young girl dressed in combat attire, whom he explained was a very dedicated fighter who needed better quality weapons to defend Anglophone women and children. Tapang Ivo in his live video further warned Cameroonianians in the North West and South West to boycott National Day activities and respect an initially announced lockdown. He said “all options were on the table” and anybody who defies the boycott would have him/herself to blame for anything that would happen35.

Some Journalists and Activists involved in the struggle like Eric Tataw, Nfor Hanson Nchianji and Kaah Aaron amongst others have had their Facebook accounts suspended several times, as a result of their posts about the crisis. While Nfor Hanson was able to create a new account and continue with his reporting, Eric Tataw resorted to using other people’s accounts to host live shows about the struggle. On the 17th of May, 2019, Eric Tataw, popularly referred to as the “Garri master” hosted a live show on a Facebook wall owned by Ashu Kingsley, to react to the Prime Minister, Chief Dion Ngute’s visit to the restive regions. Eric Tataw said that ‘the only way for peace to return in Cameroon is to let Southern Cameroon go’36. He decried the suspension of all his online accounts and announced that he was doing all to have back his accounts and promised to keep using other people’s accounts to continue communicating on the struggle. The suspension of the accounts of these journalists and activists by the administration of Facebook during the crisis indicates the powerful role of the social media and deliberate attempts by the powers that be to limit the ‘negative’ role the social media

35 https://m.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=1021821982694325&id=11171592&sfnsn=mo, followed on Sunday, May 26, 2019 at 4pm

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is playing during the crisis.
What was quite interesting at the early stage of the crisis was how government downplayed the power of new media. No wonder the president of the Republic, Paul Biya, said on national television “the Anglophones think they will get what they want through WhatsApp and Facebook”. The reason he said this was probably because state TV has been the main source of information for those who live in rural areas, and for the past decades government has been using state TV to send out distorted information about contentious issues. Unfortunately this time it backfired because of the availability of communication technologies and its associated tools for instant communication. 37
Currently, the president and prime minister of Cameroon have been actively involved in the social media- using daily tweets to announce the government’s readiness for dialogue and calling on fighters and the general public to end the violence and work towards peaceful cohesion and sustainable development. Mr. Biya’s recent involvement in the social media and especially twitter has met with diverse reactions from Cameroonian social media users. While some applaud the president for “moving with the times” by embracing contemporary and effective means of political communication like the social media, others have blasted the president’s tweets, describing the move as part of his strategies to stay in power. Whatever the case, the sudden resort to social media communication by Cameroon’s head of state at a time the country is faced with peace and security crisis is telling of the fact that the president has recognized the role that (social) media play in bringing the crisis to where it is today and the role it can play in ending the crisis.

37 http://wpmu.mah.se/nmict171group4/2017/01/24/hello-world/
Conclusion

The presented cases make it clear that the media is part and parcel of conflict and Peace studies. Media have the power to either make or mar peace. I would also strongly argue that the media has helped escalate contemporary civil conflicts. Thanks to the media, social groups are able to replicate strategies of violence and insurgency from past conflicts. For example, the Ambazonian fighters in the current Cameroon Anglophone crisis, attacking and chopping off fingers and limbs of students and workers who fail to respect the “ghost town” phenomenon imposed on inhabitants of the restive Anglophone regions of the country is a replica of what happened between the Hutus and the Tutsis during the Rwandan genocide.

The case of Kenya also reveals that the media has the potential of ruining peace efforts. Negotiation and reconciliation become extremely difficult when the media is involved because conflicting parties would not want to look ‘weak’ before their audiences. Pride and arrogance are more evident when the media is part of a mediation process.

However, we cannot also under mind the role of the Media in promoting democracy and justice. During the 1994 Peace Process in Northern Ghana, both Chiefly and Acephalous societies Printed posters and T-shirts with Peace messages and distributed during peace campaigns in district capitals during which representatives talked to the people about tolerance and peaceful coexistence. This greatly contributed to the signing of the Kumasi Peace and Reconciliation Accord of Northern Ghana in 1996\(^{38}\), which finally restored peace in the area. As Bratic and Schirch (2007) carefully explain, the media’s role in contributing to

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cognitive, attitudinal and behavioral change on a large scale is unique. Conflict prevention and peace-building professionals can use the media in harmony with their other programs; if they know when, why, and how to use the media for the most strategic impact in lessoning the polarization between groups.

On the other hand, media professionals still have much to learn about why and when their work can contribute to preventing violent conflict and building peace between groups. The media and peace professionals both have their limitations and share an interest in the dynamics of conflict. What needs to be done is for media to hold states (and power as a whole) to account and, more specifically, to hold them to account by the same standards”. In 2011, Raeesah Casim Cachalia of Consultancy Africa Intelligence CAI, took a careful study at the role of media in African conflicts with the case of Libya, and condemns the discriminatory manner with which media treats issues of conflicts.39.

Bratic and Schirch (2007) further suggest that cooperation between agencies, donors, civil society, peace-building organizations and media practitioners is essential and there is a need for meetings, seminars and work groups where models and best practices can be shared, since using media in peace-building is a new practice and everyone has a lot to learn from the exchange of experiences40. A careful assessment of whether the media is likely to play a positive or negative role in achieving the goals of conflict prevention and peace-building requires greater


insight into ways the media helps and harms the path toward constructive exchange. Both peace-building and media professionals still have a great deal to learn on this journey.\textsuperscript{41}

\textsuperscript{41} ibid
Annual Budget Corruption and the pursuit of effective Anti-Corruption Governance System in Somaliland

Hamdi I. Abdulahi

Abstract

Corruption tops common problems for state-building and economic development for most of the nations in the world¹. The contemporary anti-corruption measures led by the World Bank Group, the International Monetary Fund, Transparency International, and many other international and regional bodies, approach corruption from an upright interpretation, address it with a legal view, highlight its deleterious effect on state-building, and judge its negative consequences on development². This article focuses on the government expenditure side of annual budgets, but it does not cover corruption related to any particular problems arising from budget planning, projection and auditing. Using both primary and secondary data, the article ropes the Pritchett et al.³ led argument on the institution focused anti-corruption

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fights led by the international development interventions which remains under-valued and under-researched, and proposes a repositioning of current approach to local context. This argument establishes two views, the strategic actions and the tools we need for local fit anti-corruption reform, and dwindling the knowledge gaps among public on corruption effects^4.

Introduction:

In the last three decades, there has been increasing attention on corruption which led to extensive analysis in conjunction with the elaboration of anti-corruption strategies and approaches^5. There has been many theories and studies presented by academics and practitioners proposing definitions, categories and elucidations of corruption^6. Based on this, concepts, strategies and interventions have been tested in various countries to check its suitability and efficiency. Many ended in negative results; however, some showed promising signs of improvement^7. It’s the experiences from these contradicting results that led into further academic discussions on corruption which later advanced to interpretations that view corruption as a convoluted issue connected to political and economic factors, and that any effective anticorruption measure depends on sustained political will^8. Effectual political will shows effect when it combines individual leadership aspirations and operative governance systems which frame both the

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^4 Ibid
^7 Ibid
control and spurs for policies, activities and programs\textsuperscript{9}. The modern anti-corruption conception is state-centric and it identifies four approaches to fight corruption. These are society, legal, market, and political approaches\textsuperscript{10}. Society approaches focus on the grit of a common value against which corrupt behavior can be measured. Awareness and education to individual’s and society are strongly emphasized\textsuperscript{11}. The legal approaches focus on better regulated environment with efficient enforcement mechanisms. Market-related approach believes that there is a linkage between the market and the incidence of corruption. This approach weighs the less the government regulations are operative and greater dependence on markets for the distribution of resources the less corruption incidents\textsuperscript{12}.

Political approach highlights need for decentralization of the public sector for better governance\textsuperscript{13}. The realist theories argue that political corruption happens when power is concentrated in the hands of a politicians and bureaucrats, and that a decision making process ignores the role of the citizen participation\textsuperscript{14}. This approach stresses political deregulation and the increase of the chances for citizens to participate in governance\textsuperscript{15}. Systematic use of more than one approach for anti-corruption is often more effective than the use of a single approach\textsuperscript{16}.

\textsuperscript{9} Mark Philp (1997) Defining Political Corruption Political Studies Association 1997. Published by Blackwell Publishers, 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.
Somaliland state institutions are in the making, basic systems have been established but there are a lot of challenges facing the effectiveness and efficiency of the state institutions\textsuperscript{17}. The Corruption in Somaliland remains poorly understood in legal, institution, political and cultural contexts\textsuperscript{18}. The corruption related information is extremely limited in Somaliland. Apart from the Somaliland Parliament House of Representatives Public Account Committee close of accounts reports, there are no corruption cases available for reference. Somaliland fiscal year budget increased radically in the last eight years, however, as presented below there are a number of ill-practices affecting such increase to reflect from public services and overall government service delivery. Somaliland’s development and growth is held-back by corruption that infiltrates many sectors of the economy\textsuperscript{19}.

Corruption is a crime under the Somaliland Criminal law. In addition, there are Good Governance and anti-corruption laws which present very limited implementable options in the fight against corruption\textsuperscript{20}. According to these old-fashioned legal regimes, facilitation of illegal payments, misuse and mismanagement of public funds are crimes, however; the practical applications of these parameters are missing. The need for extensive reform on corruption related laws and meaningful enforcement of Somaliland’s anti-corruption framework that is locally fit is an issue. The Parliament Public Account Committee close of accounts reports and other numerous generic reports produced by overseas organizations and groups present corruption as manifesting through various practices, including gross public financial mismanagement, large-scale misappropriation of public funds, get-rich quick ambitions, unethical and professional negligence, and cover-up of actual local resource flows\textsuperscript{21}.

\textsuperscript{17} Somaliland National Development Plan 2017-2021 p2
\textsuperscript{18} Interview with a member of Somaliland parliament, Public accounts committee 3 Dec. 2018.
\textsuperscript{19} United Nations (2013) Somalia monitoring reports p12
\textsuperscript{20} Interview with a member of Somaliland parliament, Public accounts committee 3 Dec. 2018..
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid.
Conceptual and Theoretical Issues

Two academic arguments were advanced in the 1920s to explain the corruption in the post WWI sovereign states. The first took a cultural approach which emphasized a social norm that devotes family or clan loyalty, rather than the rule of law\textsuperscript{22}. The second argument circled the views of moralists, such as Banfield, Simkins and others which contended that corruption is economically harmful and politically amoral. Others like Wertheim observed differences in norms and their consequences\textsuperscript{23}. The academic arguments between culturalists and revisionists continued until late 1980s when neo-Marxist analyses began to lose favor\textsuperscript{24}, as the gap between their predictions and observed patterns became increasingly conspicuous\textsuperscript{25}

Literature acknowledged several elements of state fragility; such as despotism, poverty, ethnic conflicts, religious conflicts, unequal access to public services and weak state institutions. Many of these elements concern the relations between the state and society, and thus are associated with the quality of governance\textsuperscript{26}. Without better governance, the possibility for continuing or repeating state fragility remains high. African corruption literature shows that efforts to refurbish or create new structures for good governance have embraced a uniform and ambitious model that emphasize institutional development, rule of law, democratization, inclusive justice, public participation and civic engagement\textsuperscript{27}.

\textsuperscript{23} Ibid
\textsuperscript{27} Brinkerhoff DW. (2009). ‘Governance and Intrastate Conflict: Contributions,
The institutional and behavioral theories dominate the contemporary literature on corruption\textsuperscript{28}. Corruption is defined as “misuse of entrusted power for private gain” by Transparency International (TI), in recent publications\textsuperscript{29}. TI focuses more on institutional set up by characterizing the view of the corruption definitions as “according to rule” corruption and “against the rule” corruption\textsuperscript{30}. These semi-operational definitions of “according to rule” corruption are corrupt practices allowed by the law of a country while, “against the rule” corruption are corrupt practices not allowed by the law of a country. As presented in the legal framework section, Somaliland continues to depend on the “against the rule” explanation of corruption. This presents a challenge to a post conflict country where state institutions and system are characterized as fragile\textsuperscript{31}.

This legal and institution focused-definition has been subject to multiple criticisms mainly because it gives great attention to the institutional aspect of corruption\textsuperscript{32}. In many African countries, weak institutions invite frail policy and regulation enforcements and end up operating in shadow functions that serve the best interest of political ruling individuals and groups\textsuperscript{33}. The analysis of the institution focused-


\textsuperscript{30} Ibid

\textsuperscript{31} Mohamed Hersi (2018) State fragility in Somaliland and Somalia: A contrast in peace and state building. The LSE-Oxford Commission on State Fragility, Growth and Development. The commission was launched in March 2017 to guide policy to combat state fragility.


\textsuperscript{33} Ibid
concept will continue to be vital to this article because the form of corruption in Somaliland is pigeon-holed as economic, political and bureaucratic purviews.

There is an economic theory proposed by William Forster Lloyd, which argues that, if corruption is not effectively punished beyond the moral ground, one group or part of the community will find themselves politically and economically disadvantaged through illegal or immoral means in relation to their peers. This theory is one of the core arguments for building better and inclusive economies for developing states where resources need better management to avoid conflicts and tension among the communities34. The economic theory also highlights the uncertainty around the political stability in most post conflict and developing countries, this uncertainty results in individuals fearing and feeling doubtful about long lasting and quality life35.

This economic theory later on took another shape with the view of Gordon Tulloch and James M Buchanan who both linked the economic theory of corruption to political aspects sighting the relationship between the economic interest and political power of setting legal and policy frameworks serving those individual interests36.

Political corruption involves people with government authority. There are similarities between the political and bureaucratic corruptions; however, they are different in nature and effect37. Bureaucratic corruption implicates public servants stirring themselves through illegal means, while the political corruption is used by political figures and people in state power organs to build and continue unilateral domination

on power. The third theory is the Bureaucratic theory; this is well explained by John Mbaku, this form of corruption usually happens within state organs involving people with state power. It’s often used by lobbying lawmakers and politicians in an attempt to increase their level of compensation by engaging activists to influence the political system and maximize benefits accruing to them.

Many public servants also unlawfully use the Bureaucratic type of corruption to increase their compensation by offering assistance to interest groups that seek favors from the government. Prominent Political figures and businessmen also use this type of depravity pursuing ways to topple the legal frameworks, restructure resource mobilization and distribution to achieve their objectives by inducing public servants. In governments and states where public service employment benefits are below the reasonable leaving cost, public servants make a substantial part of their benefits from activities outside their legal mandated role, resulting in a major increase in bureaucratic corruption. With that said, it is well documented in the literature that socio-political legal frameworks play a vital role in the ability of public servants either legally or illegally to mobilize and secure benefits outside their mandated role.

41 Ibid.
This is very common in countries with weak institutions, inefficient, non-self-enforcing legal frameworks, and personal interest-focused individuals are relatively extensive\(^{45}\). In such countries, the “legal framework fails\(^{46}\) to adequately synchronize socio-politically and that obstructs government performance.

There is another theory which plays a crosscutting role. It focuses on the cultural norms and moral codes. This theory urges cultural and traditional norms to play a critical role in societies acting more like forgivers\(^{47}\), these kinds of norms motivate the corrupt individuals to be corrupt\(^{48}\). This is explained better by the famous Heidenheimer led color-structured classification for corruption. Arnold J. Heidenheimer (1999) shaped a color-structured classification for corruption. The classification is based on assessment of a community’s lenience towards dubious practices of individuals and institutions. Heidenheimer’s community lenience classification is presented as black, gray, or white. He explains black corruption as when “the majority of the elite and public in general would condemn” and want to see it “penalized for individuals and institutions involved.” Gray corruption “indicates that some elites may want to see the act punished, but the public may well be uninterested.” White corruption is a state where corruption is accepted and regarded as tolerable; the majority of both elite and public in general would not strongly support an attempt to punish it\(^{49}\).

Somaliland’s current anti-corruption set up is shadowed by multiple issues, including policy issues, institutional issues, limited budget and shortage of experts. Anti-corruption needs fast technical expertise covering a wide range of areas including prevention, investigation of skills and legal application, none of which are currently available

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\(^{46}\) Ibid.


\(^{48}\) Ibid

in Good governance and anti-corruption structures\textsuperscript{50}. With a limited support from International development partners like the United Nations, Somaliland established basic framework for anti-corruption, a framework which has basic legal and institutional provisions, but failed to implement any of its aspirations.

There are many reasons why institutionally focused approaches failed in Somaliland. Initiatives and plans done so far do not take into account the systemic yet specific nature of corruption in Somaliland which infiltrated the hybrid state structures\textsuperscript{51}.

The traditional Donors in Somaliland replicated the same experiences from other countries they worked in the past, an experience which proved to be irrelevant to Somaliland context. These donor-driven experiences seem to fail in Somaliland and in other post-conflict situations as the framework is missing the critical elements in local context consideration\textsuperscript{52}. There is need for detailed Somaliland focus political economy analysis on why there is a lack of political will and why public embraces the corrupt individuals and groups as clan and community protagonists.

\textbf{Methodology}

Since Somaliland claimed its independence from the rest of Somalia, attempts at legal framework and institutional reform have failed to produce more efficient systems and the last several years have witnessed continuous increase in levels of corruption in Somaliland\textsuperscript{53}. Corruption remains poorly understood in the political and social context.

\textsuperscript{50} Interview with a prominent member of Somaliland Good Governance and anti-corruption commission 24 Dec. 2018
\textsuperscript{51} Interview with a member of Somaliland parliament, Public accounts committee 3 Dec. 2018
\textsuperscript{53} Interview with a member of Somaliland parliament, Public accounts committee 3 Dec. 2018
of Somaliland. This article investigates legal, policy and institutional issues affecting the better administration of the government budget and expenditure.

A qualitative approach was deemed by the author to be an appropriate method for generating detailed and explanatory information related to the issues about the central argument of the article.

Both primary and secondary data sources were employed in the methodology of this article. Primary data was collected through seven interviews done by the author. The author conducted in-depth interviews with the members of Somaliland parliament, House of Representatives, Public accounts committee and Somaliland Good Governance and anti-corruption commission in a number of different interview sessions held in-between 3rd and 24th December 2018. The aim of the interviews was to collect valuable first-hand reflections from appropriate senior government officials. Undoubtedly, such interviews were subjective and provided details. Secondary data sources were also employed in the methodology of this article. The secondary data covered mainly desk-based document review and analysis. It was sourced from existing data related to corruption and budget expenditure obtained from books and journals and web links.

The Existing Governance System for anti-corruption in Somaliland

A. The Legal framework

The current Somaliland legal framework and existing institutional arrangements for anti-corruption are predominately sedentary. The anti-corruption measures in Somaliland rely on public accounts and Anti-corruption law no. 38/2007, Good Governance Commission law no. 58/2012 and 50 years old criminal law (The Penal Code 1962).

- Public Accounts and Anti-corruption law no. 38/2007. Although this legislation is very succinct with 12 articles only, it contains some basic punitive measures for any public official found guilty of misuse and mismanagement of public property for private gain, including fine and imprisonment. This act also provides a verdict if a public officer is found guilty of corruption by a
competent court; he or she is debarred to hold public office for life. Any other officer, who falsifies documents, takes bribe, and/or misuses power can be subject to termination of employment, fine and imprisonment. The legislation also thwarts the right of the accused person to enjoy bail or presidential amnesty until proven innocent. The legislation is silent on whom and who should implement, and this adds a big worry on what mechanics are needed to realize its policy objectives.

- **Good Governance Commission act, law no. 58/2012.** The five member commission is mandated only to assess and produce reports on government governance situation. The law focuses more on the administration side of the commission including the membership, rights, responsibilities, but not its mandate as such. The law relies on the Public Accounts and Anti-corruption law no. 38/2007 and the Criminal law for guidance for any action on corruption and governance.

- **Criminal Law (Penal law 1962):** focuses only on crimes against the public administration and crimes against the economy and commerce. Furthermore, other than election laws, there are no other laws that require government officials, Parliament or private companies to file assets and financial disclosures.

Apart from these old legal regimes, Somaliland adapted multiple public finance management laws between 2016 and 2018, these laws cover the standard finance management requirements traditionally encouraged and supported by World Bank and International Monetary Fund. The PFM legislation requires the cabinet to approve the Government’s broad strategic objectives and priorities for budgetary policies for the next fiscal year and for the next two successive years after the relevant fiscal year as outlined in the Budget Framework Paper.

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55 Somaliland Attorney General confirmed on March 2018 that he received corruption investigation report from Auditor General against two key ministries on 2018 annual budget. Ministry of Information Director General and Administration Director were arrested in a corruption allegation. After few days, both where released in different grounds without official court order. Another signal of continuous weak application of the relevant legal orders.
Somaliland has adopted the Medium term expenditure framework (MTEF) which requires certain elements for inclusive, participatory annual budget process. The introduction of a three-year macroeconomic framework (MTEF) departs from the current annual budget process. In broad terms, the starting point is the Medium Term Fiscal Framework (MTFF) that typically contains fiscal policy objectives and a set of integrated medium-term macroeconomic and fiscal targets and projections such as deficit targets. The MTFF allows the Government to put in place an affordable, realistic and sustainable medium-term fiscal framework to ensure (i) transparency in setting fiscal objectives; (ii) stability in fiscal policy-making processes; and (iii) efficiency in design and implementation of fiscal policy.

It is a top-down initial step that guides the resources enveloped in a multi-year budget process. The PFM laws of 2016 also require the Somaliland Government to develop and implement a Macro-Economic and Fiscal Policy Framework for Somaliland which comprises (a) total of resources to be allocated to the public sector and the appropriate level of resources to be allocated to individual programs within that sector; (b) supervise and monitor the public finances; and (c) co-ordinate the international and inter-governmental financial and fiscal relations of Somaliland. These are all standards and conditions presented in the PFM laws and government has not been proactive to most of the actions required under this new law. Example, the departure from the single budget to MTEF did not happen; the government continued using the single year budget system for 2018 and 2019 annual budgets.

B. The Institutional Framework

The current institutional framework is very chaotic; the legislation requires a separate good governance commission which has elements of anti-corruption. There have been some attempts from the former president - Mr. Silanyo’s government, to combine the good governance and anti-corruption. The Government proposed in 2012, a draft good governance and anti-corruption commission (GGACC), as election promise. The proposal aimed to establish GGACC as a way to improve

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56 Interview with a member of Somaliland parliament, Public accounts committee 3 Dec. 2018.
the governance sector and the fight against corruption. Without any legal ground, the president decided to nominate a five member commission in 2012. The name of the commission was restated by the president as the Good Governance and Anti-Corruption Commission (GGACC). Although the move lacked the basic legal support, many considered the move as short-term apt for the fight against corruption.

In February 2014, the commission released a three-year strategy. The strategy did not go into operation at all due to limited budget allocation for the commission, an overall limited subject matter and professional expertise available for the commission. There are a number of systematic challenges affecting the proper functioning of the Somaliland GGACC; these include the distorted legal space, insufficient financial resources, limited institutional capacities as well as the lack of parliament oversight on the work of the commission.

GGACC operated with limited financial resources. The annual budget allocation for the commission in 2014 was (190,000 US dollar), 2015 (200,762 US dollar), 2016 (341,000 US dollars). For these three years, 52% of the budget for GGACC was heading for indirect cost like Salaries, employee training and University costs; another 35% was office operation costs and outlays. From the above there was no detailed budget in the government’s fiscal year budget for the commission to exercise its investigative and monitoring mandates. However, in 2017, a total of $ 322,108 USD was allocated for the GGACC and $ 268,562 USD in 2018. The figures in budget for the last two years show that GGACC budget for 2018 is $ 53,000 USD less than the budget planned in 2017.

The 2018 and 2019 budgets contain encouraging budget plan covering monitoring, public awareness activities, traveling, investigation, and communication. Nevertheless, the amount allocated is far from being

57 Interview with a prominent member of Somaliland Good Governance and anti-corruption commission 24 Dec. 2018.
58 Ibid
59 Interview with a prominent member of Somaliland Good Governance and anti-corruption commission 24 Dec. 2018.
60 Ibid
61 Ibid
appropriate. Through the presidential decree of 16 October 2018 Somaliland President nominated a new commission, this time, the 2017 elected president - Mr. Bihi, relied on the Good Governance Commission stipulated law no. 58/2012 without details on how the work of anti-corruption will be addressed by his government. This added another degree of confusion in the fight against corruption in Somaliland.

Somaliland Parliament is another institution that has a legal mandate in tackling corruption and oversight of the implementation of anticorruption state policies and laws. Somaliland Parliament, particularly the House of Representatives is the central institution, in its capacity as the prime expression of the people’s will and therefore has a principal responsibility for fighting corruption in all its forms, especially in public life but increasingly also in the Somaliland economy at large. Through the Parliament Public Account Committee close of accounts reports, Somaliland parliament Public Accounts Committee has effected some notable actions against corruption. However, Somaliland parliament budget and economic committee, which complements the work of Public Accounts Committee failed to examine, study and debate the government’s Fiscal Year Budget proposals thoughtfully. This is a heavy responsibility which ultimately determines whether the country has a good annual budget or not. House of Representatives’ Budget and economy committee performance in this area has not been satisfactory. There have been only few debates which have been too partisan.

In the PFM Accountability (PFMA) law of 2016, the House of Representatives has been given extra mandate on FY budget and expenditure reporting approval process, including the fact that the

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62 Interview with a member of Somaliland parliament, Public accounts committee 3 Dec. 2018.
63 Somaliland Constitution (2001), The Legislation Branch; Articles 54 and 55
64 Interview with a member of Somaliland parliament, Public accounts committee 3 Dec. 2018.
65 Interview with a member of Somaliland parliament, Public accounts committee 3 Dec. 2018
66 Ibid
67 Ibid
Minister of finance is directed to ensure that the House of Representatives is kept informed of the; (a) current and projected state of the economy; (b) finances of the Government; and (c) fiscal policy of the Government (PFMA Article 1). Furthermore, the House of Representatives, through public accounts committee, is mandated to ensure that while the monies released to the government institution are being spent, public accounts committee has to intervene by monitoring and appraising the financial activities of the government institution and also ensure that projects and programs undertaken by government institutions are done with due regard to the economy, efficiency and effectiveness plans and papers that have been submitted to the house of representatives as indicated in article 4 of the Public Finance Management accountability act 2016. No palpable actions have been carried out by the House of Representatives, except few committee reports produced by public accounts committee, but their recommendations have not been reflected on the budget nor budget venalities and irregularities identified by the public accounts committee has been considered or corrected.\(^68\)

From the above, the role of Somaliland parliament in fighting corruption is central. House of Representatives through its relevant committees must fight corruption through the legislations it passes, through its monitoring of the behavior of parliamentarians themselves as well as of government officials, representatives of the judiciary and the private companies.\(^69\) Another method is to make increased use of the subject matter hearings, to which the media must have access. \(^70\) The current anti-corruption regime in Somaliland provides a complex legal and institutional arrangement that serve every bantam in prosecuting and enforcing anti-corruption mandates. The poor achievements so far seem to be as a result of several factors. The key anti-corruption legal interventions are based on institutions established and supported by United Nations donors, which only enjoy short-term project based support and ends up being unfit to the local context as soon as the project ends. \(^71\) This is particularly very true in GGACC, the support

\(^{68}\) Ibid
\(^{69}\) World Bank (2017) Strengthening Domestic Review Mobilization report
\(^{70}\) Ibid
\(^{71}\) Arne Disch, Endre Vigeland, Geir Sundet and Sam Gibson (2009) Anti-
they received from the UN was too short to make positive impact and expectations were unrealistic as shown in GGACC 2014 strategic plan.

**Government Expenditure Related Corruptions in Somaliland:**

In the past three years, there have been major corruption scandals regularly hitting the Somaliland news headlines on public funds misappropriation, mishandling of public tenders on government properties and foreign investments. Numerous news editions and reports show that more than one form of corruption is currently active in Somaliland, and key actors involved involve almost all levels of responsibilities and authorities from public to private institutions. Before analyzing the forms of corruption and levels in Somaliland, it is worthy to mention that there are no available data such as those at the Transparency International’s Global Corruption Barometer, Freedom House, World Bank governance scores or freedom of corruption in the Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom which all presents reliable data on Country’s corruption levels, these are not familiar in Somaliland because the limited capacities in anticorruption measures as well as the absence of formal IMF and World Bank engagements with Somaliland government as an independent state.

The Parliament Public Account Committee 2016 and 2017 close of accounts reports, International Crisis Group 2011, Freedom House 2015 and several UN monitoring reports categorically listed in multiple editions the Berbera Port, Customs Authorities, Revenue Departments, Telecommunications companies and private sector as key potential areas receptacles of corruption. It’s not a secret that the above mentioned reports show the involvement of key government officials, privately owned companies and co-operations in corruption allegations including large scale misappropriation of public funds, tax evasion, professional

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73 Freedom House (2015), Somaliland Report

and responsibility negligence, falsified revenue and customs collections, and unlawful involvement of government officials in national tenders and investments 75.

Not only in Somaliland but in most developing countries, public procurement is one of the government actions most susceptible to corruption 76. In addition to the tones of transactions and the business interests at stake, corruption risks are worsening by the intricacies of the process, the close dealings between public officials and businesses, and the multitude of different stakeholders 77. As presented in the annual budget plans, Somaliland public institutions plan to procure goods, services and works to carry out their responsibilities and duties. The total volume of public procurement, which is the government activity of purchasing goods, services and works, accounts for about 25% of the annual budget each year 78. The old procurement legal framework demanded that any bid which carries a value of more than $3,000 USD should be open with clear procedure for public tendering.

In 2016 alone, more than 51 procurement plans were presented in the annual budget and another 59 in 2017; all 110 were qualified for public tendering. The former procurement board, which the president discharged in early 2018, and the former minister of Finance produced not more than 15 public tender notices. In these figures alone, less than 16% of the national tenders are advertised for bidders and yet awards of those bids end up being complained about by the bidders in claims of red flags including undue influence, conflict of interest, and several kinds of scheme 79.

A bulk of construction and rebuilding related contracts were planned in the last three annual budgets. A sum of 88 constructions and/or

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75 Interview with a member of Somaliland parliament, Public accounts committee 3 Dec. 2018.
78 Interview with a member of Somaliland parliament, Public accounts committee 3 Dec. 2018.
79 Ibid
rebuilding projects were intended and awarded to companies in the last three years. These projects carried a combined budget plan of $156 USD. The government close of accounts reports from 2015-2017 show implementations of 15% construction and/or rebuilding related projects, the rest is unaccounted for\(^{80}\). The Somaliland Parliament Public Account Committee 2016 and 2017 close of accounts reports indicate structured and systemic corruption in administration of public and government owned property. The reports also mentioned in several areas, government ministers and other designated officials involved in misappropriation and prejudice of bids, selling and allocation of numerous government owned properties.

The smidgeons, acumens and evidences annexed in the Parliament Public Account Committee 2016 and 2017 reports include vouchers, correspondences and award letters all clearly presenting undue influence and conflict of interest. After the Somaliland Parliament Public Account Committee 2016 close of accounts report, the Speaker of Somaliland House of Representatives apologized to some of the companies accused of corruption by the Public accounts committee report 2016 and later on removed Public accounts committee chairperson from his chairmanship\(^{81}\), a bold decision to discourage the persistence of the bureaucratic and political corruption in Somaliland\(^{82}\).

Although it is difficult to measure the exact cost of corruption on construction related projects due to its hidden nature, the 2016 and 2017 annual close of accounts reports and annual budget plans show estimates between 15-30% of the annual budgets used in development projects in which many of them was lost through mismanagement and corruption\(^{83}\). In terms of indirect effects, corruption in public procurement leads to distortion of competition, limited market access and reduced business appetite for foreign investors\(^{84}\).

Without a coherent public procurement law, there are risks for weak enforceability, legal uncertainty for the bidders, insufficient protection

\(^{80}\) Ibid
\(^{81}\) Ibid
\(^{82}\) Ibid
\(^{83}\) Ibid
\(^{84}\) World Bank (2017) *Strengthening Domestic Review Mobilization report*
for procurement staff, and opportunities for unjustified exemptions and discretion. Although it is too early to test the effectiveness and enforcement of the May 2018 approved procurement law, one worrying sign is the fact that the new appointed procurements board members by the president do not reflect the conditions and requirements set forth in the law. In particular Section 17 Objectives of the Authority and Section 19 Membership and appointment of the Board. Their appointment came before the procurement law was approved by the parliament.

**Tax Administration and Corruption;**

Structured corruption also effects the tax administration in explicit ways. The multiple tax collectors and legal regimes operating in Somaliland led the establishment of multiple structured tax corruption schemes. There are number of regulations and ministerial degrees sanctioning specific branch of ministry or institution to collect tax and fees. This hampers the centralization of the revenue collection, example the business registration service fees, collected and used by the Ministry of Commerce and Investment and the Airports Security Tariffs. These collections, neither does not reflect in the annual budget plan, nor appraised.

In response to this, the president recently nullified agreements and arrangements established between private contractors, organizations and senior members of the government from 2012 to 2018, these include companies such as Berbera oil terminal group, the airport parking lots and Igal International Airport Security Management. This is commendable action but there is need beyond lone move-oriented measures. The physical absence of independent revenue authority (RA) model is hurting Somaliland more than ever. The 2016 approved revenue law limits direct political interference in day-to-day operations.

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85 Interview with a member of Somaliland parliament, Public accounts committee 3 Dec. 2018.
86 Interview with a member of Somaliland parliament, Public accounts committee 3 Dec. 2018.
88 Ibid
89 Interview with a prominent member of Somaliland Good Governance and anti-corruption commission 24 Dec. 2018.
by the Ministry of Finance and requires centralization of tax collection for better tax administration.

The revenue law proposed revenue authority, which is a governance system for revenue administration, providing for more autonomy than that afforded to a traditional department in a Ministry of Finance. Most of the countries in the East African region have now adopted the revenue authority model to help streamline and modernize revenue collection and administration, with each RA embodying a series of policy choices that determines its autonomy, accountability and other characteristics. The experiences from East African countries show Somaliland will benefit from establishing independent revenue authority, it will provide solutions to critical problems such as poor revenue performance, low rates of compliance, ineffective staff, and corruption. Since the Revenue Authority law was approved by the parliament, the government did not functionalize the requirements and parameters indicated in the law, no explanation has been provided by the Ministry of Finance as to why the legislation is not operational and when it will be.

91 Ibid
92 Interview with a member of Somaliland parliament, Public accounts committee 3 Dec. 2018.
Conclusion:

In this article, the author argues that the negative effects of corruption are very high, particularly in weak, fragile and post conflict governments like that of Somaliland. If corruption allegations continue to be rampant as we have seen in the past two years, it will demoralize citizens, stunt economic growth, reward indolence, undermine morale, compromise the nation’s external security, threaten internal order and stability, and generally slow down the pace of economic growth and sustainable development. The current ‘anti-corruption’ legal systems are inadequate to deal with the local realities in Somaliland. It’s very ostensible in Somaliland, these legal and institutional regimes failed to keep up with the evolving hybrid political institutions and situations in Somaliland which contributed to the weak legal enforcement.

Legal and institutional development alone continues to fail in fighting corruption. There is need for behavioral change campaigns led by the state and the media to raise public awareness. There are key elements to an effective anti-corruption approach which can be very effective if implemented accordingly, these are higher level political accountability, public participation, public awareness, creating a competitive private sector, implementing effective institutional restraints on power, and legal regimes that support accountability and rule of law. A successful fight against corruption presupposes political commitment at the highest levels.

There is increasing evidence that there are knowledge gaps among the key senior government officials on obstacles to better the anti-corruption governance system and how that will serve the bigger interest of the public. There is need for a thorough evidence-based political economic analysis focusing on Somaliland’s corruption, which centers on processes, actors, actions, positions, and end results. This

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93 Interview with a member of Somaliland parliament, Public accounts committee 3 Dec. 2018
94 Interview with a prominent member of Somaliland Good Governance and anti-corruption commission 24 Dec. 2018.
96 Interview with a prominent member of Somaliland Good Governance and anti-corruption commission 24 Dec. 2018
author argues that strong emphasis is needed to place the transformative knowledge, attitudes and behavior, study the multitude of corrupt choices that constitute the problem. There will also be some legal loopholes regardless how perfect the anti-corruption law is; it is well documented in reports, researches and academia that an active media and continued public engagements can produce effective public disapproval of blatant corruption practices. Somaliland needs more whistleblowers to come forward to expose corrupt practices. Through the available legal limits the media and public need to encourage them.

Regional Integration and the Gender Dynamics of Informal Cross Border Trade Between Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea

Violet Yigha Fokum

Abstract

In a bid to consolidate their economies and reverse the global marginalization trend instituted during colonialism, African states adopted regional economic integration. However, the approaches, practices and visions of these regional integration schemes are not contextualized into the African reality. Macroeconomic policies are such that Informal Cross Border Trade (ICBT) has become the veritable economic activity to improve on livelihoods, power and agency within the household and traders’ participation; with gender concerns still largely absent in its analysis. This paper questions the role of formal regional integration on the continent given the fact that ICBT has proven to be prominent and important than formal intra-African trade. The study uses the Feminist Trade theory to assess the gender dynamics involved and benefits thereof in reinforcing regional links and influencing decision making within the household. Using qualitative methods, the study reveals that, through ICBT, traders achieved

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1 Violet Fokum is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science and Comparative Politics, Research Assistant at the LSLA in SSA project, University of Buea, Intern Global Research and Advocacy Group, Senegal, Mandela Washington Fellow, 2014 Public Management Track, University of Arkansas
economic empowerment and provide for their family livelihoods. ICBT has empowered women traders especially in household decision making processes as majority of them take decisions either independently or jointly with their husbands; though most independent decisions are related to their gender roles. Gender sensitive trainings and capacity building workshops are imperative to enable traders especially women, develop a gender responsive mindset that would increase their level of influence in strategic household decisions especially on greater control over their lives and activities.

Keywords: Informal Cross border trade, Regional integration, Power relations

Introduction

African states are challenged by consolidation of their economies and reversing the trend of exploitation and marginalization instituted during colonialism. At independence, most African States adopted a nationalist oriented policy of protecting their economies from foreign dominance. This notwithstanding, between 1970s to early 2000s, Sub-Saharan Africa registered absolute decline on virtually all indices of socio-economic development. This was blamed on the fact that Africa attained political independence as a fragmented continent, with many small states and so no large enough internal markets to consolidate their nationalist policies. Also, the colonialist did not leave physical or institutional infrastructures to engender industrialization and development. Moreover, Africa was incorporated into the International Capitalist System from a disadvantaged position, as a major supplier of raw materials to the industries of the North and as a market for their finished goods within the logic of an already established global economic division of labor.

As a result, a potential strategy for restructuring the fragmented African region into a more coherent and viable economic space was collective action in the form of regional economic integration. Africa needed to transform its weak production structures and fragmented markets by embracing economic integration especially given the

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traditional economic integration theory that African states are not economically large enough to construct an economy. Otherwise, it will be continuously marginalized especially within the context of a highly competitive global economy. ‘Only African unity can heal this festering sore of boundary disputes between the various states’³. This is possible only if assets such as its diversity and resources are adequately harnessed⁴.

These ideologies were consolidated in the Lagos Plan of Action in 1980 which was based on the fact that; “Africa needed to actively strive to reduce its dependence on capitalist nations and to replace this dependence with a self-sustaining development strategy based on the maximum internal use of the continent’s resources”⁵. This has been described as “collective self-reliance”, “inward-looking regionalism”, and “delinking from the dominant relationships that prevailed in the international economic system”⁶. This was reiterated in 1991 by the Abuja Treaty of Declaration underscoring the need for regional integration by 2020 for Africa while recognizing the regional initiatives already undertaken. A number of other sub-regional blocs were again created under the umbrella of the African Economic Community (AEC). The aim of the AEC resonates with literature⁷ on African economies seeking integration in order to increase self-sufficiency, self-reliance and endogenous development. It creates a framework for sustainable development, mobilization of human resources, materials,

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⁶ N, Ikome, 2004:2
⁷ N, Ikome, 2004
and maintaining economic stability.8.

One of the sub regional blocs created was the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) in 1983. Central Africa’s pivotal and strategic position makes it a potentially preferred transit zone between regions of the continent. It is the only region bordering all other regions of the continent. It abounds with huge highly valued oil, mineral and mining resources. Proven oil reserves in the region are estimated at 31.3 billion barrels, representing 28% of the continent’s total reserves.9. However, intra-African trade within the ECCAS sub regional bloc stands at 1.8% for Exports and 3.6% for imports; showing therefore low intra-African trade when compared to the volume of trade (98.6% for exports and 96.4% for imports) that these countries realize at the international level.10.

Figures on intra-African trade remain lower than projected, due to slow implementation and enforcement of regional integration agreements designed to eliminate tariff and non-tariff barriers among member states. Yet most of African countries owe their survival to the semi-official, often termed illegal flows of trade, capital and services carried out by men and women across borders. The failure of most regional integration agreements has been due to the neglect of this second economy.11. The approaches, practices and visions of these regional integration schemes are not contextualized into the African reality as stated in their objectives; where the formal economy has not succeeded, the ‘second economy’ has significantly supplemented its role. Yet ICBT remains significantly un-acknowledged and disintegrated within Africa’s regional trade agreements and activities.

Traders are part of the ICBT as a safety net owing to the limitations for their incorporation into the formal economy, governments’ shortcomings

8 Madyo, RM, The importance of Regional Economic Integration in Africa, (Published Master thesis, University of South Africa, 2008)
11 M, Boas, 2011
in its governance systems and socio-economic consequences of the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP). Macro-economic policies are such that ICBT has become the most viable economic activity that one can engage in, to secure employment, supplement income, or improve household food security. However, traders’ participation and gender concerns are still largely absent in its analysis. This paper questions the role of formal regional integration on the continent given that the informal sector employs about 60% of urban work force with informal cross border trade being more prominent and important than formal intra-African trade and termed the second economy. Against this background, the article assesses the gender dynamics involved in ICBT, participation and benefits of ICBT in reinforcing economic development/regional links and its influence in decision making within the household.

**Contextual Framework**

Efforts at instituting regional integration and creating a Pan-African Free Trade Area through liberalizing and formalizing trade within Africa has witnessed little success. A regular scenario today of regional/bilateral trade or cross border trade is the picture of men and especially women with goods for sale across borders. These women and men are engaged in what has become known as ICBT. This kind of cross-border trade is usually called informal as: it involves small scale traders who do not access preferential tariff agreements; traders who may buy, or more often sell, in informal sector markets; and traders who do not always pass through the formal import and export channels for all or part of their goods.

Generally, this form of trade averages half of intra-African trade and the practice predates the independence of all African countries. Informal

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Cross border traders are reinforcing what have come to be regarded as the ‘invisible’ integration of Africa’s economies. Their involvement in a range of goods and services has resulted in new transnational networks, supported by commonalities in language, culture and kinship system. Most of the traders and communities around the borders share a lot in common both culturally and socially. These particularly strong social networks strengthen and reinforce trading ties and regional integration. Though it is not easy to get an exact estimate of the extent of informal cross-border trade in Sub-Saharan Africa, evidence shows that, on average, 60% of African trade is informal. Reviewed literature confirms that such trade represents a significant proportion of regional cross border trade.

ICBT is viewed as furthering integration of Africa’s people at a time when formal integration efforts are still fraught with many constraints. Despite its proliferation, prominence and importance to the organization of regional markets, regional integration, economic development, poverty alleviation, ICBT remains a significantly under-acknowledged and under-researched area in Africa’s regional trade activities. Macro-economic policies is such that ICBT became the most viable economic activity that one could engage in, in order to secure employment, supplement income, or improve household food security. However, women’s participation and gender concerns are still largely absent in its analysis. Insufficient attention to gender analysis and the intra-household gender relations mean that women’s contributions, benefits and concerns remain too often ignored in economic structures.

18 Njikam et al. 2011
19 V, Muzvidziwa 1998
institutions and trade systems. As a result, many policies and programs, related to regional integration, may continue to contribute to reinforce inequalities between women and men as concerns the fall backs of this trade.

Feminists and gender scholars\textsuperscript{20} postulate that interrogating intra-household gender relations enhances the understanding of the relationship between women’s participation in trade and the utilization of the benefits therein. Feminist Trade theorists advocate that the empowerment of women cannot be achieved through trade openness without measures to ensure that women can access and utilize the benefits of trade. Social relations are viewed as having an important effect on economic processes and outcomes. Gender relations are manifested in both intra and extra household processes; the household constitutes an important institutional site where such relations are nurtured and transmitted from one generation to another\textsuperscript{21}. Studies have portrayed that gender relations in the household shape the manner in which women engage in processes and activities beyond the household\textsuperscript{22}. Their control over the benefits of paid employment may be jeopardized as they may be obliged to hand over their income to their parents or husbands\textsuperscript{23}. Women’s economic work has to be recognized and valued through improved disaggregated data (to be able to assess the differential impact of trade between men and women) and by mainstreaming gender within trade theories and agreements.

In reinforcing the above argument, literature on the gendered dynamics of ICBT and its distributional benefits confirms that the fall backs of this trade are spent on the provision of household necessities. Women spend most of their income on children and household\textsuperscript{24}. Women’s access

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{20} Kabeer, N, Paid work, women’s employment and inclusive growth: Transforming the structures of constraint, (New York, UN Women, 2013)
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to opportunities both in the formal and informal sectors reduces the likelihood of household poverty since women’s possession of resources has a range of positive outcomes for human capital capabilities within the household. This also increases the distributional dynamics of need within the household\textsuperscript{25}. ICBT while improving the wellbeing of women in the household goes beyond by impacting economic growth. The economically empowered women ICBT have both an increased voice in household decisions and the means to spend on their prioritized needs\textsuperscript{26}. Women and men have differential needs. A shift in gender relations as women engaged in ICBT are able to participate in the decision-making process within the household\textsuperscript{27}. Women feel economically empowered by engaging in ICBT because they become part of the decision-making process in their homes\textsuperscript{28}. The empowerment of these women is cited in Zimbabwe, as an image of an independent and mobile class of women, regarded as shifting identities for women\textsuperscript{29}.

Informal contacts strengthen regional integration networks and relationships. ICBT contributes 30-40\% of intra-Southern Africa Development Community Trade with 70\% of these traders being women. The contribution of women informal traders to national GDP amounts to 64\% of value added in trade in Benin; 46\% in Mali and 41\% in Chad\textsuperscript{30}. Cross border trading may contribute to the productive accumulation and acquisition of assets which can promote economic development\textsuperscript{31}. In fact, interrogating ICBT at the macro-level especially

\textit{and enterprise development, (United Kingdom: Department for International Development, 2012)}

\textsuperscript{25} N, Kabeer, 2013

\textsuperscript{26} USAID, Women cross border traders in Southern Africa: Contributions, constraints and opportunities in Malawi and Botswana, (USAID Southern Africa Trade Hub, 2016)

\textsuperscript{27} Njikam et al. 2011

\textsuperscript{28} UNWOMEN 2008

\textsuperscript{29} V, Muzvidziwa 1998

\textsuperscript{30} UNWOMEN 2008

in its capacity to build the African economy; it was revealed that to reduce poverty in Africa, it is imperative that ICBT should be promoted and the implementation of policies associated to ICBT be developed\textsuperscript{32}.

**Methodology**

The study covers the two major border outlets between Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea; Campo and Kye-Ossi and adopts a qualitative research method with a grounded theory approach. The itinerary nature of ICBT militates against the availability of data concerning informal economic actors which makes a qualitative research method imperative. Also the necessity to provide useful tools to learn about individuals’ perceptions and feelings regarding a particular subject area warrants the use of the grounded theory approach. The article applies a qualitative research method to study multilevel (social, economic, cultural, and political) issues of informal cross border trade from a gender dimension.

The article, guided by the grounded research approach does not seek representativeness to achieve statistical generalizability but aims to explain and predict phenomena based on empirical data. The data collection typically encompassed in-depth interviews, observations, focused group discussions and also included other sources of data such as existing research literature and quantitative data; data collection and analysis consisting of coding and comparisons between data.

As a result of the fluidity and lack of recorded statistics on the number of informal cross border traders across the Cameroon-Equatorial Guinea border, the research adopted what is called the saturation point in acquiring a sample size\textsuperscript{33}. In this case, saturation occurred when adding more respondents to the study did not result in additional perspectives or information, especially when the researcher had collected sufficient information valuable for the study. Therefore after interviewing ninety (90) informal cross border traders across the different borders, the researcher realized valuable information had been acquired as most of the information kept repeating. This was then

\textsuperscript{32} Mwaniki, J, *The Impact of Informal Cross-Border Trade on Regional Integration in SADC and Implications for Wealth Creation, Community Organizations Regional Network (CORN). (Zimbabwe, 2004)*

supported and corroborated by interviews from key informants from
Kye-Ossi and Campo.

**Participation of traders in Informal Cross Border Trade between Cameroon with Equatorial Guinea**

This section presents findings on the rationale behind becoming Informal Cross Border Traders, the types of goods traded and how it has strengthen regional ties between the two countries.

**Reasons for becoming an Informal Cross Border Trader**

The most prominent reason for engaging in Informal Cross Border Trading was as a source of livelihood (42.7% of females and 45.7% of males). Nearness to the borders (17.6% for females and 11.4% for males) and the only business available (14.5% of females and 2.9% of males) were also advanced. The profitability of the business also spurred some traders (11.6% of females and 10% of males) to engage in the trade. The fact that some men (11.4%) and women (6.9%) had not received any formal education was a drive to involve in trading across the border to support their livelihood. Other traders (8.6% of males and 1.5% of females) were motivated by the need to raise money to invest in other businesses.

In expatiating on their reasons of becoming informal cross border traders, a married male trader between the ages of 31-40 years with a high school certificate said “...I needed a source of income to sustain my family...” Another, a female married trader between the ages of 31-40 years also added that “...due to unemployment, I had to look for an easier means to earn income...” The existence of communities that transcend borders and nearness to the border also motivated men and women. Such communities share a lot in common both culturally and socially, they speak the same language, intermarry and own land on either side of the border. These particularly strong social networks lead to cross-border trade and reinforce the trade relations between both countries because of long-standing knowledge of the customs, products and networks of each other. This was affirmed by numerous traders who were inhabitants of the border towns especially in Kye-Ossi. The DO of Kye-Ossi reiterated this point explaining that “…cross border trade consolidates families and reinforces regional ties as there are families with parents on either side of the border. The indigenes of Kye-Ossi are
actually ancestors of Equatorial Guinea, so there is a natural relationship that links the people.

This was corroborated by a focus group discussion and interview with kinsmen/women in Mephou, Kye-Ossi. The Chief averred that “…we the indigenes of Kye-Ossi are same family with Equatorial Guineans; we speak same language… so when we go there for trade it’s like visiting family members…” . This was corroborated by Commissioner of Immigration for Kye-Ossi who in explaining the difficulties in registering people and goods that enter Cameroon contended that “…because of the shared culture and families with Equatorial Guineans, most inhabitants in Kye-Ossi when they go to their farms, for marriages or dead celebrations, upon returning, they buy goods to sell in Cameroon. This is also same when they are leaving; they buy goods here to sell in Equatorial Guinea…” Most traders in Campo opined that their being inhabitants at the borders automatically facilitates their involvement in cross border trading.

Furthermore, married female traders between the ages of 21-30 years in Kye-Ossi and Campo explained it is the only business they can do at the borders especially with the lack of social amenities like water and electricity (for Kye-Ossi) and roads for Campo. A Kye-Ossi based trader explained that “..I am a trained secretary and documentations are scarce in Kye-Ossi it would have been a very lucrative business to run my own documentation. However, Kye-Ossi has a generator plant that is very unstable and unreliable for such a business. There are frequent power failures. As a result I could only resort to doing cross border trade…” In Campo, the female traders explained that “…the stretch of road between Campo and Kribi is deplorable with many checks. As a result they prefer to trade in the Equatorial Guinea markets. Numerous check points was also supported by the focus group at the palace in Mephou were both men and women lamented that the numerous check points between Kye-Ossi and Yaoundé makes them prefer trading in the Equatorial Guinea markets. From observation, it was confirmed that at least nine check points are along the Yaoundé –Kye-Ossi stretch with at least four customs posts. This resonates the argument that shortcomings in administrative procedures and governance systems reinforce the ICBT and trading ties with neighboring countries.
During the focus group discussions in Kye-Ossi, insecurity in the North and South West Regions of Cameroon was identified as a pull factor for ICBT. Displacements as a result of the socio-economic crisis and the loss of source of livelihood pushed some into ICBT. This was supported by two women in the focus group who testified about the experiences of these displaced women especially.

**Different Goods Traded by Informal Cross border traders**

Majority of traders (Females 50 % and males 44.4%) buy and sell assorted drinks both alcoholic and non-alcoholic drinks. In differentiating the types of goods traded by Nationality, field data portrayed that 77.3% of Cameroonians are involved in buying and selling assorted drinks (wine, whiskey, canned beers and juice) while 6.9% also buy cosmetics, 4.4% trade in snacks (biscuits, sardines), 3.4% with vegetable oil, 3.9% with fuel. 2.9% with food stuffs and 0.9% in second handed dresses. In Equatorial Guinea on the other hand, 41.9% trade in food stuffs, 5.6% in cosmetics, snacks, flour and groundnut oil each; 16.7% in electronics and 16.7 second handed dresses.

Empirical data has proven that most traders from Equatorial Guinea come to Cameroon to buy mostly fresh and dry food stuff. The Divisional Officer of Kye-Ossi stated that “Cameroon is the bread basket of Equatorial Guinea… there was a time that even bread was bought in Cameroon… Equatorial Guineans are not involved in agriculture as a result they rely on Cameroon to feed…” The representative of the Ministry of Commerce in Kye-Ossi further explained that “…at least 80% of Equatorial Guinean women traders trade in food stuff because that is what is really needed in their country…” This was supported by the Chief of Kye-Ossi who stated that “… anything food stuff both dry and fresh is gotten from Cameroon. The only food stuffs that Cameroon gets from Equatorial Guinea are frozen Chicken and Fish… and this is because there is no stable electricity supply in Kye-Ossi. As a result, most of the fish sold in Congelcam at Kye-Ossi is bad…” Cameroonians on the other hand buy mostly assorted drinks, cosmetics and vegetable oil (though considered contra-band). All officials interviewed affirmed that most traders from Cameroon who buy from Equatorial Guinea trade mostly in assorted drinks because they are cheaper and of good quality. The involvement of traders in a range of goods and services that
complement each other (comparative advantage) has resulted to new transnational networks and reinforcing what have come to be regarded as the ‘invisible’ integration of Africa’s economies.

**Personal Benefits of ICBT to Traders**

This section examines the personal benefits of informal cross border trade to men and women traders involved.

Traders achieved numerous personal benefits with their involvement in ICBT. Among these benefits are education of children and family livelihood (rents, health, feeding) which was supported by 29.2% of females each; 22.2% and 26.9% of males respectively. Other traders (females 12.5% and males 17.5%) were able to construct their family homes. Economic empowerment was the principal benefit according to females 29.2% and males 26.9%. A smaller number of the traders (1.6% and 4.8% especially of males) said they were able to get married and learn Spanish Language.

In expatiating on the personal developments acquired as a result of ICBT, a married female trader within the age range of 21-30 years from Kye-Ossi explained that “…I have acquired the needed financial support to help me cater for my needs and those of my children without relying on my husband… It has helped a lot especially with the Anglophone crisis in the North West and South West Regions, a lot of relatives have migrated to Kye-Ossi. The proceeds from ICBT have helped in catering for the needs of these relatives. A married female trader from Campo between the ages of 21-30 years added that “…I have been able to contribute to the construction of our family home …” Another married male, 31-40 years from Equatorial Guinea confirmed that “…I have been able to feed my children, send them to school and build a house …” From the two focus group discussions held in the palace of Mephou, the traders present confirmed that their involvement in ICBT has greatly influenced their lives positively. The women especially said they had acquired economic empowerment that has influenced the management of their reproductive roles. A 45 years old widow from the focus group in the Mephou chief palace explained that “…I have been able to feed, educate and pay for hospital bills of my four children since the death of my husband.
The above implies that ICBT serves as a cushion to many men and women in the face of poverty and economic crisis. Women’s involvement in ICBT has drastically reduced their level of poverty and enabled them to cater for additional reproductive responsibilities with ease.

To reiterate the personal benefits accrued from the buying and selling across the borders, a further analysis of the purpose in which profits are used proved that a greater part of what women do with the proceeds from trading is to take care of issues around their reproductive roles. A married female trader from Kye-Ossi between the ages of 31-40 years explained that ‘…most of my profits are invested in my household; taking care of the needs of my children and the home…” From the percentage (10.8%) of women who contributed to the construction of their households, we realize women’s economic empowerment challenges gender roles and enable women to carry out tasks that have been traditionally allocated to men.

**Participation in Decision making and Household Gender Relations**

The findings suggest that female traders have considerable degree of empowerment as concerns agency in household decision making processes, given that majority of the women responded that they take household decisions either independently or jointly with their husbands. Such responds show changes in household power relations. Decisions independently taken by female traders are mostly related to their gender roles: health issues concerning children (45.9%), feeding (51.1%), domestic activities (54.5%), health issues of relatives and adults (48.9%, 43.5%), community activities (56.3%) and household income (51.1%). Male traders on the other hand took independent decisions on productive activities (30.7), types of goods traded (34.1%), children, adult and relative education (17.9%, 21.9%, 21.9%), house construction (20.9%) and use of household asserts (19.3%).

However, the number of female traders who take independent decisions on the number and spacing of children is low (21.4% each) unlike taking decisions as a couple. Most decisions especially by traders who are married are taken together. The female traders take decisions concerning number of children and spacing with their husbands (36.9% each). Also, decisions on the education of children, relatives and adults are taken as a couple (34.5%, 30.7% and 32.9% respectively). Statistics
from the field therefore show that most female traders do not have significant control over their reproductive roles which certainly has an influence on their trading activities.

A commendable number of female traders (45.5%) were able to make decisions concerning the types of goods traded, spending on pooled resources (34.1%) and decision on alternative business (39.8%). This is as opposed to 34.1%, 20.5% and 32.9% respectively of male traders. Averagely field statistics indicate that female traders made more household decisions independently and as a couple than being influenced by the husbands. These therefore show positive changes in household gender relations as a result of their involvement in ICBT.

Women’s participation and eventual benefits from ICBT is influenced by factors both within and without the household. These factors include intra household power dynamics, cultural norms, laws, policies and regulations that govern the sector. The social construction of gender which gives different responsibilities to men and women at the micro level is often extrapolated to the macro level when it comes to trade. It determines the differences for men and women in terms of access to and control over these resources, opportunities, abilities, management while undermining the importance especially of women’s reproductive roles to the macro economy. This becomes a major problem to women especially because despite the fact that they become economically empowered through their involvement in ICBT, they cannot effectively take decisions without being limited by intra-household power relations and the traditional norms of a man as household head. In fact most male traders believed that most of the decisions that women are allowed to take independently are those related to their reproductive roles. In fact a Male trader form Campo within the age range of 41-50 years explained that “… it is women’s responsibility and a natural instinct to care for children so they must always make decisions related to that domain…” Despite this, the factor of control is still very lacking if they still have to depend on their husbands on their reproductive health and rights.

Findings however have revealed that there has been transformation in this customized system of decision making as more women make decisions independently though much transformation still has to be seen at the level of decisions out of their reproductive roles.
Changes in Household gender relations as a result of involvement in ICBT

The previous section aptly portrays how household decision making and intra household power relations have greatly been influenced with women’s involvement in ICBT. Though more of the roles and responsibilities carried out by women are directed to their traditional gender roles, women’s emancipation has greatly improved as they now take decisions concerning their livelihood and that of their families. A vivid illustration of traders’ level of agreement or disagreement to statements that explain the influence of ICBT to women, intra household power relations and its contribution to regional integration shows that;

Majority (62.2%) of the women were in support of the statement that women are more likely than men to spend their income from ICBT on their children. This was corroborated by 35.5% of men who agreed to the assertion. On the issue of ICBT serving as a cushion to households in the phase of economic crisis, 62.2% of women agreed while 37.8% of men agreed. This was even reinforced by the statement that women’s involvement in ICBT has changed household gender relations positively; supported by 36.4% of men and 63.6% of women. Again, 34.1% of men agreed that women’s decision making power in the household has increased due to their participation in ICBT. This was supported by 61.3% of women who agreed. A smaller (2.3%) of men however disagreed to the assertion.

In assessing the level of agreement on the statement if ICBT has improved the livelihood of women and children in the household, 37.7% of men agreed while 62.2% of women were of the same opinion. This was again confirmed by agreements (34% of men and 63.6% of women) on the statement that ICBT has helped women to fulfill their roles as mothers and heads of households. Traders were however not in support (30.3% of men and 23.6% of women) of the statement that income from ICBT was the only source of income for families. This statement was supported only by 6.7% of men and 38.2% of women. In the domain of coping strategies, (37.8% of men and 61.1% of women) agreed that women develop more survival skills than men as they are able to create networks in host countries. Finally, in interrogating on the argument that ICBT contributes immensely to Regional integration, 37.8% of men agreed while 61.1% of women agreed.
To support the argument that women are more likely than men to spend their income from ICBT on children’s needs, a number of traders gave numerous reasons to substantiate that. A married female trader from Campo (31-40 years) explained that “…it should be noted that women are naturally inclined to cater for children more than men, so when a women is economically empowered it is just obvious that she will spend her proceeds in taking care of her family…” A fact supported by a majority of the traders especially female respondents from both Countries. A married male trader from Campo (51-60 years) on the other hand added that “…it however depends on the situation of the family. If the man cannot care for his family then the woman obviously will do that….in other cases the couple may be separated so the woman with custody of the children will have to provide for them…in other instances, women more than men stay in the house to take care of children so it is obvious they should always provide for them…” Another married female trader from Kye-Ossi (21-30 years) added that “…as long as a woman is economically empowered, she takes care of her children without depending on the husband for assistance…”

On the other hand, the small percentage of men who disagreed explained that “…it all depends on the home because there are some women who believe it is the man’s responsibility to care for his family…so even if she has income from ICBT she uses it for her personal issues…” Another male trader from Kye-Ossi, married (31-40 years) added that “…women involved in ICBT use their money on other men rather than on their families…” Another un-married male from Campo (21-30 years) expressly added that “…men will always be heads of households even if the women are the backbone of the family…”

It however should be noted from the above that most of the respondents, both male and female still belief on the social construction of gender roles and responsibilities. As a result they still see children and family wellbeing as the responsibility of the woman as it is linked to her reproductive roles.

To support those respondents who acknowledged the role that ICBT has had on women and children wellbeing and serving as a cushion to households in the phase of economic crisis, a married female trader from Kye-Ossi said “… I can conveniently say my lifestyle and that
of my family has improved as a result of my engagement in ICBT…” This was corroborated by many female traders who participated in the research. They expressly supported the fact that their involvement in ICBT has substantially improved their livelihoods and that of their families. However, some male traders had a contrary view to such empowerment. A male trader from Campo (31-40 years) explained that “…women’s involvement in ICBT has had a negative impact on the livelihood of their children and families; the income from the trade has greatly helped in sustaining the family but their constant absence from the house has resulted in more delinquent children. The children of some informal cross border traders do not have the required parental guidance and up bringing like those of parents who have other jobs. This is because these traders are constantly travelling and leave their children at the mercy of nannies and other relatives…”

It is obvious from the above that ICBT has contributed immensely to the economic empowerment and livelihood of the traders and their families; especially women. Despite the challenges encountered as a result of their involvement, it has greatly served as a cushion to most households crumbling in the phase of economic crisis. This economic empowerment especially for women has also translated to changes in intra-household power relations as women are more influencing decisions within their homes.

**Level of agreement to changes in household decision making**

To affirm the level of participation and changes in power relations experienced by traders especially women in their household, all the female traders confirmed that their participation in decision making has improved while 79.4% of men also confirmed to the fact. On the men themselves it was more their influence and participation in community and other social activities that had improved as a result of the economic empowerment they achieved from ICBT.

The respondents shared their different perspectives on the level of empowerment they had achieved within their households especially in decision making. A married female trader from Equatorial Guinea (21-30 years) explained that “…with the income I raise from ICBT I can easily carry out my activities and suggest projects without being undermined by my husband…” Another married female of same age
from Campo affirmed that “… I take decisions without necessarily consulting my husband…” Furthermore another female trader from Equatorial Guinea 31-40 years averred that “…before my engagement in the trade, if I wanted something to be done, my husband was always slow or resistant in giving his consent/assistance but today, even when he is slow in giving his consent, I go ahead and implement the project as long as its for the wellbeing of our family. I influence many decisions now in the family as long as I can finance them…”

Male traders were more of the opinion that their decision making power had changed among their peers, family members and the community. A married male trader, 31-40 years from Kye-Ossi explained that “… I am now recognized among my friends and family members…” Another (a female single, Equatorial Guinean trader, 21-30 years) added that “… it has significantly increased my decision making power within my community and family as I can conveniently propose projects and issues and support them financially. A married male Equatorial Guinean (21-30 years) confirmed that “…I can now support in the execution of projects in the family and community…”

It is therefore obvious as explained above that intra-household and intra-community decision making for the traders involved has significantly improved as they can conveniently influence decisions. This is even better for women who have testified that their economic empowerment has changed the influence that men had on their decision making power; it has transformed significantly intra-household power relations with more collaboration than dominance in decisions among couples.

**Conclusion**

This paper examined the participation and benefits/role of ICBT in reinforcing economic development/regional links and its influence in decision making within the household. It was observed that unemployment and existence of communities that transcend borders were some of the major reasons that made traders to engage in ICBT; which resonate same issues raised in literature\(^\text{34}\). Their involvement in a range of goods and services has resulted in new transnational networks,  

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\(^{34}\) UNWOMEN 2008; Gor 2012
supported by commonalities in language, culture and kinship System which strengthens regional ties\textsuperscript{35}.

The study also established that gender relations represent social relations of power between men and women due to socio-cultural construction of women and men in the society. The household as a basic unit of the society constitute an important site where gender roles and relations are defined and played. The findings of the study are in line with studies on the impact of ICBT on intra-household gender relations and decision making\textsuperscript{36}. ICBT goes beyond the household by impacting economic growth and giving voice to women who can aptly make decisions on their prioritized needs. Findings also concur with literature\textsuperscript{37} that women and men have different priorities and needs for income. In fact both genders take decisions and allocate fall backs from trade based on their respective gender roles.

Literature\textsuperscript{38} further aligns with findings as a shift in gender relations is witnessed as women engaged in ICBT. Women were able to participate in the decision-making process within the household. Women feel economically empowered by engaging in informal cross border trade since they become part of the decision-making process in their homes\textsuperscript{39}. The empowerment of these women concurs with literature\textsuperscript{40} that informal cross-border trading in Zimbabwe introduced an image of an independent and mobile class of women which was regarded as shifting identities for women. However, findings revealed that most of these women (especially those married) could not take independent decisions on their strategic gender needs such as their sexual and reproductive rights.

To further support the findings on the traders’ perception on changes in household gender relations as a result of ICBT, we observed that ICBT served as a cushion to households which were crumbling in the

\textsuperscript{35} ECA 2010
\textsuperscript{36} USAID, 2016
\textsuperscript{37} Kuhlengsia, 2013
\textsuperscript{38} Njikam et al., 2011
\textsuperscript{39} UNWOMEN, 2008
\textsuperscript{40} V, Muzvidziwa, 1998
phase of the economic crises. Literature\textsuperscript{41} also concurred that a larger percentages of male and female traders reported spending some of their income from ICBT on household consumption. Both male and female traders were likely to spend some of the income on health care services, children school fees, and rent. Men were more likely than women to reinvest their money into their business. The study establishes therefore that, the dictates of gender relations in defining gender roles revealed the obvious; women traders more than men traders focused on household issues and activities associated with their reproductive roles such as child care and household chores from the proceeds of their trading than their productive roles dealing with their strategic gender needs. They tended not to wield sufficient influence on issues of their strategic gender needs such as reproductive rights, control over pooled resources and investments.

Although ICBT is regarded as illegal, the study has proven that it is a source of income to a majority of ECCAS’s population especially the two countries under study. ICBT have positive macroeconomic and social ramifications such as food security and income creation particularly for rural populations who would otherwise suffer from social exclusion and contributes immensely to intra-African trade. ICBT has the potential to support Africa’s on-going efforts at poverty alleviation. Therefore, the option of not including it into the regional agreement of the ECCAS sub regional bloc and for its abrasive eradication is not a feasible option and improper because part of the reasons for the emergence and growth of informal economy results from dysfunctional policies and poor governance; which has marred the effective implementation of regional integration and the painful structural adjustments that often shrink opportunities for formal business and jobs creation.

On this basis, gender aware trainings and capacity building workshops are imperative to enable traders especially women, develop a gender responsive mindset that would increase their level of influence in household decisions especially on their strategic gender needs such as women’s ability to wield greater control over their lives and activities. When women increasingly engage and take control of such processes, they would develop skills in addressing similar issues when

\textsuperscript{41} Njikam et al., 2011
encountered at the borders. More accurate and systematic disaggregated data on informal cross border traders within the regional bloc is needed to assess the magnitude of this phenomenon and its impact to the domestic and national economy. Such information will be important for evidence based policy making.
The Implications of Ethno-Religious Crisis for Post-Election Peace building in Nigeria

Abosede Omowumi Babatunde

Abstract

The fourth republic is remarkable in the political history of Nigeria. It is the longest period of democratic rule, unlike previous short-lived democratic experiments. However, in this present democratic dispensation, the country has been battling incessant ethno-religious tensions and crisis, particularly between the Northern and Southern regions and between Muslims and Christians. The situation is further aggravated by the activities of the violent religious extremist group, Boko Haram in the Northern region. The security environment in the 2015 pre-election, election and post-election period was particularly volatile. Although the ethno-religious tension was managed, that was not the case for the 2011 Presidential election, although adjudged by local and international observers to be a marked improvement on previous elections in Nigeria. As the country prepares for the 2019 elections, the ethno-religious tensions have continued to heat up the polity. This paper examines the implications of the ethno-religious

1 Abosede Omowumi Babatunde is a senior Lecturer at the Centre for Peace and Strategic Studies at the University of Ilorin
crisis for post-election peacebuilding in Nigeria. Drawing on extant studies, the paper argues that the prevailing ethno-religious tensions and crises may derail Nigeria’s democracy. The paper concludes that democratic consolidation and positive peace may remain elusive if the ethno-religious crises are not effectively addressed using much more innovative strategies than is presently the case.

Keywords: Ethno-religious crisis, Electoral violence, Post-Election, Peace-building, Democratic Consolidation, Nigeria

INTRODUCTION

The root of ethno-religious crises in Africa has been traced to colonialism which indiscriminately divided the continent into various national segments with scant regard for ethnic configuration or historical cohesion. Specifically, the merging together of heterogenous religions, ethnic groups and languages through the amalgamation of Northern and Southern Protectorates by Lord Lugard in 1914, brought into existence the political contraption called Nigeria. Scholars have argued that the merging together of ‘strange bed-fellows’ under a single territorial and institutional framework, without due respect to and for social-cultural and political differences created a common historical experience of economic exploitation, political, administrative and cultural oppression.

It is therefore not surprising that studies have succinctly asserted that colonialism was the cradle of ethnicity in Nigeria and a key factor in the crystallization of contemporary identities. The outcome is the

emergence and rise of ethnic-nationalism and the challenge of forging a pan-Nigerian identity and national integration. Rather, what emerged is what Ekanola termed nationalism; characterized principally by a feeling of community among a people, based on common descent, language, and religion.\textsuperscript{5} Studies have focused attention on how ethno-religious cleavages intersect with the struggles for access to power at the Centre.\textsuperscript{6} Insufficient scholarly attention is devoted to the implications of the deep-seated ethno-religious cleavages for Nigeria’s democratization processes. This paper explores the implications of ethno-religious crisis for post-election peace building in Nigeria. Drawing insights from extant studies, the paper argues that the intractable ethno-religious crises that are pervasive in Nigeria, have profound ramifications for Nigeria’s democratization processes in the long run. In his insightful analysis of the electoral process in Kaduna state, Angerbrandt argued that ethno-religious division and grievances heightened by electoral polarization will ultimately foster a culture of electoral violence.\textsuperscript{7} This postulation aptly characterizes Nigeria’s electoral processes and the threat that ethno-religious division pose to the consolidation of democracy in the country.

Nigeria’s elections since independence have been characterized by electoral violence that intersect with ethno-religious cleavages which ultimately led to the truncation of Nigeria’s democratic processes in the first, second and third republic and the long years of military rule in Nigeria. The transition to democratic rule in 1999 is considered remarkable in that it is the longest period of uninterrupted democratic rule in Nigeria. Previous democratic experiments from the first to the third were short-lived. The forth republic raises hope that democracy

\textsuperscript{5} Ibid.
has come to stay in Nigeria. However, the expectation and prospect for the consolidation of Nigeria’s fledgling democracy is threatened by deep-seated ethno-religious cleavages and crises that undermine the electoral processes and spawned electoral violence in the pre, during and post-election periods since the onset of the forth republic.

Eteng elucidated on the nature of ethnic-nationalism in Nigeria which he conceptualized as a condition of heightened self-consciousness and identity of an organised ethnic group, given its national level of competition and conflictual interaction with similarly organised ethnic groups over quest for power, wealth, security and status for its members.\(^8\) The quest for civic nationalism, which requires that an individual should belong to a nation, which in turn belongs to a state, blood ties or ethnic ties and are subsequently lifted to the level of political supremacy has proved elusive in Nigeria.\(^9\) Since ethnic nationalism does not necessarily follow the lines of the state; therefore, multiple ethnic nations within a state can lead to the fracturing of the state.\(^10\) Aluko and Ajani described ethnic nationalism is the political dimension of ethnicity and it is ethnocentrism in that it cuts across all other loyalties to stress loyalty to a particular ethnic group.\(^11\)

Therefore, ethnic nationalism emerged in Nigeria with the politicization of the different cultural and ethnic elements, and their mobilization for political objectives, which included regional autonomy in a multi-national state, or even the total break up of Nigeria into


\(^9\) Afolayan, 2002


one or more independent sovereign nation-states.\footnote{Hansen, 1987} As Ake put it, this antagonistic characterization is associated with the framing of politics in the mould of ethnic conflicts where claims are seen as largely exclusive.\footnote{Ake, 2000} The result is the making of exclusive political claims, which engenders fierce competition for the control of the state, thus raising the quest for power into a zero-sum (winner take all) game as witnessed in Nigeria. This assertion aligns with Aluko and Ajani postulation that politics is a zero-sum game in Nigeria whereby power has been used to pursue sectional or parochial interests of the ethnic group controlling the center.\footnote{Aluko and Ajani, 2009} As such, the marginalization of some groups will inevitably arouse consciousness and then sensitize such groups for action, resistance, apathy and other related negative vices.\footnote{Ibid.} In this game, the only avenue of mobilizing support available to the elites struggling for power is ethnicity. This accentuated centrifugal tendencies in Nigeria, eventually aborted the birth of a truly independent and unified nation-state.\footnote{Hansen, 1987; Ekanola, 2006}

Accordingly, since the attainment of political independence in Nigeria, the country has been battling a myriad of ethnic-religious crises which continue to undermine its national unity, stability and integration. The majority of Nigerians continue to derive their sense of belonging from an ethno-religious perspective. In this sense, the lack of common citizenship by the people reinforces polarities in ethnic, religious, regional, and legal status. Tracing the challenges of political stability in Nigeria, Olukoju posited that after Nigeria won her independence from Britain in 1960, its artificial origin, coupled with other factors, had bequeathed it a number of fundamental problems, one of which is the challenge of integrating, into a cohesive socio-political whole, the various entities and strange bed fellows that were lumped together by the colonialists.\footnote{Olukoju, A. (1997). “Nigeria: A Historical Review,” In F.U Okafor (eds). New Strategies For Curbing Ethnic And Religious Conflicts In Nigeria. Enugu: Fourth} It is significant to note that the inability
of successive Nigerian government to effectively integrate the diverse ethnic groups toward the end of evolving a true sense of national identity and commitment to the survival and development of the nation continue to undermine the democratic process and peacebuilding initiatives. According to the former United Nations Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali in the 1992 “An Agenda for Peace” report, peacebuilding has to do with action to solidify peace and avoid relapse into conflict. Elaborating further on the concept, the United Nations 2000 Brahimi Report stated that peacebuilding is “activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war.” Also, in 2007, the United Nation Secretary-General’s Policy Committee described peacebuilding as “a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundation for sustainable peace and development. In essence, the overarching goals of peacebuilding and state building identified in the 2012 United Nations report include legitimate (inclusive) politics; people’s security; access to justice; employment generation and livelihoods support; and accountable revenue management and service delivery. Within the context of the ethno-religious crises in Nigeria, although the root of the problem has been sufficiently highlighted in extant literature, the failure of successive governments to map out effective peacebuilding strategies to tackle the challenges has affected efforts geared at rebuilding political, economic, judicial and civil society institutions.

According to Abiodun, the plural nature of Nigeria society and its variant compositions were the basis upon which identities thrive. Nigeria is comprised of over two hundred and seventy ethnic groups and not just the three ethnic groups; Hausa-Fulani, Ibo (Igbo) and Yoruba which constitute the majority ethnic group and account for............


over 68 percent of the entire population. In fact, Otite observed that there are 374 ethnic diversities in Nigeria. All other ethnic groups fit into the minority category with varying degree of political status depending on their numerical size and political influence. In terms of religion, Nigeria is divided along its so-called “Middle Belt” between the mostly Muslim north and the majority Christian south. Therefore, as a heterogeneous society, Nigeria has continually faced the problem of strong ethno-religious identities which prevented the development of a truly pan-Nigerian identity in her national life.

However, Deng argued that it is not how people choose to identify themselves that is necessarily problematic; rather the challenge lies in the ability of the government to manage a pluralistic identity. He opined that unless a government creates a national framework with which all the citizens can identify without any distinction based on ethnicity, tribe, or religion, peace and unity will prove elusive. Aapengnuo noted that identity conflicts in Nigeria actually mask deeper systemic issues at the center of which is the relationship between political power and access to economic resources and opportunities. The Nigerian case demonstrates that ethnic thinking and mobilization is traceable to the struggle for power, wealth, and resources rather than an intrinsic hatred for another ethnic group. The fierce competition for economic and political resources which is disguised in the form of ethnic and religious contestation further accentuates the fault line in Nigeria. Nigeria’s fault line relates to the economic and social imbalance between the relatively underdeveloped, historically marginalized and mainly Muslim north, and the wealthier, more industrialized and predominantly Christian

Narrating the socio-economic disparity between the north and South, Kwaja contended that Nigeria’s northern states, particularly in the “Middle Belt,” states of Plateau and Kaduna (where Hausa-Fulani Muslims and Yoruba-Igbo Christians are evenly divided) account for roughly 66 percent of the country’s poverty. The World Bank has also categorized the whole region comprising north-eastern Nigeria, Chad, Eastern Niger, Northern Cameroon and South Sudan is one of the poorest in the world. It is therefore not surprising that many northern politicians perceive that their control of the presidency is the only viable means of “catching up” with the more developed and affluent south. However, the southern politicians, for their part, argued that Northerners have ruled Nigerian more than three decades out of the over five decades since independence, therefore, southerners should also be allowed to have control of the centre of power. Since 1960 when Nigeria gained independence, majority of the Heads of State are from the North while only a negligible number are from the South. The intense competition for the control of power between these two contending forces has continued to heighten the risk of ethnic conflict in Nigeria.

After from the introductory section, the next section offers insight into the nature of Ethno-Religious Contestation in Nigeria Political History. Then, a section on Nigeria’s electoral Challenges follows. The subsequent section elaborates on the severe ramifications of Ethno-Religious Crises for Post-Election Peace building in Nigeria. Finally, there is a concluding section that summarizes the issues of focus to the study.

Ethno-Religious Contestation in Nigeria Political History

In Nigeria, right from the colonial era, ethnic contestation has been influencing the political system and this manifest in an aggressive regionalism with the formation of political parties along ethnic and regional lines. After the attainment of independence, Mahmudat, noted

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23 Kwaja, 2011
25 Ekanola, 2006
that politics in the post-independence years, from the first republic (1960-1965) was a triangular competition between the regions, championed by their hegemonic groups and carried out through the instrumentality of ethnically controlled parties.\textsuperscript{26} Thus, Mahmudat argued that the second republic (1979-1983) was not markedly different. It was a continuation of the same crude contest for supremacy by the former monolithic regions, especially as old foes and contests in the 1960s resurfaced. The aborted third republic in which two parties of Social Democratic Party (SDP) and National Republican Convention (NRC) were allowed to exist was created to streamline ethnic politics and promote unity. However, the tendency to hold on to power by the military truncated the Third Republic democratic experiment.\textsuperscript{27}

Significantly, right from the first republic, the three predominant political parties; the Northern People’s Congress (NPC), formed by the Northern educated elites in 1949, the National Council for Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC), formed by Herbert Macaulay and Nnamdi Azikwe, and the Egbe Omo Oduduwa formed in the West and dominated by the Yoruba nation, which later metamorphosed into a political party in 1951, by the name of the Action Group, all stood for the three dominant ethnic nationalities (Hausa-Fulani, Igbo and Yoruba) respectively.\textsuperscript{28} The trend in the formation of political parties along ethnic lines in Nigeria from the first to the fourth republic was not markedly different, except for the third republic in which the military on the recommendation of the Political Bureau registered only two political parties - Social Democratic Party (SDP) and National Republican Convention (NRC).\textsuperscript{29} During the second republic, the National Party of Nigeria (NPN), Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) and Nigerian Peoples Party (NPP) stood for the three major ethnic nationalities; Hausa/Fulani, Yoruba and Ibo.

The fourth republic was not radically different as the parties formed before the 1999 elections, the ruling party – Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) is a party of the Hausa/Fulani but captured many states in Ibo land. The All Peoples Party (APP) is more or less a party of the Northern

\textsuperscript{26} Mahmudat, 2010
\textsuperscript{27} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{28} Op. cit
\textsuperscript{29} Aluko and Ajani, 2009
people as it did not capture any state in both Ibo and Yoruba land, while the Alliance for Democracy (AD), which later metamorphosed into the All Progressive Congress (APC) was exclusively and predominantly based in the Southwest and a party of the Yoruba people. It is therefore obvious that even in this present democratic dispensation, political parties are to certain extent still ethnically based in the pursuit of sectional agenda. This perhaps informed Ekanola postulation that these regional political parties sought to advance regional and ethnic interests instead of the overall interest of the country thereby further exacerbating the ill-will already existing between the different ethnic groups.30 This ethnicity-induced parties, as Nnoli and Attoh and Soyombo rightly asserted, were perceived as an attempt by the regional elites to carve out economic spheres for themselves while weakening those of their opponents.31 However, these political elites created the false impression that their political parties were championing the interests of their various ethnic groups.

It is in this context that Kwaja pointed out that since 1979, Nigeria has been governed through a power-sharing arrangement mandated by its constitution which requires equal representation in key political and bureaucratic positions among its diverse communities “to reflect the federal character of Nigeria and the need to promote national unity.”32 However, this gradually transformed into a patronage system of governance which he termed a pacifying system of distribution and allocation. Rather than promoting a sense of belonging and equality, this political patronage, often based on ethno-religious factors, has contributed to marginalization and corruption, and ultimately resulted in integrity and legitimacy problems for the government.33 It has also created a kind of institutionalized incentive for political opportunists to build power on the basis of exclusion. The resultant effect is that it undermines the democratic form of government that Nigeria aspires to uphold and undercut the very notion of what it means to be a Nigerian.

30 Ekanola, 2006
32 Kwaja, 2011
33 ibid
Nigeria’s political life has been marked by conflict along both ethnic and geographic lines, characterised most remarkably by the Northern Hausa/Fulani domination of the military and the attempt at succession by the southern Ibo which culminated in the Nigeria’s civil war. It is, therefore, understandable that the major ethno-national movements are concentrated in the south and middle belt regions of the country because the military rulers were perceived as perpetuating northern (Hausa-Fulani) hegemonic interests. In consonance with this view, Attoh and Soyombo contended that ethnic rivalry culminated in the various conflicts that led to the abortion of the First Republic and consequently, the coup and counter coup which culminated in the civil war fought by the Ibo attempt at succession through the declaration for a sovereign state of Biafra in 1967. The tactical alienation of the Ibo from access to power at the Centre on account of the perceived distrust and suspicion of their motive, largely linked to the Biafra declaration continue to be the basis for the Ibo’s agitation and demand for sovereignty state of Biafra in the fourth republic.

After midwifing three failed republic, Nigeria transited to the fourth republic in 1999, which ushered in the longest period of democratic rule witnessed in Nigeria’s political history. However, the widely held anticipation that the new democratic experiment would provide an avenue for addressing ethno-religious grievances did not materialise. The reality is that ethno-religious crisis metamorphosed into electoral violence that continue to derail the forward trajectories of Nigeria’s democracy. The situation is such that elections in Nigeria present democratic dispensation are usually contentious and associated with massive electoral fraud, similar to the massive forms of rigging, fraud and violence that accompanied the elections of 1964, 1965, 1979, and 1983. The 1999 elections complicated the quest for national unity and stability as a result of the massive electoral fraud and violence that accompanied these elections. Indeed, Human Right Watch noted that elections in the present democratic dispensation were almost as

35 Attoh and Soyombo, 2011)
36 Abiodun, 2012
contentious as the infamous 1983 elections that precipitated the collapse of the Second Republic. The electoral conflicts seem to further deepen the ethno-religious cleavages in Nigeria, with severe ramifications for the forward trajectories of Nigeria’s fledgling democracy.

**Nigeria’s Electoral Challenges**

The International Crisis Group (2007) detailed some of the major challenges that trailed elections in Nigeria’s fourth republic, particularly relating to electoral malpractices and violence, during the 1999, 2003 and the 2007 elections. These elections were adjudged by local and international observers to be marred by electoral fraud and violence. The implication is that the outcome of the elections has been the subversion of the democratic process rather than its consolidation. It is therefore not surprisingly, that major political conflicts will inevitably emerged around rigged elections.

In spite of the electoral malfeasance that trailed elections in the fourth republic, the success of the 2011 elections, adjudged by both local and international observers to be a marked improvement to previous elections herald hope for Nigeria’s fledgling democracy and overall political health. Although there were reported incidents of electoral frauds, particularly in the South-South and the South-East during the 2011 presidential elections, many commentators noted that these challenges hardly undermined the widely acclaimed verdict about the credibility of the polls in comparison to the previous elections. However, the laudable progress made in the 2011 elections,

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fail to mitigate the prevailing ethno-religious cleavages between the North and South which continue unabated with severe ramifications for Nigeria’s political life and democratic trajectories. Not surprising, after the election, in which the North lost the Presidency to Goodluck Jonathan, a southern from the minority ethnic group, violence broke out in the Northern region.

While local and international observers have attributed the relative success of the 2011 elections to the dexterity, determination and tremendous efforts of the Independent Electoral Commission (INEC) under the leadership of Prof. Jega who assumed the mantle of leadership of the electoral body before the 2011 elections. Nevertheless, it would seem that the ethno-religious crisis which arose at the post-elections phase was not adequately addressed by the government before the commencement of the 2015 general elections. The failure of the government to effectively tackle the problem has the tendencies to exacerbate ethnic contestation that arose from the flawed 1999, 2003 and 2007 elections. Arguably, the intensification of ethno-nationalist agitations in the fourth republic may partly be a fallout of the electoral crises.

It is noteworthy that in reaction to the flawed elections, Ohanaeze Ndigbo, the pan-Ibo ethnic pressure organisation, called on all Ibos to “totally condemn and dissociate themselves from the elections” and “to deny legitimacy to the president and some governors, including state and federal legislators who have been declared winners by INEC”.

Thus, the intensification of separatist agitation championed by the Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) since 1999 can be considered as consequential outcome of the flawed elections.

_Punch, 17 April 2011._


The attempt to pacify the aggrieved ethnic group may have informed the zoning of the Vice Presidential candidate of the former ruling party, People Democratic Party (PDP) in the 2019 Presidential election to the South East. The choice of the former governor of Anambra state, Peter Obi as the vice Presidential candidate to Atiku Abubakar, former Vice-President during Obasanjo’s administration and the Presidential candidate of PDP was perceived by many commentator as strategic and calculative. Although Atiku Abubakar lost the presidential election to President Buhari, he was able to amass a majority votes in the South-east, the ethnic group of Peter Obi.

On the part of the ruling party, the All Progressive Congress (APC), the choice of the Vice President, Yemi Osinbanjo who hails from the South West was strategic as well. Since the South comprises the South West, South East and South south, both parties were able to amass votes from their ethnic groups in the sub-regions belonging of their candidates. Interestingly, the presidential aspirants of the two major parties are from the North. From the outcome of the election, the candidate of the ruling APC was favoured by the Northerners. Not satisfied with the outcome of the election, the Presidential candidate of PDP, Atiku Abubakar is contesting the result in the law court. Many commentators perceived the 2019 election as a major contest between the North and South and political reckoning in preparation for the 2023 elections.

Although incidences of electoral violence was minimal during the pre-election period for the 2019 elections, there was remarkable incidences of electoral violence reported in both the electronics and mass media during the elections. The militarization of the election with the deployment of joint security forces failed to quell the electoral violence that accompanied the elections in many states, particularly in the South west, South east and South where incidents of ballot snatching, thuggery, political assassination, killings and others were widely reported. In some states, including Rivers and Kano, the governorship elections were declared inconclusive, partly because of the massive electoral crises. Both the local and International observers condemned the incidences of electoral violence, even though they adjudged the election to be credible.
The persistent electoral flaw that characterised Nigeria’s elections even after successive democratic transition since the onset of the forth republic in 1999 is a serious issue that should be at the front burner of political debate. After experiencing five general elections including the elections that ushered in the fourth republic, it is an worrisome that the country has continue to prove incapable to conducting an election devoid of electoral violence. The flaw in the electoral processes has continue to subvert the will of the electorate to freely choose political leaders that would govern in a secured and conducive environment. It is instructive that at the pre-election period for the 2015 election, which was seen as very crucial for the sustainability of the Nigeria’s democratisation process, the heightened fear in the country was palpable. This fear could be attributed to the previous experience of electoral malpractice and the high number of incidents of electoral violence that accompanied the 1999, 2003 and 2007 elections and the 2011 post-election violence. The insecurity was heightened by the security challenges linked to activities of the Boko Haram terrorist group and the tensed political terrain arising from heated pre-elections violence characterised by hate speech, propaganda, the use of security agencies to target perceived opponents and stockpiling of arsenals by the government. This situation rekindled old fears that the basic institutional weaknesses associated with the electoral system could lead to the disruption of the Nigeria’s democratic experiment.

The then incumbent government of ex-President Goodluck Jonathan was alleged to have used the security agencies to intimidate opposition parties and aid electoral violence. There was threat and counter threat of violence, most notably by the Niger Delta militants who claimed that unless President Goodluck Jonathan was re-elected, the country would be made ungovernable. The Northerners also issued a counter threat that should power not revert back to the North, there would be dire consequences. There was also rampant allegations that the Jonathan-led government was stockpiling weapons for the Niger Delta militants for the purpose of waging war against the Nigerian state in the event that Jonathan lose his re-elections bid. According to the African Centre for Strategic Studies (ACSS), the largest militant group in the Niger Delta, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), threatened that it would resume its violent campaign should
Muhammadu Buhari, the winner of Nigeria’s 2015 presidential election and a northerner, come to power.43

The 2015 pre-election violence heated ethno-religious tensions and conflict that could have caused serious instability in the polity and reversal of the gains made by the Independent Electoral commission in the electoral process and Nigeria’s fledgling democracy. The situation was so dire that it raised fear among eminent Nigerians who quickly summoned the will to wade in before it escalated into a serious crisis. In the pre-election period, some eminent Nigerians, like the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Prof. Bolaji Akinyemi wrote a letter of appeal for peace to the political contestants and their supporters, which was directed to leading presidential candidates of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), Dr Goodluck Jonathan and All Progressives Party (APC), General Muhammadu Buhari. In his note, Prof. Bolaji Akinyemi contended that “the certainty of violence after the 2015 elections is higher than it was in 2011” and that “the violence of 2015 is going to be horrendous and worse than that of 2011”.

It may seem perplexing that despite the intense tension that preceded the 2015 elections, the outcome of the election was adjudged by both local and international observers as a major improvement to previous elections in Nigeria and further boost to the credibility of INEC and determination to conduct free and fair elections. Yet, as earlier stated, many observer opined that the commendable effort of INEC under the leadership of Prof. Jega largely accounted for the progress made in the conduct of the election. It is equally important to acknowledge that the election was also not devoid of skirmishes of electoral violence at the pre and election stages.

The role of the Abubakar-led National Peace committee in arresting the post-election violence that would have emerged after the declaration of the 2015 electoral result was highly commendable. The peace initiatives of the National Peace Committee headed by General Abdulsalam Abubakar with other eminent Nigerians comprising retired

Army, prominent traditional rulers, religious leaders, legal luminary, renowned academics and others played a major role in dousing the heated ethno-religious tensions from the pre-elections, elections and post-elections cycle of the 2015 electoral process. Specifically, at the pre-elections stage, the National Peace committee, aside from advocating a peaceful and credible elections anchored on hate-free and danger-free speeches, acceptance of the results by losers and magnanimity of victors, also midwifed the Abuja Peace Accord signed by leaders of political parties.

The Abubakar Peace committee with the support of the International community prevailed on ex-President Jonathan and then candidate, Muhammadu Buhari to accept the will of the people. The efforts of the international committee, particularly the United States and the United Kingdom were also crucial to the violence-free post-2015 election experience. The United States and the United Kingdom persistently mounted pressure on the then Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan and called on the presidential aspirants to prevail on their supporters to shun violence during the electoral process.

The 2015 elections was significant in that it marked the first time an opposition party toppled the incumbent and won majority seats in the National assembly and governorship elections in Nigeria. The massive support that the candidacy of Buhari enjoyed from diverse ethnic groups who voted en masse for a man regarded as credible with sterling integrity raises hope that perhaps the deep-seated ethno-religious divisions has been largely laid to the backburner. While some scholars opined that ineptitude of the Jonathan-led administration in managing the deadly Boko Haram insurgency that has decimated large swathe of the highly populated Northern Muslim dominated region accounted to his losing the 2015 Presidential election to Buhari, it is important not to downplay the massive votes that Buhari derived from other regions in the South. Yet, the expectation that the ethno-religious division may have been jettisoned turned out to be a miscalculation. After the elections, the Buhari administration has continue to face fundamental challenges of ethno-religious tensions and crisis that permeate the

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Nigerian state. The resurgence of militant agitations by the Niger Delta militants, MASSOB and various ethno-religious conflict across the country are indicative of the lingering challenges.

As earlier noted, the ethno-religious tension also played out during the pre-election and election period for the 2019 general elections. It may be too earlier to postulate on the dynamics of the ethnic-religious cleavages that the Buhari-led government that recently won re-election may confront as the President took up the mantle of leadership for his second term. Yet, if past experiences and the lack of political will power to tackle the challenges by successive Nigeria is to be used as a yardstick, then the most likely projection would be a worst case scenario. This projection may become a reality unless the Nigerian government summon the political will to frontally address the grievances that undergird the agitations. This assertion is not far-fetched as Angerbrandt rightly noted that the outcome of elections heightened local polarization and intersected with local grievance given that successive Nigerian presidents have tended to rely on and distribute positions to their ethnic groups as a form of patronage; a major contributory factor for mobilisation along ethnic lines while also pitting the Northern Muslim dominated region against the Southern Christian dominated region.

Ethno-Religious Crises and the Implications for Post-Election Peacebuilding in Nigeria

The forth republic is remarkable in that it is the first time in Nigeria’s political history that the country witnessed two decades of uninterrupted democratic experience that started since May 29, 1999. Yet, the two decades of democratic sojourn, after the end of military rule, have been accompanied by recurrent incidents of ethno-religious, community and resource-related conflicts. Some commentators opined that many of these crises arose from flaws in the 1999 constitution, distorted use of wealth resulting from oil revenue and the operation of a deeply flawed federal and electoral system.

As Sklar aptly contended, the politicization of ethnicity since Nigeria’s independence has truncated the quest for cultural and political

45 Angerbrandt, 2018
46 Attoh and Soyombo, 2011
unity, or national integration. Successive Nigerian government have designed various peacebuilding measures to address the perceived sense of marginalization among the various ethnic groups. The African Centre for Strategic Studies (ACSS) noted that in the efforts to allay the fear of the minority and their exclusion from the political process on the basis of ethnicity and religion, the Nigerian government experimented with institutional and legal measures which have met with mixed success. A case in point, according to ACSS was the Federal Character Commission (FCC), a statutory body established in 1996 to provide affirmative action and promote equity in public appointments through the so called “indigene certificates,” a practice recognized by Nigeria’s constitution. The Federal Character principle allows residents who are indigenous to a particular area to enjoy rights including the ability to own land and access to education and government employment, that are denied to non-indigenes.

However, the possession of the “indigene” certificate is perceived as a license to socioeconomic advancement for indigenes while people who may have lived in a jurisdiction for generations would still be deemed “a settler.” It is in this context that Kwaja contended that Nigeria’s systems of political power sharing and resource allocation further entrench the country’s multiple fault-lines. Thus, Mustapha opined that in the heated competition for resources and power, politicians have to resort to radicalising their ethnic base to have access to the oil wealth. For this reason, contest for political supremacy has been seen as a means of gaining access to the national wealth, which Joseph aptly described as Nigeria’s brand of prebendal politics; an unremitting and unconstrained struggle for possession and access to state resources.

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48 ACSS, 2015
49 Ibid.
50 Kwaja, 2011
the sharing of the federal revenue has been a contentious political issue. To lend credence to this assertion, Olurode argued that the competition for oil wealth set in motion new forms of ethnic rivalry and conflict.\textsuperscript{53}

Another lackadaisical peacebuilding efforts of the government centred on state creation. Within this context, the establishment of regional or federal structure of three units, that is the North, West and East regions was constructed to accommodate the identities of the major ethnic formation, Hausa-Fulani, (North) Yoruba (West) and Ibo (East) without adequately capturing the ethnic minority components.\textsuperscript{54} One of the consequences of the establishment of this federal structure is the incessant minority agitation for their own autonomy and the growing feelings of nationalism among these groups. The attempt by the government to address the imbalance tripartite ethnoregional structure with the creation of Mid-Western state did not yield any positive result, rather it encouraged ethno-regional polarization and collapsed into bipolar north-south confrontation.\textsuperscript{55}

Indeed, Osaghae and Suberu, explained that the Nigerian government solution was the dissolution of the four regions into twelve state, later to nineteen and finally thirty-six states rather than restructuring the lopsided structure of the Nigerian federalism.\textsuperscript{56} This would have required addressing the minority question, perhaps through the creation of sub-federal regional units. While state creation was envisaged as creating equality between the majority and minority ethnic groups, in practice it has reproduced the extant inequalities that have been historically structured into the construction of the Nigerian state.\textsuperscript{57} Hence, Mustapha noted that since resources such as grants, jobs, scholarships, social infrastructure, public investments, and so on are shared on the basis of territorially defined states and local governments, the ethnic majority groups who control the preponderant numbers of these units continue

\textit{Fall of the Second Republic. Ibadan: Spectrum books.}
\textsuperscript{54} Abiodun, 2012)
\textsuperscript{55} Osaghae and Suberu, 2005
\textsuperscript{56} Ibid.
to enjoy a substantial share. The sharing formula further increases their already accumulated advantages.\textsuperscript{58}

In terms of rotation of power, the then ruling party, Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) jettisoning of the power sharing arrangement (zoning formula) devised by their northern and southern political elites in 1999 in the attempt to resolve the zero-sum approaches to politics further complicated the ethnic contestation. In this sense, the “gentleman’s agreement” reached by the political elites of PDP in terms of rotating the presidency between the North and South allowed Olusegun Obasanjo, a southerner, to rule from 1999 to 2007.\textsuperscript{59} In line with the spirit of the arrangement, Umaru Musa Yar’Adua, a northerner, took over the mantle of leadership from Obasanjo in 2007 but later died in office in 2010. The death of Yar’Adua paved way for Goodluck Jonathan, the then Vice President and a Christian from the South, to assume leadership and secure his party’s nomination to contest the 2011 presidential elections which he won.\textsuperscript{60} Jonathan declaration of his intention to contest after the end of his tenure in acting capacity nearly triggered an ethnic war between the predominantly Muslim North and the Christian dominated South south region where Jonathan hailed from.\textsuperscript{61}

For the people of the ethnic minority of the Niger Delta region, Jonathan assuming the mantle of Nigerian leadership provided a rare opportunity for the deprived oil-rich region to access power and resources at the Centre for the first time in Nigeria. Although Jonathan won the 2011 election, the euphoria that accompanied his victory in his region soon waned when it became glaring that he seemed to be ‘clueless’ in finding lasting solution to the marginalization of the people of the oil-rich Niger Delta region, beyond cosmetic measures as pacifying few political elites and militants through monetary inducement. Not surprising that Jonathan’s second term bid failed, particularly given the Northerners determination to ensure that power return to the North.

\textsuperscript{58} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{59} ACSS, 2015
\textsuperscript{60} Ibid.
Many Nigerians perceived the victory of Muhammadu Buhari, in the 2015 Presidential election as depicting a ray of hope for Northerners and Nigeria in general. This expectation was not unconnected with the failure of the Jonathan-led government to make any meaningful progress in tackling the security challenges confronting the Nigerian state. However, while the Buhari-led administration has made some gains in managing the security challenges, particularly the war on terror, there have been various agitations by the diverse ethnic groups linked to the perceived favoritism of Northerners in the appointment of key government officials in the Buhari government. Apart from the resurgence of agitations by the Niger Delta militants, and the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), Nigeria has been confronting other security threat, notably the farmer and herder’s conflict, and banditry, especially in the North and middle belt. In spite of Buhari military background, the security situation has continue to be in a dire state.

The transition to democracy is seen as the instrumentality for addressing monopolization of power by ‘single ethnic group’ or a ‘group of ethnic groups’ in the country as well as the restoration of political stability in a multi-ethnic society. In the case of Nigeria, segregation along ethnic division is employed to discriminate not because of the superiority of a particular ethnic group over another but in competition to control the economic spoil of the nation–state. The activities of the ethnic militias and ethnic nationalities which include the violent protest of the Niger delta over the perceived injustice for resource control and true federalism; the menace of Oodua People’s Congress and its accompanying violence, particularly in Lagos and Shagamu areas; the formation of Arewa People’s Congress (APC) to protect northern interest; the Movement for the Sovereign state of Biafra (MASSOB) agitation for Biafran state; and the recent insurgency of the Boko Haram, Farmer/herder conflict and banditry in the Northern part of the country, are indication of the intense ethnic contestation for the control of resource and power in the present democratic dispensation.

One frightening dimension to these manifestations, as Akinwumi rightly noted is the unprecedented rate at which ethno-religious and ethno-regional bent are used to advance the cause of these groupings,

62 Mahmudat, 2010
resulting in violent ethnic and religious conflicts across the country.\(^{63}\) The implication of this ethnic distrust and alienation is that it became one of the strong bases for conflictual identity formation and discriminatory practice as exemplified in recent ethno-religious crisis in Kano in 1953 and 1966, Maitatsine religious crisis in 1980, Jos-Pleateau carnage in 2001, Sharia crisis in 2000, Kaduna and ethno-religious crisis in many parts of the nation as well as the reprisal attacks in the south in places like Shagamu in 1999 among others.\(^{64}\)

To underscore the deadly incidences of violence in the country, Jega noted that Nigeria had witnessed forty major civil disturbances in the form of ethno-religious and commercial clashes between 1999 and 2002.\(^{65}\) In mid-2005 alone, it was estimated that at least 50,000 people have been killed in various incidents of ethnic, religious and communal violence and between 2009 and 2012, the incidence of Boko Haram has threatened the national co-existence of ethnic groups in Nigeria.\(^{66}\) Both the Boko Haram insurgency and Farmer and herders conflict have been ranked as the most deadly attacks in Africa in recent report of the Global Terrorist Index. Thousands of lives and properties were lost in the incessant violence across the country thereby impacting negatively on the security of the people, undermining development and also constituting a threat to national security, stability and integration.

The “North-South, Muslim-Christian” dichotomies were invoked by the political elites and exploited in the fierce competition for public office and control over resources that can support the extensive patronage networks that have dominated Nigerian politics.\(^{67}\) Many Muslim communities have turned to religious institutions for redress

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64 Osaghae and Suberu, 2005
for the perceived marginalization of the majority of northerners in the region ranked as one of the poorest with a ranking of 86% poverty incidence. Evidently, Islamist-based insurgencies in parts of northern Nigeria predates Boko Haram. In the absent of a comprehensive solution to the region’s grievances, extremist ideologies will live on even after the group is defeated militarily. It has been aptly argued that ethnicity and religion are not the driving force behind Nigeria’s conflicts but rather narratives politicized to mobilize support for economic, regional, and political goals.

Therefore, it is hardly debatable that there is problem with power relations in Nigeria politics. The emerging scenarios in the ongoing democratic dispensation indicate that the heated competition for access to the centre has not in the least abated. Rather, the three dominant ethnic groups, particularly the north has continue to pursue their vested interest to gain control of the Center at the expense of the other ethnic groups, not deterred by the heated opposition by others. In this sense, Ajani and Aluko noted that the propaganda of the Northern oligarchy is that the South has always being in control of economic power and to balance the equation, the North must hold on the political power. Abiodun, thus, observed that the North-South divide depict a picture of a marginalized south arising from the control of the political machinery of the state by the North over a long period of time. For instance the annulment of the June 12, 1993 election acclaimed to have been won by MKO Abiola from the Yoruba south-western region by the Northern military era of General Ibrahim Babangida, had raised speculation about the deliberate scheme of the Hausa-Fulani major ethnic group to hold on to power at the expense of other major ethnic groups.

The emergence of Olusegun Obasanjo who won the 1999 Presidential election under the platform of the then ruling party, PDP was perceived

69 Aapengnuo, 2010
70 Ajani and Aluko, 2009
71 Abiodun, 2012
72 Ibid.
as a tactic to pacify the aggrieved Yoruba for the June 12 debacle. Yet, some scholars contended that the northern oligarchy have come to see power as their own inalienable right while the other ethnic groups remain in servitude.\textsuperscript{73} In retrospect, the fact that power has often been monopolized by the three dominant ethnic nationalities has also meant that the minority groups have been marginalized in the rat race for power.

This bring into fore the ineptitude of the political leadership in the abysmal state of affairs that has become embedded in the political process. As Paden pointed out, the many security challenges witnessed in Nigeria, from the resources control conflict in the Niger Delta region, incessant ethno-religious crisis to the recent Boko Haram terror attack in the northeast and farmer and herders conflicts are reflections of the government’s inability to provide an effective system of equitable distribution, manage ethno-religious relations, uphold accountable governance, and exercise the responsibility to protect its population.\textsuperscript{74}

To achieve durable peace, Deng (1997) suggested that a pluralistic state like Nigeria need to develop norms and means for managing diversity within a framework of unity. He added that advancing such a vision will entail measures that directly mitigate violence as well as constitutional reform to address perceptions of marginalization which unfortunately has so far not been factored into the electoral discourse. The expectation that Buhari’s victory in the 2015 Presidential elections offer a prospect to find lasting solution to the deep-seated ethno-religious fierce contestation, given his acclaimed leadership qualities and integrity of character has so far remained elusive.

As Buhari assume office for his second term, there is mixed feelings about his capacity to frontally tackle the enormous challenges bedeviling the country deeply divided along ethnic and religious lines. To succeed in resolving the intractable suspicion and rivalry between the

\textsuperscript{73} Op cit.

northerners and southerners, Buhari will require the concerted attention of political leaders and their support to made fundamental reforms. So far, this seem to remain a forlorn expectation.

A case in point is the post-elections violence in the north that occurred in the wake of the April 2011 elections in Nigeria. The violence nearly ravaged fourteen northern states and claimed about 1,000 lives. Another post-election violence would have accompanied the 2015 general election, if not for the timely intervention of the Abubakar-led National Peace Committee that forestalled the eruption of violence. The intense ethno-religious tensions that permeated the polity during the 2015 pre-elections cycle was widely perceived as a precursor to elections and post-elections violence that was capable of leading to the disintegration of the Nigerian state. It is for this reason that the Abubakar-led National Peace Committee initiated pre and post elections peacebuilding measures to pre-empt the likelihood of post-elections violence. The pressure mounted on the Nigerian government by the international community to ensure a credible and violent free elections also helped to avert the post-elections violence. To consolidate on the efforts of the National Peace committee and the International Community, the need for the Buhari government to devise and utilised much more innovative strategies to effectively manage ethno-religious crises cannot be overemphasized.

It is hardly contentious that this situation of ethnic tensions and conflict between the diverse ethnic nationalities in Nigeria has grave implications for post-elections peacebuilding in Nigeria. It also has the tendency to lead to the fragmentation of the country, taking into cognisance the intelligence report from the United States of America, which warned that Nigeria may disintegrate within the next 15 years. The recent study conducted by the Air University in the United States that ranked Nigeria among the five least peaceful countries in Africa and concluded that Nigeria is likely to be a failed state by 2030, cannot be ignored.

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This view is buttressed by Maier submission that the vicious cycle of violence and instability that permeates the country threatens the survival and stability of the nation. It is not surprising that there has been persistent agitation for the political restructuring of the country as a panacea for addressing the ethno-religious challenges. This assertion is premised on the argument that the lop-sided political structure is to be blamed for the intense ethno-religious crises in Nigeria. The extent to which political restructuring can tackle the intense ethno-religious crises in Nigeria is debatable. Nevertheless, one need to highlight that in designing an effective measures to tackle ethno-religious challenges, peacebuilding efforts should be transformative, ensuring fairness and equity for the diverse ethnic groups and inclusiveness in the political system.

Conclusion

The instability in the polity arising from ethno-religious crises constitutes a threat to the consolidation of democracy and national integration in Nigeria. The widening disparities in access to socio-economic opportunities, insecurity, corruption, politics of exclusion of the vast majority of the populace and enrichment of the few, politicization of ethnicity and religion has led to loss of confidence among the citizens in the Nigerian state. The ultimate test of legitimation resides in people’s fulfillment of their needs, aspirations, value and interest. The centrifugal tendencies of the elites erode the bases of good governance and lead to a crisis of legitimacy which is an indication of state failure and collapse and poses a threat to national integration. This implies that intra-class struggle among factions of Nigerian elites have manifested in the manipulation of ethnicity and religion as tools to advance parochial and sectional interests of the dominant ruling class. The resultant effect has been crisis of legitimacy to the detriment of good governance and national integration.

78 Osaghae and Suberu, 2005
The implication is that without a veneer of legitimacy, the government is alienated from the society. A situation of legitimacy crisis arises when citizenship rights and benefits are largely denied, and the states seem out of reach, and this lead to the emergence and rise of sub-national identities that constitute a platform of resistance against the state. This is exemplified by the militancy in the oil-rich Niger Delta where youths are vandalizing oil installations, kidnapping and oil theft is widespread and the recent phenomenon of Boko Haram terrorist, Farmer and Herders and Banditry in the North. The electoral violence that characterized elections in Nigeria is a major dimension of the problem. The ill-wind blowing across the country manifested in these security challenges and undermined the gains made in Nigeria’s electoral process and democracy.

Although the efforts of the Abubakar-led Peace Committee and the international community succeeded in averting the post-elections violence that would have accompanied the 2015 elections, the ensuing peace was negative. This underscore the need for the Buhari’s administration to take urgent and purposeful steps to effective tackle the ethno-religious challenges. To be successful in this enormous task, the leader must be nationalist in outlook in the sense that he defines or sees himself as a Nigerian first and foremost rather than a member of a particular ethnic group. Such a leader would be totally devoid of nepotism and ethnicity and consequently sees all the other ethnic groups in Nigeria as partners in the Nigerian project.

The problem of ethnicity and religion is so pervasive in Nigeria because successive Nigerian leaders are more of an ethnic leaders such that they usually identify with their ethnic and religion groups first, and then Nigeria. Even at the state level, the tendency to afford ethnicity and religion primacy over nationhood predominates. This is more so, even during elections which one may term general selections, rather than general election in the sense that gubernatorial candidates for the parties were usually selected mainly on ethnic considerations.

Indeed, the need to urgently address the ethno-religious challenges becomes more glaring. The effective management of ethno-nationalist agitation is central to the attainment of successful peacebuilding, democratic consolidation and national integration in Nigeria. Finding
lasting solution to the ethno-religious crisis will go a long way in refuting the projection by the United States intelligence report that the Nigerian state may disintegrate in the near future. This will necessitate devising innovative measures that is based on the tripartite principles of fairness, equity and justice to tackle the precarious ethno-religious problem, if the country is not to disintegrate in the future.

Such proactive measures must be designed to address drivers and root causes of ethno-religious crises. Post-elections peacebuilding would be undermined if there is no concerted efforts to build institutions and capacities of individuals, communities and authorities to address drivers of ethno-religious conflicts. Successful peacebuilding efforts will also enhance social cohesion and build trust among ethnic and religion groups. It will also build trust in and boost the legitimacy of the government.

Concerted efforts through strategic interventions that address the underlying causes or drivers and consequences of ethno-religious conflicts will contribute to restoring social contracts between the state and the people, through the building of institutions and the delivery of services, and strengthening inter- and intra-ethnic social cohesion. They may include activities that facilitate inclusive participation in political processes, dialogue and reconciliation, or strengthening of access to justice and human security. The national resources that is fiercely contested should be accessible to the diverse ethnic and religion groups in a manner that is perceived as addressing inequalities, marginalization and grievances. This will no doubt create incentives for non-violent behavior, allay the fear of the minorities’ ethnic groups and begin the process of instilling trust in institutions. It may also address grievances that underlie or trigger violent ethno-religious conflict and offer a means for the state to reach out to society and rebuild its legitimacy and systems of accountability.
Gendering the African Union’s Women, Peace and Security Architecture

Nothando Maphalala

Abstract

The current iteration of women, peace and security tends to treat women as a homogenous and monolithic group which lends credence to the assumption that women’s participation in peace processes is synonymous with fulfilling a gender perspective. This paper argues that this gender blindness is problematic because it reinforces assumptions about capacities and needs which directly affects how marginalized women and men are included in conflict resolutions processes. With an aim to advance the WPS conceptualization and praxis, this paper calls for an intersectional approach that focuses on “marginalization” rather than “sex.”

I have something to say...Please do not forget me.

Statement to the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission from a 19 year old witness

Diversifying the table: Intersectionality and the women, peace and security agenda

Every January, over 55 African women’s rights organizations–gather for the Gender is My Agenda (GIMAC) consultative meeting in Addis Ababa at the margins of the African Union summit. Feminist movement building has always been imperative for gender equality advocacy and GIMAC is a convergence of 2 key forces: local dynamics and global policy. In 2017, following the AU theme of the year on youth, GIMAC discussed the role of young women in peace and security. There was consensus about the need to increase young women’s inclusion, integration and empowerment. However, the sessions lacked

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1 UN Women, 2018, Progress Study on Youth, Peace and Security
the robustness that has always carried the women’s rights movement when political will wouldn’t: from the glaring omission of diversity within discussions on inclusion, the silence of men which perpetuated the notion that only women represent so-called women’s issues, to gender clichés like women as “natural peacemakers” and intrinsically “peace loving” repeated uncritically to justify the inclusion of women in conflict resolution. I left the 2-day meeting with a sense of “feminist fatigue”\(^2\); that if the meeting was emblematic of the state of the women, peace and security (WPS) agenda, it is marked by pockets of progress but also inertia.

The adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 in 2000 was monumental for a transformational agenda which, among others, offers an opportunity to address the nexus of militarized power and gendered inequalities. The Resolution hinges on 4 pillars: 1) the prevention of violence against women and girls in conflict and other situations of insecurity; 2) the protection of women and girls from sexual and gender-based violence, including in humanitarian situations; 3) the participation of women at all levels of decision-making in the prevention, management, resolution of conflict and peacebuilding processes and; 4) relief and recovery in post-conflict reconstruction and development. Since 2000, 8 subsequent resolutions have deepened the WPS Agenda. Countries were encouraged to develop national actions plans (NAPs)- as of September 2018, 23 African countries had developed NAPs- on how they would institutionalize gender equality in their defense activities. Regional bodies such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union, and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)- incorporated the agenda to their defense and security policies.

Since 2000 the 1325 marketplace has grown exponentially- from donor funding for WPS programming to the mainstreaming of gender mainstreaming; “women, peace and security” is now firmly lodged in the public policy lexicon. However, upon closer inspection the superficial nature of this commitment is exposed: while 76 UN Member States have developed National Action Plans only 17 have an allocated

\(^2\) Stern, M. 2009. Feminist fatigue(s): Reflections on feminism and familiar fables of militarization.
budget for its implementation (as of September 2018). In addition to the divestment from gender and peacebuilding to the more politically viable violent extremism, a study by the Association for Women’s Rights and Development (AWID) found that the spotlight on women has not led to a proportionate impact on improving the funding situation for women’s organizations.

Data from AWID’s 2011 global survey of over 1000 women’s organizations found that these organizations are primarily reliant on project support rather than on long term flexible funding, with 48% of respondents to AWID’s survey reporting never having received core funding and 52% never having received multi-year funding.

Additionally, 1325 spurred a surge of academic and policy interest on sexual violence in conflict. This focused exclusively on sexual violence against women perpetrated by men, often to the exclusion of other types of violence such “everyday” domestic violence, sexual violence committed by civilians, sexual violence against men, and sexual violence committed by armed females.

Yet UNSCR 1325 is perhaps the most significant political success of women peace activists because it globally asserts the role of women in peace building processes. According to Hernes there are three global trends that have contributed to the focus on participation of women in politics; “the human rights revolution”, “the diffusion of democracy”; and “the growing acceptance of gender equality”. In the years following the adoption of 1325, regional and international intergovernmental organisations, supported by NGOs, have coalesced around awareness raising of the resolution. However, women’s organizations- like those of women’s International League of Peace and Freedom. 2018. https://www.peacewomen.org/member-states


present at the GIMAC meeting- working on 1325 are often placed outside official decision-making. As such women’s participation is at the level of the informal and many struggle to increase women’s participation in higher decision-making bodies. The advocacy on women’s increased participation involves 2 parallel processes: women are recruited, and the increased influence of women’s groups and activists, and acknowledgement of the importance of so-called women’s issues, by decision-making bodies.

The concept of empowerment is central in the discussion of women’s participation in conflict resolution. Empowerment refers to the process by which those who have been denied the ability to make choices acquire such ability.\(^7\) In mediation, where women have been marginalised, one precondition for the inclusion of women is to empower women. The concept of empowerment can be explored through three interlinked dimensions: agency, resources and achievements. Whereas agency refers to how choice is put into effect, resources are the medium through which the agency is exercised. Achievement refers to the outcome of agency.

Quotas and quota systems have been viewed as an empowering tool in engendering participation in governance. The Beijing Platform for Action sets the bar at 30%, “which provides the critical mass necessary to allow women to influence political culture, endorse gender-sensitive policies and uphold women’s rights.”\(^8\) As a related development, women in politics are often then structurally prepositioned to speak on so-called women’s issues and engage in particular forms of participation seen as feminine. The 2013 SADC Gender Monitor found that there is “an alarming trend of feminization of deputy positions, which, while possibly giving women experience and signalling correct male/female proportions, provides limited power and control for women in these decision-making positions.”\(^9\)

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9 SADC. 2013. Gender Monitor.p.13
At the African Union, 1325 spurred rhetorical currency and institutional commitment. In 2010, the Peace and Security Council commissioned a study on women in armed conflict. Following its recommendations, then Chairperson Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma established an Office of the Special Envoy on Women, Peace and Security to lead the advocacy on WPS and appointed veteran gender activist, Bineta Diop, to the role. The Office engages in high-level advocacy with the aim of narrowing the gap between policy and praxis.\(^{10}\) The African Union’s WPS efforts to include women have also included gender mainstreaming (through the African Union Gender Policy), and capacity building through the launch of the Network of Women in Conflict Prevention and Mediation, “FemWise Africa” – under the umbrella of the AU Panel of the Wise.

How those who implement the WPS architecture define “gender” has practical implications for policy development. The African Union’s WPS agenda is underpinned by a liberal, women-centered perspective which focuses on the exclusion and underrepresentation of women as its foundational starting point. While the argument for women’s inclusion, because they represent 50% of the population is important, it is potentially superficial when it is bolstered by gender stereotypes (i.e., women are “naturally peace loving” etc).\(^{11}\) Furthermore, while increased representation expands an organization or body it does not necessarily imply that a structural transformation has taken place. Secondly, broadening the political space (or more aptly, adding more chairs to the peace table) does not necessarily lead to a broadening of perspectives. Thirdly, this approach does not represent any fundamental contestation to the established norms in peace and security but rather serves to “make war safe for women.”\(^{12}\)

Silencing the guns and building peace, while interconnected, are separate processes. Violent conflict may be ended at the negotiation


\(^{11}\) Stern, M. 2009. Feminist fatigue(s): Reflections on feminism and familiar fables of militarization.

table, but sustained peace is in addressing the social, political and economic conditions that led to war then buttressed by a solid social contract. From this sustaining peace paradigm, greater inclusivity is the starting point—not objective—of more resilient peace agreements.

Historically, war has always been gendered: militarism as the terrain of men was in exerting violence (Cockburn writes “killing and being killed, in the name of nation as the ultimate badge of honour and manhood”) and negotiating peace while women were victimised by war becoming rape victims or war widows and thus in need of protection. Yet, the study of peace and security has been spectacularly un-gendered. While feminists have attempted to provide a gendered lens of security, Cynthia Weber describes how scholars outside the traditional International Relations discipline have been made into “intellectual immigrants”.

1325 makes gender the focal category of political, social and economic marginalization. However, marginalization is not confined to women nor is it universal among women. Conflict tends to exacerbate those who are already marginalized; whether they are male or female. But the dominant, liberal framework explores diversity between men and women rather than amongst men and women. This lends relevance to an understanding of gender that incorporates intersectionality and supports a relational understanding of gender not exclusively focused on women.

The American civil rights advocate Kimberle Crenshaw coined the term “intersectionality” to mean:

The view that women experience oppression in varying configurations and in varying degrees of intensity. Cultural patterns of oppression are not only interrelated but are bound together and influenced by the intersectional systems of society. Examples of this include race, gender, class, ability and ethnicity. (Crenshaw, K 1991)

14 Weber, C. Why is there no queer
Crenshaw makes a case for using intersectionality, as a framework, for analyzing political, sexual and economic (in)justice. While the WPS agenda emphasizes the centering of gender it simultaneously de-centres other critical categories of analysis needed for a nuanced understanding of the role of gender in war and peace. An intersectional analysis would begin at gendered vulnerabilities and explore how multiple identity makers (race, class, ability, marital status, urban/rural setting and ethnicity) compound vulnerability. Viewing insecurity from this lens offers a contribution to how policy-makers may view human security more broadly.

The focus on which sex should have a place at the table based on their unique gendered standpoints based on multiple social categories created by conflict might be able to contribute towards a sustained peace.

The violence of war typically leads to loss of life, loss of livelihood, poverty, humiliation and frustration, failures of governance, political manipulation, and breakdown of inter-communal relations; in turn these effects generate further manifestations of violence, including, for example, domestic and sexual abuse, alcoholism and drug abuse, depression, suicide, armed criminality, and adherence to militias. These in turn reinforce poverty and humiliation, further embedding conditions which perpetuate war, and leading to a general reduction in social cohesion and social capital, rendering the communities concerned vulnerable to continuing fragmentation. Gender identities are deeply implicated in this cycle, being key factors in people’s perceptions of their social roles and positions. This suggests that they must equally be implicated in the processes whereby societies pull out of conflict cycles to build peace.16

Intersectionality is gaining momentum as an integral part of peacebuilding practice (and easily identifiable within the context of conflict-related displacement) however, it has not become mainstream in conflict resolution. The AU is in the position to advance a WPS agenda that centralises “gender” underpinned by intersectionality.

Today, we are beginning to recognize that the presence of women does not necessarily make an agenda or policy more woman-centered much less a force for addressing systemic gender inequalities but the presence of women and men from marginalized groups is critical to gender-sensitive outcomes.

**Recommendations**

1. **Changing the conceptual lens.** Incorporating an intersectional lens to analyses of conflict takes the analysis beyond “toys for the boys” and compels an analysis that tackles broader socio-cultural conditions that underpin the normalization of violence in our lives. An intersectional approach personalizes our concept of peace and security, conflict ceases to be a far-away activity concerned with arms, and expenditure.

2. **Include men and boys especially marginalized men and boys.** The literal interpretation of women, peace and security perpetuates the perception that the agenda is only a women’s rights issue rather than a security issue. In the UN resolutions on WPS, men and boys are consistently limited to “engaging” men and boys rather than a sustained involvement and treatment of men and masculinities. Men and boys (particularly marginalized men and boys) need to be engaged meaningfully beyond the creation of a cadre of “good men” or “allies.”

3. **Participation beyond the “usual suspects”.** Women engaged in policy-making need to be representative of diverse populations and policy-making organs should avoid relying on a cadre or elite of familiar participants.

4. **Locate WPS agenda in the broader Sustained Peace agenda.** Security concerns and the WPS agenda should be addressed by the AU Peace and Security Department as a single set of problems. In view of promoting comprehensive and sustainable security, the Peace and Security Council should not only include WPS issues in the mandate of the Femwise Secretariat but also integrate the Femwise mandate within the entire spectrum of its activities from early warning, to conflict analysis.
Nothando Maphalala is a member of the FemWise network. She writes in her personal capacity.

Sources


Gendering the African Union’s Women, Peace and Security Architecture

Nothando Maphalala

Abstract

The current iteration of women, peace and security tends to treat women as a homogenous and monolithic group which lends credence to the assumption that women’s participation in peace processes is synonymous with fulfilling a gender perspective. This paper argues that this gender blindness is problematic because it reinforces assumptions about capacities and needs which directly affects how marginalized women and men are included in conflict resolutions processes. With an aim to advance the WPS conceptualization and praxis, this paper calls for an intersectional approach that focuses on “marginalization” rather than “sex.”

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The concept of empowerment is central in the discussion of women’s participation in conflict resolution. Empowerment refers to the process by which those who have been denied the ability to make choices acquire such ability.\(^7\) In mediation, where women have been marginalised, one precondition for the inclusion of women is to empower women. The concept of empowerment can be explored through three interlinked dimensions: agency, resources and achievements. Whereas agency refers to how choice is put into effect, resources are the medium through which the agency is exercised. Achievement refers to the outcome of agency.

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\(^8\) R. Sigsoworth & L. Kumalo 2016. Women, peace and security: Implementing the Maputo Protocol in Africa. p. 17
\(^9\) SADC. 2013. Gender Monitor. p.13
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approach does not represent any fundamental contestation to the established norms in peace and security but rather serves to “make war safe for women.”

Silencing the guns and building peace, while interconnected, are separate processes. Violent conflict may be ended at the negotiation table, but sustained peace is in addressing the social, political and economic conditions that led to war then buttressed by a solid social contract. From this sustaining peace paradigm, greater inclusivity is the starting point- not objective-of more resilient peace agreements.

Historically, war has always been gendered: militarism as the terrain of men was in exerting violence (Cockburn writes “killing and being killed, in the name of nation as the ultimate badge of honour and manhood” and negotiating peace while women were victimised by war becoming rape victims or war widows and thus in need of protection. Yet, the study of peace and security has been spectacularly un-gendered. While feminists have attempted to provide a gendered lens of security, Cynthia Weber describes how scholars outside the traditional International Relations discipline have been made into “intellectual immigrants”.

1325 makes gender the focal category of political, social and economic marginalization. However, marginalization is not confined to women nor is it universal among women. Conflict tends to exacerbate those who are already marginalized; whether they are male or female. But the dominant, liberal framework explores diversity between men and wom-

14 Weber, C. Why is there no queer
en rather than *amongst* men and women. This lends relevance to an understanding of gender that incorporates intersectionality and supports a relational understanding of gender not exclusively focused on women.

The American civil rights advocate Kimberle Crenshaw coined the term “intersectionality” to mean:

> The view that women experience oppression in varying configurations and in varying degrees of intensity. Cultural patterns of oppression are not only interrelated but are bound together and influenced by the intersectional systems of society. Examples of this include race, gender, class, ability and ethnicity.\(^\text{15}\) (Crenshaw, K 1991)

Crenshaw makes a case for using intersectionality, as a framework, for analyzing political, sexual and economic (in)justice. While the WPS agenda emphasizes the centering of gender it simultaneously de-centres other critical categories of analysis needed for a nuanced understanding of the role of gender in war and peace. An intersectional analysis would begin at gendered vulnerabilities and explore how multiple identity makers (race, class, ability, marital status, urban/rural setting and ethnicity) compound vulnerability. Viewing insecurity from this lens offers a contribution to how policy-makers may view human security more broadly.

The focus on which sex should have a place at the table based on their unique gendered standpoints based on multiple social categories created by conflict might be able to contribute towards a sustained peace.

The violence of war typically leads to loss of life, loss of livelihood, poverty, humiliation and frustration, failures of governance, political manipulation, and breakdown of inter-communal relations; in turn these effects generate further manifestations of violence, including, for example, domestic and sexual abuse, alcoholism and drug abuse, depression, suicide, armed criminality, and adherence to militias. These in turn reinforce poverty and humiliation, further embedding conditions which perpetuate war, and leading to a general reduction in social cohesion and social capital, rendering the communities concerned vulnerable to continuing fragmentation. Gender identities are deeply implicated in this cycle, being key factors in people’s perceptions of their social roles and positions. This suggests that they must equally be implicated in the processes whereby societies pull out of conflict cycles to build peace.¹⁶

Intersectionality is gaining momentum as an integral part of peacebuilding practice (and easily identifiable within the context of conflict-related displacement) however, it has not become mainstream in conflict resolution. The AU is in the position to advance a WPS agenda that centralises “gender” underpinned by intersectionality. Today, we are beginning to recognize that the presence of women does not necessarily make an agenda or policy more woman-centered much less a force for addressing systemic gender inequalities but the presence of women and men from marginalized groups is critical to gender-sensitive outcomes.

Recommendations

1. *Changing the conceptual lens.* Incorporating an intersectional lens to analyses of conflict takes the analysis beyond “toys for the boys” and compels an analysis that tackles broader socio-cultural conditions that underpin the normalization of violence in our lives. An intersectional approach personalizes our concept of peace and security, conflict ceases to be a far-away activity concerned with arms, and expenditure.

2. *Include men and boys especially marginalized men and boys.* The literal interpretation of women, peace and security perpetuates the perception that the agenda is only a women’s rights issue rather than a security issue. In the UN resolutions on WPS, men and boys are consistently limited to “engaging” men and boys rather than a sustained involvement and treatment of men and masculinities. Men and boys (particularly marginalized men and boys) need to be engaged meaningfully beyond the creation of a cadre of “good men” or “allies.”

3. *Participation beyond the “usual suspects.”* Women engaged in policy-making need to be representative of diverse populations and policy-making organs should avoid relying on a cadre or elite of familiar participants.

4. *Locate WPS agenda in the broader Sustained Peace agenda.* Security concerns and the WPS agenda should be addressed by the AU Peace and Security Department as a single set of problems. In view of promoting comprehensive and sustainable security, the Peace and Security Council should not only include WPS issues in the mandate of the Femwise Secretariat but also integrate the Femwise mandate within the entire
spectrum of its activities from early warning, to conflict analysis.

Nothando Maphalala is a member of the FemWise network. She writes in her personal capacity.
Executive Summary

Elections are a hallmark of democracy and their enshrinement within the governance architecture of most African states has become institutionalised, especially since the third wave of democratisation that swept across the continent in the late 80s and early 90s. Electoral processes on the continent are however often plagued with controversy as they are accompanied by serious tensions and violence. Instead of being an instrument of conflict prevention in their role of legitimising representative democratic governance, elections in the African context have become drivers and enablers of conflict and channels through which broader political, socio-economic, religious, tribal and regional conflicts are expressed. While the international community, especially through international organisations, have remained engaged in supporting peaceful and credible elections in Africa, the quality of electoral governance has not necessarily improved, especially in regard to curbing violence. This paper argues that beyond technical assistance and election observation, the international community must deepen its political engagement in electoral peacebuilding using high-level diplomatic channels to assist with building effective long-term structures for inclusivity and conflict resolution to forestall electoral excesses and violence.
Introduction

Elections, being periodic processes through which the people elect their leaders, are a fundamental aspect of democracy, which almost all African states have embraced as the agreed form of government. The importance of elections is articulated by the African Union in the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance and several sub-regional instruments agreed upon by sub-regional groupings such as ECOWAS, SADC, the ECCAS and the EAC. While holding elections does not in itself make a country democratic, peaceful and credible elections are a crucial institution in competitive, participatory political processes that confer legitimacy to the governing elite.

In many countries on the African continent, the democratic project continues to suffer major setbacks, especially as almost every electoral cycle is accompanied by significant tensions and serious concerns regarding the process’s credibility. Recent elections in Kenya

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2 There is an extensive number of legal and policy instruments that have been adopted by the African Union (AU) and other sub-regional bodies that outline the principles that are expected to be upheld in elections held by member states. The Economic Community for West Africa (ECOWAS) adopted the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance in 2001 to supplement the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security (1999); the Southern African Development Cooperation (SADC) adopted its SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections; The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), under the auspices of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Question in Central Africa, adopted the Bata Declaration for the Promotion of Lasting Democracy, Peace and Development in Central Africa (1998); The East African Community (EAC) is in the process of finalising its Draft Protocol on Good Governance as a framework for governance issues in the EAC that would include the conduct of elections.

3 See the African Union Declaration on the Principles Governing Democratic Election in Africa (2002). This Declaration recognises that democratic elections are the basis of the authority of any representative government and that regular elections are a key element of democratisation.
(2017), Zimbabwe (2018), Cameroon (2018), the Democratic Republic of Congo (2019) and Nigeria (2019) have all been marred by significant tensions and violence that in most cases, led to loss of lives. There is empirical data to support the proposition that threats to electoral integrity and of violence in Africa are greater than in the rest of the world.\textsuperscript{4} In a recent Economist Intelligence Unit report on global democracy index, it is acknowledged that despite holding regular elections, Sub-Saharan African countries’ score for credible elections has been persistently low, reflecting a lack of genuine political pluralism in most countries that hold these processes.\textsuperscript{5} This situation further deepens anxiety and fuels electoral violence in many situations.

Within a context of high youth unemployment, poverty, prebendalism, weak political/electoral institutions and a pervasive lack of trust, weak political parties, heated political competition around multiparty elections is likely to exacerbate existing ethno-regional and socio-political tensions that easily lead to brinkmanship and degenerate into electoral violence.\textsuperscript{6} African elections therefore - mostly being winner-takes-all processes - become synonymous with being triggers, drivers and enablers of electoral tensions and violent conflict rather than instruments for conflict prevention.

**International Electoral Assistance, Electoral Integrity and Conflict Prevention**

The greater focus of international electoral stakeholders in African elections has been to assist with technical support on capacity, procedural and logistical issues. The main areas of engagement include building capacities of national electoral institutions, deepening professionalism of election management bodies (EMBs), strengthening party liaison committees within EMBs, enhancing voter registration and voting


\textsuperscript{5} The Economist Intelligence Unit Report (2019), Democracy Index 2018: Me too? Political Participation, Protest and Democracy

systems, enhancing the capacity of local conflict resolution committees, election observation, peace messaging and perfecting procedures to ensure credible and peaceful electoral processes in Africa.\textsuperscript{7} However, it is now considerably evident that this approach focusing on these national initiatives and procedures alone, together with international election observation\textsuperscript{8}, do not put out tensions associated with electoral grievance and the subsequent outbursts of electoral violence, especially against a backdrop of the above-mentioned socio-economic and political context that characterises many African countries.\textsuperscript{9} While it is imperative to strengthen the capacity of national institutions and ownership through existing strategies and structures aimed at enhancing electoral governance systems,\textsuperscript{10} it is unlikely that these strategies alone, and in the context of heightened internal distrust and political corruption, would be effective in eliminating deep-seated structural causes of conflict and contribute to preventing outburst of electoral violence and conflict.

As repeatedly observed in several countries on the continent, international stakeholder engagement in electoral processes in the lead up to elections - through the provision of technical and financial assistance, peace messaging and election observation - has not stopped

\textsuperscript{7} Preventing Electoral Violence: Greater Awareness, but Still Falling Short, United States Institute for Peace, available at https://www.usip.org/preventing-electoral-violence-greater-awareness-still-falling-short


serious abuse of authority/incumbency, serious electoral irregularities, incitement to violence, and the rampant infringement of the rights to freedom of association and assembly. Sustained support and expressed commitment by international stakeholders have therefore not translated into credible and peaceful elections on the continent, thus the increasing calls for revised perspectives and policy guidelines for international engagement.11 There is therefore the need for a paradigm shift in international electoral engagement to ensure constructive electoral peacebuilding that is aimed at effectively and efficiently promoting accountability, political cohesion and inclusive electoral processes, while enhancing incentives for compliance with agreed international norms.

Since the actual or perceived failure to observe international standards, it could rightly be inferred that an effective and efficient framework for international electoral assistance would only thrive through an integrated international approach with appropriate levels of legitimate political capital, political incentives and dissuasive capacity, and the ability to effectively coordinate international activities that ultimately fit into, and reinforce, national initiatives and actors.

To make the case for greater international commitment to integrated electoral peacebuilding for African elections, this paper aims to highlight briefly the challenges and opportunities for electoral peacebuilding from the perspective of an innovative political engagement supported by the Commonwealth in Zambia for that country’s 2016 general elections and referendum.

Commonwealth Electoral Conflict Prevention Initiative in Zambia

In the lead up to the 2016 general elections in Zambia, the Commonwealth Secretary-General appointed Professor Ibrahim Gambari12 as her

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11 With increasing calls for more effective international stakeholder engagements in electoral processes, several organisations have recently revised their election observation guidelines. See for instance Revised Commonwealth Guidelines for the Conduct of Election Observation in Member Countries, available at http://thecommonwealth.org/sites/default/files/inlinerelations Files/Conduc t to Election Observation in Member Countries_1.pdf

12 Professor Ibrahim Gambari is an Elder African Statesman and a Political Science
Special Adviser on Political Dialogue to the Electoral Commission of Zambia. This appointment followed prior eclectic consultations between the Commonwealth and the Electoral Commission of Zambia, the Government, political parties, civil society organisations and members of the diplomatic community. With the express commitment of the ECZ, an independent body, the Special Advisor on Political Dialogue was appointed by the Commonwealth and hosted by the Electoral Commission of Zambia.

The mandate of the Special Advisor was to work closely with the ECZ Chairperson and his Commissioners, to assist in building trust and confidence and facilitate inclusive dialogue - especially between the main political contenders - on sensitive issues relating to the highly competitive polls.

Key Lessons for Electoral Peacebuilding by the International Community

The Commonwealth peace initiative in Zambia was an innovative approach to help bridge the gap between international and national efforts in support of peaceful elections in Africa. The initiative was quite laudable for the following reasons:

1. It provided an opportunity for long-term political engagement by the international community: One of the key challenges with international peace initiatives during elections is the brevity of engagement, which engagement only mostly occurs with a few days or weeks of deployment, just before elections, usually with leaders of election observation groups engaging in peace messaging at the last minute - immediately before or after elections and usually in reaction to actual or perceived tensions and violence.

2. The initiative provided for an express international political mandate to support dialogue through agreed terms of reference. One of the key challenges faced by the international community

Professor who has held several positions, including Minister of Foreign Affairs of Nigeria, United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Nigeria’s Ambassador to the United Nations, and an Eminent Person of NEPAD’s African Peer Review Mechanism.
is the lack of an express mandate to engage national stakeholders directly on election-related issues given that elections are sovereign, national processes. With a prior agreed mandate to facilitate political dialogue, the political approach of the international community shifted from reactive to proactive engagement with the Special Advisor’s prior agreed terms of reference and scope of engagement.

3. The initiative provided for a unique opportunity that brought the much-needed amplified political capital and experience that reinforced and complemented national initiatives. The Special Advisor on Political Dialogue met regularly and worked with national and international partners and served as a liaison among national stakeholders and between national stakeholders and the international community. As a former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Nigeria and former Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations, Professor Ibrahim Gambari had the level of seniority that provided access to engage key political leaders at the highest levels before, during and after the elections. He brought not only the political capital, but the wealth of experience as a respected African elder statesman and an international peacebuilder who managed to work with the relevant players to navigate through the complexities of very sensitive issues as and when they arose.

4. The engagement offered an opportunity to reinforce trust and confidence in the international community as it brought in someone who was deemed to be neutral and independent. The deployment of someone external to the country’s daily politics assisted in building trust in the international community as some members of the international community resident in the country had been tainted and deemed to have been compromised or sympathetic to one political party or the other. The Special Advisor on Dialogue helped to bridge the trust deficit that usually undermines or paralyses electoral peace efforts and the moral authority of the resident internal/diplomatic community.

5. Having been deployed ahead of the elections, the Special Advisor on Political Dialogue worked with electoral stakeholders on issues for a relatively longer period and built a relationship of trust with
all the key players. This relationship of trust was particularly relevant for the conveyance and acceptance of peace messages given a fundamental understanding by the players that the envoy had come a long way with them. It was not simply a matter of someone who had been parachuted into the country a few days prior to election day.

6. Through shuttle diplomacy, the Special Advisor on Political Dialogue was able to build consensus among stakeholders by acting as a credible liaison between the electoral commission and political parties on the one hand, between other state institutions (such as the police) and the ECZ, between the political opposition and the national police command, between the ECZ and civil society, between the ECZ and international election observation groups, between the ECZ and the diplomatic community, and between the ECZ and state officials. These shuttle diplomacy demarches were quite crucial for conveying relevant and timely information and messages, especially at relevant levels of authority.

7. The Special Advisor on Political dialogue was able to brief election observer missions on key issues and provide them with independent, reliable, first-hand information. These briefs were quite relevant as they also capacitised heads of observer groups with relevant insights for engagement on electoral peace and credibility messaging efforts.

8. The Special Advisor on Political Dialogue had access to the highly restricted results centre where he facilitated delicate negotiations and agreements between the ECZ and representatives of political parties before the announcement of results. Breaking several deadlocks was critical for timely announcement of results whose delay continued to generate unwarranted tensions.

9. The envoy was a reliable sounding board and also provided moral support to the ECZ leadership at a critical time when some commissions can easily feel overwhelmed and intimidated by their hostile electoral environment. The envoy was a source of reassurance that emboldened the Commission, especially at moments of heightened electoral tension.
10. The initiative complemented and reinforced national peace initiatives such as the presidential candidates’ meeting that led to the signing of the peace pledge. The Special Advisor on Political Dialogue infused some trust in the platform and encouraged participation that was seen at the highest levels, including the attendance of the incumbent and the leader of the main opposition political party.

11. Through this political engagement, the leaders of the main opposition political parties were encouraged to seek redress to political grievances through dialogue and where necessary, constitutional channels, rather than through violence. The reiterated messaging by the Commonwealth envoy can be said to have contributed greatly to a relatively peaceful post-election environment in Zambia after the 2016 polls, despite the rejection of the results by the main opposition party. The opposition ultimately sought redress through established democratic channels.

12. Importantly, the engagement provided a framework for distilling issues that formed the basis for a post-election political dialogue engagement that aimed at addressing all electoral challenges observed and for the implementation of observer group recommendations ahead of the future polls. The post-election engagement was geared towards pursuing continuity in dialogue through enhancing a national dialogue framework to discuss relevant electoral reforms in an inclusive and timely manner ahead of future polls.

Despite the many opportunities presented by this initiative, there are a few challenges to such an engagement which must be borne in mind for any such engagement to succeed. These include:

1. Respecting the thin line between international support and interference: During such an engagement, it is important for the political envoy to always remind him/herself that this is a national process that needs facilitation rather than control.

2. Trust and leverage: the envoy and the appointing organisation must have leverage in the country of engagement. A messenger is as good as the sender. The envoy must not have any political baggage and should have some leverage by his credentials and
the appointing organisation.

3. Maintaining neutrality and objectivity: As in any conflict prevention or resolution initiative, it is imperative to maintain neutrality and objectivity on all key issues.

4. Identifying a host institution: Such an initiative needs a host institution to facilitate engagement and interaction. The host institution must enjoy at least a minimum level of trust and confidence among electoral stakeholders. In the case of Zambia mentioned above, the host institution was the Electoral Commission of Zambia, an institution that is known to have managed elections that have led to several democratic transitions in Zambia.

5. Support and political commitment by the political leaders: Without the commitment and support of the main political players, it would be difficult to succeed with such an initiative. The sustained support and full commitment of political leaders to the engagement is critical and should be prioritised throughout the engagement, especially at the conceptional and foundational phases.

6. Such a political engagement should be distinct from an election observation mission. Election observation is governed by a separate set of declaration of principles and a code of conduct that define the role of observers.\textsuperscript{13} While some international observer missions have been seen to assume conflict resolution roles during elections, this \textit{ad hocism} and reactive approach could be avoided by a strategic and proactive international peacebuilding approach.

Conclusion

The case for more proactive international political engagement in electoral processes in emerging democracies, especially in Africa, cannot be overemphasised. The international electoral community needs to come up with a time-sensitive, efficient, legitimate and more coherent international approach to reinforcing preventive electoral peacebuilding in Africa. While such an approach would need to be context-sensitive, it would be important to afford it the necessary political capital to help engage institutions and stakeholders at the highest levels - bearing in mind sensitivities - to promote admissible levels of basic political accountability. It is imperative that these international efforts legitimately complement and reinforce the efforts of legitimate, independent national stakeholders with the eclectic support of sub-regional, regional and international communities. The international community has an important role in supporting peaceful and credible elections in Africa and that can only be successfully realised when legitimate political instruments are proactively deployed to reinforce and amplify credible national initiatives and ensure accountability for democratic commitments which states have signed up to.

To efficiently play its role to support peaceful and credible elections, the international community must consider two important areas, namely codifying minimum standards of electoral best practice and investing more time and resources into establishing a legitimate and efficient international mechanism with an express mandate to support both electoral peacebuilding and electoral accountability. In addition to helping to curb the prevalence of brinkmanship by political actors, such a robust international mechanism would, working closely with relevant national and regional stakeholders, provide for institutionalising political inclusivity, timely and coordinated international political engagement, ensure pre-election and post-election follow-ups and pursue an electoral cycle approach that facilitates delivery of meaningful electoral assistance. The international community must move from being largely reactive to becoming proactive in electoral peacebuilding by adopting a comprehensive methodology that approaches elections as processes rather than events.