Edited by
Samuel Kale Ewusi

NEW PATHS TO
SUSTAINABLE PEACE IN AFRICA
NEW PATHS TO SUSTAINABLE PEACE IN AFRICA

Edited by
Samuel Kale Ewusi
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acknowledgement</th>
<th>v</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>List of Accronyms</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Contributors</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Introduction:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Towards Sustainable Peace in Africa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Samuel Kale Ewusi</em></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Part I</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Elections and Political Settlement</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral Governance and the Stability of Political Order in Africa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Ibrahim Mouiche</em></td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An Analysis of the Sustainability of Peace Agreements in West Africa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Mamadou Ghonge</em></td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revisiting the Debate on Women’s Representation with Insights from Women Local Politicians in Cameroon</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Justine Ayuk Fonjock</em></td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Part II</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Peacebuilding Perspectives</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grassroots Peacebuilding in the Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Rumbidzai Elizabeth Chidoori</em></td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Societies’ Peace-building Initiatives: A Case for “Proactive” Peace-building Endeavours in “Non-violent” Societies.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Timothy Oduojo Obaje</em></td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socializing Peace: Social Media as a tool for Peacebuilding</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Lisa Kwaleyela</em></td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Part III Development Issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assessing the Interactions between the State and Social Support Organizations in South Africa and Zimbabwe (2009-2013)</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Tariro Mutongwizo</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contested Urban Spaces and the Gauntlet of Urban Management: A Case Study of Kitwe, Zambia</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>John Bwalya</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Nolubabalo Magam</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Part IV Managing Peace and Security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Integration in a Troubled Region: Potentials and Pitfalls of the Proposed EAC-IGAD Merger for Eastern Africa</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Kizito Sabala</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Private Security Industry as a Perpetrator of Crime or Crime Prevention Agent: A Closer Look at the Case of South Africa.</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Sabelo Gumedeze</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Chris Kwaja</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Chris Kwaja</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Acknowledgements

This edited volume is the result of an international symposium on Peace, Governance and Security in Africa organized by the Africa Programme of the United Nations Mandated University for Peace (UPEACE) in collaboration with the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa and the Africa Union with the financial support of the International Development Research Centre (IDRC). Our first debt of gratitude goes to the International Development Research Center (IDRC) for providing the funding for our capacity building projects of which this book is a product. Special thanks to Ms Njeri Karuru and Ms Rita Bowry of IDRC’s Governance, Security and Justice Programme and Fellowship and Awards Programme respectively for their unrivalled dedication to bring the network to fruition.

Our gratitude also goes to all the participants of the symposium whose feedback to the presentations helped improve the quality of the papers.

We are especially grateful to colleagues at UPEACE Africa Programme, especially Ms Tsion Abebe, Ms Rahel Getachew, Ms Tsega Desta, Ms Agnes Assele and Ms Samrawit Tesfaye, more importantly the former Director of UPEACE Africa Programme Dr Jean Bosco Butera.

We would also like to thank all the chapter contributors and manuscript reviewers, who worked on very strict deadlines in order to keep up with an extremely stringent publication schedule.

Samuel Kale Ewusi

Director: UPEACE Africa Programme
# List of Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACHPR</td>
<td>African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADF</td>
<td>Allied Democratic Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AEC</td>
<td>African Economic Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMESA</td>
<td>Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPDM</td>
<td>Cameroon People Democratic Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZC</td>
<td>Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>East African Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMB</td>
<td>Election Management Body</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDRC</td>
<td>International Development Research Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KANU</td>
<td>Kenya Africa National Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for African Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODM</td>
<td>Orange Democratic Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PASSOP</td>
<td>People Against Suffering, Suppression, Oppression and Poverty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNU</td>
<td>Party of National Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QPC</td>
<td>Quaker Peace Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RHA</td>
<td>Reseau Haki na Amani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDF</td>
<td>Social Democratic Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSO</td>
<td>Social Support Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSRC</td>
<td>Social Science Research Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITA</td>
<td>Union for the Tati Independence of Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSGPC</td>
<td>United Nations Secretary General’s Policy Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZANU-PF</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African National Union -Popular Front</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
List of Contributors

Editor


List of Contributors

1. Prof Ibrahim Mouiche – University of Yaounde II, Cameroon
2. Dr. Mamadou Gbonge – CIRES/IFR-ESG, Abidjan Cote D’Ivoire
3. Ms Justine Ayuk Fonjock – Department of Women and Gender Studies – University of Buea, Cameroon
4. Ms Rubidzai Elizabeth Chidoori – Copperbelt University Zambia
5. Timothy O. Obaje, - University of Kwazulu Natal
6. Lisa Kwaleyela – Copperbelt University, Zambia
7. Dr Tariro Mutongwizo – University of Cape Town
8. Dr John Bwalya- Copperbelt University, Zambia
9. Ms Nolubabalo Magam – University of Kwazulu Natal
10. Dr Kizito Sabala – IGAD Nairobi, Kenya
11. Dr SABELO Gumede – PSIR, Pretoria, South Africa
12. Dr Chris Kwaja- University of Jos Nigeria
With the end of the cold war and the unavoidable consequences of a sudden global alteration of the international system, it became ostensible that, Africans needed to adjust in order to confront the multi-dimensional challenges facing the continent. However, before Africans could adjust to the new world order characterized by the dominance of western liberal democracy and by extension the globalization of capitalist free market economies, they were rudely awakened to new challenges such as post-cold war conflicts with unprecedented levels of barbarity previously unknown to them. These seismic changes were partly driven by international pressure to democratize previously dictatorial
regimes, ‘multipartize’ previously one party state and partly driven by
the struggle for economic emancipation by ethnic groups, individuals
who suffered deprivation as a result of the endemic corruption and
mismanagement of post independence African states\(^1\).

Since then, Africans have focused not only on resolving the post
independence and cold war generated conflicts but also on managing
the post cold war conflicts and states which emerged, while at the
same time engaging in peacebuilding efforts\(^2\). Consequently, the
current generation of peace and security experts may well be termed
a generation of conflict managers and peacebuilders\(^3\). This moniker is
merited because of the intense and diverse wave of efforts to resolve
conflicts through the creation of both normative and institutional
frameworks for achieving sustainable peace.

Through this, the continent has taken colossal steps to reverse violence
and injustices, avoided genocide and reduced dictatorships as well as
large scale poverty\(^4\). While some conflicts have been resolved through
mediation and the building of consensus which have ultimately led to
power sharing agreements as seen in Zimbabwe, Kenya, Burundi and
the Democratic Republic of Congo other conflicts have engendered
outright military intervention like in Somalia where African Union
forces are actively involved in fighting Al Shabaab and supporting a
sustainable return of Somalia to statehood.

Another critical step towards sustainable peace in Africa has been

---

1 Also see Boutros Boutros Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace*, 2\(^{nd}\) ed (New York: United Nations

2 Deng, Francis, Sadiko Kimaro, Terence Lyons, Donald Rothchild, and I.W. Zartman, 1996

3 Philpott D & Powers, GF (2010) *Strategies for Peace: Transforming Conflict in a Violent
World*. Oxford University Press. Oxford. For a more detailed understanding of the war and
peace situation in the post-cold war era, it is instructive to examine the work of Michael
University Press, 2006).

4 See, for example, Commission for Africa (2005) Our Common Interest: Report of the
Commission for Africa, London. UNDP and World Bank analyses have also tended to
emphasize governance issues.
the institutionalization of opposition against unconstitutional changes in power through the adoption of African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance\(^5\). This has contributed to what Huntington calls “the third wave of democratization” in Africa as “coup” which were previously widespread in the continent seized to be the modus of ascension to power. African Sub-regional organizations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC) have taken the cue from the African Union by frowning and taking active steps towards preventing unconstitutional changes in power.

These sub-regional organizations which form the building blocks of the African Peace and Security Architecture through the principle of subsidiarity have historically played peacekeeping roles and continue to be the first port of call in the resolution of conflicts in the countries in the region\(^6\).

The creation of the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR) which is already functional in spite of its lack of capacity to implement its decisions and the further creation of the African Court of Human Rights will go a long way in dealing with perceptions of bias by the International Criminal Court with regards to issues of abuse of human rights in the continent.

However, with regards to challenges of effectively bringing powerful perpetrators to justice in the African Court, the jury is still out. Capacity and resource-related challenges which have bedeviled most African

---

5 The African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (“ADC”) entered into force on February 15, 2012. The main goal of the ADC is the encouragement and promotion of democracy and human rights on the African continent.

6 An observation of conflict trends in Africa indicates that intrastate armed conflicts, which were on the rise between 1990 and 1998, have significantly decreased in number. Many conflicts on the continent have been settled and others are in the process of being resolved, generally through peaceful means. However, a number of conflicts remain a challenge in Africa. For more on this trend see also Alfred Nhema and Paul Tiyambe Zeleza (2008) The Resolution of African Conflicts: The Management of Conflict Resolution and Post Conflict Reconstruction. Ohio University Press.
institutions are sure to confront these critical institutions.

The sustainability of Africa’s pursuit of justice may lie in adopting a fusion of western justice systems of courts and commissions and indigenous post conflict justice systems which have the effect of building and strengthening resilient African societies\(^7\). Resilient African societies will be the bedrock of conflict prevention and sustainable peace without which, the continent will be continuously enveloped in the vicious cycle of bad governance, violent conflict, conflict resolution and post conflict peacebuilding whose western inspired orientations have never proven to be sustainable especially in Africa.

Scholars like Paul Collier have advanced serious arguments against the current conflict resolution and post-conflict strategies adopted by the United Nations, Western countries and development partners as unsustainable\(^8\). With regards to Africa, they have pointed to the high frequency of relapse to violent conflicts within a period of ten years.

While the continent engages in democratic political, economic and social transformation, globally, from the United Nations to the World Bank and other development agencies the quest for poverty alleviation and reduction has gained prominence as a means of conflict prevention, management and post-conflict peacebuilding\(^9\). This lends credence to Paul Colliers argument that, sustainable peace in Africa depends on prioritizing the development of the economies of African countries by creating jobs, building ‘clean’ governments through a long term involvement of the international community in conflict resolution, management and post-conflict peacebuilding. In fact, the geometrical growth in Africa’s youth over the last two decades and the commensurate


\(^8\) Paul Collier’s New Rules for Rebuilding a Broken Nation. TED, New York, United States, 2009

\(^9\) Philpott & Powers, Op. cit. p1
lack of employment opportunities for this bulging population has transformed this productive resource into a threat to long term peace and stability in the continent. As long as developmental programs in the continent do not address the issue of youth bulge by creating jobs and harnessing their potential, attaining sustainable peace in Africa will be farfetched. It is clear that, youth unemployment remains a barrier to Africa’s development. Some of the highest rates on the continent are in Southern Africa, where 51 percent of young women and 43 percent of young men are unemployed. This large unemployed population indicates lost potential since communities and nations fail to benefit from what young people could theoretically contribute.

However, if this combination of energies to transform the continent and bring about sustainable peace describes a trend, they also evoke very serious questions. Are all these interventions aimed at sustainable peace? Which of these have succeeded in effecting any transformational impact and under what conditions? Are all these efforts, concepts, doctrines or perspectives that inform what sustainable peacebuilding in Africa ought to be pursued? Philpott and Powers attempt to respond to these questions by apportioning the approach to the dominant thinking behind these efforts — “liberal peace.” They argue that Liberal Peace is dominant because it pervades the most powerful and prestigious institutions and governments who take on the work of peacebuilding. The aims of liberal peace are simple and familiar in that, they include a desire to end armed violence and to establish human rights, democracy and market economies. It envisions the United Nations, outside intervening states, state governments, and oppositional factions, undertaking mediation, military intervention, war settlement, disarmament, election

monitoring, refugee resettlement and the creation of free government institutions, free markets, and a free media. In agreement with Philpott and Powers, the challenge with Liberal Peace is finitude. It’s extremely difficult to identify a clear cut end to the liberal peace prescription with regards to sustainable peace in Africa. However, the result in the implementation of Liberal peace is paradigm in Africa is far from rosy. It has been characterized by too many false starts, reversals and sometimes degeneration into unprecedented violence in a lot of cases\textsuperscript{11}. This is because of the narrow view of liberal peace paradigm. In fact some scholars have argued that, sustainable peace can be achieved in situations where, in addition to the prescriptions offered by Liberal peace paradigm, the building of peace should include taking into consideration a far greater array of actors, activities, levels of society, links between societies and time horizons.

Sustainable peace in Africa must embrace new paths which include placing a high premium on the indigenous processes, values and norms of African people. Religious actors must also be brought in to play an active role considering the religious nature of African people. The promotion of a ligation of interdependence in the wide range of actors, synchronizing and linking them with the efforts of governments and international institutions with the broad project of building sustainable peace while dealing with the socio-economic and political imbalances over a sustained period of time will most assuredly bring about a harmonious society in Africa.

\textbf{Sustainable Peace in Africa: A Proposal}

On the whole, liberal peace has failed to bring sustainable peace in Africa. While through it, there has been some gains in a few African countries, the overall report card is not hugely positive in the sense that the type of peace obtainable where gains are identified, are at best what Galtung calls ‘negative peace’\textsuperscript{12}. Without delving into the merits

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{11} Victoria Fontan (2012) Decolonizing Peace. Dignity Press, Germany.\textsuperscript{12} Johan Galtung, the father of peace studies often refers to the distinction between ‘negative}
and demerits of the paradigm the prevalence of conflicts in Africa, the high levels of poverty, underdevelopment, unemployment, corruption even at a period of relative positive economic growth speaks for itself. It is also important to note that, placing the blame on the prescriptions of liberal peace paradigm would be tantamount to blaming Africa’s problems on external actors – which to some extent is true. While it is a cliche that external actors have contributed a great deal to Africa’s current status, a new path to peace must involve summoning Africa’s nationalistic spirit which emancipated much of the continent from colonialism. This spirit is very much present to a greater extent in countries like Rwanda and Ethiopia. The monumental growth and by extension the transformation witnessed in these countries came as a result of the failure of the application of liberal peace paradigm, the non-sustainability of exploitative and divisive neo-colonial policies and the ability of the people of Rwanda and Ethiopia, through blood, tears and sweat to take their destiny into their own hands. The people of these countries – Rwanda and Ethiopia- have also faced the challenge of a barrage of criticisms ranging from the un-sustainability of their statebuilding enterprise to accusations of lack of respect for human rights. Through all these, the two nations- Rwanda and Ethiopia- have stood resolutely and it is clear they are on the right path.

Without prescribing the Rwandan or Ethiopian models in toto, a new path to sustainable peace must encompass the following principles:

---

Peace’ and ‘positive peace’ (e.g. Galtung 1996). Negative peace refers to the absence of violence. When, for example, a ceasefire is enacted, a negative peace will ensue. It is negative because something undesirable stopped happening (e.g. the violence stopped, the oppression ended). Peace does not mean the total absence of any conflict. It means the absence of violence in all forms and the unfolding of conflict in a constructive way.

13 Pan-Africanism and African Nationalism proved very popular among nationalist African leaders because it offered a way for them to overcome both regionalism and ethnic divides by stressing commonalities and a common oppression. By the 1950s, Pan-Africanism had profoundly influenced almost every African nationalist leader: Kwame Nkrumah, Kenyatta, Nyerere, Kenneth Kaunda (1964–1991; Zambia), Haile Selassie (1892–1975; Ethiopia), Albert Luthuli (c. 1898–1967; South Africa), and Nnamdi Azikiwe (1904–1996; Nigeria), all were deeply affected by the movement.
First, a recognition and an acceptance that, most African states have not attained that level of statehood with regards to the existence of strong institutions which can sustain extremely complex peacebuilding or statebuilding processes without a visionary, disciplined and benevolent leadership in the form of a person or group of persons. Personality matters a great deal in the psyche of the African person and has implications on the legitimacy of either the person or the institutions or processes they represent. This notion is explored by Michael Jana in his study of the meaning of legitimacy in Sub-Saharan Africa. Jana quotes Mattei Dogan who states that ‘power, legitimacy, trust and effectiveness do not have identical meanings in London and Jakarta or in Washington and Cairo’. Dogan argues that ‘the ambition to encapsulate these concepts in definitions of universal validity maybe a sin of Western cultural ethnocentrism.’

Jana therefore explains that, notions of political legitimacy in a specific society are embedded in the societal culture and this can be unearthed by examining the specific language, metaphors and other images used to transmit thoughts about politics. In Africa that includes, the dominant role of the personality or group of persons driving the process of building peace in the polity. In this case the processes must have historical and cultural connections to the specific societal way of life of Africans in order for it to be sustainable- of course this has been pretty absent.

Most Africans as Jana asserts consider their governments and to a greater extent their leader as a ‘parent’. As a parent therefore sharing the spoils of power – resources allocated to the leader- is a critical tool for measuring the legitimacy of the leader. Therefore in the creation


16 Michael Jana, Op. Cit. 5.
of institutions and building sustainable peace in Africa, processes must take into consideration supporting a disciplined leadership which encapsulates symbolic legitimacy based on the leaders’ capacity to create a sustainable environment of human security and institutions to sustainably support the process.

Second, sustainable peace in Africa would require taking into consideration all existing indigenous paradigms of governance, conflict resolution, management and post conflict peacebuilding. While all may not be relevant especially in situations where bad governance has obtained over an extensive period of time or where law and order has irretrievably broken down, once the situation is normalized all those systems and processes must be explored at the minimum at the micro levels to scoop their advantages.

The application of the ‘Gacaca system’ in Rwanda as a post-conflict justice system against the wishes of western countries and its long term effectiveness in bringing about some modicum of closure for victims of the genocide lends credence to this argument.\(^{17}\) The practice of relegating African indigenous methods of governance, conflict resolution, management and post conflict justice smacks of an effort to portray western legal system as superior and African legal system as inferiority and irrelevant. However the results of the ‘Gacaca system’ in relation to the number of cases adjudicated and the limited resources far surpass the number of people indicted and convicted by the relatively well resourced International Criminal Tribunal on Rwanda (ICTR)\(^{18}\).

\(^{17}\) Ewusi and Nelson, Op Cit. pg 3.
\(^{18}\) The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) is an international court established in November 1994 by the United Nations Security Council in Resolution 955 in order to judge people responsible for the Rwandan Genocide and other serious violations of international law in Rwanda, or by Rwandan citizens in nearby states, between 1 January and 31 December 1994. In 1995, it became located in Arusha, Tanzania, under Resolution 977. (From 2006, Arusha also became the location of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights). In 1998 the operation of the tribunal was expanded in Resolution 1165. Through several resolutions, the Security Council called on the tribunal to complete its investigations by end of 2004, complete all trial activities by end of 2008, and complete all work in 2012.
Apart from its relative effectiveness and volume of cases undertaken, most western critics failed to understand that, the ‘Gacaca system’ had been used in conflict resolution in Rwanda for hundreds of years as customary law throughout the Kingdom of Rwanda. It was a system well known and acceptable to all Rwandans Tutsi, Hutu or Twa. In spite of that, several western countries sort to undermine an indigenous system which has delivered justice for centuries and which on hindsight has delivered justice in post genocide Rwanda and also immensely contributed to the development of a stable Rwanda today. A further importance of harnessing indigenous systems is the outcome of the system. Most African justice systems are not tilted towards meting out punitive measures as the case of western justice system. In most African Indigenous justice systems the continuity and harmonious existence of the society after the conflict is preponderant and therefore reconciliation is the key output of African indigenous justice systems. This output is fundamentally important for the achievement of sustainable peace in a lot of African societies. Ignoring the strength and benefits of this system on the assumption that its primitive and ineffective is another example of western imperialism and superiority complex which is unacceptable as is the case and does not do justice to sustainable peace in Africa.

Third, sustainable peace in Africa would require the strengthening of African institutions of governance, conflict resolution, management and post conflict peacebuilding. While it is clear that, there is a lot of financial support from Western donor countries to institutions like the African Union as well as Regional Economic Communities on issues of conflict resolution and peacebuilding, the preponderance of conflict in the continent is indicative of the ineffectiveness of not only the institutions but the support given to these institutions. It is clear that, support to these institutions is not based on altruism but on the interests of donor countries. In spite of the arguments for African solutions to African problems, the African solutions are not backed by the African financial
provisions. A case in point, during the Mali conflict, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was prepared to provide peacekeeping troops but requested financial and logistical support from western countries. In the case of the crisis in Central Africa, Rwandan troops were transported by the United States. While the Africa Union and the Regional Economic Communities have been at the forefront of resolving African conflicts, the interventions are contingent on funding from western countries and eventual transformation of the peacekeeping missions into United Nations peace keeping missions. Furthermore it is also clear that much of the support to these institutions is currently uncoordinated, unfocused and ineffective and laden with all types of interests. The support is uncoordinated in that, both the African Union and the Regional Economic Communities access the same sources of funding for the same programmes. The support is unfocused in that more emphasis is placed on conflict resolution than on conflict prevention. Conflict prevention may include not necessarily early warning systems but supporting the strengthening of governance systems and effectively supporting economic development activities which improves the livelihood of citizens in fragile states. The ineffectiveness of the support is based on the chronic capacity challenges which impede the implementation of otherwise important programmes.

The question then is how can support to strengthen African governance, conflict resolution management and post conflict peacebuilding be effectively done? Part of the solution lies in capacity building of human resources at the highest levels through tailor made programmes to support these institutions. Most of the governance institutions in Africa suffer from ridiculously severe shortage of qualified staff to deal with the monumental and complex challenges of governance, conflict resolution and post conflict peacebuilding. In situations where the pool exists, the institutions lack the funding to hire these human resources\(^\text{19}\).

Therefore support should not be limited to building this human capacity but must include mechanisms for absorbing and effectively utilizing these resources for the benefit of the institutions. It’s also noteworthy that, support for African governance, conflict resolution, management and post conflict peacebuilding institutions must be long term and sustainable. This is because while building sustainable peace is a long term, multidimensional and expensive enterprise, it is beneficial in the long term. The challenge has been that, most of the support has been external, short term, unfocused and the result has been unprecedented instability in the continent.

Fourth, sustainable peace in Africa will require African leaders to put their money where their mind is. It is not true that African countries are so poor that they cannot provide financial resources to the governance, conflict resolution, management and peacebuilding institutions in the continent. What is true is the lack of political will from African leaders to support these institutions financially. The personal financial worth of most African leaders runs in millions if not billions of dollars. Apart from their personal worth, African leaders have not been able to leverage internal resources in support of strengthening institutions of governance. The exceedingly high rates of corruption, money laundering and capital flight out of the continent lend credence to the existence of resources which could be harnessed for the betterment of the continent. Therefore, African leaders must show the political will to harness the internal resources in the continent to drive development in its multidimensional character, create jobs especially for the youth, build credible democratic institutions and support governance institutions in order to guarantee sustainable peace.


Fifth, sustainable peace in Africa will require a re-think of the classification of rights within an African context and by extension a prioritization of programmes for achieving these rights. Within the human rights movement and paradigm, civil and political rights are considered first generation rights while socio-economic and cultural rights are deemed second generation rights. In Africa the latter should be categorized as first generations rights in the sense that, the prioritization of civil and political rights over socio-economic and cultural rights has elevated elections to a zero-sum game. Consequently, elections have become synonymous to democracy as they represent the expression of civil and political liberties with their ability to engender freedom of expression and association.

This has resulted in leaders focusing on winning elections rather than socio-economic development thereby elevating the stake of election into a cause of conflict rather than a vehicle for political stability and development. Therefore, socio-economic rights must be elevated to first generation rights in Africa for there to be sustainable peace. Statistics in most African countries indicate an increase in the number of elections being held and an improvement in governance systems. However, it is also clear that, most African countries have not been able to achieve the Millennium Development Goals which are inclined towards human security and the achievement of socio-economic rights. This strongly indicates that, the improvements in democracy and by extension civil and political liberties has not been equated with a commensurate improvement in the livelihoods of most Africans.

Consequently the underlying causes of conflict, terrorism, and political instability which are the non attainment of socio-economic rights have not and are not being dealt with through this approach.

Sixth, in order to achieve sustainable peace in Africa, the continent must deal with issues of intra-African trade. Africa occupies barely 2% of global trade. However, the 600 million people in Africa represent a huge internal market which could serve as consumers of African goods.
However, Africa produces what it does not consume and consumes what it does not produce. The theme of the 2013 African Union Summit called for the promotion of intra-African trade. The measures towards achieving that include strengthening regional integration and regional trade. African Regional Economic Communities represent trading blocs which could form the building blocks for the facilitation of intra-African trade considering that, the reduction or total elimination of tariffs within regional economic communities is a positive step towards promoting intra-African trade. However, some RECS are far more advanced in institutionalizing tariffs reduction or elimination and free movement of people than others. Overall, Africa must liberalize the movement of people and goods within the continent so as to harness the benefits of intra-African trade.

Today, Africa remains the most difficult continent to travel within, with the existence of unreasonable visa restrictions and prohibitive tariffs for goods and services. Furthermore, Africa’s limited participation in meetings related to international trade negotiations, aid for trade and the elaboration of trade policies vis-à-vis the continent through international and multilateral organizations like the WTO does not enable Africa’s positioning in the global trade system. Africa’s effective participation in global trade negotiations under the WTO should be fostered to have a more balanced multilateral trade, which takes into account their interests.

However, to play an effective and important role in global trade negotiations, the formulation and implementation of trade policies and strategies to improve Africa’s contribution remains essential. The above principles are neither unknown nor completely ignored. However, the current state of affairs in the African peace environment is proof that, leap service is paid to a whole lot that is important to

---

22 Daouda Cisse “Africa plays limited role in international trade talks. Business Day, March 26, 2015.”
the continent and its people. It is clear that, the continent has created numerous institutions derived from global institutions of peace and justice.

The creation of the African Union is an African aspiration of an institution reminiscent of the European Union which is still an experiment in integration. Africans aspire to a single currency similar to the European single currency which has faced unprecedented challenges against the back drop of the Greek crisis. The creation of the African court of Human Rights as well as the African Commission on human and people’s right is a copycat of the International Criminal Court considering that its jurisdiction covers the serious crimes of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. What is not clear is the creation of an African institution which is wholly indigenously oriented. This shortcoming will continuously affect the attainment of sustainable peace in the continent. The studies contained in this volume, address some of the key challenges facing Africa’s quest for sustainable peace.

**Chapters in this volume**

The chapters cover four specific themes namely: Elections and Political settlements, issues in Peacebuilding, development issues and challenges in managing peace and security.

With regards to the elections and political settlements, Ibrahim Mouiche examines the issue of electoral governance and political order in Africa. He argues that, Sub-Saharan Africa has made undeniable progress on the political front especially with the holding of regular elections in several countries in the continent. However, he concludes that while democracy emphasizes the opportunity for the electorate to choose periodically among elites competing for political office, for elections to be democratic, they must be free, fair and credible. He further argues that, for elections to be free, fair and credible, the process has to be inclusive and participatory at the highest level by all actors. However, the absence of free, fair and credible elections has often resulted in conflicts such as in Kenya in 2007 and Cote D’Ivoire in 2010.
Africa’s attempt to address post election violence have seen the establishment in some cases of an all-inclusive governments brought about by the signing of peace agreements. This is the issue addressed by Mamadou Gbonge is his research on the sustainability of peace agreements in West Africa.

Mamadou argues that, peace agreements following the outbreak of conflicts in West Africa have not been properly managed. He intimates that, the premature and frequent breakdown of peace agreements and the resurgence of conflicts observed in West Africa require a profound reflection in order to understand the requirements for the sustainability of peace agreements. His research there provides critical conditions for the sustainability of peace agreements and by extension sustainable peace in Africa.

According to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325, women must be included at all levels of the conflict prevention, resolution and post conflict recovery continuum. However achieving this requires women’s substantive participation at the local levels of governance. This is the area addressed by Justine Ayuk Fonjock. In her study of local governance in the English speaking part of Cameroon Justine argues that since 1982, the proportion of women elected to local government in Cameroon has been on the increase. However, she concludes that, the numerical increase has not translated into a substantive involvement especially on issues pertinent to women in the overall governance output at the local levels. She recommends that, councils need to implement strategies to promote women’s substantive participation by ensuring that, council policies and development projects reflect the inputs of women councilors.

---

23 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (UNSRC 1325) was adopted unanimously on 31 October 2000, after recalling resolutions 1261 (1999), 1265 (1999), 1296 (2000), and 1314 (2000). The resolution on women, peace and security acknowledges the disproportionate and unique impact of armed conflict on women and girls. It calls for the adoption of a gender perspective to consider the special needs of women and girls during conflict, repatriation and resettlement, rehabilitation, reintegration and post-conflict reconstruction.
Africa’s quest for sustainable peacebuilding trajectories remains an important pre-occupation of both the international community and regional institutions. What has not been adequately explored is the critical role played by indigenous grassroots movements in the peacebuilding enterprise. This is the issue raised by Rumbidzai Elizabeth Chidoori in her study of grassroots peacebuilding in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Chidoori argues that, grassroots movements are usually not politically generated as they spring spontaneously due to some pressing issue that the community feels needs to be addressed. She submits that, grassroots movements in DRC have played an important role in peacebuilding for a long period of time and that, lasting peace in the DRC cannot be imposed from outside.

It is therefore important for the international community to encourage grassroots movements by exploring the work of local actors in order for peacebuilding to be sustainable. In the same vein, Timothy Obaje explores civil societies’ peacebuilding initiatives and makes a case for proactive peacebuilding endeavours in relatively non violent societies. According to Obaje, civil societies’ peacebuilding efforts are inclined towards post-conflict activities and they have at various points contributed to the restoration of peace and serenity amongst conflicting parties. He argues that, irrespective of the knowledge of their productive influence in peace restoration and conflict transformation, their scope of peacebuilding must be extended to embrace pre-conflict phases rather than restraining their relevance only to the post conflict stage.

The growth of social media and the role it can play at various stages of the search for peace cannot be underestimated. In this regard, Lisa Kwaleyela examines social media as a tool for peacebuilding in Africa. Kwaleyela justifies her research by stating that, while there is yet to be astounding empirical evidence that the new media can ever surpass the traditional media in the peacebuilding realm, it is worthwhile to investigate how the social media- peacebuilding nexus promises to be part of a holistic and coherent peacebuilding strategy that is focused
on resolving the root causes of conflict rather than the simple use of ICTs as applications. She concludes by arguing that, there is need for African led conversations on how the social media can be used for peacebuilding, cognizant of the various factors that may impede its usefulness on the ground.

It has often been argued that, underdevelopment stands at the root of several conflicts in Africa. The actors in the development enterprise are wide and varied. It is important for these actors to interact harmoniously in order for the fruits of development to be evident. It is within this context that Tariro Mutongwizo, examines the interactions between the state and social support Organizations in South Africa and Zimbabwe from 20019-2013. She explores issues of co-option, hostility and collaboration which all define this complex relationship. She concludes that in the two countries Social support organizations are revealed as being reactive to the state. She points out that the time period of the interaction, the nature of the state as well as the type of Social Support Organization determine the type of relationships experienced with the state.

Conversely, John Bwalya explores the issue of contested urban spaces and the Gauntlet of Urban Management in the town of Kitwe in Northern Zambia. He argues that, urban spaces represent an arena in which power relations of domination and resistance overlap. He concludes that, the politics of exclusion and inclusion in the urban landscape, display power struggles and contestations among different actors.

A very serious challenge to development in Africa has been in the area of energy with frequent energy shortages with the attendant negative economic effects in many countries of the continent. The Southern African Development Community\textsuperscript{24} has taken a regional approach

\textsuperscript{24} The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is an inter-governmental organization headquartered in Gaborone, Botswana. Its goal is to further socio-economic cooperation and integration as well as political and security cooperation among 15 southern African states
aimed at addressing this challenge through a regional energy access strategy. It is within this domain, that Nolubabalo Magam analyzes the regional energy access strategy in the Southern African Development Community Region. She strongly argues that the lack of proper planning, commitment, funding as well as investment into the energy sector hinder development of the regional energy access projects in the SADC region. She concludes that, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) has the potential to meet the energy demands and to venture into the use of alternative energy as the region possesses abundant renewable energy resources.

Another critical area examined in this volume is the question of managing peace and security in Africa. One of the challenges regularly discussed in this area is the proliferation of regional economic communities with several African countries being members of multiple regional economic communities at the same time. Against this backdrop, there have been discussions and proposals for the merger of the East African Community (EAC) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development IGAD. This is the question addressed by Kizito Sabala as he points out the importance of merging the two regional groupings in a bid to create a bigger economic bloc and expedite the integration process thereby ensuring greater economic development and prosperity for the peoples of the East African region. Kizito questions whether such an anticipated merger will be pursued to a logical end and examines the legal, political and financial implications of such a merger.

Apart from issues of merger, the African security landscape has been dominated by the proliferation of private security companies which have enabled governments to outsource certain aspects of the security sector of the state. This is not unprecedented considering that at the global level private security companies are actually fired to fight conventional wars. However, Sabelo Gumede incisively explores South African

---

private security industry and questions whether it’s a perpetrator of crime or a crime prevention agent. According to Gumede, while the South African private security industry remains one of the biggest in the world, the crime rate in South Africa statistics is also among the worst in the world. He argues that, the demand for private security is so high considering that, the ration of South African Police Officers to the population is 1:324 indicating that, on its own, the police fall short of the capability to prevent crime.

Gumede’s justification for the study is the absence of empirical evidence to show whether or not crime levels have gone up or down as a result of the intervention by the private security sector. On the same vein Chris Kwaja explores the governance implications of the management of private security industry’s involvement in peace and security. The evolution of security threats on the continent especially with the existence of rebel and terrorist groups dishing out asymmetrical warfare which cannot be adequately tackled with conventional armies has generated the call for specialized armies which for the most part are provided by the private security sector. The challenge is that, these private armies may act ultra vires and engage in nefarious activities such as unconstitutional overthrow of governments which is undesirable for the continent. The example of South African mercenaries arrested in Zimbabwe en route to overthrowing the government of Equatorial Guinea with the financial backing of British businessmen based in South Africa is very instructive. Therefore it is clear that private security involvement in peace and security in the continent has to be properly managed to avoid undesirable governance implications.

These critical issues addressed in the chapters have implications for long term peace, governance and security in the continent.

PART I

Elections and Political Settlement
Introduction

Sub-Saharan Africa has made undeniable progress on the political front. Before 1990, almost no country was able to make a democratic choice as to its rulers\(^1\). At the time, coups d’Etats or uprisings seemed to be the only elections and democracy have become virtually synonymous in Western political thought and analysis. The most influential formulations of democracy emphasize the opportunities for the electorateto choose periodically among elites competing for political office. But, elections to be democratic must be free an fair: this requirement emphasizes a highlevel of inclusiveness and participation of all actors in the process, as well as transparency and compliance with the rules of the game. Scholars are also unanimous in their opinion that the electoral process in a democratic polity operates as an independententity, and the functional roles of the electoral actors should be defined in unambiguous terms long before the electoral games commences.
way to overthrow dictatorial regimes. Olusegun Obasanjo in Nigeria in 1979, Leopold Sedar Senghor in Senegal in 1980, Ahmadou Ahidjo in Cameroon in 1982 and Julius Nyerere in Tanzania in 1985 were the exceptions that proved the rule as they only left office to better organize their succession. Most of their peers were at the heads of juntas or single party states (Pérouse de Montclos, 2010 : 6). In 1990, only five African countries out of a total of 54 weren’t led by military or civilian dictatorships. Ten years later, however, 16 had held elections and could be called « developing democracies », to quote Staffan Lindbergh, (2001 : 174). Although it is generally accepted that elections alone do not make a democracy, it is also recognized that multiparty elections are an indispensable pillar of democratic governance. Well, the third wave of democratization that began in the early 1990s facilitated in some African countries the emerging of democratic institutions essential for the credibility of elections. That is, independent organs or bodies of management of elections, nonpartisan election monitoring groups of the civil society and independent media. Political parties have been trained and have deployed scrutinizers to monitor the electoral process, while professional security services have ensured that political candidates and their supporters conduct campaign activities freely and vote in respect of their constitutional rights.

This glorious image should not however mislead: more than twenty years after the first experiments of the organization of free and competitive elections in Africa, the assessment that can be done is still contrasted as experiences of “democratization” themselves. There are some quite positive cases, in which the organs in charge of electoral process (especially the Electoral Commissions and the Constitutional Court) were successful in their managerial mission of elections. Mitigated experiences can equally be noted that require a more balanced judgment. Finally, it is possible to note cases to be greatly concerned about, in the situation where, structures in charge of electoral processes have largely failed in their mission , undermining their credibility and letting the
heavy mortgage weigh on the sociopolitical climate. This then means that beyond the main conflicts presently in Africa based on the territorial integrity of States, the continent is facing several recent conflicts resulting from complaints related to poor governance and policies of exclusion. In many cases, unfair or unsuccessful elections precipitated political conflicts or aggravated simmering tensions and leading thus, to an explosion of violence, as demonstrated by the dramatic electoral crises in Kenya, Zimbabwe, not forgetting the Ivorian case where the magnitude of hostilities was able to reach the level of armed conflict closer to a civil war.

**Elections, democracy and peace**

One of the components of human rights and human security is peace. Preserve peace, prevent conflicts from tipping-up into violence and strengthen international security are objectives which constitute important elements of the action of the international community. In the absence of peace, nothing can be achieved in terms of human, social, economic, and even political development. Peace is a framework of respect for human rights, and without it all other human rights are violated by default: the right to life, the right to safety, the right to development and most of all rights related to human dignity. The most vulnerable members of the community are affected as well as the whole society. Violent conflict is costly in human lives, resulting in violations of human rights, causing the displacement of the population, destroys the means of subsistence, undermines economic development, aggravates states’ fragility, weakens governance and jeopardizes national and regional security. This said, the history of Africa is marked by conflicts and wars dating back to pre-colonial, colonial and postcolonial era. Nowadays, most of these conflicts be they armed, political or social, have as origin among others, poor political and economic governance, corruption, deficit in democracy and dialogue, injustice, persistence of inequalities, violations of fundamental freedoms and human rights, intolerance, impunity and fraudulent elections. They are intrastate in
nature and undermine social peace and stability (BIT, 2010: 6).

Similarly, to build the economy of a State, resources are allocated for the construction of infrastructure, for collective social facilities and for investment in various fields. But during conflicts and war, all these areas are affected given that resources are used to finance the war. It is needless to say, conflicts and war on the continent have caused delay and increased poverty among the peoples of this continent as resources are unnecessarily wasted in war. Worst still, the 1990s saw the phenomena of political violence increase, mainly in the poorest states, i.e. with very low incomes, poor infrastructures and so on, like most Subsahara African states. During this period, the complex and fluid internal struggles between governments and rebel groups, or between armed groups, became the predominant form of conflict. To understand what appeared to some as the “new wars”, a vision of these conflicts developed around a particular dimension: the greed of belligerents which, as in Sierra Leone or Liberia, financed the extension of an armed struggle that the ideology of the Cold War could no longer justify, by the exploitation and trade of natural resources. With this resurgence of conflicts, multi-party elections are of great importance in peace-building process.

**Elections and peace**

Elections are now the norm, not the exception in Africa. In the 1960s and 1970s, the subcontinent averaged only 28 elections per decade. By the 1990s, this had increased to 65 elections per decade and, in the period between 2000 and 2005, there were 41 elections in just five years. Elections are now increasingly contested, often vigorously. Extraordinarily, in the early years of independence, only two presidents faced any opposition at all in 26 elections conducted across the subcontinent. By the 1990s, 90 percent of elections were contested. Although, the nature and quality of the electoral contestation varies wildly, there is at least a “modest but meaningful” rise in the theoretical
possibility of an incumbent losing power in an African presidential election. Nevertheless, since the end of Cold war, multi-party elections have become a key aspect of peace agreements designed to put an end to wars in various parts of the world. They have also been writ large in political transitions from authoritarian/militarised political contexts to open, multiparty democratic systems.

In countries such as Cambodia, Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Namibia, Mozambique, El Salvador and East Timor, elections were a critical aspect of the peace and transition processes. In West Africa, a similar pattern has been replicated. The peace processes that brought an end to the brutal civil wars in Liberia, Guinea-Bissau and Sierra Leone, and political transitions that marked the end of authoritarian political regimes in Ghana, Nigeria, Togo, Nigeria, Benin, Niger, Mali and Mauritania were centred, among other things, on open and competitive elections.

Elections are thus of critical importance within the context of peace-building. Many commentators and scholars agree that elections play several roles in post-conflict contexts. These include war termination, marking the formal end of military/one-party rule, providing legitimacy and international credibility to post-conflict governments, promoting democratisation and reconstruction in societies emerging from prolonged conflict, and acting as a strategy for conflict management or resolution (Sisk and Reynolds, 1998). Elections also lend credibility to the ‘new leadership and institutions that emerge from negotiated settlements to a civil war.’ However, Zeeuw and Kumar (2006: 4), make the important point that elections take place in the context of ‘a threefold transition; war to peace, command to free market economy,

---

4 Lyons (T.), 1999, Voting for Peace: Post Conflict Elections in Liberia, Washington DC:
5 Op cit
and authoritarian system to open political order’.

This underscores the connection between post-conflict elections, the role of the international community and the promotion of a (neo) liberal peace (Paris 2002: 637). Thus, peace-building and reconstruction could in reality imply the promotion of multi-party democratisation, market-based economies and public institutions designed to promote a ‘capitalist peace’.

An additional reason for the election-centric nature of African transitions is the usefulness of elections in helping bring an end to armed conflicts that have eluded resolution by negotiation. Elections provide combatants a way out of the stamate warfare. The risks that electoralism poses for countries seeking an exit from autocracy or war are counterbalanced by its indispensability in initiating a new democratic order.

This is clearly an optimistic view of elections that also has the approval of the international community. But, where the struggle for power is hinged upon structural political divisions and a historically rooted sense of grievance, elections may not lead to the resolution of conflict; rather they may create new forms of old divisions.

At another level, elections are a part of the peace-building architecture in which processes of transitional justice, particularly national reconciliation, play important roles. It is believed that democracy can also breathe life into processes of reconciliation and reconstruction. But as Cyril Obi underlines, the main and logical question that arises is on the nature and sustainability of these ‘newly won’ democracies, and how they may strengthen, or weaken the prospects for democratic consolidation, peace and development. It would appear that at best what has emerged could be described as some form of electoral democracy from above, or, at the worst, pseudodemocracies.

---


8 Op Cit
Elections and democracy

In recent years, social scientists as well as democracy practitioners and aid agencies have sought to develop means of framing and assessing the quality of democracy. This stream of theory, methodological innovation, and empirical research has three broad motives: first, that deepening democracy is a moral good, if not an imperative; second, that reforms to improve democratic quality are essential if democracy is to achieve the broad and durable legitimacy that marks consolidation; and third, that long-established democracies must also reform if they are to attend to their own gathering problems of public dissatisfaction and even disillusionment. This said, all democracies, in the minimal sense of electoral democracies, share at least one broad, essential requirement: the principal positions of political power are filled through regular, free, and fair elections among competing parties or candidates, and it is possible for an incumbent government to be turned out of office in those elections. The standard for electoral democracy (what constitutes “free and fair”) is more ambiguous than is often appreciated. However we judge them, elections are only one dimension of democracy. The quality of a democracy also depends on its level of freedom, pluralism, justice, and accountability.

One aspect of this definition requires further discussion. We emphasize that elections must be conducted within a matrix of civil liberties. In practice, civil liberties guarantee that politics will be genuinely competitive. Before elections, all potential candidates must have the opportunity to offer themselves for office, to express their political views openly, and to form political associations to aggregate support behind their bid for power. At the same time, citizens must be equally free to obtain political information to move without hindrance to political meetings, and to opt for political associations of their choice. Democratization

presupposes political liberalization, that is, the provision of civil liberties. Since Schumpeter’s time, definitions of democracy based on a “procedural minimum” have included the requirement of respect for civil liberties as a means of ensuring that elections are not merely formalistic exercises in the uncontested ratification of incumbents. Although we hew to this definitional consensus, we recognize that elections alone are not a sufficient condition of democracy.

We do not wish to commit the “fallacy of electoralism” by ignoring that the consolidation of democracy in the long run involves the permanent establishment of many other valued institutions, such as civilian control over the military, independent legislatures and courts, viable opposition parties and voluntary associations, plus a free press. But no other democratic institution precedes elections, either in timing or importance. In our view, elections are the principal and necessary condition of democracy, the first step without which democracy cannot otherwise be born. Furthermore, we apply the term “democratic” only to the immediate outcome of regime transitions, that is, to signify whether a new regime is installed by electoral means. To designate that a political change is “democratic” is only to record the inauguration of an elected government; no judgment is passed on whether the new regime can survive in the short, medium or long term. We consider regime survival or consolidation, which concerns the durability of democracy, to be analytically separate questions, albeit important ones.

Thus, the analysis of “good” democracy should exclude hybrid or “electoral authoritarian” regimes, which by failing to conduct free and fair elections fall short of an essential requirement for democracy. By definition, we will find the quality of democracy quite low in defective democracies, which are “exclusive” in offering only limited guarantees for political rights, or “dominated” in allowing powerful groups to condition and limit the autonomy of elected leaders, or “illiberal” in the inadequacy of their protections for civil rights and the rule of law.
We can also expect the quality of democracy to be quite deficient in delegative democracies, which have electoral competitiveness and relative civil and political freedom, but whose officials, once elected, are only minimally responsive to citizen preferences, constrained by other agencies of government, and respectful of the rule of law.

Democracies vary in their degree of competitiveness, in the openness of access to the electoral arena by new political forces, in the ease with which incumbents can be defeated, and in the equality of access to the mass media and campaign funding on the part of competing political parties. Depending on the type of electoral system, democracies may also allow for more or less decisive alternation of power.\(^\text{10}\) Note that this approach to democracy does not depend on proving that contestants for power are “true” democrats. It does not presuppose the existence of a political culture of democracy and opponents acknowledge, however reluctantly, the acceptability of electoral contests for leadership.\(^\text{11}\)

African countries have embarked on distinctive and divergent paths of political change; most importantly, some arrived at a democratic regime while others failed to do so. In the same number of countries, incumbent strongmen could halt opposition demands for political reform. Instead, they allow the reform process to unfold to a considerable extent, often actually losing control over the process. For example, and often explicitly against their better judgement, incumbent rulers acquiesce to competitive elections. At the same time, however, they exploite the powers of incumbency to dictate the rule of the political game by manipulating electoral laws, monopolizing campaign resources, manipulating or appointing head the Election Management Body (EMB) or interfering with the polls. The results (as in Cameroon, Gabon, Ghana, and Kenya…) are dubious elections that usually returned the

\(^\text{10}\) Op cit
\(^\text{11}\) Bratton (Michael )and van de Walle (Nicolas), 1997, Democratic Experiments in Africa. Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
incumbent. Such democratisations are flawed. Finally and perhaps, in democracies that aren’t really democratic, political blockages can result in violence.

**Unfair elections as sources of destabilization of the political order in Africa**

Contested elections have sometimes led to violence, and there remain concerns about electoral laws as well as the operation and management of electoral bodies. Elections are often a flashpoint for violence. For example, in Angola, fighting restarted in 1992 after UNITA guerillas refused to accept their electoral defeat; in Côte d’Ivoire in 2002, the political crisis stemming from the inability to register voters properly led to civil war, the situation worsened with 2010 presidential election; in Kenya, there were ethnic cleansings after the fraudulent victory of the presidential party in 2007; in Zimbabwe the level of repression increased during the 2008 election; and finally, in Gabon, pillaging took place after the result of 2009 presidential elections were announced by the extreme violence they have caused, the Kenyan and Ivorian post-electoral crises remain symbolic of the recurrence of conflicts resulted from imperfect elections in Africa.

**The Kenyan 2007 Electoral Crisis**

Much has been said and written about the Kenyan crisis; what we can rapidly retain is that, on December 27, 2007, Kenya held its General Elections, the fourth since the return of multiparty democracy to Kenya in 1992. Given that the General Elections of 2002 had seen, finally, the removal of the Kenya African National Union from power by the National Rainbow Coalition, largely without incident, there was little expectation that anything could or would go wrong. In some ways, that optimism was not misplaced.

The 2007 General Elections were the most contested in Kenya’s history, at all three levels (civic, parliamentary and presidential) even though
it was clear that the presidential contest had come down to a struggle between the incumbent Mwai Kibaki, standing for the new Party of National Unity (PNU), and his erstwhile National Rainbow Coalition colleague, Raila Odinga of the Orange Democratic Movement-ODM. In this controversial and hotly disputed Presidential elections, President Mwai Kibaki was declared re-elected, with 46% of the vote. Raila Odinga obtained 44% and Kalonzo Musyoka of the Orange Democratic Movement-Kenya (ODM-K) 9%. Other candidates obtained 3.4% collectively. In parliamentary elections held on the same date, ODM won 99 seats, PNU obtained 46, ODMK 16, KANU 14 and other parties, 35; 2 seats were ex-officio and 12 seats were appointed by the President in accordance with party strength in parliament - ODM 6, PNU 3, ODM-K 2, KANU 1 (Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group, 2013 : 4).

These general elections were followed by unprecedented inter-communal violence that erupted over the conduct of the elections combined with longstanding problems such as a culture of impunity, the informalization of violence, social and spatial inequalities, communal narratives of historical injustice, high unemployment rates, and grievances over corruption and the monopolization of political power by a small number of elites (Lych, 2013 : 3). The crisis erupted after the incumbent President Mwai Kibaki was declared the winner. However, Raila Odinga of the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) and his supporters alleged electoral malpractice; this allegation was widely confirmed by both domestic and international observers. The announcement and swearing-in of Kibaki was followed by a mix of opposing reactions from the supporters of ODM coalition because of their ethnic and geographical diversity. Besides staging of nonviolent protests, opposition supporters engaged in violent rampages in different parts of the country, most noticeable in Odinga’s home of Nyanza Province, the slums of Nairobi, and part of his Langata constituency. The crisis that was more of targeted ethnic violence was initially
directed against the people of Kikuyu, the community in which Kibaki is a member.

This particularly affected those living outside their traditional settlement areas, mainly in the Rift-Valley Province. Some of the people in Kikuyu were also involved in violence against the opposition groups that supported Odinga, especially Luos and Kalenjin and basically in the areas surrounding Nakuru and Naivasha. In Mombasa, Kenyan Muslims took to the street to protest the electoral manipulations and air their own grievances. Though ethnic tension played a role in these protests, hardship being experienced by the masses, especially the poor actually intensified the violence, as looters also struck a number of stores in Mombasa. The slums of Nairobi saw some of the worst violence, some were ethnically motivated attacks, some acts of outrage at extreme poverty, and some the activities of criminal gangs. The violence continued sporadically for several months, particularly in the Rift Valley.\textsuperscript{12}

In the devastation that ensued between January 25–30, 2008, approximately 1,300 people were killed and over 600,000 displaced. The conflicts also resulted in destruction of tens of thousands of homes, properties, and businesses. Children and families who had recently interacted peacefully with schoolmates, friends, and neighbors from different ethnic backgrounds suddenly found themselves thrust into conflict that permeated most of their relationships and during which they had little choice but to align along ethnic lines (Skinner, Oburu, Lanaford and Bacchini, 2014 : 38).\textsuperscript{13} This plunging of Kenya, until recently a centre of stability and growth in East Africa, into political and economic uncertainty following the general election of December


2007 is regarded as a major cause for global and African concern. It is widely accepted that the elections were deeply flawed, and that there was electoral malfeasance by all the major players. President Kibaki’s rapid declaration of victory in the face of a heavily disputed election and his determination to hold on to the levers of state power precipitated a deadly crisis, communal violence and economic decline.\textsuperscript{14}

The Final Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group for the 2007 General Elections in Kenya stated that the “Electoral Commission of Kenya has not succeeded in establishing the integrity of the tallying process, thereby bringing the validity of the election results into question.” This was despite “the many positive aspects of the pre-election and polling day procedures, when Kenyans came out in large numbers to vote” (Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group, 2013 : 4). In his role as chair of the African Union (AU) Panel of Eminent African Personalities, Kofi Annan led mediation efforts that resulted in a power-sharing agreement between President Mwai Kibaki’s Party of National Unity (PNU) and the then-opposition Orange Democratic Movement (ODM).\textsuperscript{15} The agreement allowed Kibaki to stay on as head of state and created the position of prime minister for ODM leader Raila Odinga.

**The 2010 Ivorian Crisis**

The Ivorian presidential election of 2010 was the culmination of a long, complex and costly process of coming out of crisis, initiated in 2007 by the signing of the Political Accord of Ouagadougou. The much awaited organization of these elections also met the conditions set in

\textsuperscript{15} - United Nations Secretary-General (UNSG) Ban Ki-moon characterized the post-election ethnic clashes in Kenya as an issue concerning of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), a relatively new principle that imposes the duty to halt mass violence. Mr. Ban took diplomatic steps to address the violence by encouraging mediation efforts by former UNSG Kofi Annan. The crisis in Kenya was the first time that the doctrine of R2P was invoked by the international community and « remains as the only case since the adoption of R2P at the 2005 World Summit », to quote Johannes Langer (2011 : 1-17 ; see BoruHalakhe, 2013).
the Resolutions of the UN Security Council. Through this election, the important stake was to put an end to a period of 11 years of intense political crisis and to normalize the turbulent relationship that Côte d’Ivoire has with the international community. This election that all Ivorian wished for and which many Africanists considered as the vault of the process of coming out of crisis or the sine qua non for the establishment of a lasting peace in the country, proved to be the source of serious tensions.

This Ivorian post-electoral violence is well detailed in the Amnesty International Report 2011 and in the EU Report. Laurent Gbagbo had been elected head of state in October 2000 after an election that he himself described as “disastrous”. At the end of his mandate in 2005, elections were due to be held. However, this election was postponed for five years because of delays in compiling electoral rolls and disarming fighters. The elections were finally held on October 31 (first round) and November 28 (second round) 2010, with the two opposing candidates Laurent Gbagbo and Allassane Ouattara. The international community made considerable efforts to help organize election but in the wake of the election both parties claimed victory. Alassane Ouattara, who had been banned from standing in Côte d’Ivoire’s two previous presidential elections on ethno-political grounds, claimed a victory that was supported by the National Electoral Commission and certified by the UN Secretary General’s Special Representative in Côte d’Ivoire (who had an unprecedented mandate from the UN Security Council to conduct this process of certification).

However, the result was disputed by the Constitutional Court who ruled in favour of incumbent Laurent Gbagbo, a decision that hinged upon the nullification of roughly 600,000 votes in the pro-Ouattara regions of the

---

centre and north. The resulting standoff led to the country descending into large-scale violence.\textsuperscript{17} Both candidates declared themselves winner of the elections. The schism at the helm of the state invited strong international reactions; notably, the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), recognized Alassane Ouattara’s victory and the country found itself in a political stalemate with two presidents and two governments. Efforts to mediate, particularly by the African Union, failed to peacefully resolve the political crisis. Alassane Ouattara and his government, led by Guillaume Soro (the leader of the Forces armées des Forces nouvelles- FAFN, Armed Forces of the New Forces)\textsuperscript{18}, who was appointed Prime Minister and Minister of Defence shortly after the results of the November 2010 presidential elections were announced, remained blockaded in the Golf Hotel in Abidjan under the protection of the Forces armées des Forces nouvelles and UNOCI forces. The conflict ended in April 2011 when former rebels supporting Ouattara were aided by French and UN forces, resulting in the arrest of Laurent Gbagbo. The last official assessment of the crisis reported more than 3,000 deaths and more than a million people displaced.

\textsuperscript{17} Yabi (Gilles), 2012, Keeping the Peace in Electoral Conflicts: The Role of ECOWAS, UNOCI and the International Community in Côte d’Ivoire, Center for International Peace Operations, Policy Briefing,

\textsuperscript{18} It is important to underline that, in September 2002, a coup attempted by some members of the security forces ended in the \textit{de facto} partition of the country into a northern zone controlled by the armed opposition movement, known as the \textit{Forces nouvelles}, and a southern zone loyal to President Gbagbo. The \textit{de facto} partition of the country was confirmed by the establishment of a buffer zone under the supervision of the French force Licorne. Within the framework of an attempted peaceful resolution of the conflict, the United Nations Security Council authorized in 2004 the deployment of the UNOCI peacekeeping forces. Several attempts at political mediation took place under the aegis of France and Burkina Faso and ended in the signature of the Linas-Marcoussis (2003) and Ouagadougou (2007) Agreements. Following the latter agreement, Laurent Gbagbo appointed the then General Secretary of the New Forces, Guillaume Soro, as his prime minister. Despite the signature of several agreements seeking to reunify Côte d’Ivoire and to carry out a process of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR), the country remained divided in two till the arrest of Laurent Gbagbo.
Conclusion

The relationship between elections and violence has only recently started to be examined systematically. The fact that electoral violence can occur before, during, or after elections creates difficulties for developing appropriate search designs. In addition, the causes of election violence may differ depending on when it occurs.\textsuperscript{19} This said, in the domain of governance and democracy, 23 African countries have held democratic elections between August 2011 and March 2013. Elections in Niger have completed a major transition from military to civilian rule and legislative elections in Ivory Coast have helped to consolidate peace after the post-electoral crisis of 2011. Elections held in Zambia, Senegal and Lesotho, respectively in September 2011 and in March and May 2012, brought in these countries pacific changes of government, implanting more and more the democratic practice. In addition, the DRC held elections (presidential and legislative) in November 2011 and Liberia held a constitutional referendum in August 2011 and elections (presidential and legislative) in November 2011. It was the second round of elections since the end of the war in both countries. Sierra Leone also completed its democratic transition by holding elections in November 2012.\textsuperscript{20} Elections occupy thus a central position to the stability of the political order in Africa: if they have become a widely accepted means to legitimate the institutions of governance, they are at the same time one of the key factors that triggers violence and insecurity in the region as we have just seen. This raises the need for the consolidation of the democratic order in our continent. To achieve this, our institutions must be reformed to better ensure their acceptance by the people and the protagonists of electoral processes;

\textsuperscript{20} - Progress in regard to elections and democracy did not go smoothly: elections in Mali and Guinea -Bissau were postponed as a result of coups d’état in March and April 2012 respectively. After an acute internal crisis in which France intervened to save Mali from the Islamist and secessionist pressure, the country successfully organized a presidential election in 2013 in which IBK was victorious.
but more importantly, we must ensure their sovereignty.

Many of these reforms have been listed by the civil society, bilateral and multilateral partners, and election observers in Africa, including African Union\textsuperscript{21}, European Union., Commonwealth, OrganisationInternationale de la Francophonie, Sub-Regional African Organisations, and so on. These concern all the stakeholders in the electoral process especially, judiciary as well as the electorate, election commissions, the balance of power, the security sector, the media, political parties, and so on. Each of these organs should fully play its role. As a result, scholars have increasingly adopted broader definitions of consolidation in which the criteria include the legitimation and institutionalization of democratic practices over time, buttressed by the widespread adoption of democratic values. In this view, key political institutions, including political parties, the legislature, and the judiciary, need to function effectively and to successfully nurture broad-based pluralism. However, the emergence of a democratic political culture is an essential component of consolidation. The essence of democratic consolidation is a behavioural and attitudinal embrace of democratic principles and method by both elites and masses. Democracy, in other words, is not possible without democrats.”

\textsuperscript{21} - Apartelectoral observation, thereexistswithin the African Union, an African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governancewithclear provisions on democracy and good governance, including free and fairelections to bepromoted by African States.
An Analysis of the Sustainability of Peace Agreements in West Africa

Mamadou Gbongue

Introduction

Even though the issue of conflicts and the methods of their resolution has been the subject of many studies, this is not the case with the management of peace agreements that are signed following the outbreak of conflicts. The premature and frequent breakdown of agreements, the resurgence of conflicts and their scope following the signing of peace agreements observed today, call for a profound reflection to understand the condition of sustainability of peace agreements.

Through a construction of the sustainability of peace agreements by the national communities of
countries affected by conflict, our study sets out to provide answers to the following questions:

What are the factors that influence the sustainability of peace agreements?

- How can national communities establish conditions for the durability of peace agreements?
- What is the role of women in endogenous governance, the prevention and resolution of conflicts in West Africa?
- What is the endogenous capacity of African women in the prevention of conflicts and in sociopolitical regulation?

This study uses a participative methodology (MAPP) which enables local communities, groups and all the entities involved in conflict management to construct a sustainability indice of conflicts, the threshold of the general and specific factors of selected countries and their capacity of resilience. This comparative approach is used to highlight the general and specific factors that condition the sustainability of the peace agreements of selected countries (Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia and Sierra Leone).

This paper is an extract from an on-going comparative study between Côte d’Ivoire, Sierra Leone and Liberia. It presents the preliminary results of studies carried out in Côte d’Ivoire.

Research Problem

Socio-political conflicts have been the subject of many studies with regards to their determinants, origin and their economic, social, cultural and environmental incidence. Through an analytical and statistical procedure, the studies carried out by Collier (2000)\(^1\); Kaldor (1999)\(^2\),

Collier and al. (2006)\textsuperscript{3}, Doyle and Sambanis (2006)\textsuperscript{4}, provide elements for the understanding of the resurgence, aggravation and complexity of civilian or militarized conflicts. The results of these studies have enabled us to propose global frameworks for the intervention and management of armed conflicts.

Global systems conceived in the tenth century were intended to resolve tensions between States and in isolated cases, civilian conflicts. Wars, be they inter-state or civil, follow a logic and a given sequence and oppose known belligerents – sovereign States or well defined rebel movements. If a conflict aggravates and real hostilities break up, they finally come to an end (in the event of the victory of one camp over the other or a negotiated settlement); a “post-conflict” period of a short duration follows suit, leading to the re-establishment of peace. (World Bank, 2011 :5). According to this researcher, the global system relies on this model which attributes to different national and international actors, a clearly defined role: promoting development by ensuring prosperity and strengthening the capacity of Nation States, (while keeping a distance during the phase of hostilities); by giving previlege to diplomacy, by ensuring the smooth functioning of prevention or mediation in the case of conflicts between states, or between the central power and rebel movements in the case of a national conflict; ensuring the maintenance of peace during the post-conflict period and providing humanitarian aids.

Even though the threats of civil war and inter-state conflicts have reduced during the last 15 years, violence and conflicts have certainly not disappeared. Between 1997 and 2002, about half of the global armed conflicts occurred in Africa. (African Development Bank, 2008). Between 1990 and 2005, 23 African countries experienced violent

\begin{itemize}
\end{itemize}
conflicts. Among them are the three countries of this study: Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia and Sierra Leone. Today, these countries experience repeated cycles of violence, weak governance and instability. Moreover, they all share a certain number of common characteristics. Firstly, they have already experienced civil conflict during the last 30 years, with the exception of Côte d’Ivoire. Secondly, they have witnessed new forms of conflict that endanger development. In fact, whereas these countries have succeeded in negotiating political or peace agreements after conflicts, they are today confronted by different waves of criminal violence that impede their development. Thirdly, signed peace agreements are very unstable with regards to their duration. Thus according to the World Bank (2011), the game of the perpetrators of conflict and the conditions in which these agreements are concluded explains this situation. Some criminal movements finance their activities as is the case in Sierra Leone and Liberia. Organized criminal groups contribute to political violence during elections periods, like in Côte d’Ivoire.

It is necessary to have a thorough review of these peace agreements to know their real scope, given the current observation of the cycles of violence in which these countries find themselves, whereas peace accords have been forcefully concluded. More agreements have been reached following a really classical model: pressure from the international community, designation of a facilitator, conclave of direct belligerents, etc. Admittedly, this model enables the reaching of an agreement but has some shortcomings owing to its non-inclusive and indeterminate nature. It is non-inclusive because it remains the affair of the belligerent nations only, with the help of a facilitator. Also, it is not endogenous. Also, it is indeterminate because it does not result from an analytical approach of causality. Furthermore, the average life span of peace agreements does not exceed five years without being broken. The work of Xavier (2008) shows the inability of the UN in imposing peace in Côte d’Ivoire. According to this researcher, the current situation of fragile peace was obtained not as a result of the presence of the UNO
but due to the will of the belligerents to broker peace. These results show the importance of endogenous procedures in the negotiation of peace agreements.

In these countries, vulnerable persons, especially women and children, further experience the ravages of war. While women are victims of sexual violence, children are being enlisted as soldiers of the warring forces. This situation sometimes renders the resolution of conflicts difficult, to the extent that it would be necessary to take into consideration psychological problems related to traumas of war as well as ensure the social stability of future generations. As a matter of fact, child soldiers who have learnt how to handle weapons are the future generation. Furthermore, their non-consideration in strategies for the negotiation of peace agreements exposes the country to repeated acts of conflict. Moreover, they are potential actors who can fuel armed conflict in Côte d’Ivoire. Today, they are referred to as war dogs. The desire for a rapid resolution of armed conflicts from the top sometimes overlooks these vulnerable groups in the negotiations.

Measures have been taken to involve women in conflict management in countries like Liberia and Sierra Leone. However, it has been proven that the participation of women in the process of negotiation is rather belated, whereas they would have been more efficient if they were involved from the very beginning of negotiations.

The following fundamental questions therefore come to mind: what are the factors that influence the sustainability of peace agreements in Africa? How does the national community construct the conditions for the sustainability of peace agreements? What is the role and responsibility of women in endogenous governance, the prevention and resolution of conflicts in West Africa? What are the endogenous capacities of African women in conflict prevention and sociological regulation? How can they be promoted and developed?
These questions constitute the framework for the analysis that guided the conduct of this applied research in three African counties: Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia and Sierra Leone. This work is aimed at providing solutions to the current development priorities of these countries: economic recovery through a strong growth based on the realization of major public investments, ensuring the basis of national reconciliation and maintaining an atmosphere of post-conflict stability.

This study presents the first results of analysis carried out from data extracted from the first Focus Groups in Côte d’Ivoire. The theoretical basis of the research is derived from the concept of sustainable development from studies undertaken by the World Bank and DFID (2010). The multidimensional method of approaching today’s development issues stems from the fact that problems no longer occur in isolation: there are interactions between the economic, natural and socio-cultural spheres. An analysis of sustainability thus demands us to pinpoint the different dimensions of the phenomenon considered and to put in place indicators capable of measuring the interactions. This is the same thing in the construction of peace and the resolution of conflicts. DFID (cited above) proposes an integrated approach for the attainment of four main objectives of sustainability necessary for the construction of peaceful societies and states. They are:

- Addressing the causes and effects of conflicts and the weakness of states and establishing mechanisms for the resolution of conflicts;
- Establishing procedures for an inclusive political resolution of conflicts;
- Developing the main functions of the State;
- Responding to the needs of the population.

For these authors, addressing these four objectives requires that national
and international actors involved in conflict resolution work together on the basis of a process akin to affected countries. These objectives are strongly correlated and form a virtuous cycle that helps to maintain a positive dynamic by strengthening relations between the State and the population.

The literature identifies three complex factors as the causes of conflicts: grievances or motivations, opportunity and feasibility. Questions about identity, discrimination and high level of social inequality are factors that can trigger violence. High rate of unemployment and poverty in a country can give rise to conflicts and signifies the fact that individuals have little to lose by being involved in conflicts. Finally, a conflict becomes possible when the country is incapable of crushing rebel groups.

There are five approaches relating to the resolution of conflicts: arranged agreements, imposed agreements, agreements in the form of pacts between political elites, agreements having a certain legitimacy and inclusive agreements. Explicitly negotiated, usually under peace processes (Nepal, Sierra Leone, Northern Ireland), arranged agreements have the tendency of being modified and adjusted by national elites during peace negotiations. Agreements that are for the most part imposed by foreign powers certainly have the ability of making hostilities to cease. However, they have the peculiarity of being volatile and fragile. In fact, once a ceasefire has been obtained through pressure from the international community, this period is usually used by the belligerent powers to strengthen their military and political positions. This type of agreement is the precursor of armed conflicts that in the form of rebellion. Agreements in the form of pacts between political elites consist in the negotiation of peace by major political parties of the country.

---

Even though this approach has the advantage of instilling an atmosphere of confidence among the elites, it does not guarantee the sustainability of peace agreements since there is usually the issue of alliances, influence and especially strategies of actors who want to reap the individual benefits of peace agreements for their political parties. At times, these agreements are signed at the detriment of collective good.

Even though every approach has its strengths and weaknesses, in our opinion, inclusive agreements ensure the conditions for their sustainability (Naseem, 2011). More so, those dependent on the ability of the State to ensure its principal functions (security, justice, law as well as financial and macroeconomic management) and to respond to the aspirations of the people have limits. As a matter of fact, the State alone can not restore confidence. To achieve this result, in situations characterized by violence and fragility, it is important to deploy concerted efforts in a bid to forge coalitions that are sufficiently inclusive, as was the case by Indonesia when it was confronted by the 2006 violence that break up in Aceh or Timor-Leste and even in Chile during its phase of political transition. This was the same with South Sudan, with the experience of local actors in the dynamics relating to the post-conflict construction of the state.

A coalition is “sufficiently inclusive” when it brings together all the necessary parties during the initial phases in the process of the re-establishment of trust and the transformation of institutions. It is not necessary for it to be totally inclusive.” The mixed outcome of the process of Disarmament, Demobilization and Re-integration of ex-service men commonly referred to as DDR is a illustration. In fact, in most of the countries that have initiated this process, the authorities who are in charge of this issue often encountered insurmountable difficulties; the equilibrium to look for between the budget cost of implementation

---

and the inclusion and satisfaction of the whole social segment of the country that is more or less directly concerned by the conflict. This is the dilemma of countries such as Côte d’Ivoire, DRC and Central African Republic engaged in post-conflict reconstruction. Furthermore, the recent militaro-political crisis in Central African Republic is the outcome of poorly mastered and poorly conducted DDR process. (Manzan, 2011 :8).

There are two forms of sufficiently inclusive coalitions : (1.) At the general level, by mobilising the country’s energies in favour of change and by obtaining the membership of important stakeholders in view of collaboration between public authorities and other segments of the society as well as with investors, funding bodies and neighbouring countries of the region , and (2) At the local level, by encouraging contacts with community chiefs with the aim of identifying priorities and ensuring the execution of programmes. Sufficiently inclusive coalitions can produce results when violence is of a political nature and when they are criminal, in this case, through collaboration with community chiefs, enterprises and the civil society in zones affected by criminal violence. The civil society, especially the association of women, often contributes in restoring confidence and in maintaining the dynamics of recovery and transformation, as indicated by the role played by the Association of Liberian Women in assisting the pursuit of progress within the framework of peace agreements.

However, even though the DFID approach (2010) offers a better understanding of the variables that the influence stability of States and the sustainable maintenance of peace, it is still limited from the point of view of national actors in the way they themselves determine the indicators of sustainability. Although in a study undertaken by the World Bank (2011), investigations were conducted in some countries which are the object of the report, the methodology used was not participative.
Consequently, our methodological approach consists in determining the manner in which the national community constructs the sustainability of peace agreements. To this end, we will rely on MAPP (Method for Impact Assessment Programmes and Projects) developed by Neubert and Muller (2010)\textsuperscript{8}, which is a variant of MARP (Méthode Active de Recherche Participative – Active Method for Participative Research). MAPP is a tool for the analysis of the impact of the project and the programme of beneficiaries. It is a socio-anthological approach for the evaluation of the global objectives of programmes and projects such as poverty reduction, democratization and the maintenance of peace.

\textit{Analysis}

MAPP, which is essentially a method for participative evaluation depends on the development of three (3) matrixes or tables of analysis by the actors targeted, with the technical assistance of an animator. These include:

- the sustainability of agreements curve;
- an analysis of trends relating to the indicators of the sustainability of agreements;
- the influence matrix.

\textbf{The Sustainability of Agreements Curve}

Like an icebreaker, the sustainability of agreements curve shows the global trends of the sustainability of agreements in a given country, while considering the period preceding the agreement so far. The sustainability of agreements curve highlights certain indicators that are important to parties in a conflict. These indicators concern the political, economic, social, environmental, cultural and institutional dimensions of the sustainability of peace agreements.

It is presented in the form of a diagram where the abscissa axis represents the sustainability of peace agreements according to the actors concerned and the ordinate axis represents time. It is aimed at enabling actors to have a global view of the evolution of the situation of stability and peace in the country and in the community in the temporal range identified. The latter will themselves, define the notion of “the sustainability of peace agreements.”

A point of departure or year of reference shall be defined. Participants will determine a year during which a major event greatly perturbed the political and social stability of the country. The event must not have taken place more than ten years ago. From this reference point, participants will determine the situations and factors responsible for them in the coming years.

The sustainability of agreements curve defines the variables used to construct each indicator for the analysis of trends.

**Analyzing the Indicators of the Sustainability of Agreements**

An analysis of the trends highlights the indicators of the sustainability of agreements and their evolution in a given period. It is a retrospective analysis of events, focusing on both the periods before and after the signing of agreements. However, before dwelling on this, the indicators for the sustainability of agreements must first be determined on the basis of a review of related literature. These indicators are discussed by Focus Groups for amendment or other proposals. Participants determine their proper definition and the content of variables necessary for their construction.

We can illustrate by identifying the main indicators:

- Political
- Economical
- Environmental
- Socio-cultural
- Institutional
- Others (HIV AIDS, etc.).

Figure 1 below is an example of a trends matrix to be understood by participants.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators of Durability</th>
<th>Year 1</th>
<th>Year 2</th>
<th>Year 3</th>
<th>Year 4</th>
<th>Year 5</th>
<th>Year 6</th>
<th>Year 7</th>
<th>Year 8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. QUALITY OF PEACE AGREEMENTS</td>
<td>+/- (4)</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>++</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. ACCESS TO MEANS OF NEGOTIATION</td>
<td>+/- (1)</td>
<td>+/- (2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. KNOWLEDGE AND COMPETENCE IN NEGOTIATION</td>
<td>_ _</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. RIGHTS AND THE POWER OF NEGOTIATION</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+/- (1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Grade: ***** or 5 = Very Good, **** or 4 = Good, *** or 3 = Average, ** or 2 = Bad, * or 1 = Very Bad

--Reduce two times; - more recent less than before; +/- no change; + more than before; ++ has risen twice

It is fairly easy to understand this matrix. In the column below for identified indicators, for example, Focus Group participants will determine for themselves, the variables for formalising an indicator. Thereafter, a score will be given in the form of a point as the grade indicates the importance of every indicator on the A, B, C et D Criterias on the stability and duration of peace agreements.
The Influence Matrix

This matrix enables us to assess the influence of parameters for the indicators of the sustainability of peace agreements. A scale of value is given between 0 and 5. At the end of this assessment of the influence of indicators, an active and passive survey is calculated. The active survey shows the activities that have affected the sustainability of agreements the most. The passive survey shows to what extent the indicators of durability of agreements have been improved as well as those that have not improved (figure2).

Figure 2: The Influence Marix …………………….(Village / Country)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quelle est l’intensité de l’influence sur…. ?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Activities/project /programmes →</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicators of Développement ↓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. QUALITY OF PEACE AGREEMENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A1. e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A2.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>B. ACCESS TO MEANS OF NEGOTIATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B2.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>C. KNOWLEDGE AND COMPETENCES IN NEGOCIATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>D. RIGHTS AND THE POWER OF NEGOTIATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D3.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Results

Factors Responsible for the Sustainability of Peace Agreements and the Degree of Inclusion

The sustainability of peace agreements curve relates the perception of national entities interviewed in focus groups on political events pertaining to the management of militaroen-political conflicts that occurred in a given country (Graph 1).

Source: Extracts of the results of focus groups of political and institutional actors as well as opinion leaders (2014)

During the period 2002 – 2008, six (6) peace agreements were signed in Côte d’Ivoire after the post-electoral crisis that occurred in September 2002. These agreements had the peculiarity of being very ephemeral. The average duration was one year, with the perpetual questioning of a party to the discussions.
The Ouagadougou Agreement (there were many) were those that permitted the organization of the 2010 general elections. They were peculiar in the sense that this time around, the parties to the conflict initiated discussions, defined the mode of operation, the terms of reference and the agenda, all in the presence of a facilitator.

Participants of the focus groups of this study define a number of common factors relating to the duration of peace agreements as follows:

- The involvement of national communities in all peace agreement negotiations, whether in the form of ceasefire or political agreements. During the different peace agreements signed in Côte d’Ivoire, the national community, specifically the civil society, opinion leaders, professional organizations, ethnic communities, the mass media, etc. were only partially involved;

- The consideration of the people’s aspirations. Generally, for participants, signed peace agreements are just a reflection of the aspirations of politicians. In these agreements, the belligerents are only concerned with political power sharing. However, according to the data from focus, the conflict in Côte d’Ivoire has a strong civilian origin. There is of course, a strong ethnic division between those from the savannah north and the christians from the forest south. This division is due to the strong conflict between political parties;

- The pre and post-electoral periods. Participants observe a recurrence of conflicts during these periods. This is the same with the nullity and weakness of the signed agreements. For them, political actors who are signatories of the peace agreements consider the exercise of political power as an end in itself, an investment in financial capital for which the beneficiary must pay dividends in return.
### 4.2. Sustainability of Peace Agreements and Degree of Inclusion

**Figure 1: Trends Analysis Matrix**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators of durability</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007-2010</th>
<th>Trends</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A1. Quality of stakeholders</td>
<td>•</td>
<td>•</td>
<td>•</td>
<td>•</td>
<td>••</td>
<td>•••</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A2. Strategic position of belligerents</td>
<td>4•••</td>
<td>4•••</td>
<td>3•</td>
<td>3•</td>
<td>3•</td>
<td>3•</td>
<td>+/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A3. Relative weight of identity and religious division</td>
<td>4••••</td>
<td>4••••</td>
<td>4•••</td>
<td>4•••</td>
<td>3•</td>
<td>3•</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A4. Hegemony of foreign powers</td>
<td>4••••</td>
<td>4••••</td>
<td>4••••</td>
<td>4••••</td>
<td>4••••</td>
<td>4••••</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A5. Social and economic aspirations</td>
<td>•</td>
<td>••</td>
<td>•</td>
<td>•</td>
<td>•••</td>
<td>••••</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### A. QUALITY OF PEACE AGREEMENTS

#### B. ACCESS TO MEANS OF NEGOTIATION

#### B1. Availability of means of communication

#### B2. Area of negotiation

#### B3. Existence of a framework of concertation

#### C. CONNAISSANCE ET COMPETENCES EN NEGOCIATION

#### C1. Method of resolution

#### C2. Capacity to negotiate

#### C3. Nature of problems

#### D. RIGHTS AND THE POWER OF NEGOTIATION

#### D1. Nationals in the negotiation team

#### D2. Involvement of women

#### D3. Observer roles of nationals
Trends on the Indicators of the Quality of Peace Agreements

1. According to focus group participants, the quality of stakeholders and the consideration of social aspirations during negotiations of peace agreements are important in the improvement of the quality of peace agreements. The positive trend in the perception of these indicators is an illustration. In fact, between 2002 and 2005, the quality of stakeholders as well as the consideration of social aspirations during peace agreements was weak or sub-standard. This is explained by the strong importance of foreign powers in conflict resolution, the radicalisation of the strategic positions of belligerents, especially by a very strong identity division. Between 2006 and 2010, the trends for two indicators improved because there was lesser influence of foreign powers in the negotiations.

2. The trend on the strategic position of belligerents did not witness any global changes between 2002 and 2010. No matter the agreement signed, the position of belligerents changes very little. The obvious difficulty in conflict resolution resides therefore in the nature of the forces that determine strategic positions. For the inhabitants interviewed, the degree of inclusion of the different social components of Côte d’Ivoire in the negotiation and management of signed peace agreements remains low due to the strong dependence of the contents of peace agreements on political exigences only. The consideration of social and economic aspirations is equally vital.
Trends on the Indicators of Access to Means of Negotiation

1. The availability of means of communication reduces during political peace agreements. There is very little communication during negotiations. Everything happens in an opaque manner and generally, the inhabitants are presented with a fait accompli. According to participants of focus groups, when the negotiators have a means of communication, this can have a double effect: a positive effect if the means are used to strengthen arguments advanced. On the other hand, the effect can be negative if the negotiators use these means to slow down the process of negotiation. This was often observed during peace agreements negotiations in Côte d’Ivoire where the belligerents who had ultra-modern means of negotiation resorted to prior arbitration with their mentor before taking any decision.

2. The more precise the domain of negotiation of peace agreements is, the easier the access to means of communication will be. According to the results of figure 1, participants attach so much interest to the domain of negotiation. For them, an improved domain of negotiation facilitates access to the means of negotiation.

3. The existence of a framework of consultation equally favours access to means of negotiation. This indicator increased at least twice. It is a very strong rising trend. During peace agreements, there is a noticeable effort to promote an atmosphere of dialogue.

Trends on the Indicators of Knowledge and Competence in Negotiation

Generally speaking, the main indicators of competence in the negotiation of peace agreements, that is, the method of resolution adopted, the ability to negotiate and the perfect knowledge of the nature of the problem have improved. These results synchronise with the improvement of peace agreements.
According to participants of focus groups, it is therefore necessary to further strengthen the capacity of negotiators in a bid to have quality and lasting peace agreements.

Trends on the Indicators of Rights and the Power of Negotiation

Trends on the indicators ‘nationals in the mediation team’, ‘involvement of women’ and ‘observer role of nationals’ does not change during peace agreements. These indicators register a poor score. This result shows a lack of consideration of the aspirations of a great part of the components of the Ivorian society in peace agreements as well as vulnerable groups and women during conflicts.

According to participants, the involvement of women in peace negotiations in Côte d’Ivoire has been virtually non-existent.

There has virtually been no actions in their favour, even though they are the most affected of the long period of militar-o-political crisis.

**Endogenous Practices in Conflict Management and the Sustainability of Peace Agreements**

Comments of focus group participants on the influence:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activities/project/programmes</th>
<th>Indicators of Sustainability ↓</th>
<th>1Reconciliation Forum</th>
<th>2Conclave of Linas Marcusiss</th>
<th>3Permanent work group</th>
<th>4Permanent framework for consultation</th>
<th>5Dialogue Truth and Reconciliation Committee</th>
<th>6Organisation of kings and chiefs</th>
<th>7Forum of religious bodies</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>11</th>
<th>12</th>
<th>∑ Passive Survey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A1. Quality of stakeholders</td>
<td>4 3 0 2 3 4 4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A2. Strategic position of belligerents</td>
<td>5 5 3 5 1 1 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A3 Identity and Religious division</td>
<td>5 5 1 2 1 3 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A4. Hegemony of foreign powers</td>
<td>2 5 5 3 2 2 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**A QUALITY OF PEACE AGREEMENTS.**
Passive Survey:

The consideration of social and economic aspirations, the existence of a framework for negotiation and the perfect knowledge of the nature of the problem and the involvement of nationals in negotiation teams of peace agreements are the indicators, which are the most influenced by the activities identified or realized within the national community. The capacity to negotiate and the involvement of women in peace agreements have little influence.

1. The consideration of social and economic aspirations: the forum for national reconciliation, the Linas-Marcoussis conclave, the activities of CDVR, the forum of religious confessions and of the organisation of kings and traditional rulers significantly influence the consideration of the social and economic aspirations in the negotiation
of peace agreements in **Côte d’Ivoire**. These are activities essentially initiated and animated by the national community, with the exception of the Linas-Marcoussis conclave.

2. **The existence of a framework of negotiation**:
All the activities conducted within the framework of research on peace influence the existence of a framework of negotiation. This result proves that these activities create a favourable atmosphere for political, social and economic dialogue, which in principle, result in lasting agreements once they are signed.

3. **Perfect knowledge of the nature of problems**:
Activities carried out by the CDVR, the forum of religious confessions and the association of kings and traditional rulers in **Côte d’Ivoire** have an influence on this indicator. In fact, the operational method used by these institutions, based on a hearing procedure of all the components of the society, enable a better understanding of the real problems relating to conflicts.

4. **Nationals involved in negotiation teams**:
The activities initiated, animated and conducted endogenously have an important effect on the involvement of communities in the negotiation process. They contribute to a better appropriation of the resolutions of negotiation and thus in ensuring the sustainability of agreements.

**Active Survey**

The forum for national reconciliation and the association of chiefs and traditional rulers in d’Ivoire are the most influential activities on the durability of peace agreements. These two activities highlight the involvement of all the components of society and the consideration of customs and practices as well as local traditional practices in the resolution of conflicts.

**Conclusion**

Since independence, a majority of African countries have experienced cycles of unbearable disturbances marked by coups d’Etat, civil wars
and rebellion. It has even been reported that Africa has become the theatre for the experimentation of all sorts of conflicts in the 21st century. The intensity of these conflicts has been observed these past years at the eve of elections.

These conflicts, which are in general civilian, are more over, triggered by the dangerous manipulation of religion and ethnicity. Uncertainties about the outcome of elections in these countries is the worry of every citizen. The State itself has lost legitimacy as a result of the actions of those who are charged with ensuring the respect of established rules. Institutions in charge of the regulation of democracy and the respect of Human Rights are dependent on political parties. The managers of these institutions do not have the culture and the necessary independence to play their part in keeping with democratic principles.

The fragile nature of peace agreements signed at the end of these very violent conflicts shows every interest to analyse the main factors that determine its success and sustainability. It is in response of this that this study has attempted to provide answers through a sociological approach based on constructing the indicators of the sustainability of peace agreements by the different components of the national society of the countries affected by militaro-political conflicts such as Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia and Sierra Léone. However, in this study, we have presented the results of interviews of focus groups conducted in Côte d’Ivoire.

The results show the existence of a number of factors characteristic of the duration of peace agreements. In fact, the involvement of national communities in the negotiation of peace agreements, the consideration of the socio-economic aspirations of the people, the management of pre and post-elections periods are the major determinants of the duration of peace agreements. The efficiency of including the different societal components in the management of peace agreements is enhanced to the extent that activities put in place in this sense are initiated and conducted
by these societal components. It has therefore been proven in this study that the consideration of the method of endogenous regulation (based on the ways, traditions and ancient customs) can play an important role in the conduct of peace negotiations.
Women Substantive Representation and Changing Gender Relations in Local Governance in Cameroon

Justine Ayuk Fonjock

Introduction

Since 1982, the proportion of women elected to local government in Cameroon has been on the increase, though timidly. The number of women in municipal councils has witnessed an increase from 336 in 1982 to 1,651 in the 2007 municipal elections. In

the recent 2013 twin elections (municipal and legislative) over 2,500 women were elected in the 320 local councils in Cameroon.

This chapter examines the extent to which the observed increase in women representation in local government translate to women’s substantive involvement in local governance in Cameroon. Specifically, the chapter interrogates the extent to which the visibility and presence of women in local government transforms gender relations and address women’s strategic needs and interest in local governance.

Methodology

The chapter is based on interviews conducted with 151 women local councillors selected from 31, out of the 67 councils of the two Anglophone regions\(^2\) of Cameroon (the North West and South West Regions)\(^3\). Anglophone regions in this study refers to regions where English is there dominant language of expression. Being regions with a history of a decentralised system of governance, the general expectation would be that men and especially women would find it easier to participate in activities and decision-making processes in local government. Although the degree of autonomy of local government systems has depreciated over time, the basic structures of local councils have been preserved from colonial to contemporary times.\(^4\) Consequently, data collection was limited to local councils within this region.

Gender and Governance: A review

Owing to its potential to promote balance, equitable and sustainable development, gender responsive governance has attracted considerable attention in recent years, particularly from the 1980 onwards. The concept occupies a central position in the development agenda of

---

2 Anglophone Regions in this study refers to regions where English is the dominant language of expression; i.e. the former British West Cameroon  
3 Data in this chapter is drawn from a PhD research on “the Effects of Gender Relations on Women Councillors’ participation in the Governance of Selected Council Areas in Anglophone Cameroon”; Justine Ayuk (2012).  
4 Mawhood, P, Local Government in the Third World (South Africa: African Institute, 1993,) 187-209
global governance institutions such as the United Nations (UN), World Bank (WB), the African Union (AU) as well as regional and global development frameworks like the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) of the AU, etc. These institutions and frameworks consider gender sensitive approach to governance as a good practice to promote effective and sustainable good governance, and the promotion of greater accountability, transparency, inclusiveness and responsiveness of governance systems at all levels (Evertzen, 2001). Consequently, multilateral organisations and donor agencies like the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank consider the implementation of gender equality principles in governance processes as a precondition for development aid. States are continuously being interrogated in terms of the degree to which they are implementing gender equality principles and challenging discriminatory practices in governance processes. Furthermore, in line with the ratification of international conventions and instruments to promote gender equality, states are continuously reminded of their commitment to implement strategies that would enable women and other disadvantaged groups to freely engage in decision-making and governance.

Arguments for equality in political representation for women and men is pivoted on the justice, efficiency, diversity and transformation arguments. Feminist have argued from the perspective of justice that the process of decision-making must build on the experiences of both women and men through equal representation at all levels and in all fields of decision-making (IULA, 1998; Evertzen, 2001). Women and men have different and sometimes conflicting needs and interests, perform different tasks, are subjected to different socio-economic and cultural conditions and have different (and sometimes unequal) access

---

5 Okome, MO, Women, the State and the Travails of Decentralising the Nigerian FED-Bringing Government Closer to the People: A Conceptual Exploration (Review Literature and Arts of the America, 2,1).
to development resources and benefits. Consequently, men and women are bound to have separate political interests. It is therefore necessary for men and women to freely and equally advance their different interests and claims to resources through active participation in decision-making. Besides, it is a basic principle of democracy for adult citizens from all works of life to have equal stakes in decision-making.

From the perspective of efficiency, women bring in different experiences and resources into decision-making which, together with those of men, can improve the efficiency of governance processes. Failure to exploit the men as well as women’s experiences in decision-making would only render such processes and their outcomes inefficient and unrealistic.  

The Inter-Parliamentary Union has well documented evidence of how women’s involvement in politics makes a difference. The IPU (2000) report reveals that decisions are more responsive to women’s needs and people’s needs in general when more women get involved in politics. Therefore, women’s engagement in local governance foster better democracy, increase transparency and render governance processes more efficient and effective (IPU, 2000; World Bank, 1998).

**Local Governance and Gender Equality**

Proponents of decentralisation of decision-making to local government have observe that local government is the level of governance closest to the people (particularly women) and, therefore, is more likely to promote more effective and efficient service delivery and development management and wider citizen participation in decision-making and development.  

This notion is also prominent in Africa’s development policy discourses, which, beginning from the 1990s, have witnessed increased support in favour of the involvement of diverse groups in governance and

---


decision-making as a strategy to promote sustainable governance, peace, security and development. The protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Right on the Right of Women in Africa calls on member states including Cameroon to implement adequate measures to promote strategies that would render the administrative, structural and institutional procedures of governing institutions more gender inclusive, responsive, effective, efficient, accountable and sustainable. Likewise, the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, also ratified by Cameroon, requires member states of the African Union (AU) to adopt strategies to promote representative democracy and human rights. The positive outcomes likely to emerge from local governance have also been advanced as the main driving force behind the recent push by powerful world donors like the World Bank for decentralisation as a good governance package.\(^8\) States are continuously being interrogated in terms of the degree to which they are implementing gender equality principles and challenging discriminatory practices in governance processes. Furthermore, in line with the ratification of international conventions and instruments to promote gender equality, states are continuously reminded of their commitment to implement strategies that would enable women and other disadvantaged groups to freely engage in decision-making and governance.

From a gender perspective, local government is presumed to be beneficial to women given that local government is closet to women’s ‘traditional/household’ sphere.\(^9\) Many activists and policy makers have come to see the local level as a strategic site for advancing gender interest. This is because, governance at the local level is said to open up new opportunities for women to engage in political activities which they hitherto cannot at the central level, given that local government is considered to be closer to women’s ‘traditional’ sphere, making it easier for women to blend political activities with the triple role of production,

\(^8\) Op Cit

reproduction and community labour. The assumption is that women would relatively find it easy to blend political activities with their triples roles of production, reproduction and community roles at the local level since local government is closer to the private/household sphere.

Past and current statistics on women in local government seem to confirm the above logic. Although in most countries women are yet to achieve parity with men in representation, the proportion of women in local councils has increased considerable in the last decade. The percentage of women in local councils all over the world currently stands at 13.5%, up from 10% in 1995 (UNDP, 2000). The Republic of Seychelles currently ranks first all over the world in women’s representation in local government, with over 52% women representation in local councils, followed by Sweden with 42%, Tanzania (25%) and the United States and Netherlands with 23% (Inter-Parliamentary Union [IPU], 2012; Council of European Municipalities and Regions [CEMR], 2012).

Even though many reports suggest that women’s representation in decision-making is improving at the local level, the extent to which this increase translates to the substantive involvement in local governance is not evident. Past and current studies have reported an inverse proportional relation between increase in women’s presence in local councils and their effective participation in local governance. This suggests that the increase in women’s representation in decision making and governance is necessary, but is not sufficient in and of itself to trigger women-friendly legislatures. The latter can occur only when women’s numeric presence complements their effective participation in policy formulation, implementation, and evaluation.

**The Context of Local Government in Cameroon**

Local government structures in Cameroon dates back the 1950s, during the colonial period and was typical of the British West Cameroon, where

---

British colonial authorities ruled indirectly though the native authorities. Although the level of autonomy of local government in Cameroon has experienced some transformation over time – from colonial, post-colonial to contemporary times, the basic structures are still in place. Mawhood (1993) traced the evolution of local government systems in English and French Cameroon through two distinct cultures. While British West Cameroon was characterised by a decentralised native authority system where chiefs and councillors had greater control over economic and political decisions, the French Eastern part of the country was governed by a more centralized system of administration.\textsuperscript{11}

By the 1950s, British Southern Cameroon had a well-established system of democratic native governance in which chiefs and local councillors (both male and female) administered their own local territories and had autonomy to manage their revenues (Mawhood, 1993). The local councils had jurisdiction over the control of markets, road maintenance, agriculture, forestry extension, primary education and the provision of minor health services, with supervision from generalist administrators who later became prefects and sub-prefects responsible for small areas.\textsuperscript{12} A total of 24 local councils were established in British colonial Cameroon by 1969. Typical of West Cameroon’s local governance was the strong emphasis on community development. Community development officials were trained and assigned the responsibilities to mobilise and organise voluntary labours for construction of rural roads, bridges schools, water supplies, and health centres. These councils were strategic to West Cameroon’s administration after independence, until the state’s unification on the 20 May 1972.

By contrast, French East Cameroon was governed more or less by a centralised system of administration. Urban communes, typical of the ‘French department’s general councils’ were established in Cameroon as far back as 1950. Twelve rural communes were established in 1952

\textsuperscript{11} Op Cit
named sub-divisions and later renamed *arrondissement*. All councillors in rural communes were elected into single member seats with a certain proportion reserved for French citizens. By 1960 to 1961, two-thirds of the members of rural communes were elected while one-third was nominated ‘from among notables and other elites of the commune’\(^{13}\). However contrary, to the West Cameroon system, urban communes had limited powers to legislate over financial issues and acted only as an advisory authority to the central executive. Revenues of communes was managed at the central level.

A distinctive transformation in Cameroon’ local government systems was observed in the 1960 following the amalgamation of the British and French speaking Cameroon as federal states and then as a united republic through a peaceful revolution. Following the merging of the two systems, a new administrative structure was establish under the system of province headed by a governor appointed by presidential decree. Consequently, the native authority systems of West Cameroon was abolished. A new law to organise the functions of local councils in Cameroon was enacted in 1974 shortly after the reunification. This law harmonised the Anglophone and Francophone systems of local council. City councils were subsequently set up as part of the local government in 1984 and accorded specific power. The 1974 endowed local councils with largely social functions such as celebrations of marriages and delivery of birth and death certificates.

Contemporary policies and structures of local government administration in Cameroon is driven by the process of decentralisation based notably on the Constitution embodied in Law No. 96/06 of 18 January 1996. On the strength of the provisions of article 55 of the said constitution, ‘decentralised local entities of the republic shall be regions and councils… they shall be freely administered by boards elected in accordance with the conditions laid down by law’.

\(^{13}\) Op Cit
Decentralisation is viewed as the main driving force for promotion of development, democracy and good governance at the local level in Cameroon as state resources and service delivery systems are brought closest to the people thereby improving the efficiency of resources allocation and decentralised service delivery. The first three laws on decentralisation reforms in observance with the 1996 constitution were enacted in 2004. These include: Law No. 2004/17 of 22 July 2004 on the Orientation of Decentralisation; Law No. 2004/18 of 22 July 2004 to Lay Down Rule Applicable to Councils and Law No. 2004/19 of 22 July to Lay Down Rule Applicable to Regions.

Section 2, of Law No. 2004/17 on the orientation of decentralisation state that ‘decentralisation shall consist of devolution by the state of special powers and appropriate resources to regional and local authorities”. Furthermore, Section 7 of the same law provides that devolution of power to region and councils shall be accompanied by transfer of necessary resources (both fiscal, political and administrative) to enable regional and local governments function efficiently.

The role of the state in decentralisation is limited to supervision of regional and local authorities. Pursuant to Section 15 to 22 of Law No. 2004/018 of 22 July to lay down the rule applicable to councils specific powers relating to economic action, environmental and natural resource management, planning, regional development, town planning and housing; health and population, social actions, education, literacy, technical and vocational training, youth, sport and leisure, and culture and development of national languages is devolved to councils and city councils (MINARD, 2008). Furthermore, powers relating to health and population, education and literacy, and technical and vocational training shall be restricted only to local councils.

Presently, Cameroon has 10 regions (two English speaking and eight French speaking). Each region is broken down into divisions, which are further divided into sub-division and councils. The number of divisions, sub-divisions and councils per region is determined by the population of
the region. Currently there exist 376 councils in Cameroon, 67 of which are located in the English speaking part of the country (MINAD, 2008). The 2004 local government law classifies councils into three types. In the first category which constitute majority of councils in Cameroon are local councils which could either be rural or urban but lack the special status granted to city council.

All councils both rural and urban are headed by mayors who are directly elected by a team of elected councillors. City councils on their party are few and exist in large towns such as Kumba, Bamenda, Douala, Limbe and Yaoundé. Unlike local councils that are headed by elected mayors, city councils are governed by government delegates appointed by a presidential decree and assume the duties and powers of the mayor. Sub-divisional councils on their part are found in city councils. Each city council has between two to three divisional councils with the exception of Yaoundé and Douala with seven and six divisional councils respectively (MINAD, 2008). Just like local councils, sub-divisional councils are headed by elected mayors supported by elected councillors.

As discussed so far, local councils are run by councillors who are elected through direct universal suffrage for a term of five years and whose activities are overseen by a superior authority – the Governor and the Senior Divisional Officer (SDO) at the level of the region and council respectively. The number of councillors depend on the population of the area. Therefore, local authorities are not accountable only to the electorate but also to the Head of State through the Governor and the SDO. The Head of State for instance can dismiss an elected official on counts of embezzlement by virtue of article 95(1) of the Orientation law.

The 2004 local government law further provides the proportion of councillors per council as follows: 25 councillor for council with

---

population of less than 50,000; 31 councillors for councils with population ranging between 50,000 to 100,000; 35 for councils ranging between 100,001 and 200,000 people; 41 councillors in council areas with population between 200,001 and 300,000 and 61 councillors in council areas whose population is more than 300,000 inhabitants (MINAD, 2004). There are two organs at the level of the council; deliberative and executive as well as four statutory annual meetings as opposed to two under the 1974 Law.

Decisions are made by simply majority vote and council sessions are open to the public. The extracts of council proceedings must be communicated to the populace within eight days following a council session (art 40(1). Article 131 of the Orientation law also permits councils to form alliance with other councils to foster development objectives.

This new approach to local governance administration is considered to enable local populations, irrespective of gender to fully and actively participate in the development of their communities.

**Women in Cameroon Local Governments: Implications on the Promotion of Women’s Rights and Gender Equality Concerns in Local Governance**

Once elected into municipal councils, women councillors in Cameroon participation in local governance in three ways, which include: participation in council sessions where decisions policy and project priorities for local development are taken; (2) participation in council committees in which suggestion on possible council intervention in the areas of health, education, finance, works and transport, land and town planning, waste management, etc. are proposed; and (3) interactions with different member of their constituency to discuss their problem and possible interventions by the councils to address identified problems.

---

15 Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralisation, Guide for Mayor and Municipal Councillors (Yaounde-Cameroon, MINARD, 2008)
This section aims at critically analysing the extent to which women’s engagement at the above three levels of governance promote women’s rights and address the strategic needs of their respective constituencies.

Findings relative to the above themes are analysed from three perspectives. The section proceeds by examining the nature of interactions between women councillors and different groups (men, women, mixed group, etc.) in their respective constituencies. It pays attention to the problem/issues (practical and strategic) constituents, particular women, frequently complain about during consultative meetings.

Secondly, it analyses the issues women councillors prioritise during council deliberations and in their respective committees, in order to determine the extent to which the identified needs (practical and strategic) are articulated by women politician in the above processes.

Finally, the chapter examines the degree to which party politics and patriarchal norms shape women’s ability to address the practical and strategic gender needs of their respective constituencies.

**Women Councillors’ Participation in Consultative Meetings with Constituency**

One of the responsibilities of municipal councillors in Cameroon has to do with interactions with local communities to identify their problem and follow-up to ensure that these problems are adequately addressed by the council. All the women councillors in the study sample claimed to be very active in this activity. The women councillors interact with male, female and mixed groups of their various constituencies. It was however observed that the women councillors interacted with women’s groups more often than men and mixed groups. Consultative meetings are held to discuss identify the problems of their constituencies and propose possible interventions by the council to address identified needs and problems.
The problems and issues identified are similar across all the councils and relate to both the practical and strategic needs of women in these council areas.

The practical issues/concern identified by women in the local communities include the need to: improve on community health though frequent hygiene and sanitation campaigns; improve on women’s reproductive and children’s health; provide the social amenities to the local populations (access to potable water, electricity, roads, etc.); income generating activities for women, etc.

In addition, women in local communities also identified strategic issues affecting women in society, such as: child marriage; the education of the girl child; political empowerment of women; issues of domestic violence and marital conflict; property rights for women; farmer-grazier conflicts; gender inequalities in access to and control of land; voting rights of women; women’s involvement in cash crop production etc. Strategic gender needs (as oppose to practical gender needs) are identified by women as a result of their subordinate position in society.

When address, strategic gender needs (i) improve on the wellbeing of women and society as a whole, and (ii) transforms gender relations and challenge the subordinate position of women in society, thereby empowering women and improving women’s status in society. Consequently, women’s involvement in local politics will be more meaningful to women as a group, when women politician as able to articulate the practical as well as strategic gender needs/concerns of women in political decision-making. Unfortunately, findings on issues prioritise by women councillors during council deliberations and in their respective committees suggest that they are more concern with practical that strategic concerns of their constituencies, particularly women.

**Women in Council Decision-making Processes**

Council deliberations constitute the legislative arm of local government, during which all councillors, irrespective of gender are required to
participate in decision-making. During council sessions, the elected councillors are equally expected to articulate the interest of their respective constituencies by proposing policies and projects to address the identified needs and problems of their populaces. Therefore, even though women councillors are not represented in strategic decision-making positions and committees as demonstrated in chapter five, council deliberations offers an opportunity for women politicians to articulate the needs of their respective constituencies.

Most of the women (close to 93%) interviewed had some commendable experience in local governance. 92.7% of the women had been participating as local government councillors for at least five years, while a few of the respondents were in their second mandate as municipal councillors. The women councillors interviewed claimed to be vocal in council sessions. Majority of the women councillors said they participated in council sessions by raising issues and/or contributing to issues raised by other councillors (both male and female). Extensive evidence from the study reveals that women councillors actively participate in the discussion of social issues which address the practical as oppose to the strategic needs of their constituency, particularly women. As shown in figure 10, majority (74.3%) of the women councillors are more concerned with practical needs/concerns such as financial assistance to association and groups, health, hygiene and sanitation, development of sporting activities like football and handball and creation of recreational clubs, income generating activities for women, promotion of culture, support to women farmers, etc. Conversely, 25.7% of the respondents reported that they discuss issues relating to women’s strategic gender needs such as adult literacy programmes for women, education of the girl child improving women’s political participation, political solidarity by women, advocating for women to support each other in politics, need to reinforce campaign strategies to gain more votes in elections, issues of

16 Councillors are voted into municipal councils for a mandate of five years renewable
child marriage, education of the girl child and settling of land disputes such as farmer-grazier conflicts. The findings thus far suggest that the level of women councillors’ involvement in council deliberations does not significantly address the strategic gender needs/concerns of women in local communities, which is relevant to the promotion of women’s rights and gender equality issues in local governance. This argument is also supported by research findings on women’s involvement in council committees.

**Women in Local Government Committees**

Local government committees are set up at the level of local councils with responsibility to assist the council attained its development objectives. All the councils visited had similar committees to deal with health, social, education, finance, works, transport, supervisory, and land. However, committees in the areas of agriculture, forest management, and environmental protection exited only in a few councils. Local government committees are expected to make project proposal to enable the council. During council sessions, the proposals of various committees are presented for debates and approval. Council committees also have the responsibility of educating and sensitising the local populations on council activities and policies based on their respective areas of jurisdiction.

Given that majority of the women councillors are represented in social, education, and health, their activities are tired to education, social and women’s issues. Activities performed by women these committees can be summaries as follows: (1) ensuring community health through sanitary inspection and community health programmes; (2) take care of social issues such as provision of special needs to disadvantaged groups like handicaps, children from poor families, etc.; (3) assessing educational facilities and encouraging the public to better manage educational projects and promote vocational training; (4) identifying and proposing projects to the council; (5) promoting women’s rights, political participation and social integration; and (6) train women on
how to blend politics with the domestic activities.

The above findings suggest that women councillors are not represented in committees that would enable them to address the strategic gender needs of their respective constituency. This probably explains why, when asked to state the activities performed in their various committees, some of the women councillors responded as follows: “I teach women in my constituency on how to care for their families and even carry out cookery lessons” “I advice women on how to handle their homes alongside other activities”; “I help sponsor and provide for needy children in my constituency”, “I educate people in my jurisdiction on the law on decentralisation, in their meetings houses and church group”; “I go to women’s meetings and njangi and inform them about decision and plans of the council as well as listen to their needs and communicate back to the council during meetings”; “our intension here is to make women more respectable in society…we train them on income generating activities so that they can better take care of their families…we educate them on how to take good care of their husbands and children so that women should be respected in my constituency” on how to families and even carry out cookery lessons; etc. These findings so far corroborates those of Duflo & Topalova (2004) that the gender roles of a women politicians significantly influences the policy priorities of female legislators.

Only very few women councillors (less than 15%) reported activities relating to strategic women’s issues, including scholarship for girls, creation of educational facilities and issues relating to violence against women. In this light, one of the women reported as follows: “every year, prizes are given to two best female students in my constituency, which is what I proposed”. Another respondent said “I resolve conflict among women in my constituency and sensitise families, particularly men on the dangers of domestic violence against women”.

The above findings point to the suggestion that, though aware of
the practical and strategic gender concerns of local populations, particularly women, the level of women’s involvement in local politics tend to address women’s practical concerns more than their strategic interests. This observation triggers both theoretical and politically relevant questions, such as: why are the women councillors less willing to question the subordinate position of women in society during council deliberation, even when these issues emerge in discussion with women group in local communities? Why are women councillors more concern with issues that address practical as opposed to strategic gender needs? Answers to these questions could be attempted by investigating the influence of party politics as well as the socio-cultural environment of local councils on women’s political participation.

**The Influence of Party Political Culture on Women Substantive Participation in Local Governance**

The women councillors in the sample were representative of the ruling Cameroon’s Peoples Democratic Party (CPDM) and the Social Democratic Front (SDF) which is the main opposition party in Cameroon. During municipal elections, individuals are voted into local councils based on a party list system. Political parties nominate candidates, who eventual become municipal councillors of the political party/parties that emerge victorious in the elections. Once elected into local councils, councillors (both men and women) are expected to represent party interest irrespective of whether or not they are gender sensitive. Consequently, in order to gain eligibility for re-nomination in subsequent elections, party politicians must protect the interest of their respective political parties in decision-making.

In line with the above observations, the findings of this study reveal that, once voted into municipal councils women local politicians promote the interest of their respective political parties, as opposed to their gendered interest. For, findings indicate that the activities performed by women councillors during council deliberations and in council committees, for both male and female councillors are influence by the agenda of
the political party. Some of the responses advanced by the women councillors to support the above claim include the following: “I was nominated by my party to improve on the wellbeing of my constituency, not just women…I have to respect the norms of my party”; “the fact that am a woman does not necessarily mean that I must represent only women… I need to represent all of them [men and women] so as to ensure their support during future election”; “I am councillor to govern everybody and to show that every body count…we don’t discriminate in our party”.

As such, even though the women councillors seek to address, in addition to general development concerns, issues that promote women rights and empowerment (see chapter five), the policies of political parties do not create an enabling environment for women to address gender equality concerns in local politics. The study also contends that party interest over rides gender interest even in councils with women mayors at the helm council administration. The situation is further exacerbated because findings reveal that the women councillors, on their part, are not adequately empowered to challenge party politics and resist patriarchal norms that limit their effective participation in local governance.

The Influence of Patriarchal Norms on Women’s Participation in Local Governance

Findings elsewhere have shown that women’s involvement in the affairs of their constituencies, among other issues, makes women visible for re-election as local politicians. Interview with the women councillors also reveal that, in addition constrains eminent in party politics, women politicians tend to limit their participation in council processes to activities within their socially ascribed gender roles as care givers and home makers. This enables the women to gain recognition and eligibility for re-election by their local communities. Consequently, for most of the women councillors, being a ‘good’ wife, determined by how effective women managed their home are an indication of their effectiveness as a municipal councillor. As such, a woman who
cannot successfully manage her home, and teach other women to do same, cannot be a good councillor. Johana shared this view. She said; “I have to give a good impression to the population as a good wife and a councillor... I cannot be a good councillor when my home is not in order... I have to be a good example of a wife and a councillor so that others (women) can copy”. For Miriam; “... it helps me gain popularity; when people see me succeeding as a good wife, they know I am better placed as a councillor”. As a result, the women politicians are less willing to engage in activities that question gender relations and women’s subordinate position in society, given that, such activities go beyond the normative gender roles of women. This trend is also reflected in the findings on women councillors’ perceived strategies to enhance their substantive involvement in the governance of local councils.

**Women Councillor’ Perception strategies to improve their substantive participation in local governance**

Based on this indicator, women councillors in the study sample were asked to propose what they perceive could be done to enhance their participation in local governance. Based on responses from interviews, it became apparent that respondents were resistant to strategies that transform gender relations particularly with women’s position in society. Responses in this direction revealed that none of the respondent was in support of strategies that would alter gender dynamics by increasing women’s influence in decision-making at household or community levels, regardless of the fact that such strategies would likely add value to their decision-making abilities and contribute to their meaningful participation in local governance. Instead, proposals advanced by the respondent were more in relation to education and leadership skills and for women, the need for women to be assertive and have self-esteem, solidarity among women and to a lesser extent increase in women’s representation. Some of the responses in this light are quoted as follows: “women should be educated on leadership skills”; “women should be
New Paths to Sustainable Peace in Africa

courageous and assertive”; “if we have women in higher positions like Divisional Officers and mayors, they will make decisions that will favour women and empower them”; “we need more women in high ranking positions”: women should learn to speak as one voice, they should be united”; “women should support other women”; “women should always have time to participate in council sessions”; etc.

The few respondents who mentioned the household were advocating for strategies that would enable women to effective manage their triple roles of production, reproduction and community work. For example one of the respondents proposed that “women should get orientation on how to manage their home alongside their office, village and immediate community” (aged 41-45, divorced). For this other respondent, “women should manage their time very well to be available at home, village and the public sphere when needed” (aged 31-35, married for 12 years).

These findings demonstrate that even though respondents observed that they are more likely to exhibit more meaningful participation in council’s deliberative discussions when they have greater command over decision-making at household and community level, they were less willing to depart from their ‘traditional’ status and responsibility as women in their households and in their communities. Such that, as discussed elsewhere, the respondent feel they would be considered as successful councillors only when they are able to demonstrate that their participation in local government does not jeopardise the smooth functioning of their homes.

This notwithstanding the fact that statistics discussed on section 7.6 revealed that majority of the respondent agreed that women councillors can improve on the participation in activities and decision-making processes of the council when they engage in activities that go beyond normative female gender roles

Conversely, it is also imperative to note that some husbands of married women councillors were quite aware of the importance of assisting
their wives with household chores especially when the women were committed to other responsibilities at the level of the council. The study noted that quite a few husband encouraged their wives to participate in council activities and willingly assisted their wives in performing household chores. Although this finding was reported only by a few women councillors (i.e. less than 10% of all the women councillors interviewed), it suggest that the some men are becoming aware of the fact that gender equality and social transformation in women’s status and position in society cannot be fully achieved without the active and full contributions from both men and women. This was the experience of Margaret, a female councillor from the South West who had been married for 23 years. She reported that, “since my husband understands my role as a municipal councillors, I can stay for days working in the council, which is far away from my area of residence”. Grace, on her part, said, “at first it was difficulty to leave the house without my husband’s permission…but now it is not the case…he is even the one who reminds me about events in the council”.

Based on the above findings there is sufficient evidence to argue that the observed increase in women’s representation in local councils is not associated with the substantive involvement of women in the governance of local councils. Evidence on the level of women’s participation in council deliberations and committees indicate that women politicians prioritise the practical over the strategic needs of their constituencies, particularly women.

Findings could also suggest that the influence of party politics and the socio-cultural environment of local councils limit the ability of women politicians to articulate women’s strategic issues in deliberative discussions. The situation is further exacerbated by the observation that the women councillors, on their part, are not adequately empowered to resist and challenge party policies and patriarchal norms, especially in situations where such efforts threaten women recognition and eligibility for re-election into local councils.
Consequently party interest over rides gender interests in local governance.

**Implication of Women’s Participation in Local Government on the Promotion of Gender Sensitive Principles in Local Governance**

Scholars in gender and politics (Cornwall and Goetz, 2005, Cos-Montiel, 2009, Kabeer, 1995) have noted that once elected, women local legislators see themselves as social workers with responsibilities to provide social needs to their constituencies. By doing so, the, women councillors reinforce female traditional gender roles as care givers and home makers. The findings of this study resonates and extends the findings of other studies on the political behaviour of women politicians at the local level.

Women councillors in the study sample were more concerned with similar issues relating to female gender roles and women’s welfare needs. By relating women’s political behaviour to their traditional gender roles, this study points to possible explanations why women councillors would mostly likely prioritise issues that reinforce normative gender roles of women, with very little attempt to question unequal power relation and gender inequality in local governance. Analysis of the finding of this study suggest that there is a likelihood for women councillors to transfer the skills, attitudes, abilities and capabilities women councillors exhibited in local governance related to their gender household responsibilities, abilities, and capabilities. This observation echoed the views of Agarwal; (1997) who is of the opinion that household gender relations contribute in “ascribing to women and men of different abilities, attitudes, desires, personality traits, behaviour patterns…”.

When they are eventually elected into local government administration, women transfer the traditional acquire gender roles, values and attributes to the councils. These become manifest in the activities women councillors perform and the types of decisions and project priorities
they readily support in their respective councils. In addition, women councillors transmit these normative stereotypes to other women during meetings in their respective constituencies. This tendency has severe implication on the social transformation and the promotion of gender sensitive culture in local government.

**Conclusion**

Judging from findings, it can be concluded that quantity does not necessarily translate to quality of women’s participation in local governance in Cameroon. While the numeric presence of women in local politics has increased in the last two decades, the substantive involvement of women in local councils is constrained by the structure of local politics which limits the ability of female politicians to promote the strategic needs of their constituencies. This is because the study has revealed that, in performing their activities at the level of their respective councils and communities, women councillors reinforced the stereotypes on female gender roles that ascribed responsibilities for reproductive and domestic household work solely to women. Consequently, women councillors internalise, without questioning, the values and attribute society ascribes on them with regards to their role in society. This seemingly explains the reason why findings indicated that majority of the women councillors consider reproductive household work as a primary women’s responsibility which cannot be substituted by any other activity even though they reported that reproductive work limited their effective participation in council processes.

Even though it is evident from the study that transformation in gender relations and roles would add value to enable participation in local governance, most of the councillors were resilient to issues that question unequal power relations between women and men in society. This is because study results revealed that most of the women councillors in the study sample were more in support of strategies that do not challenge their ‘traditional’ female gender roles as wives, and home
makers, despite the fact that many of them reported that it affects their effective participation in council activities. Furthermore, many of the women councillors were not in support of strategies that would alter gender relations especially strategies aimed at increasing their level influence in decision-making processes in their homes or communities. Consequently, the proportion of women in local councils in Cameroon is not an adequate indicator of gender equality in local governance, as is currently considered in Cameroon.

Increasing women’s presence in local government (as currently the case) without a concomitant interrogation of the underlying factors (both institutional and cultural) that limit the substantive participation of women in governance is counterproductive.

The findings and conclusion of this study suggest the need for more rigorous sensitisation on gender awareness among local politicians and communities. Effort by governmental as well as non-governmental organisations to increase the quantity and quality of women’s active participation in politics and governance should implement well in advance.

The current approach where women are prepared closed to elections into positions of decision-making short chain the huge benefit that can be derived otherwise. In addition, the study also demands that emphasis should be placed on the quality as much as quantity of women elected into local councils. Women vying for positions of councillors in local government must be adequately empowered to engage discussions that go beyond normative gender norms.

Even though it is evident from the study that transformation in gender relations to enable women to gain more influence in activities and decision-making, particularly at the household, majority of women councillors are resistant to such transformations. Consequently, for capacity building on women leadership to successfully address issues of gender inequality and transform unequal gender relations, there is
a need to deconstruct women’s psyche. Women need to be equipped with the capacities and abilities to critically question social norms, perceptions, stereotypes and values that reinforce unequal gender power relation between women and men, and gender inequality and women’s subordination.

The study also makes evident the need for councils to implement strategies to promote women’s participation in local government decision-making. Therefore, in addition to decision-making by voting, as is currently the case, municipal councils should implement strategies in decision-making that would enable council policies and development projects to reflect the inputs of women councillors. This could be achieved by allocating a specific proportion of council budget to address issues and project concerns proposed by women councillors.
PART II

Conflict Resolution and peacebuilding
Grassroots Peacebuilding in the DRC

Rumbidzai Elizabeth P Chidoori

Introduction

In politics, a “grassroots movement” is a movement that develops organically at a local level before spreading throughout the state and even the country. A true “grassroots movement” isn’t organized by political forces - instead, a “grassroots movement” springs up spontaneously due to some pressing issue that a community feels needs to be changed or enhanced¹.

The term “peacebuilding” 1st appeared in Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s Agenda for Peace in 1992. It was defined

as “action to identify and support structures which will tend to solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.” Initially the concept was defined in relation to a conflict cycle that passed from pre-conflict preventative diplomacy through peacemaking and peacekeeping to post-conflict peacebuilding.\(^2\) Boutros-Ghali’s 1995 Supplement to the Agenda for Peace later expanded this understanding to include preventative action as well.\(^4\) The 2000 Brahimi Report further refined the concept of Peacebuilding as “activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide tools for the building of those foundations on something that is more than just the absence of war.”\(^5\)

**Maman Shujaa: Hero Women of the Congo**

‘*Maman Shujaa*’ means ‘Hero Women’ in Swahili

- Based in Bukavu, DRC this group of grassroots women is led by Neema Namadu (whose daughter was indiscriminately beaten by government soldiers)

- this group of women is speaking out and sharing their stories of healing and transformation through WorldPulse, a global media and communications network.

- this women’s movement calls for peace, for women to take action across the globe, for the root causes of conflict to be addressed and demands for a voice in the DRC peace process by way of holding a seat at the negotiation table.

It can now be argued that effective peacebuilding is in effect a hybrid of political and developmental activities targeted at the sources of conflict. In May 2007, the UN Secretary General’s Policy Committee (UNSGPC) agreed on the following conceptual basis for peacebuilding to inform UN Practice:

---


\(^3\) Wyeth Vanessa, (2011) *Peacebuilding at the UN over the last 10 years*, International Peace Institute, page 1.


Peacebuilding involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management and to lay the foundations for a sustainable peace and development.6

‘Peace’ has often been defined as the absence of war. ‘Building’ for its part means constructing, establishing and giving rise to something. It indicates a product that either does not yet exist at all or is yet to be assembled from its existing parts, but together will form something more than their sum. It is in the ‘building’ sense that peacebuilding differs from peacekeeping—which focuses mainly on suppressing the destructive consequences of armed conflict and lacks a constructive element. Currently the Democratic Republic of Congo hosts MONUSCO, the world’s largest peacekeeping military mission containing an offensive brigade, whose mission is to “neutralise armed groups”.

There is often confusion about what peacebuilding is, when it happens, how long it lasts, who does it and how it differs from other activities. The UNSGPC’s statement is the closest the UN has come to endorsing a definition of peacebuilding. Up to now there still is no “official” UN definition. Most UN documents tend to list the types of activities that peacebuilding may encompass. In the UN’s experience peacebuilding tends to flow from, rather than shape practice.

Peacebuilding encompasses:

- support to electoral processes;
- Disarmament, demobilisation, rehabilitation and reintegration (DDRR);
- Strengthening the rule of law;
- Security sector reform (SSR);
- Refugee return and reintegration;
- Governance, basic service provision;

---

- Rehabilitation of basic infrastructure and
- Support to economic revitalisation\(^7\)

What is wrong with this picture in illustrated in Figure 1 above? Where are the local actors? At what point are they involved in building the peace? In the 2000s the limitations of the approach outlined here was very clear- in the DRC, the largest peacekeeping mission in the world failed to protect civilians from massacres by armed groups, let alone bring peace to the territory\(^8\).

\[\text{Figure 1. UN Peacebuilding in Practice}\]

**Brief History to the Conflict in the DRC**

The DRC has been mired in intractable conflicts since the 1990s\(^9\). Millions of civilians have been killed and displaced. Despite the establishment of an elected government in 2006, the implementation of a series of peace agreements, the country still faces challenges in consolidating peace\(^10\).

\(^7\) Supra note 3, page 2.
\(^8\) Supra note 3, page 4.
\(^10\) Ibid, page 2.
The First Congo War began in November 1996 and ended with the toppling of Mobutu Sese Seko in May 1997. In this war Angola, Uganda and Rwanda formed a coalition against DRC forces. After a brief lull in the fighting the then President Laurent Kabila fell out with his Rwandan and Ugandan allies and this sparked the second Congo War which began in August 1998. In this war, on side there was Angola, Chad, DRC, Namibia, Sudan, Zimbabwe and the Mai Mai and Hutu aligned forces. On the other side there was Burundi, Uganda, Rwanda and the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo, the Congolese Rally for Democracy and Tutsi –aligned forces. A series of peace agreements were signed ending the second war: The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement (1999), the Sun City Agreement (April 2002), the Pretoria Agreement (July 2002) and the Luanda Agreement (September 2002)-these ultimately contributed to the Global and Inclusive Agreement of December 2002.

Unfortunately the signing of the December 2002 agreement did not effectively end the violence and in many parts of Eastern DRC, the fighting continued. This violence is what is considered the third episode of the conflict in the DRC. The origins of this third episode can be traced back to 2003. A group of Officers from the Rwandan –backed RDC refused to integrate their troops into the Allied Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC) and they launched a rebellion called National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP). In January 2008, the CNDP was integrated into FARDC after a peace deal. However in April 2012 the CNDP members mutinied & subsequently formed the March 23 (M23) rebel group. The Rwandan government has been accused of supporting the M23.

The Eastern, Northern and other regions of DRC have consistently experienced high insecurity and repeated incidents of violence, often as a result of interference of neighbouring countries. (See Figure2. below)
Figure 2. Rebel Groups operating in the DRC

Why has peace been elusive in the DRC?

It has been argued that most of the conflicts in eastern Congo are rooted in local disputes and competition between communities for land and economic opportunities. Some scholars argue the DRC conflict is rooted in a deadly triangle of identity, land and power. The myriad of local, regional and international actors pursue their own interests and fall back on violence as an instrument to enforce them. This is often carried out by local armed actors such as militias and rebel groups.

It therefore follows that to achieve peace, the DRC requires tailor made, grassroots solutions that go beyond a military response to work side by side with the international actors to achieve a sustainable peace. The Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) notes that, “experience shows that reform processes will not succeed in the absence of commitment and ownership on the part of those undertaking reforms.”

This is most likely because it is the locals that have to live with the

outcomes of peace processes in ways that international actors do not, and externally-imposed arrangements are more likely to be viewed as reflecting the vested interests of foreigners and are unlikely to thrive once the influence of external pressure and resources begin to recede.

The majority of the local actors work in isolation and are not part of the global peacebuilding process. Most of the peacebuilding discussions or initiatives in the DRC have focused almost exclusively on peace between the rebel groups or peace between the regional governments. In 2005 the AU and NEPAD worked on a post-conflict reconstruction framework which is structured on three broad phrases: emergency phase; transitional phase and developmental phase. This strategy is powered by multiple international actors. Since 1999, US$ 8.73 billion has been spent to fund UN peacekeeping efforts in the DRC. The new Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework (PSCF) agreement signed in 2013 in Addis Ababa has no mention of civil society nor was it prepared with the involvement of local actors.

This is all macro peace, which is largely concerned with the ‘big picture’ to the detriment of the ‘small picture’. It has long been argued that local wisdom and local resources are essential elements of peacebuilding; local actors possess the historical, cultural, and linguistic resources that foreigners lack, and that are essential not only to understanding the root causes of any conflict but also to the search for sustainable solutions.

The involvement of external actors whose involvement has many a times been destructive has also contributed towards the conflict in the DRC. Countries such as Uganda, Burundi and Rwanda have been motivated to be part of the conflict in DRC by particular interests. Hence negotiating a representative settlement becomes challenging with many

---

14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
17 Supra note 13, page 11.
parties and diverse interests. Uganda - the Uganda’s People’s Defence Force (UPDF) has been in the DRC to capture or kill member of the rebel group Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), which has been accused of widespread human rights violations. UPDF has often collaborated with FARDC in these operations; The Allied democratic Forces (ADF) are also another rebel group the UPDF has been in pursuit of inside the DRC. ADF has been operating from north-eastern Congo. Whilst in pursuit of these rebel groups the UPDF has also been accused of subjecting Congolese civilians to human rights violations. Rwanda - The presence of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) in North and South Kivu is problematic as it gives Rwanda the reason to constantly intervene in the DRC. FDLR is composes of ex-Rwandan Armed forces, ex-Interahamwe militia and Hutus that fled to DRC after the 1994 genocide- It is still determined to return to power in Rwanda. Also Rwanda’s alleged support for M23- the M23 poses a serious threat to peace and security of the entire region. Burundi - The Burundian army has also been crossing over into DRC to pursue members of armed opposition groups, most notably National Forces of Liberation (FNL). The Eastern DRC provides a stronghold for FNL and other rebel movements to orchestrate attacks in Burundi.  

In addition to the above various national and multinational corporations (MNCs) exploiting the mineral rich Congo have also in various ways fuelled and supported the war in the Congo. Revenue gained from trade has facilitated continuous participation of armed belligerents in the conflict. Some of the corporations that have been fingered include: THAISARCO, the world’s fifth-largest tin-producing company, owned by British metals giant, AMC (Amalgamated Metal Corporation) Group. THAISARCO’s main supplier, Congo-based Panju, sells cassiterite and coltan from mines controlled by the FDLR.

18 Supra note 9, page 3.
Another company is the UK-based Afrimex, already found by the British government in 2008 to be in breach of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises for buying from suppliers who made payments to a rebel group. The British government has yet to take any concrete action on this information.20

**Victoria Group** belongs jointly to Muhoozi Kainerugabe, son of President Museveni, and Jovia and Khaleb Akandwanaho. Victoria Group is involved in trading diamonds, gold and coffee. The Group purchases these mineral and agricultural products in Isiro, Bunia, Bumba, Bondo, Buta and Kisangani.21

Elusive peace in the DRC has also been attributed to an inadequate local ownership of peacebuilding by civil society. The attempts to promote reconciliation between communities at local level have been too few and far between. The ‘Barzas’ (large community meetings) organized by a local initiative called Reseau Haki na Amani (RHA) are just not enough to make the desired impact.22

Founded in 2004, RHA is a network of civil society organisations. Its main objective is to help reconcile the ethnic tensions between the Hema and Landu communities in Orientale, northeast province. RHA works by addressing frequent conflicts over land with dialogue-supporting initiatives at community level.23 This is not to say that such initiatives are irrelevant, but rather to say DRC needs more of such initiatives to work together with the top down approach used by the international actors toward building a sustainable peace. A plethora of local initiatives are working at peacebuilding—unfortunately most are underfunded, unrecognised, or neglected by the

---

20 Ibid.
22 Supra note 16.
23 Ibid.
international community. Some are even in danger of being targeted by warlords, politicians, businessmen or other actors whenever they contradict powerful elites.

Figure 3. Example of grassroots initiatives in the DRC

Conclusion

It is evident from the DRC experience that building peace is no easy task and that lasting peace cannot be imposed from outside. If peacebuilding is to succeed in the DRC much of the heavy lifting must be done by war-affected communities themselves, from the grassroots. Peace can only be built person by person, community by community, as a society knits itself together after the trauma of war.\textsuperscript{24} Peacebuilding entails constant negotiation and renegotiation of expectations and relationships and the distribution of power and wealth in society. These are messy, deeply political, processes and the 2013 World Development Report rightly points out, processes that can in the best case scenario, take a generation.\textsuperscript{25} Lasting peace can only really be built from within—e.g. he US has learnt the hard way in Iraq and Afghanistan. Despite criticisms, it is only fair to acknowledge that the UN is indeed

\textsuperscript{24} Supra note 13, page 11.
\textsuperscript{25} Ibid.
the only international actor with the full range security, economic and political tools for peacebuilding.
Civil Societies’ Peace-building Initiatives: A Case for “Proactive” Peace-building Endeavours in “Non-violent” Societies

Timothy Aduojo Obaje

Introduction

Peace-building endeavours have been dominated with post-conflict activities aimed at the diminution of the sources or causes of violent conflict with a primary aim of establishing sustainable peace in a society. Just like many other societies, countries such as Rwanda, Bosnia and Liberia have experienced such peace-building activities in their effort to rebuild their societies after various devastating violence. It is important to also stress that irrespective of the broad and encompassing nature of some of the definitions of peace-building, policy-makers and practitioners have seemingly resolved to make do with the practice of post-conflict peace-
building activities. In brief, peace-building can be understood as a pragmatic and realistic plan or activities designed for the enhancement of peace in a society. Such understanding of peace-building does not keep a tight rein on when peace-building activities may or may not be embarked upon. Hence, peace-building activities should neither be bounded by time nor event. It is of course acknowledged that there are favourable and less favourable times to embark on peace-building programmes. Such programmes may not be favourable in situations of intense violent conflict or war. There is always the need for a reasonable level of calm or what is politically termed as ‘cease fire’ amongst conflicting parties in order to initiate peace-building activities that would hopefully enhance the sustainability of the relative calm and peace in the society. This paper stretches the existing comprehension and scope of peace-building activities with the argument that it is not less favourable to consciously initiate peace-building programmes in ‘non-violent’ societies than the usual choice of post-conflict societies. Thus, it propagates the view that peace-building activities ought to commence prior to the escalation of violent conflicts rather than the traditional post-conflict orientation of peace-building initiatives. Post-conflict peace-building programs naturally tend towards the curtailment of further disastrous consequence of violence while simultaneously building the people capacity to resist slip up to further conflicts. A conscious effort and investment in establishing the necessary peace-building programs in any society would in essence capacitate the people with necessary knowledge and skills to avert some violent conflict rather than spending the already scarce resources in curtailing the effects of violence.

**Conceptualisation of Civil Societies and their Place in the Society**

The concept of civil societies has been broadly embraced and celebrated by scholars and practitioners from various spheres of life. Such broad-based acceptance and their increased importance are attributable to “their perceived ability to facilitate regular and sustained participation
by the citizenry, beyond simply voting in general elections”. This view is also upheld by McKeon singles out the civil society as “groups that can shift the public *mood* regarding conflict by highlighting the unacceptable cost of the conflict and increasing the political stakes for peace. They can catalyse public mobilisation for peace”. Resultant of such enthusiastic reception is the multiple comprehension of the meaning of civil societies. The concept has been comprehended and defined by various actors in multiple ways. Such multiplicities of meanings necessitate a clarification of what civil societies denotes in this paper.

A review of relevant literature portrays civil society as a complex and contentious concept leading to questions about its essence and unique attributes. In fact, according to Glasius (2004), cited by Spurk (2010), some of the literatures are beginning to question whether this fuzziness in the comprehension of civil society, explains its popularity, given that it can be all things to all people. Some scholars have attempted bringing clarity to this concept via their discourse on the conceptualisation of Civil Societies.

The idea of civil society has undergone conceptual transition overtime. Building on John Lock’s invitation for the understanding of civil society as a body in its own right, separate from the state, Adam Ferguson and Thomas Paine amongst other authors led the way in building on Lock’s understanding of civil society. They worked at differentiating civil society from the state, defining its forms, norms and principles. This distinction of civil society and its supposed independence from the state positioned it as a ‘watch dog’ that regulates the state dominance over the masses. It was essentially looked upon as “means of defence against despotism and other potential abuses by political leaders”. According

3 Ibid
to Paffenholz⁴, “civil society is a composition of a huge variety of actors, including the market economy, social classes, corporations, intellectuals, and civil servants—essentially all societal actors not directly dependent on the state apparatus”. Through this encompassing understanding, he introduces a new dimension to the discourse of civil society. His understanding implies an inherent diversity of objectives and focus, and possible conflict of interest, amongst members of the civil society.

Within the context of peace-building and conflict transformation, conflicts of interest are considered inevitable element of our existence as social beings. All the same, we do have unambiguous roles to play on how such conflicts influence our quality of life. Our decisions and actions as individual actors or members of civil societies either contribute towards the internalisation of existing peace⁵ in the society or towards its degeneration and erosion. As members of civil societies in our respective way, we have a huge responsibility of being proactive in our quest for a sustainable peace in the society through various peace-building initiatives.

Yet again, we may ask – what is peace-building? Just like manner other concepts, peace-building has attracted several meaning over the years. Together with the conception of peace, its meaning has evolved over the years. Both scholars and practitioners have played great roles in conceptualising and re-conceptualisation of the idea.

**Demystifying Peace-building and its Activities**

Peace, along with other concepts such as “truth,” “beauty,” and “love” is considered by Sandy and Perkins⁶, as the most frequently uttered

---


⁵ Peace in this paper, as we shall see in subsequent section, refers to positive peace as understood and explicated by Galtung.

⁶ Sandy, L. R and Perkins, R (n.d). *The Nature of Peace and its Implications for Peace*
word. Similar to these concepts there are numerous understandings and definitions of peace. The concept is endowed with an inherent ability of simultaneously representing different realities to various subjects or standpoints.

Reflections and debates about peace and its meaning are always intertwined with issues of conflict\(^7\) in their various forms. Our reflection of peace would thus also grapple with issues of conflicts, their nature and causes.

Peace is often considered as a state of tranquillity and quiet. It may be a state of internal or psychological tranquillity within a person or amongst a group of people or a state of security or freedom from civil disturbance in a nation-state\(^8\). Akin to concepts such as ‘truth’ and ‘love’, peace is always employed to express human desire; that which is perceived as good and ought to be ultimately pursued. Renowned peace scholars such as Johan Galtung, John Paul Lederach, Bonisch and Schmid have attempted offering much needed clarity in our understanding of peace. Johan Galtung, a leading figure in peace studies, highlights different impressions of peace. He begins by illustrating a long-standing idea of peace as a synonym for stability or equilibrium. This conception of peace was widely embraced, as it sits well with the psychological/religious perceptions of peace which relate to the internal state of a human person. Some of the primary features and weaknesses of such perceptions are their subjectivity and compatibility with violence, given that an individual could be very stable or “at peace” inwardly, while submerged in a violent, conflict and tense environment. He however expounded this concept in the prelude to the first edition of the *Journal of Peace Research*, where he engages the concept from two perspectives: negative and positive peace.

---

\(^7\) Conflict within the context of this paper is understood as violent conflict except where stated otherwise.

Negative peace is defined by Galtung as the “absence of organized or collective violence”\(^9\). It is the “absence of organized collective violence ... between major human groups; particularly nations, but also between classes and between racial and ethnic groups because of the magnitude internal wars can have”.\(^{10}\) This form of peace, Reardon calls the absence of violence in all its forms, including physical, social, psychological and structural forms of violence\(^{11}\). Within this school of thought, the end to violence is the supreme goal of peace initiatives, without much interest in the means to achieving this goal. Historical facts point to military actions as the default preference by national government in an effort to keep the peace, however reasonable effort is been made in major parts of the world to move beyond such narrow understanding of peace into what is today described as positive peace.

The emergence of the idea of positive peace may be considered as a consequence of the apparent weaknesses\(^{12}\) embedded in the idea negative peace\(^{13}\). Galtung summarized the idea of positive peace as “the integration of human society”\(^{14}\) in harmony. This is a notion of peace that seeks to promote the “presence of the conditions for a just and sustainable peace, including access to food and clean drinking water, education for women and children, security from physical harm, and other inviolable human rights”\(^{15}\). Rather than the state-centric nature of the negative peace, positive prioritizes the people, justice and the

---

11 See note 5 above.
12 An outstanding example of such weakness includes its replication of the very issues at the roots of the conflict it seeks to address.
sustainability of existing peace. It could also be understood as bottom-up and human-needs approach to peace where the masses have a say in shaping their future.

With this understanding of peace, conceptualisation of peace-building and its activities would be quite straight-forward.

**Peace-building**

Peace-building in its simple form may be understood as an effort to beget peace in a society. This concept has become fashionable for a variety of reasons. The reality of recurring violent conflict in a society creates a strong interest from the international, national and local actors to support communities emerging from civil wars, societal breakdowns and a violent past. Boutros-Ghali considers peace-building activities as “comprehensive efforts to identify and support structures which will tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and well-being among people.” The introduction of this concept within the UN’s framework expanded the UN’s missions in conflict zones. Peace-building, within the structure of UN, was initially understood as an extension of the UN’s existing peacekeeping and peacemaking responsibilities. Embedded in this understanding was the principle that peace-building was an exercise of the elite and a nation-based enterprise. Thus it was often restricted to diplomatic engagements between receptive nations and their counterparts. This understanding comes with difficulties, challenges and shortcomings which includes inadequate appreciation of indigenous effort, ignorance of the importance of local ownership of the peace-building processes and the reality of external actors’ multiple/ulterior agendas. However, UN’s adoption of the abovementioned understanding of peace-building

---


led to the broadening of its mandate beyond military actions to include “traditionally defined” civilian activities.

Prior to Boutros-Ghali’s re-conceptualisation of UN’s understanding of peace-building, Galtung presents an in-depth analysis of the concept. He holds that peace-building “has a structure different from, perhaps over and above, peacekeeping and ad hoc peacemaking”. His line of reasoning proceeds from his classification of violent conflict into three forms – direct violence, structural violence and cultural violence. Unlike the viewpoint which exclusively considers the elite, peace-building amongst this group of scholars strongly relates to conflict prevention and resolution initiatives driven by the non-elite class. He and likeminded scholars consider social, psychological and religious-oriented programmes to be essential in peace-building processes.

Irrespective of the conceptual diversity embedded in the definition and redefinition of peace-building, this paper adopts and modifies Lederach’s definition of peace-building as a “comprehensive concept that encompasses, generates, and sustains the full array of processes, approaches and stages needed to prevent and transform conflict towards more sustainable, peaceful relationships”. This definition is preferred over others because of the holistic nature of its approach in comparison with others. It enables our interrogation of some of the processes, approaches and stages in peace-building programs. Of greater importance is this definition’s emphasis on prevention. This sets a tone for our exploration of why peace-building activities should be promoted prior to the escalation of violence in the society.

19 Direct violence refers to physical injury inflicted on another human being. Structural violence on the other hand is a form of violence that built into the structures of society; this form of violence is more indirect. Cultural violence involves any cultural norms, beliefs, and traditions that make other types of violence seem legitimate, acceptable, normal or natural (Galtung 1969).

20 Non-elite class here refers to people at grassroots level incorporating the local and community members.

Peace-building activities can be approached from various directions. It is an operation that is largely driven by UN and national agencies, but with the recent engagement of CSOs in some parts of the globe. The subsequent section presents some arguments for civil societies’ proactive peace-building endeavours in seemingly non-violent societies.

**A Case for Civil Societies’ Proactive Endeavours in “Non-violent” Societies**

A lot of resources have been invested in understanding civil societies and their roles in the state. Their relationship with the state with respect to the internalisation of democratic values has been a dominant theme in scholarly debates. Writers such as Paffenholz and Spurk asserts that

*Civil society as a concept gained more momentum at the beginning of the 1990s as a means to improve governance and democratization. As the Cold War came to an end, there was an opportunity to set good governance, respect for human rights and the rule of law as priority objectives in development cooperation. Thus, a vibrant civil society was considered as an important pillar for establishing democracy and its support an obvious aim of democratization effort*.

Such debates, though not without its criticism, often reinforce the optimistic and enthusiastic reception of the effort civil societies as a reliable instrument for sustainable development and democracy. Same could be duly said of their roles in the promotion of peace and values of non-violence across the globe. Paffenholz and Spurk\(^2\) draw attention to the view that “civil society actors are the key protagonists in the Conflict Resolution and Conflict Transformation schools”. Other scholars


have gone further in establishing this claim with both qualitative and quantitative studies. It is claimed that a “recent quantitative research analysing 22 peace negotiations over a period of 15 years shows a positive correlation between the degree of civil society involvement in peace negotiation and the sustainability of peace agreements”.24 The relevance and activities of civil societies in peace-building is self-evident. It is based on such evidence that World Bank’s 25 *Civil Society and Peace-building* report: asserts that “today the main question is no longer whether civil society has a role to play in peace-building, but how it can realize its potential, what are the roles of various actors, what are critical factors and pre-conditions for their effectiveness, and how can external actors best provide support?”

To a large extent, civil societies’ peace-building efforts are inclined towards post-conflict activities and they have at various points contributed in the restoration of peace and serenity amongst conflicting parties. Irrespective of the acknowledgement of their productive influence in peace restoration and conflict transformation, this paper stretches their scope of peace-building to including “pre-conflict”26 phase rather than restraining their relevance to the post-conflict stage. Such a proactive approach to peace-building is considered highly necessary for three primary reasons.

Firstly, it is common knowledge that one of the core duties and responsibilities of civil societies is to protect citizens and communities against the repression of the state and other armed or violent groups in the state. Protection within the discourse of peace-building is traditionally understood as physical protection from harm. This understanding

---


26 Pre-conflict peace-building in this context refers to the period before the escalation of violence in the society.
underpins Paffenholz and Spurk’s discourse of the INGO – Peace Brigades International’s service of protecting national peace in conflict zones. Such understanding takes us back to the realm of I would describe as neo-negative peace which comes with all the implications and weaknesses of negative peace as highlighted in previous section. Protection in this paper, therefore, goes beyond physical protection to the protection of the value and culture of peace via peace-oriented education.

Peace-oriented education is a form of “education or socialization that results in more peace in the world or that at least has as a result the greater likelihood that peace will be the existing condition than the case would have been without that education”\textsuperscript{28}. It is acknowledged that there are a variety of educational format across the globe including cultural form of education, informal education and formal education. Education in the context of this paper refers to the formal education. A formal education is a form of education that involves a “mass schooling system that is regulated, financed, and provided (in theory) as a universal public service to all citizens by the state, on an equal basis”.\textsuperscript{29} Education has been applauded by scholars and practitioners as a tool for an enduring transformation of conflict and building of a lasting peace\textsuperscript{30}. Save the Children’s exploration of the place of education in building peace and transforming conflict in three countries – Guatemala, Nepal and Liberia reveals the impact and appreciation of education in their quest for sustainable peace in their societies. After years of political turmoil in Guatemala form 1960, a peace accord was reached in 1995. A central part of the peace agreement according to Save the Children


\textsuperscript{29} Save the Children. (n.d). \textit{Education for Peace: Building Peace and Transforming Armed Conflict through Education Systems}. Norway: Save the Children.

reference of Jonas (2000b) was the “Peoples called for educational reform, including decentralization of and increased funding for the education system, expansion of the system, promotion of multicultural education, and use of indigenous languages in schools as mediums of instruction” 31. In Nepal and Liberia, the issue of education was alluded to from various dimensions in their quest for sustainable peace.

It was stated in their peace agreements that measures should be adopted to guarantee the rights of all citizens to education, and that education should be free and compulsory. In addition, it was also stressed that both sides of the conflict should not impede the right to education by taking over and controlling educational institutions, abducting students and teachers, and turning schools into barracks 32.

According to McKeon, “educational initiatives can also make a crucial contribution to the broader socio-political dimension of a peace process by challenging public perceptions about the [possible] conflict” 33.

Such emphasis of education in peace agreements expresses the significance and exceptional role of peace education in the peace-building processes. Civil societies’ proactive approach to the integration of peace-oriented syllabus in the people’s education would to a great extent enhance their resistance to violence while improving their skills in non-violent conflict resolution.

A large number of peace-building organisations are involved with the task of state-building across the various conflict prone states. However noble such a task may be, this paper questions why civil societies have seemingly laid back until after the disastrous consequences of violent conflict before stepping in to act. Going by our adopted definition of peace-building as “comprehensive concept that encompasses, generates,

32 Ibid
and sustains the full array of processes, approaches and stages needed to [prevent] and transform conflict towards more sustainable, peaceful relationships”, pre-conflict initiatives aimed at the prevention and transformation of potential conflict should better desired than such post-conflict endeavors.

As acknowledged by Paffenholz and Spurk,34 the overall objective of peace-building is the prevention of violent outbreaks of conflict and the sustainable transformation of armed conflicts into constructive peaceful ways of managing conflict. Rather than the traditional post-conflict approach to peace-building, civil societies willingness and ability to engage with various societies, prior to outbreak of conflict, in the development and establishment of relevant institution with the goal of averting potential or impending conflict would be greatly applauded. This could be done via rendering of necessary assistance in establishment of state apparatus that will be principally responsible for the co-ordination of state-driven peace-building initiatives. The ability of non-state actors to set a compelling agenda in this respect has been significantly acknowledged across the globe. I suppose the time is ripe in taking advantage of civil society aptitude in re-shaping the discourse on peace-building activities.

Conclusion

One of the identified loopholes in the existing peace-building initiatives is the unspoken perception that it is a post-conflict endeavour. Very few scholars, (if any at all), have either highlighted or challenged this reality. This paper breaks the silence through its arguments highlighting the need for a review of the dominant approach to peace-building (post-conflict peace-building). It argues for peace-building initiatives that are proactive enough to prevent the initial violent conflict. The

idea of post-conflict peace-building implicitly assumes our approval of embarking on peace-building initiatives only after the conflict has escalated and calmed. This paper by no means denies the challenges embedded in such proactive approach. In spite of such challenges, it refuses to be comfortable with the dominant of approach. It holds that the civil society is capable of playing a strategic role in redefining our conception of peace-building.
Socializing Peace: Social Media as a tool for Peacebuilding

Lisa Kwaleyela

Introduction

The African continent is a pot of gold for any journalist looking for the biggest scoop. This region is full of the most dramatic, pitiful, shocking and attention-drawing stories that any news media can use to up its sales and popularity. From sensationalised stories of blood-sucking dictators, disease-mongering rebels to rogue states and feuding statesmen, these shockers never disappoint as they provide their audience with riveting entertainment. For most media, coming up with the latest and
juiciest news item is the goal, but unfortunately in the rush to up the sales, the media tends to report stories prematurely and superficially often lacking adequate and quality commentary. The media has been known to, in some cases (and to their benefit), withhold and delay information that is of public interest and that needs to be known at a particular time.

The traditional media¹ is indeed an important source of information, reaching millions of people every day and providing information and current affairs that keep people in the loop. However, in many cases, the choice of information that is provided to the general audience can have deadly consequences as the media tends to provide sensationalised news that is meant to sale rather than educate. It usually operates under the sales-oriented concept of “if it bleeds, it leads.”² The ability of the media to spur hatred and promote violence has been witnessed in the use of government-controlled radio to incite genocide in Rwanda in 1994³.

Africa has been a victim of incorrect reporting and prejudice as a result of one-sided information from both regional and international media. Thus, television news is more adept at pointing to corpses than explaining why violence may, in certain places, pay so well.⁴ It is therefore clear that the media can be a driver of sensationalised and partisan news that has little or no benefit for positive pursuits such as peacebuilding. Henceforth, there is need to reiterate that “the media is

¹ Traditional media here implies communication through television, radio, newspapers or other print publications.
² Common expression used to imply that the media loves violence, and that bad news sells more.
a ‘double-edged’ sword which can either be a weapon of war, or can uphold prospects for peace."

Yet, there is no denial of the role the media can play in peacebuilding. It can either make or break the process. In many cases, the media is perceived to lack autonomy and is seen as a mouthpiece of the state. Where government or powerful interests exercise complete control over the media, the news is simply another form of propaganda and compelled to aggravate societal prejudices through biased and manipulative reporting. Despite its shortcomings, the media can be invaluable to the domain of conflict prevention and peacebuilding. As some writers in this field have already alluded to in their various works, knowing when and how to use the media for conflict prevention and peacebuilding is crucial.

Thus, bearing in mind that there is yet to be astounding empirical evidence that the new media can ever surpass the traditional media in the peacebuilding realm, it is still worthwhile an endeavour to investigate how the social media-peacebuilding nexus promises to be part of a holistic and coherent peacebuilding strategy that is focused on resolving the root causes of conflict, rather than just using ICTs as applications. The social media, being one of the most influential factors in inciting the uprising that led to social and political changes across North Africa was credited for being a platform for participatory decision-making, dialogue and debate.

---

5 Howard, *the media’s role in war and peacebuilding*, p5.
6 Howard, *the media’s role in war and peacebuilding*, p5.
It is not an uncommon theme nowadays that social media is an oasis of somewhat untapped opportunities for peacebuilding. Based on the premise that peacebuilding should be an inclusive process that embraces dialogue, in the context of this paper, it is seen that social media has potential to solicit interchange and greater participation in the peacebuilding process. Consequently, the focus of this paper is threefold. First, it will investigate how the social media can be useful vis-à-vis peacebuilding. Secondly, what kind of a peacebuilding approach is it most cut out for? Finally, the paper attempts to examine the potential of the social media in peacebuilding pursuit in Africa, bearing in mind that virtual peacebuilding may not always lead to realistic peacebuilding.

Understanding Key terms

Social Media

The social media phenomena have a long history dating back to 1971 when emails were first introduced, which marked the foundation of a much more collaborative social media decades later. Advancements in the internet took people’s interaction medium to further heights than before, with the new media and information and telecommunications technologies (ICTs) being the world’s biggest communication medium. It is the most recent communication tool of the world where a user can transcend borders and have access to the encyclopaedias, newspapers, bulletin boards, video arcades, hypermalls, broadcast stations, the movies, grapevine, travel agency, and mail order - all at one stop, in a global village.

---


Given this background, the tremendous expansion of the Internet during the 21st century, as well as the development and spread of sophisticated mobile phone technology, has enabled and promoted the unprecedented growth of social media, generally considered to be any web-based or mobile communications technology that allows the creation and exchange of user-generated content.\(^\text{10}\) It has further been extrapolated that the best way to define social media is to break it down; media is an instrument of communication, like a newspaper or radio, social media would be a social instrument of communication.\(^\text{11}\)

Still, other scholars have classified social media into six categories: open-source, collaborative projects, blogs and micro-blogs, content communities, social networking sites, virtual game worlds, and virtual social worlds.\(^\text{12}\) In the context of this paper, the usage of the term social media will be in reference to websites that allow users to interact with the websites and with other users. These websites include, firstly, popular social networking sites such as Facebook, Twitter, Google+, LinkedIn, and Pinterest. Secondly, social photo and video sharing sites such as Flickr, MySpace, Instagram and YouTube.

The wide use of social media, particularly social networking sites during and after the uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya gave birth to the idea that in the 21\(^\text{st}\) century, the revolution may not be televised – but it likely will be tweeted, blogged, texted and organized on facebook.\(^\text{13}\)

The popularity of social media today is because it is seen as a powerful tool of expression.


\(^{11}\) http://www.webtrends.com


\(^{13}\) http://www.peacedirect.org/blog
Social media involves the confluence of online social networking and user-generated content. It refers in part to the platforms for content generation and consumption: Facebook, Twitter and YouTube are examples of social media. It allows for dissemination of content in a peer-to-peer rather than unidirectional manner such as is done by television, radio, newspapers and some news websites. One can create and share content, as well as participate in online discussions. For example one can create a blog post and then share over social networks, and invite discussion around the content. The media is thus, “social” in the sense that it can be shared, easily disseminated and discussed online.14

Social media has become the most popular information media in countries where the press is controlled by the government or other powerful interests and where the media is perceived to lack reliable journalism. And unlike the traditional media, social media offers greater chances for interaction and feedback.

Social Media Popularity in Africa

The social media is undeniably very popular across Africa. The availability of mobile phone technologies in Africa’s poor countries is creating a possibility for African countries to harness the creative use of social media in economic, political and social spheres of life. Globalisation has made the flow of information swift and the social media may create many possibilities as a tool for building peace in some of Africa’s countries.

14 Comninos, The Role of Social Media and User-Generated Content in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding. p10.
A reported 73% online adults worldwide use social networking sites. As of September 2013, 71% of online adults use Facebook, 18% of online adults use Twitter, 17% use Instagram, 21% use Pinterest, 22% use LinkedIn. Facebook, twitter and youtube were very popular during the North Africa uprisings.\(^{15}\)

In the Africa, “in recent months Facebook — the major social media platform worldwide and currently the most visited website in most of Africa — has seen massive growth on the continent. The number of African Facebook users now stands at over 17 million, up from 10 million in 2009; more than 15 per cent of people online in Africa are currently using the platform, compared to 11 per cent in Asia. Two other social networking websites, Twitter and YouTube, rank among the most visited websites in most African countries”.\(^{16}\)

There is an estimated 80-90% of people in less developed countries that have access to a cell phone.\(^{17}\) This coupled with the events subsequent to the North Africa uprisings, has contributed to the growing recognition of the social media across Africa. Accordingly, studies suggest that when Africans go online (predominantly with their mobile phones) they spend much of their time on social media platforms.\(^{18}\)

The use of popular social networking sites in the uprising in North Africa prompts one to say that there is potential to use social media in peacebuilding the same way it was used to incite protests. Though it was not by itself the cause, the social media was a tool used by citizens to have an influence in domestic politics. About 84% Tunisians, 67%...

---

18 Essoungou, A Social Media Boom begins in Africa, np.
Libyans and 45% Egyptians believe that Social Media was a key factor in the success of their uprising. Using the social media exposed the plight of citizens to the world at a faster rate than before, with thousands of pictures and videos posted depicting government brutality. Civil society was more actively engaged in problem-solving debates and dissemination of critical information that was crucial to building citizen confidence.

Based on the lessons learned from the North Africa uprising, many Africans are now joining the global conversation on how the mobile web, particularly the social media is beginning to reshape the economic, political and social development of the continent. Hence, along with the many regular citizens, African stars, thinkers, political leaders and companies have rapidly joined the global discussion on how to use the social media to bring change to the continent.

Social media is nowadays used considerably even in political spheres. It was highly recognised that the social media had a central role to play in mobilising masses in protests during the Egyptian uprising. It became possible to speedily draw international attention to what was happening in the country by the use of facebook, twitter and blogs. Egyptian protesters were able to disseminate a continuous stream of text, videos, and images from the streets directly to millions via social media technologies, and indirectly through the republication of these messages on news networks such as Al Jazeera and CNN.

---

19 Al Jazeera survey, 2013
20 Essoungou, A Social Media Boom begins in Africa, np.
Additionally, the use of the social media has therefore widened from being only a social platform, but to also include political and economic discussions. As noted below:

Given this noteworthy ICT progression, it has now become substantially easier, compared to five years ago, to access electronic data, publish or share information, and interact on the Web. These developments have had profound implications for the manner in which people communicate with each other, express opinions, organise activities and events, socialise and even mobilise others towards specific objectives.²²

Social media is also being used by entrepreneurs to advertise their products, interact with customers and harness investment prospects. As a case in point, media organisations in South Africa and companies such as Kenya Airways are using various social media platforms to interact better with customers and readers.²³

Peacebuilding

The concept of peacebuilding as popularised under the United Nations refers to all action taken to solidify peace and avoid relapse or lapse into conflict. In simple terms, peacebuilding refers to strategies employed to bring about peaceful outcomes whether in post-conflict or pre-conflict scenarios.

Peacebuilding in a post-conflict backdrop is intended to address underlying causes of conflict and to dissuade the resurgence of such. It entails the normalization of relationships between people who were

---

²³ Essoungou, A Social Media Boom begins in Africa, np.
once in conflict with each other. The overall aim of peacebuilding is to transform conflicts constructively and to create a sustainable peace.\textsuperscript{24} It also includes addressing the root causes of the conflict and promoting social and economic justice as well as putting in place political structures of governance and the rule of law which will consolidate peacebuilding, reconciliation and development.\textsuperscript{25} Peacebuilding centrally involves the transformation of relationships and cultures and thus this sustainable reconciliation requires structural, cultural and relational transformations. \textsuperscript{26}

On the other hand, pre-conflict peacebuilding involves steps taken toward reducing the risk of faltering into conflict by investing in long term growth and a sustainable peace process that is both context-specific and people-centred. Thus, pre and post conflict peacebuilding at individual level imply cognitive, attitudinal and, eventually, behavioural changes that reflect a shift from polarisation to positive relationships and moving from a culture of violence to a culture of peace.\textsuperscript{27}

In essence, peacebuilding is a long, intricate and multidimensional process that requires adequate investment in social, political and economic spheres and calls for the participation of many actors at community, national and international levels.

The success in any peacebuilding approach is highly dependent upon

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{27} European Centre for Conflict Prevention 2007. \textit{Why and When to Use the Media for Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding}. Issue Paper 6.
\end{itemize}
the contextual realities of a given setting, having taken into account the socio-economic and political variables. It is clear from the lessons learned particularly from African settings that there can never be a one-size-fits-all model.

The central aspiration for any peacebuilding approach should be to develop a holistic and inclusive process. Ultimately, peace must be defined and constructed locally, and peacebuilding efforts become energetic and sustainable only to the extent that they tap local resources, empower local constituencies, and achieve legitimacy within particular cultural and religious contexts.28 It is based on this backdrop of localising peace that this paper endeavours to outline how the social media can be applied to some aspects of the peacebuilding process, particularly on dialogue as being very necessary to the process.

Social Media-Peacebuilding Nexus

The media in general has a troubled history of being an instigator of conflict rather than a tool for conflict resolution. The use of media as a peacebuilding tool has always been a contentious subject. The vast majority of the peacebuilding literature blatantly omits the role of the media.29 This is in part due to the media’s history in inciting conflict through irresponsible and erroneous reporting of misty facts. For example, the 20 year conflict in Sri Lanka, and the fragility of the subsequent peace processes there, are partially due to sensationalist, partisanised and ethnically divided media.30 There is vast literature

---


30 Howard, *The Role of Media in War and Peacebuilding*, p7.
on the relationship between media and conflict, most notorious are the studies describing the skilful use of early mass communication channels by the Allies in World War I, the cruel manipulation of media by Nazi Germany and the recent abuse of media in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia.\(^{31}\)

Further, it has been observed that the other reason why the traditional media fails at peacebuilding is because journalists themselves are uncomfortable with their role as peacebuilders.\(^{32}\) This function is perceived to be incompatible with the basic journalistic principle of objectivity, which dictates that the media should merely report, and not play any part in a conflict. Diverting from the objectivity principle may cause the media to lose their credibility, and thus their “market value.”\(^{33}\)

Notwithstanding the view that the media is usually on the opposite end of peacebuilding, there are some positive uses of mass communication channels in the reconciliation of post-conflict societies. Practitioners from international government agencies and non-profit organizations conducted such media projects in support of conflict transformation; the Bosnian television network OBN, the Burundian production studio Ijambo, Cambodian radio UNTAC and the Israeli/Palestinian ‘Sesame Street’ project are just some of the prospects of this innovative application.\(^{34}\)

This peace-oriented media or peace journalism tries to focus more on internal and more complex explanations for conflict rather than

---

32 Vermeulen, M. (2011). *How can the media be successfully used for peacebuilding?* NP.
33 Vermeulen, *How can the media be successfully used for peacebuilding?* np.
superficial and visible attributes of conflicts.\textsuperscript{35} Whatever name is given to the media, peace-oriented media or peace journalism, or just traditional media, we should expect it to almost always fail at peacebuilding if it is not learned when and how to use it for peace.

On the other hand, there is insufficient literature on the social media’s role in peacebuilding. Social media in its nature has been seen to have an ability to foster dialogue between groups that have previously been unable to interact with each other. Peacebuilding is highly dependent on participation from ordinary citizens at the grassroots level who in certain cases lack adequate and quality representation in this process. In its fundamental nature, building peace is an intellectual process in which those concerned promote interaction that solicits response and debate from the state, donors and international community at large.

The social media as a tool is a platform where problem-solving contributions and messages of freedom and peace can be spread quickly as an important element to the support of peacebuilding enterprise. To ensure that peacebuilding inculcates a culture of peace among the recipients, there is need to encourage the growth of a peacebuilding narrative which focuses more on dialogue between groups of people that previously do not have a platform to initiate such interaction. This is the kind of peacebuilding approach that the social media would most likely be cut out for.

The social media gives users a right to free expression and debate, and can therefore be a useful tool for peacebuilding if in a particular context, peacebuilding is based on a narrative that encourages conversations and allowing the recipients to have a say in what kind of peace is to be built.

\textsuperscript{35} Skjerdal, 2011 as cited by Vermeulen (2011).
In the case of Egypt, the social media was also used in the constitution writing process after the uprising. Dialogue is critical in any constitution writing process. There was an attempt to use the social media in this process. It was not very successful but was very useful at the same time. Many observers are optimistic that over time, using the social media to solicit participation from the citizenry will only get better. Egypt is in the delicate process of transitioning towards democracy, and this transition should be accompanied by a peacebuilding strategy that will deter a fallback into instability.

Therefore, dialogue has to be sustained not only for the sake of a democratic constitution, but also for the sake of putting in place long term social, economic and political policy that will uphold the possibilities for building a sustainable peace. Elections and referenda may not automatically translate into peace, but it sets the pace upon which Egypt can begin to reconcile and heal while building.

In Kenya on the other hand, there were attempts by Kenyan authorities and civil society to use mobile phone technology to curb political violence in the March 2013 Kenyan elections. Through the use of social media monitoring technology, elections were monitored for violence and voter fraud. Local communities were further urged to utilise social media in sensing emerging conflict which in turn served as an early warning.

It was widely reported that the Kenyan government had succeeded in its efforts to foster civic participation, transparency and accountability during those elections. Non-governmental initiatives bolstered the reporting process, while citizens were involved in proactively disseminating information and messages of peace using SMS, Twitter
and the internet.\textsuperscript{36} In the end, it was seen that these initiatives were to an extent successful in deterring violence and irregularities and thus contributing to a peaceful election.

The social media, therefore, can complement what the traditional media has previously endeavoured. It can spread positive cascades further than imagined. For instance, the social media played a key role in creating an outpouring of private aid after the earthquakes in Haiti and Chile were people posted requests for text message donations to the Red Cross.\textsuperscript{37} These technologies are today available in most of the world’s countries, including regions in which humanitarian, development and peacebuilding workers operate, constantly seeking new tools and instruments that help them master their challenging tasks.\textsuperscript{38}

In practice, the social media can solicit dialogue, participation and awareness for peacebuilding pursuit. Dialogue is an important and inclusive process to any peacebuilding process as it brings together a diverse set of voices to a microcosm of a larger society, and to bring about sustainable change, people have to develop a sense of joint ownership of the process and become stakeholders in identifying new approaches to address common challenges.\textsuperscript{39}

However, it is important to also note that dialogue is not the only aspect that can contribute to successful peacebuilding neither is successful peacebuilding largely founded on dialogue alone. While it can bridge communities and allow for different perspectives, dialogue has to be
part of a full package of a pragmatic peacebuilding strategy. Thus, as a tool for peacebuilding, the social media is no “quick fix” but its use in peacebuilding efforts will only get better in as far as promoting dialogue and participation is concerned. If used carefully and tactfully, social media has vast potential as a useful tool for peacebuilding.

Consequently, the social media has potential to affect perception on ethnicity, change attitudes, and promote tolerance and mutual understanding; thus it can bridge the divide between ethnic groups that wouldn’t otherwise communicate with one another.\(^{40}\) It can be noted further that:

> While the exact significance of the new media “revolution” for peacebuilding is still hard to pin down, the use of social networking sites facebook and twitter to organise protests in Colombia, Iran and Egypt, and the use of text messages for activist mapping by the Ushahidi website during the post-election violence in Kenya, are promising examples of the possibilities. In Afghanistan, a new project called Mahaal allows people to receive the news on their mobile phone. As mobile phone coverage is now more ubiquitous than radio coverage, this is a particularly useful way to disperse information in remote areas (Adam, 16-03-2011).\(^{41}\)

In quintessence, if the social media was used to identify goals, build solidarity and organize demonstrations during the North Africa uprising, it is also possible to use it as a tool to solicit human and financial

---


\(^{41}\) Vermeulen *How can the media be successfully used for peacebuilding*, np.
resources, public interest, dialogue and participation of civil society in peacebuilding.

Social Media as a Publicist for Peacebuilding

Traditional media is “conflict-obsessed”\(^{42}\). The news is about conflict and less about peacebuilding. There is always less said in the media than what would be necessary to garner support towards peacebuilding. In those peacebuilding contexts in which a vast amount of data exists, it is often not available for all interested organisations.\(^{43}\) And to further note:

First, there is an inherent contradiction between news media values and peacebuilding. News is about conflict. The professional journalist seeks immediacy, drama and simple images which favour stereotypes. Immediacy does not favour peacebuilding as a news story because it is almost always a time consuming process rather than an instant event.\(^{44}\)

The lack of news about peacebuilding is detrimental as little or no time is allocated to publicising peacebuilding efforts that need airtime for serious debate between international observers, civil societies and governments.

Therefore, to help publicise and harness public interest in peacework, the social media has great potential in being a publicist for peacebuilding. Using social media to publicise peacebuilding can actually provide free information to the youth and other interested stakeholders to participate

\(^{42}\) Howard, The Role of Media in War and Peacebuilding, p5.


\(^{44}\) Howard, The Role of Media in War and Peacebuilding, p5.
in problem-solving dialogue at community level and help pave the way for building a localised peace.

Historically, it has already been demonstrated that traditional media, if not guided by reliable journalism allows no accountability and permits government agents to operate in a political culture of secrecy, withholding almost all information of vital interest to the public. As it has been commonly stated before, it is abundantly clear both historically and presently, that expenditures and resources consumed by war far outpace those allocated for building peace. The social media can be used as a tool to help hold governments accountable, and in post-conflict societies, to ensure that there are adequate financial resources, transparency, and inclusive dialogue allocated to the peacebuilding process. However, how well this turns out highly depends on effective checks and balances in peacebuilding governance.

Nonetheless, it is also important to note that new media in general are increasingly and often successfully used for needs assessments and beneficiary communication; but few examples exist in which new media are applied for improving monitoring and evaluation in peacebuilding contexts. Regardless, social media can be used to encourage community-based initiatives in building peace.

Realism over Romanticism

Despite the great potential that the social media has in relation to peacebuilding, there is need to tread carefully. Social media is a double-edged sword. The easy accessibility of makes it a dangerous platform upon which communication can incite violence and hatred. Social media can also be manipulated into spreading propaganda and hostilities. It

45 Howard, The Role of Media in War and Peacebuilding, p5.
46 Koeltzow, Monitoring and Evaluation of Peacebuilding: the Role of New Media, p91.
should therefore be expected that its effectiveness in peacebuilding will have varying degrees of success depending on how well it is utilised. It should not be seen as a flawless intervention for peacebuilding but rather as a tool, which in reality can also be susceptible to abusive inaccurate information and promulgation of violent agendas.

Additionally, the question of who should control access to social media can make it a tool of repression against citizens in countries ruled by repressive regimes. During the Arab Spring, it was widely reported that authoritarian governments attempted, with varying degrees of success, to use social media against the revolutionaries in an effort to control the flow of ideas and information.

Social media is not inherently good, and not only used as a liberation technology. Authoritarian governments, often mocked for their inability to understand and confront a new technology, are increasingly realizing the potential that social media has for state repression. U.S. presidents from Reagan to Obama have argued that “the long-term survival of authoritarian states depends on their ability to control the flow of ideas and information within and across their borders.”

It is apparent that the social media also has its pitfall. There is need to be realistic and aware that the social media despite the popularity cannot work in a vacuum but rather its utility in peacebuilding will be a culmination of other important measures put in place. There is need to avoid the feeling that the social media or the internet in general is the answer to everything or what is referred to as “cyber-utopianism”.

48 Cyber-utopianism is the romantic belief that the internet or online communication is in
Looking Ahead: Socialising Peace in Africa

The African continent faces its own unique challenges that include a long list of human insecurities; violent conflict, poverty, inequality and poor governance. All these factors have implications for peacebuilding endeavours in countries prone to or emerging from conflict. Hence, Africa should be on the lookout for any potential tools that may be beneficial to assist in the many peacebuilding projects across the continent.

ICTs in general are now gathering momentum as to how they can be used effectively for the sake of peace. But, like other ICTs, the social media may be faced with its own opportunities and challenges as a tool for peacebuilding.

On the upside are opportunities. In post-conflict situations, demobilisation and reintegration (D&R) is likely to be a key aspect of peacebuilding programming for the foreseeable future, and complex and costly D&R programmes are underway in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Côte d’Ivoire, Libya, Sudan and South Sudan; consequently, it is worth exploring possible alternative tools that will be beneficial in D&R, such as ICTs\textsuperscript{49}. It is possible to use social media to provide valuable information in conflict zones that have traditionally been devoid of data.

Further, lessons from Kenya have demonstrated that the social media may contribute to community efforts to deter outbreaks of violence as they can be used for early warning. Additionally, social media can be used in facilitating communication between poorer clients and government officials by connecting them to authorities, who hold political power.

\textsuperscript{49} ISS, 2013.
and wealth in order to pursue economic goals. Thus, overall the social media has potential to not only curb violence, but to also contribute to dialogue regarding socio-economic dynamics that are sometimes the bone of contention in violent flare-ups.\textsuperscript{50}

The Social Science Research Council (SSRC) launched in March 2012, the African Peacebuilding Network (APN) which supports independent African research on conflict-affected countries and neighbouring regions of the continent, as well as the integration of African knowledge into global policy communities.\textsuperscript{51}

This is an example of a great initiative toward Africanising peacebuilding perspectives and creating home-grown responses in Africa fragile states. In strengthening peacebuilding networks such as the APN, the social media is a useful tool in garnering publicity and soliciting debate from African practitioners and international analysts.

On the contrary, there is a whole set of challenges that the use of social media in the African context may be hampered by. The growing literature on ICTs and peacebuilding also outlines that this may not always be a successful approach in the African context due to social, economic and political factors.

Research undertaken by InfoDev in Liberia and Rwanda indicated that the use of Internet and mobile phone ICT in post-conflict settings has been hampered by underdeveloped ICT infrastructure, limited access to ICT services among the general population, and cultural aversions to the use of ICT, as well as a range of other factors.\textsuperscript{52} This may be

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{50} Bieber, R & Said, S. (2012). \textit{The Role of Social Media in Promoting Peacebuilding in Egypt}. Relational Diplomacy Institute.
\item \textsuperscript{51} SSRC website, 2014.
\item \textsuperscript{52} ISS, 2013.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
compounded further by low levels of literacy and computer or internet illiteracy in Africa’s poor countries.

In addition, the social media specifically may lose credibility due to high possibilities of being planted with false information by political supporters of oppressive regimes. As witnessed in the North Africa uprisings, authoritarian regimes may cut access to these social media platforms as was the case in Egypt when Mubarak shut down mobile and Internet services.

All these factors and many others are an impediment to how well the social media can produce results on ground as a tool for peacebuilding.

Yet, in other cases, it may actually lead to further conflicts between people. As summed up:

Access to ICTs can create new inequalities and new sources of conflict: ICTs can introduce new “digital divides” based on income, literacy, and ICT literacy. In some contexts, ex-combatants may be relatively less literate than others. Use of social media and User-Generated Content in DDR may have the effect of alienating them. Giving ex-combatants cell phones or smart-phones as parts of new DDR programmes may cause resentment and stigmatization of ex-combatants, who already suffer much of this from being recipients of cash and goods, perceived possibly by community members as being rewarded for their time spent in combat.53

53 Comninos, *the Role of Social Media and User-Generated Content in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding*. p15.
Conclusion

It is not yet fully documented how well the social media will influence monitoring and evaluation of peacebuilding, but we can say for sure that the role to be played in soliciting debate and encouraging dialogue among concerned parties is undeniable. Social media are opening up new channels of communication and new ways of learning. They will provide an opportunity for change in Africa’s approach to peacebuilding. Based on a bible principle, socialising peace is about teaching all of us to be peacemakers by providing us with a variety of appropriate social interactions so we can practice getting along with others in the midst of struggles and conflicts.

On the contrary, caution has to be expressed as the social media may present obstacles to preventing violence and building peace. In line with the traditional media, social media can be used to incite violence and hatred. They can be used to deploy prejudice, racism and conflict which may have a reversal effect on peacebuilding. The social media can only be a tool and thus, success is dependent upon the existence of a pragmatic and holistic approach to peacebuilding that is informed by political, social and economic variables in a given setting. Currently, it is suffice to say that in their current nature, the social media can only compliment other important tools already existing, such as traditional media.
PART III

Development
Assessing Interactions Between the State and Social Support Organisations in South Africa and Zimbabwe (2009-2013)

Tariro Mutongwizo

Introduction

This chapter attempts to uncover the types of interactions between the state and SSOs and what they yield. To avoid the controversies and intricacies involved in the undefinable and ‘diverse deployments’ of civil society, the particular features of the cases used in this research are isolated so as to concentrate on the specifics of the organisations through referring to them as SSOs. These are non-

state groups outside the household and family aimed at supporting individuals and groups. These organisations include non-governmental organisations (NGOs), non-profit organisations (NPOs), community-based organisations (CBOs) or civil society organisations (CSOs). The normative function of these organisations is concentrated on in order to enable the analysis of the extent to which these organisations deviate from their objectives while adapting to formal or informal pressures.\(^2\)

Given that the term was developed for the purposes of this research, there is no literature that refers specifically to SSOs. Therefore, there will be the reliance on the general literature on CSOs that pertains to the facets of SSOs focused on. The cross-national comparison is an important part of this discussion, since the manner in which the two different states interact with SSOs will be investigated.

Time period and the nature of the state in South Africa and Zimbabwe are relied on as independent variables and they are employed to analyse state-SSO relations. Two key themes, namely: ‘dependencies’ and ‘exchanges’ will be explored. ‘Exchanges’, refer to ways of communicating, while ‘dependencies’ denote reliance relationships. Prior to conducting the research, it was anticipated that there would be minimal collaborative relationships between the Zimbabwean state and SSOs and that these interactions would be more antagonistic.\(^3\)

---


More tolerant state-SSO relations were expected in South Africa. It was anticipated that due to the two politically-charged, conflict-ridden settings, and political tensions between different political parties unique to each setting, there would be diverse conflicts that shape state-SSO interactions and consequent governance patterns. The necessity for a more contextual understanding of these processes in different places and what accounts for varied relations led to the South Africa-Zimbabwe exploration.

**Methodology**

Four organisations undertaking diverse work were relied on. The two in Cape Town were: the People Against Suffering, Suppression, Oppression and Poverty (PASSOP) an organisation promoting the rights of refugees and asylum seekers, and The Quaker Peace Centre (QPC) which aims to identify areas of potential violence and mitigate its effects. The two in Harare were: the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition (CZC) which advocates for democracy and the respect for the rule of law, and the Combined Harare Residents Association (CHRA) which aims to ensure that the state provides equitable service delivery for residents.

In addition to the non-participant observation conducted in each SSO, a total of 17 semi-structured, in-depth interviews were conducted with SSO staff in both sites in the first phase of the research (2010) and 21 in the second phase (2013) among the same SSOs. Through the dual processes of observation and interviews, insight into the SSOs as entire organisations was gained. Participants’ identities were kept anonymous when reporting the findings.

---

Each SSO was obliging in supplying organisational documentation such as annual reports and publications. These were analysed along with detailed interview notes to gain deeper understandings of each organisation. Rakodi’s ‘contrasts in context’ \(^5\) approach was taken, this uses the differences in each case under study to understand cases individually through setting one against the other and pointing out similarities where they exist. Likewise, it must be highlighted that because of the access denied and received from SSOs, those which are employed in this research act as both a useful lens into state-SSO interactions and also offer a sense of the limitations inherent in these relations.

Findings: Phase I

**Exchanges: The State As A Brick Wall**

Besides the nature of the state, the type of organisation and its work are significant factors that influence the nature of each SSO’s relationship with the state. This is noted in statements such as:

> The political rather than socio-economic climate determines what we can or can’t do. Before the June 2008 elections (*sic*, in Zimbabwe), working here was very dramatic. We had to operate from elsewhere because of fear of intimidation from the government.

**CZC - 1**

They [the government] tried their best to keep us from De Doorns\(^6\) and refused to engage with us at all on this issue. There are many issues where they just ignore us but for this one we have to fight back until they allow us in to help the people there.

---


\(^6\) In 2009, foreign farm workers in the De Doorns area were threatened with violence by locals leading the Western Cape provincial government and the UNHCR to open a refugee camp in the area to house the displaced; the camp was closed in late 2010.
The rare times we are given a chance to participate in policy issues, the government acts like they are granting us a privilege. The city council is so opaque. If we are invited to a meeting we see it in The Herald7 maybe one day before the meeting so we never have enough time to prepare. CHRA - 3

In this phase, all participants from the Zimbabwe SSOs cited state-SSO communication as challenging. Participants raised that SSOs are perceived to be purveyors, rather than mediators of conflict. CHRA participant 1 said that their work was in some instances sabotaged by the state. This participant added that their satellite offices in Mbare, Mabvuku and Glen View had been forcefully shutdown by the Chipangano gang alleged to be associated with the Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF). Chipangano closed down the office citing that they perceived it to be more of a Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) initiative rather than a CHRA office.

Such communication challenges were noted among the South Africa SSOs. However, this was said to be because of the state’s disregard for SSOs. PASSOP participants shared the opinion that the issue of intolerance towards foreign nationals by locals was something to which state actors did paid scant attention.

Communication problems and varying degrees of support and antagonism from the different political groups was a significant obstacle hampering harmonious state-SSO relations. CZC participant 4 for instance said:

There is a certain stigma the state associates with us CSOs. We also suffer because there are three ruling political parties and so it is hard to reach a consensus with each party or to secure support from all three groups.

7 The Herald is the state-owned national newspaper.
Communication problems open up the possibility for numerous other challenges for the state-SSO relations. The next issue discussed is the degree to which, under these conditions, SSOs perceive they can effect change.

**Counterfeit counterweight?**

In some instances civil society is seen as an extension, rather than as a counterweight to the state’s influence. These characteristics of civil society are exhibited in this participant’s statement:

> We don’t need the state’s support. All we need the state to do is to create an environment where it is conducive for us to do our work. We just need the state to not undermine our work or the work of other CSOs. It is the role of any government to do this.

**CZC - 3**

Participants in the Zimbabwe SSOs were particularly sensitive to the state’s attempts to curb their work and how consequently SSOs tended to appear ineffective. CHRA participant 3 said:

> What we can do as CSOs in Zimbabwe is very limited. In developed countries and even in places like South Africa they can stand up against the government, but for us here we are always being watched, intimidated and arrested. In the past years there have been about 500 arbitrary arrests of civil society leaders and staff each year. The numbers have reduced with the unity government but arrests do happen. We can say we’d like to do more and advocate for good governance but sometimes I think we are just toothless watchdogs.

**CZC’s participant 5** pointed out: ‘we rely on confrontational advocacy. There is no nuanced advocacy’. Although this behaviour of SSOs is a reaction to the state, it only compounds the disorderliness of civil society and reduces its integrity. Conversely, one participant raised this point:
There have been positive changes brought by the inclusive government. We have begun to see that there is an enhanced and increased access for CSOs into areas they formerly did not have access to. The GNU has brought about the constitution-making process which encourages national healing; these are positive changes.

CZC - 4

While the surveyed SSOs all insisted on the importance of organisations like themselves to represent and support individuals and groups, there was consensus that the work done by SSOs alone was insufficient.

Piecemeal servings of power to preserve peace

The state capitalises on situations where SSOs are influential and able to work as vehicles which can benefit both parties’ interests. This is noted in the relationship between the QPC and the state. Participant 3 of the QPC stated:

We receive a lot of our funding for our projects from the government through the Department of Social Development. We appreciate this funding but in many cases it is directed to projects and communities which they want us to work in which may not be where the funding is most needed.

Another instance where the state grants minimal power to SSOs in order for conflict to be reduced is observed in the statement by CHRA participant 4:

We can talk about other things such as children’s rights and service delivery issues but there is absolutely no talk of security sector reform (SSR). SSR is a no-go area because security officers have been involved in politics and they want to hold onto their control of the police and the army.
The engagement with SSOs at a slight level raised confidence in the state; however, it is clear that SSO participants are of the opinion that the state clings to most of the power in their engagements. The next section explores a similar type of relationship to that of granting minimal authority to SSOs while maintaining control of the broader status quo.

**One for you, three for me**

PASSOP participants alleged that the state only tended to be more attentive to them when their positions in office could benefit from showing concern for refugee and asylum seeker issues. The Special Dispensation Permits for Zimbabwean asylum seekers and refugees, a process started in early 2009 and concluded on 31 December 2010, was a controversial topic among PASSOP participants. There was great speculation that the open borders to all Zimbabweans in possession of a valid passport was only brought about to cater for the FIFA World Cup which necessitated the supply of cheap labour, something which was mutually beneficial for the migrants and the South African economy.

In Zimbabwe, the GNU brought a collaboration of opposing parties to govern the country jointly. CZC participant 8 and CHRA participant 1 said that the GNU only took place as a compromise and that CSOs continue to operate fearfully as they cannot challenge the systems of governance because the violence which surrounding the GNU process rears its head each time the government was challenged.

The media is also an area which the Zimbabwean state has for long used as a method for controlling society. By loosening the laws on the control of the media, in some respects, the state strategically gained the favour of its citizens and has begun to appear more approachable. The catch-22 nature of this is evident in the following statement from CZC

---

8 There are various restrictions on what can be broadcasted and published in Zimbabwe and this is controlled through the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC), which owns the single television station and radio stations. The state owned newspapers, The Herald and The Sunday Mail are also regulated by the ZANU-PF government.
participant 4:

The Daily News and other non-state media papers and magazines have been allowed to operate again and so there are more tools to spread the democracy message. The majority can’t afford newspapers and other print media so there is a need for more free community radio stations, this is still a challenge for the government to allow.

It was these participants’ belief that the government had successfully pacified society in the interim through limited freedoms.

The types of state-SSO exchanges in the two sites are varied and their shape is largely dependent on the state and the individual characteristics of each SSO. The manner in which an SSO engages with the state as well as the issues being engaged with are also vital factors that influence the type of exchanges. The next part explores the findings of the dependencies between the two realms in the first phase of the research.

Dependencies

Funding: A hand that feeds, and a hand that suppresses

QPC participant 4 asserted: ‘after 1994, the government withdrew funding from many organisations but now the government has realised that it can’t service all the people’s needs and it requires support from NGOs.’

The scenario mentioned in the previous section of the state co-opting SSOs and thus giving them limited power through funding is one way in which SSOs depend on the state and likewise, through providing funding, the state depends on funding SSOs, both to outsource its duties and also to stifle SSOs.

The ways in which both the South African state and the Zimbabwean state use funding as a gimmick for controlling SSOs vary largely. The
South African state uses funding to appease or dictate the work of SSOs, while the Zimbabwean state controls funding and imposes strict embargoes on foreign aid thereby controlling SSOs.

**Collaboration: important or impotent?**

PASSOP participant 2 said: ‘working with the government is equivalent to interference from the government. This will diminish the trust we have from people.’ Similarly, CHRA and the CZC shared the desire to be completely separate from the state but expressed the yearning for the ability to freely engage with the state. Correspondingly, participants also pointed out that the state also felt that SSOs interfere in the state’s work.

Whether viable partnerships between the state and civil society can exist to benefit both parties is purely based on the context and purpose of the collaboration. In order for partnerships to honour both parties, it is important for there to be an independent umpire in the equation.

However, the ability of states and civil society to acquire an impartial structure to mediate their relationships is in itself a challenge. In another vein, PASSOP and QPC participants pointed out that they had informal relationships and partnerships with state officials.

Next, I highlight the findings from the second phase of fieldwork.

**Phase II: Exchanges and Dependencies**

**Exchanges: An assortment of associations**

Similarly, the second stage generated findings which pointed to various types of interaction between the different levels of state institutions and SSOs. PASSOP participant 8, for instance said that their relationship with the Department of Home Affairs (DHA) depended on the project that PASSOP was working on and to some extent the approach taken. Participant 9 observed: ‘there is no blanket relationship between us and
the state; there are many faces to it’. Additionally, QPC participant 6 raised the point that there were good relations with some government departments and hostile interactions with others.

Among the SSOs in Zimbabwe, a similar wide array of interactions was observed. CHRA participants said that they experienced half-hearted association with state departments. CHRA participant 6 said:

The government says they will consult with the people on service delivery issues and budgeting but when they arrange for a budget meeting they advertise it in The Herald maybe a day before the meeting. We all know that’s short notice and 75% of our population can’t afford to buy newspapers. In the end, two people show up and local government concludes that they have consulted residents.

The different relations between the state and SSOs are largely related to the interactions between political parties. Points such as those of CHRA participant 7 were raised: ‘Our satellite office in Mbare was very popular. Then it was closed down by Chipangano. They felt that we were threatening their existence and taking over Mbare’.

Likewise, the CZC identified certain time periods as influencing the types of relationships they and other SSOs and with the state. The pre- and post-GNU period had marked differences in terms of state-SSO relations as did election periods and processes such as the constitution-making process.

These differences noted in CZC participant 6’s statement: ‘the GNU watered down some of the state’s dominance but the good relationship we had could be eroded in an instant’.

Another point to note is that there were diverse state-SSO relations based on individuals and specific departments. This will be explored in the next section.
Interactions with individuals and institutions

There are many instances where participants pointed to some relations being restricted to a specific department, individual or group rather than to the umbrella ‘state’. The shifts in the relationship between PASSOP and the DHA during and after the ZDP era illustrate the dynamic and transforming relations between the two. Participant 9 puts forward that ‘we had a good relationship with the DHA on the ZDP and we have an acrimonious relationship with the Refugee Reception Centre (RRC)’. Furthermore, PASSOP participant 6 pointed out that there were discrepancies between policy and implementation since The Refugee Act (No. 130 of 1998) was disregarded by DHA personnel who were either ignorant or in contempt of laws.

Likewise, participants 6, 7 and 8 of the QPC described the relationship between the QPC and specific departments, such as Social Development and the Metropole South Educational District as ‘very good’ and ‘good’, while the government as a whole was described by epithets such as ‘corrupt’, ‘plagued by poor leadership’, ‘secretive’ and ‘controversial’.

The Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) posed numerous challenges for Zimbabwe SSOs particularly in the form of the Public Order and Security Act (No.1 of 2002) (POSA). Participants from both the CHRA and the CZC referred to the POSA as limiting the freedom of association of SSOs and consequently leading to strained state-SSO relations. Participant 6 said that some CHRA personnel had established internal relations with individual ZRP officers to ease relations.

Another theme that emerged from the findings was the role of individuals in state-SSO interactions. Numerous individual names were mentioned as influencing the overall patterns that particular SSO relationships with state departments took. PASSOP participant 10 for instance cited a tumultuous relationship with the South African Home Affairs Minister, a relationship which is shaped by this participants’ involvement in
the African National Congress Youth League (ANCYL) as well as with PASSOP. Correspondingly, CHRA participants in Harare cited the decisions of the Zimbabwean Minister of Local Government as standing in the way of their progress. In line with this, participants made a distinction between their interactions and those of ZANU-PF and/or MDC associated individuals within the state. The findings suggest a wide array of ways in which specific individuals and state institutions influence state-SSO associational configurations.

**Monitoring relationships: Turning a blind eye to the watchdog**

Phase two saw an increase in the relationships of monitoring between state institutions and SSOs. This is perhaps because of the increased state-SSO partnerships. PASSOP had a particularly dynamic monitoring relationship with the South African DHA. Likewise, the QPC cited the difficulties they faced in their relationships with state departments, particularly with provincial government. Participant 7 said that the government feared that NGOs are ‘loose canons’ who publicised negative information about the government, even unnecessarily.

Strikingly, vast differences were observed among the counterpart SSOs in Zimbabwe. CHRA prided itself in the extent to which its monitoring of local government’s service delivery had yielded good results. It appears as though the initial confrontational approach seen in phase one attracted the state’s attention to such an extent that CHRA has adjusted its method of engagement to more tolerant styles. However, this could be attributed to the time period and events such as the GNU which opened up avenues for better engagement.

Engaging the media proved to be a technique which CHRA, like PASSOP relied on to receive the state’s attention. Participant 6 revealed that ‘we perform a lot of tricks to get the Minister’s attention, contacting the press is one of them.’ The methods of the CZC for monitoring the state were similar to those of CHRA although their ability to perform watchdog
functions was said by most participants to have been compromised by the GNU. Nevertheless, unlike the South Africa SSOs which were at times loosely monitored by the state, both the CZC and CHRA cited excessive state intimidation.

These observations on the state-SSO coalitions and the reciprocal monitoring relationships lead to the next section which explores the types of state-SSO dependencies noted to exist in the second phase.

**Dependencies: Costly coalitions**

CHRA participants expressed that the government had the advantage in engagement with SSOs, particularly in instances of partnerships. Participant 5 was bluntly sceptical about the reliability and enduring nature of partnerships for as long as one party was dishonest and not transparent about its ulterior motive: ‘when we were pushing for the water bills to be cut the Minister was quiet, but as soon as it was time for elections he took the idea and made it his own, how sustainable is such a partnership?’. The permanence of the agreements was uncertain.

Moreover, CZP participant 1 said that the GNU was seen as both beneficial to SSOs and an encumbrance to their work. This participant emphasised that ‘all relations can be eroded easily; they depend on ZANU-PF’. Additionally, in cases where SSOs formed partnerships with the state, this was not received well by other SSOs as it was taken more as a sign of SSO weakness, thus diminishing SSO influence. The involvement of PASSOP participant 6 with the ANCYL is a prime example of this; PASSOP personnel were particularly opposed to this arrangement.

The reasons behind each partnership established vary. Next, a discussion on state-SSO relations in the two contexts based on location and time period is conducted.
Discussion: Understanding State-SSO Interactions

What is clear from the findings is that ‘state-SSO relations are fluid and fragmentary rather than monolithic and fixed’. In the two settings, relations of avoidance, collaboration, compliance and conflict are structured differently. The diversity of responses in each SSO call for due consideration of the two time periods in which the research was conducted. This variety speaks to Latour’s assertion that ‘relating to one group or another is an on-going process made up of uncertain, fragile, controversial, and ever-shifting ties’.

Moore’s observations on semi-autonomous social fields are taken cognisance of here, since state-SSO relations are not simplistic. Each SSO’s internal identity (which includes those of each individual, their activities and well as the broader environment) affects and influences SSOs and also shapes state reactions to them.

Indeed, Swilling points out that state and civics are not necessarily always engaged in antagonistic relationships and often collaborate in spite of the assertions of other scholars. As stated by Chazan, non-state groups develop a variety of methods when engaging with the state. The two phases of findings differ in terms of patterns of communication, particularly between the Zimbabwean state and SSOs. ‘Confrontational

9 Dorman, ‘Inclusion and exclusion’.
advocacy’ and hostile relations in the first phase were replaced by ‘cordial’ engagement and mutually beneficial partnerships. The time specific developments (such as the ZDP and GNU) in each site and the internal advancement of each SSO explain these shifts. However, it is clear that there are various types of interaction between these two realms and more so if the different individuals and departments of SSOs and the state are examined.

Assertions by scholars\(^{15}\) of CSOs being a counterweight to the state’s authority are not immediately apparent. This is seen particularly in the second phase of results, since the advocacy agent or watchdog/overseer of the state and alternative service provider function of SSOs is accompanied by SSOs that partner with the state in many instances. The tension between the state and civics between 1997 and 2000 during the Constitution debate in Zimbabwe which is documented by Dorman\(^{16}\) is contrasted with the collaboration seen in the 2008-2013 constitution-making process. This proves the fragile and ever-shifting ties in state-SSO relations depending on different contexts and time periods. Therefore, the relationship between the state and SSOs should not be dismissed as antagonistic but should rather be considered as one that is fragile, variable, dynamic, unpredictable, and of a love-hate nature.

SSOs in these two sites display the longing to achieve their aims, which occasionally may require losing their integrity. Rosenau’s thesis\(^{17}\) on how political entities attempt to ward off challenges and exploit


\(^{17}\) Rosenau, \textit{The study of political adaptation}. 
opportunities is amply demonstrated by the manner in which each SSO adapts. Moreover, the point about objectives being divided either deliberately or inadvertently into primary, secondary and ultimate goals is well taken here. The structuring of goals is evident from organisations such as the CZC and PASSOP that aimed foremost to acquire a platform to engage with the state before their other goals were even mentioned.

The types of advocacy noted by Moyo can be detected in these state-SSO relations. While PASSOP occasionally engaged in passive resistance against the state, both the QPC and recently the CZC took a more collaborative approach. Entryism is detected more in the interactions between CHRA and the state. The CZC also takes an entryist approach in COPAC issues when engaging with the state. PASSOP and CZC, and CHRA to a lesser extent, resort to oppositional advocacy. Likewise, ‘in-between’ engagement is also seen in some interactions such as the CZC in constitution-making issues. The two time periods demonstrate a wide array of interactions, as do the two contexts and each SSO in its uniqueness. The extant literature points to the confrontational approaches resorted to by many NGOs and even churches in the 1990s in Zimbabwe because of the economic crisis but these differ from methods used in the current study.

Therefore, highly contrasting techniques of engagement may also be resorted to depending on a variety of factors, which include the political environment, the issue under consideration, the time period, the type of SSO and the response of the state to the matter. The South African state has a laissez-faire attitude to some groups, as noted in interactions with

---

20 Brian Raftopoulos, ‘The state, NGOs and democratization’, in Sam Moyo, John Makumbe, & Brian Raftopoulos, (Eds.), *NGOs, the state and politics in Zimbabwe* (Harare, SAPES, 2000); Dorman, ‘Post-liberation politics in Africa’.
PASSOP. The common perception among PASSOP staff that the state was not concerned with the plight of refugees and immigrants could have been exacerbated by the fact that the majority of staff members were foreign nationals. However, harks to the observations of scholars that some societal groups continue to be ignored by the South African state even post-1994.21 Also, while the Non-Profit Organisations Act (71 of 1997) consolidated the liberties of civil society, the tolerant stance of the South African government allowed SSOs to thrive. On the other hand, this reduces the glare on the state and somewhat licenses the state’s neglect of SSOs.

In Zimbabwe, a more aggressive approach is taken by the state. In my view, this approach is meant to intimidate SSOs. However, the constitution-making process presents the possibility of having amicable and democracy-directed interactions between the state and civil society. Although the constitution-making process experienced large delays and was not free of problems, it presented the Zimbabwean state in a different, positive light. Further, ‘poles of governance’, which Nina says develop in instances where state institutions and civil society work together towards a common goal,22 are evident in the constitution-making process, as well as in other schemes such as the ZDP in which PASSOP was engaged in. Such ventures may indeed become more commonplace in future state-SSO interactions, where the term ‘pole’ ensures their separateness, while circumstances such as time period and socio-political conditions will determine whether the ‘poles’ are working in a parallel or conflicting manner.


The alignment of SSOs with political parties similarly alters the playing field of state-SSO relations. Initially, most civic groups were apolitical, but soon transformed and formed the foundation for political groups. This again demonstrates the adaptive identities of SSOs and the problems of political affiliation. Additionally, the wearing of ‘two hats’, as noted in the PASSOP participant who also holds a position in the ANCYL, brings to the fore arguments of where the loyalty of such individuals lies, as raised by scholars.

Conclusion

The question of the dependencies and exchanges between modern African states and SSOs show relationships of reliance. State-SSO interactions are highly dependent on the type of state, SSO and the time period, which relates to prevailing socio-political conditions. While confrontational methods are still relied on by SSOs, many have been adapted and evolved so as to receive positive attention from the state. The recently completed constitution-making process in Zimbabwe and the topical mobilisation against the Protection of State Information Bill in South Africa are germane examples of the exchanges between the state and civil society and how both spheres wield great influence in national processes. Questions resonate from this study such as; to what extent do the types of interaction between the state and each SSO influence the activities and sustainability of SSOs? How much of their integrity do SSOs risk while attempting to engage with the state?

The types of interactions displayed in the two sites give insight into the evolvement of state-SSO relations and particularly into the opportunities that each realm exploits in order to gain control and survive. Moreover, the findings display March & Olsen’s point that adaptation does not necessarily improve an institution’s efficiency or promote its survival, since in some instances SSOs tended to suffer more after adjusting to certain conditions.

SSOs and the state have a symbiotic relationship in which they need each other to exist, depend on each other to continue to exist, and, based on the state type, depend mainly on the state to coexist. Therefore, this article has been useful for elaborating on the types of relationships between state actors and SSOs in two contexts and for responding to questions on how relationships are altered by time.

25 March & Olsen, ‘Elaborating the “new institutionalism”’. 
Contested Urban Spaces and the Gauntlet of Urban Management: A Case of Kitwe, Zambia

John Bwalya

Introduction

Space, particularly urban space, is an arena in which power relations of domination and resistance overlap. As such, the politics of exclusion and inclusion, in the urban landscape, display power struggles and contestations among different actors.¹ At a global scale, the 2011 Occupy Movement clearly demonstrated urban landscapes as sites of resistance. The widespread protests in major European and North American cities, which emerged from the Occupy Movement, provided an

indication of what diminished economic opportunities in urban areas can lead to, and the role urban space can assume as a medium of struggle and conflict. Although scales of conflict in the urban space and the nature of conflicting parties differ with place, politics of inclusion and exclusion among actors are germane to the conflicts in the urban landscape. With rising urbanisation globally, the exclusionary and inclusionary discourse increasingly permeates the urban landscape. Projections of levels of urbanisation paint an ominous picture: by 2050, about 67% of the global population will be living in urban areas. In Less Developed Countries (LDCs), natural increase and rural-urban migration of young adults will be key drivers of this rapid urbanisation. Invariably, the ‘urbanisation of poverty’ will continue to create islands of severe deprivation and marginalisation amidst urban prosperity. Inevitably, people in these islands of deprivation and economic exclusion resort to stealthy entry into urban space, thereby engendering contestation over space. This surreptitious claim to urban space is often met with varying degrees of repulsion from either the state or local authority. In light of such contestations, and against the backdrop of rising urbanisation and youth unemployment, this paper examines the challenges of governing the urban space in an increasingly cosmopolitan city.

Towards an Inclusive City

In view of the marginalisation evident in urban areas, scholars increasingly advocate for modes of urban governance which promote inclusion. The approach of an inclusive city sharply contrasts with ecological models of the city which were ensconced in the modernist thought of conformity and deep social class division in access to, and use of, urban space. The early twentieth Century influential scholars of the Chicago School, such as Burgess’ [1925] (2009), with his proposition

---


4 Ernest W. Burgess “The Growth of the City: An Introduction to a Research Project,” in
of the concentric model of the city, and Hoyt’s [1939] sector model, demonstrated the engrained exclusionary effect of class on access to the urbane. Underpinning these propositions was the view that urban land use followed clearly distinguishable zones which reflected the spatially incompatible social classes of the users. However, from the 1960s, with Lefebvre’s probe on the Right to the City, urban scholars have increasingly challenged the status quo in asking questions about who holds the right to the city.

Though writing on globalisation, Sassen⁵ asked a pertinent question: ‘whose city is it?’ To answer this question, it is necessary to have an understanding of what the right to the city entails. Harvey⁶ conceptualised the right to the city as ‘…a right to change and reinvent the city more after our hearts’ desires’. In Purcell’s words, this conception of the right to the city ‘calls for profound change’⁷ which enables users of the urban space to manage it for themselves. In the context of the concept of an inclusive city, this ‘profound change’ and reinventing of the city seeks to recognise the presence, in the urban landscape, of hitherto ‘invisible’ people – people without a voice to determine the use of urban space. Extending the right to the city, the UN-HABITAT⁸ and UNESCO⁹ have actively championed inclusion in the city and social justice, a theme which Harvey¹⁰ explored in his publication on Social Justice and the

---

⁶ David Harvey, Rebel Cities: From the right to the city to the urban revolution (London: Verso, 2012): 4.
¹⁰ David Harvey, Social Justice and the City, Revised Edition (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 2009).
In the process of this attempt to ‘reinvent the city’, however, conflict lurks between public agencies seeking to maintain the urbane and groups of people seeking visibility in the urban landscape. In this context, conflict over urban space manifests as a contest comprising the more powerful groups who guard the city from intrusion of private interests.\(^\text{11}\) In the course of these contests, political elites may unwittingly exploit the situation to their advantage, but with ramifications which are at variance with ethos of city management.

Although the concept of an inclusive city has been used in urban planning, design and architecture, this paper adopts the broad understanding of the concept to mean a city in which all residents – including the most marginalised of the poor workers - have a representative voice in governance\(^\text{12}\) and, fundamentally, ‘a place where people have access to employment opportunities and can engage themselves in productive livelihoods’\(^\text{13}\). In short, an inclusive city is about social justice. As Mutale\(^\text{14}\) noted, for people on the urban margins of power ‘to make an effective contribution to the development of the city, then they ought to be treated with dignity, both as individuals and as community’. An inclusive city ought to recognise the presence and need for urban space to support informal livelihoods.

Against the foregoing milieu, this paper seeks to answer two central questions regarding the governance of public space in a sub-Saharan African city: first, what local dynamics shape the governance of the urban space? Second, how does the quest for inclusiveness and the

---

ensuing contests affects management of the urban space? Specifically, this paper examines these questions in light of escalating numbers of informal roadside carwash businesses, which have become an integral feature of the Zambian urban public space.

**Background to the Study**

In October 2011, the Local Government Minister at the time directed Councils country-wide to cease issuance of operating permits for carwash business.\(^{15}\) At the time, roadside carwashes were rapidly mushrooming in all major urban areas of Zambia. The ban was ostensibly aimed at ensuring establishment of minimum standards for operating carwashes. For this purpose, all local authorities were to constitute Taskforces. In the same vein, taskforces were also to rid streets of venders. This attempt to ‘clean’ the streets in urban, with the aid of state and Council police was met with resistance from the vendors and those running roadside car washes. Clearly, this episode confirmed the assertion that in urban areas, public space can be a site of exclusion of empowerment and, invariably, contention.\(^{16}\) The vendors and roadside car washers’ protests got the attention of the state President whose party had just formed government following national elections in September 2011. The chasing of street vendors and roadside car washers was interpreted as harassment and mistreatment of people who were using their initiative to create their own employment, which was a prominent campaign promise of the Patriotic Front (PF) political party. In a letter to town clerks across the country, the President instructed all Councils to immediately rescind the removals because they had potential to make the PF party *unpopular* [emphasis added]. It was widely considered that the PF government received massive support from young unemployed youth in urban areas.

The Presidential intervention in matter between vendors and local authorities was not a new phenomenon. In fact, it was a mirror image of what transpired in 1993 when Lusaka City Council (LCC) also attempted to remove street vendors. This attempt to clean-up the streets also drew the then President’s (Frederick T.J Chiluba) intervention. President Chiluba also blamed Lusaka City Council for not providing alternative trading space to vendors. In recognition of the assumed voting power of the economically marginalised masses, who also contributed to the Movement for Multiparty Democracy’s (MMD) electoral victory in 1991, the President ordered LCC to stop the removals. Following the Presidential intervention, vendors who had successfully moved to trade in Council-designated markets abandoned the stalls and moved back on the streets en masse. The establishment of a Vendors’ Desk at State House in December 1996, and the subsequent appointment of a deputy Minister in charge of the Desk endeared the President to vendors and virtually incapacitated the local authority from effectively managing urban public space. Although, three years later, in April 1999, the President did not intervene to prevent Municipal demolition and clearance of vender-built trading stalls, the venders have had a way of always returning to public spaces, each time with ‘anarchic proportion’. Invariably, each return to the public spaces produces a new wave of conflict over urban public space.

Faced with disconcerting levels of youth unemployment, successive attempts to rid the streets of vendors did not produce a lasting solution. However, what these attempts consistently demonstrated was that contestation over urban public space was a dynamic but integral to the urban landscape. Although street vending had always been a feature of the urban landscape, and a subject of long-standing contestation, roadside carwash business was a new phenomenon bolstered by an increasing number of cars on Zambian roads, especially in urban areas.

This increase in cars had opened-up a carwash business niche, which, to a large extent, was previously a preserve of the formal sector. With the backdrop of alarming youth unemployment, which even the PF government recognised, as a political ‘ticking time bomb’ the informal sector, and more specifically roadside carwashes, presented an escape route for livelihoods security of unemployed urban youth. The biggest challenge, however, remains to be about the exclusionary nature of public space. To further provide context for this study, the next section presents a brief socioeconomic overview of the study area.

**The Study Area: Socioeconomic Characteristics of Kitwe**

The growth of Kitwe, which attained the city status in 1967, is strongly tied to the copper mining activities, which began in the early 1930s. The city has subsequently grown, for instance, from 314,800 in 1980, 347,024 in 1990, 376,124 in 2000 and 517,543 in 2010 (Figure 1).

![Figure 1. Population growth of Kitwe, Zambia (1980-2010)](image)


Kitwe has the second largest population after Lusaka, Zambia’s national capital. The 2010 national population census revealed that Kitwe had the largest (26.2%) proportion of the population on the Copperbelt province. Further, at 666.1 persons per square kilometre, Kitwe was the most densely populated district on the Copperbelt province, followed by Ndola at 409.1 persons per square kilometre. Estimates indicate that the city hosts about 700,000 people during business hours, most coming to trade from other districts on the Copperbelt. One of the most significant demographic traits was that the bulk of Kitwe’s population (more than 66%) was aged below 25 years.

Following the progressive decline of the mining industry from the 1970s through the 1980s, the Zambian government embraced neoliberal policies of free market economy. The immediate consequence of these policies was massive unemployment in the 1990s. As a result, an estimated 130,000 people country-wide lost formal employment. On the one hand, this loss of formal employment had a domino-effect on the growth of the informal sector, while on the other hand other people migrated to other towns in search of employment opportunities. In the post-1990s, the resurgence of mining activities in Kitwe has registered partial reversals of the ramifications of the economic hardships of the 1990s. The gains have been partial due to the preponderance of unemployment among the bulk of the youthful (under 25) cohort of the city’s population. Like in other urban centres in Zambia, especially along the line of rail, many of the youth turn to self-employment in the informal sector. For its ease of setup, a number of youths have taken to the carwash business in public spaces (Plate 1).

---


Plate 1. Advertising a new carwash spot: Central Street, Kitwe (2013)  
(Source: Author)

Following the Presidential intervention to stop local authorities from removing street vendors and car washers from the streets, the Kitwe City Council constituted a Taskforce to recommend the best practice of monitoring and regulating car washers. The interaction between the Taskforce and the car washers is discussed in this paper.

Research Design and Methods

For its applicability in studies seeking to explore complex contemporary phenomena in their context, the study adopted an explanatory single-case study design. From the conceptual perspective of an inclusive city, the study sought to first, explain the context for contested urban public

space between the unemployed youth on margins of urbanity and the Kitwe City Council (KCC) on the one hand and, second, the unfolding dynamics on the use of these spaces.

In-keeping with a key strength of triangulation in case study design, observation and interview methods were used to collect data. The observation method was used across the length and breadth of the city as a preliminary method of establishing the spatial extent of carwash business in Kitwe. Overall, the data sought to answer four underlying questions on: first, the extent of carwash business in the city of Kitwe; second, how the council was managing the process of opening-up public space for private use; third, how the youth car washers were managing the allocated space and, fourth, the linkages which the youth car washers had with property owners in the neighbourhoods where the roadside carwashes were established.

Although observation covered different parts of the city, this paper focuses only on one area - Kantanta Street. This site was chosen for the elaborateness and the levels of organisation among the car washers. Due to readily available stream water used for washing cars nearby, Kantanta Street had attracted many car washers stretching for more than 500 metres along the road. During the preliminary stages of the survey, the researcher spent considerable periods of time with car washers along Kantanta Street. These periods permitted the researcher, based on the foregoing criteria, to make an informed choice about the selection of the best single-case study site.

The interview method was used for representatives of KCC and a sample of car washers in a middle-class residential area along Kantanta Street. The face-to-face in-depth interview with KCC representatives sought to explain the factors which drove the Council to permit the youth’s use of public space for their own private carwash business and

---

how the Council was managing the process of space allocation. The chairperson and Secretary of the Taskforce were interviewed, for one hour, at the City Council premises on August 16, 2013 with a follow-up interview session on October 31, 2013.

A total sample of 25 youth car washers operating along Kantanta Street were interviewed on October 5, 2013 and on December 16, 2013. All carwash interviewees were males aged between 18 and 27. The interviews, conducted on the carwash site, lasted about 30 minutes. These interviews were designed to understand the dynamics of self-allocation of carwash space, interactions and potential contests over space among car washers, linkages with people in the residential neighbourhood where car washers operated, and the management of public space adjoining existing carwash areas. The findings of the observation and interviews are presented in the next section.

Research Findings

Interview with the Taskforce chairperson and Secretary revealed that although establishment of roadside carwashes were in contravention of the city regulations over the use of public space, the circumstances leading to their legalisation was tinted with politics of appeasement. As in previous times when a Presidential decision countered municipal legislation and decision to clear venders from the streets, the 2011 attempts were ominously similar; venders carried the day. In view of the decision to keep venders on the streets, ‘the number of carwashes increased exponentially’ (KC 01, personal communication, August 16, 2013). In June 2012, KCC appointed an 11-member Taskforce to recommend a policy on how to manage the mushrooming carwashes.

The Taskforce organised and called a meeting with car washers in August and September 2012. More than 150 car washers from different areas of Kitwe attended the consultative meeting. In the meeting, the Taskforce recommended that carwash business was to follow the following operation guidelines: maintain at least three meter-distance away from the road – for safety, have a litter bin – for hygiene and
health reasons - at each carwash slot, and ensure drainage. Further, the Council, through the Taskforce proposed a daily charge of carwash business, according to location. Proposals were submitted for K20.00 per day for carwashes located in high-cost areas and K10.00 per day in low cost areas. After negotiation with the car washers in attendance, a flat rate of K10.00 per day, regardless of location, was agreed upon.

The Council regulated the number of car washers through temporary permits which were issued upon lodging an application letter. Although the Council was to determine the suitability of the site through physical inspection, the sheer overwhelming number of mushrooming carwashes seriously handicapped the Council’s mobility due to lack of adequate numbers of manpower and motorised transport to traverse the city to monitor compliance. The lack of consistent inspection of roadside carwashes presented locational risks such as proximity to power lines. In some instances, roadside car washers whose businesses were located near power lines refused to take the Taskforce’s advice to relocate (KC 01, personal communication, October 31, 2013). At the time of the last interview the Taskforce had successfully made two collections from car washers and were to report on performance to the Council.

Although the Taskforce was expected to determine the number of roadside car washers operating in Kitwe, this remained undetermined due to the sustained mushrooming of carwashes. In the final analysis, the Council’s oversight over roadside carwashes in Kitwe proved difficult to provide. Although legitimisation of what was previously illegal provided new opportunities for Council revenue, the actual management of the urbane in these public spaces proved to be a daunting task. Further, although the Taskforce comprised the water utility company and electricity corporation had mulled the idea of servicing roadsides with water and electricity connection points to facilitate the use of clean water for car washing and electricity for vacuum cleaning and other activities which would require electricity. However, this lofty consideration presented a logistical nightmare and never materialised.
Roadside Carwash: Kantanta Street

Both interview with the Kitwe City Council Taskforce representatives and field observations revealed that the roadside car wash business was mushrooming in different parts of the city. However, the spatial concentrations varied across the city. From several site observations, Kantanta Street in Nkana East was one of the busiest carwash areas in the City. This section focuses on this case study site (Figure 2).

Figure 2. Location of Kantanta Roadside Carwash
(Source: Author)

Based on interview with the car washers along Kantanta Street, the identification of an unused plot along a road was the first step to own a carwash business. Through their own social networks, washers informed their friends about the existence of washing plots and general business in an area. One of the washers, Mike [not his real name] revealed that he was a vegetable grower until his friend invited him join the business. Mike cleared his plot and was happy in business.

To reduce muddy wash areas, the car washers bought and compacted heaps of rubble on their plots (Plate 2). Through locally-based roadside
organisation, potential disputes over space were easily settled. Car washers were further transforming the outlook of the public spaces in which they conducted their business (plate 3). This was particularly evident from the beautification of their plots by planting and maintaining flower gardens.

Interview data also revealed that occasions for disputes over space were few and far between. In part, the establishment of leadership structures, with a local chairman, was sufficient to neutralise potential conflict. Further, because washers only worked on cars which pulled into their respective plots – usually from regular clients, conflicts were prevented.

Plate 2. Preparing carwash spots with rubble: Kantanta Street, Kitwe (2013)
(Source: Author)

Roadside car washers of Kantanta Street also exhibited shrewd business acumen: some of the interviewed car washers subcontracted part of their plots to short-term washers who, based on negotiation, paid part of their daily earnings to the subcontractor. This practice maximised daily takings. In most cases, these short-term washers were well-known to the subcontractors, which fostered harmony among the partnerships. On a busy day, the whole length of the roadside car wash area along Kantanta Street - about 500 metres long (Plate 4) would be filled with cars waiting
for a wash. Business starts early and runs till dusk. Interviewees stated that on a good day, they were able to wash a minimum of five cars (at K20.00 per car). One interviewee remarked: ‘I get enough money to support myself, my family and even save a bit’ (KT 01, personal communication, December 16, 2013)

Plate 3. Carwash Flower Garden: Kantanta Street, Kitwe (2013) (Source: Author)

Plate 4. Kantanta Street Carwash, Kitwe (2013) (Source: Author)
The study also sought to investigate the linkages and possible contests over space between roadside car washers, who had invaded the middle-class neighbourhoods through their business, and property owners separated from the carwashes by the road – Kantanta Street. The study did not encounter any report of confrontation between car washers and property owners, who neither protested over the influx of youthful car washers in their neighbourhoods. In fact, one instance presented a uniquely interesting case: a property owner across the road, who had no legal claim over the space across the road opposite their house, took advantage to buy rubble and compacted it, thereby creating eight carwash plots. The property owner subsequently subcontracted eight car washers to use the plots at a daily fee of K10.00. This was the only instance which the study encountered where a middle-class resident was a proxy roadside car washer. Considering the high number of cars washed along the street and, expectedly, the corresponding number of people who converge at this location, the same property owner erected a make-shift restaurant (Plate 5) for the burgeoning clientele.

Plate 5. Roadside Carwash-Restaurant: Kantanta Street, Kitwe (2013)
(Source: Author)
Discussion of Findings

By their nature, cities have traditionally exemplified struggle over space - between the ‘landscape and vernacular’. The landscape represents the urbane while the subaltern constitutes the vernacular, which city managers strive to exclude from urban space. However, the complexity and multidimensionality of public space suggests that other players have a say on access to, and use of, public space. The interactions amongst the different players produce negotiated urban landscapes with new forms of urbanity. This paper has demonstrated that although local authorities were legally mandated to govern urban public space, their capacity to exercise that power was subservient to state politics. These politics had the ability to undermine and eventually incapacitate the local authority’s ability to manage public space, to a point akin to running a gauntlet. While the concept of an inclusive city has been applied to participation in urban planning, design and architecture, this paper applied the concept in terms of access to urban public space, which provided opportunity for youth self-employment. The concept places emphasis on participation of the marginalised in governance and planning. The study revealed that with political intervention, the hitherto marginalised youth developed a voice and negotiated for access to, and the conditions for governing the use public space. Although groups on the margins of urbanity, such as young people, may appear weak, their use of what has been characterised as ‘voiceless politics’ or the ‘power from below’, may yield unexpected results which ultimately

guarantee their access and hold onto urban space. In this sense, the paper demonstrates in the quest for an inclusive city, there is efficacy of power from below.

In terms of the role of the City Council in determining the management of public space, this study demonstrates the gauntlet of negotiating between politicians playing politics of appeasement and patronage on the one hand, and the marginalised equipped with political support and the potential for anarchy.

In the long term, managing of the urban space presents a daunting task to the local authority – a task in which acts which contravene urban legislation are unwittingly legalised, thereby engendering what Mutale\textsuperscript{28} conceptualised as the cyclic nature of conflict. Overall, the UN Habitat report on Kitwe\textsuperscript{29} captured the dilemma of urban governance emanating from this dichotomous relationship between politicians and the city thus:

Urban governance in Kitwe, as in other districts in the country, is dualistic. On one hand is the municipality, which is represented by the mayor, councillors, and city management staff; on the other hand is the district commissioner’s office, which is responsible for all central government functions in the district. This dual system of governance, introduced in 2000, can be an impediment to development if different parties are in conflict.

---


\textsuperscript{29} UN-HABITAT, \textit{Zambia: Kitwe Urban Profile}. (Nairobi: UNON, 2009)
Conclusion

This paper has argued that urban public space is a contested terrain. Part of this contest emanates from the exclusionary aspect of space. Despite the exclusion, the unfolding urban realities make the marginalised to challenge the exclusionary urban spaces. Further, to demonstrate the role of context, this paper has illustrated the manner in which local politics shape the management of urban public space. These politics influence the extent to which the local authority, which holds the responsibility to plan and manage the daily life of a city, is able to carry out its mandate. To underscore the role of context in the challenges of urban management and the dilemma of inclusion, the paper has further highlighted the fluidity and multifaceted layers of inclusion which manifested through the relationships amongst the roadside car washers and with some middle-class residential property owners in the vicinity of Kantanta Street roadside car washers.

This study also shows that while the theory of an inclusive city and the manner in which it is espoused may appear to be at variance with preservation of the urbane, consultation, rather than confrontation, can yield win-win situations. However, as the study demonstrates, this give-and-take has the potential to open a spiral of additional and unanticipated layers of inclusiveness. If this process is not properly monitored and managed, it has the potential to incapacitate the authority of the city to manage the urban space.
The Implications of the SADC Energy Access Strategy and Action Plan on Peace, Security and Development in the Region

Nolubabalo Magam

Introduction

“...The lack of proper planning, commitment, funding, as well as investments into the energy sector hinder the development of the regional energy sector and energy access projects. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) has the potential to meet the energy demands and to venture into the use of alternative energy, as the region possesses abundant renewable energy resources”

The importance of securing energy as well as the need to expand the energy capacity in the region, in
order to accelerate development, has led to many countries searching for alternative ways to meet the energy demand. The use of traditional ways to produce energy has a negative impact on both the people and the environment. Diseases related to the use of such as well as environmental issues such as deforestation are as a result of the continued dependency on traditional biomass. The majority of people in the SADC region are still dependent on such; this has forced governments to seek ways of resorting to alternative energy, as it is ecologically sound and readily available.

Responding to this demand, the Southern African Development Community adopted the SADC Energy Access Strategy and Action Plan in March 2010 (herewith referred to as the Action Plan). The core of the Action Plan is to expand the regional energy capacity and introduce alternative energy in the region. This paper is a discussion of this policy and the implications it has in the region.

Background

During the last two decades, Southern African Development Community (SADC) has outlined its energy strategy and policy in several documents: the SADC Protocol on Energy (1996) being the first, followed by the Energy Cooperation Policy and Strategy (1996). There was also, the SADC Energy Sector Action Plan (1997) and the SADC Energy Activity Plan (2000) among others. Comprehensive as they appear, these policies and strategies (before being fully implemented) have been overtaken by developments in the sector regionally and globally. This led to the continuous change in energy use patterns and the ever growing energy demand that outstrips the supply (as in February 2008, SADC combined electricity demand stood at 47,067 MW as opposed to the available capacity of 43,518 MW). As a result these documents needed to be revised and updated. SADC recently formulated the Regional Energy Access Strategy and Action plan (March, 2010), as
a step towards realigning the Energy sector to emerging issues.\textsuperscript{1} The review is in response to concerns raised by many stakeholders that the current energy governance instruments should be updated to aligned with current developments such as the climate change discourse.\textsuperscript{2}

In March 2010, SADC formulated a Regional Energy Access Strategy and Action Plan (herewith referred to as the Action Plan) in an effort to realign the regional energy sector to that of the world. Although improving energy access is a national responsibility rather than a regional one, there is a potential for regional arrangements to harness available resources for the collective benefit of member states, thus igniting them to implement the Action Plan nationally. This requires investments into the renewable energy sector in each country, thus posing a challenge for member states, which lack funding for development of infrastructure. This is evident in the case of Lesotho and Malawi, which still has 3\% to 4\% of energy use in rural areas and a national consumption less than 20\%.\textsuperscript{3}

Furthermore all energy investments have to compete for scarce funding with other infrastructure investments like those on schools, hospitals and roads. This threatens energy security in the region as the demand for energy continues to outstrip the supply and strain the resources in use. In 2007/2008, South Africa experienced shortage of electricity supply. This led to massive load shedding which affected development and investments in the country.

Millions of SADC citizens still have limited or no access to energy and therefore many still use traditional methods like biomass, paraffin. All these methods are a threat not only to the environment but to the health and safety (houses burnt by candle accidents leading to death and dislocation) of the user; they contribute to deforestation, soil erosion,

\textsuperscript{2} SADC Energy Thematic Group Bulletin, 2010
\textsuperscript{3} SADC Energy Access Strategy and Action Plan, 2010
and global warming. Food security also becomes a problem as the climate changes resulting in unfavorable conditions for farming (soil erosion makes the land infertile) and other ways of food production. Scarce resources create the potential for conflict which has implications for peace.

Climate change and environmental disasters that threaten human security can induce forced migration and lead to competition over scarce resources among communities, with potential for political instability and conflict. Competing for scarce resources could aggravate territorial and border disputes and then complicate conflict resolution processes.

The degradation and depletion of agricultural land, forests, water, and fish contributes more to social turmoil. Scarcity of resources (food) leads to rural-urban migration and people would then move to countries with better opportunities.⁴

**Climate Change and Energy**

Climate change has emerged as an important challenge facing Africa and indeed, much of the world in the 21st century. In the light of the mounting evidence of its causes and effects, expanding access to reliable energy supplies, particularly for the poor and promoting investment in clean energy and low-carbon approaches to economic development are urgent imperatives globally⁵.

Energy production contributes more to global warming, the production and consumption of energy places a wide range of pressures on the environment and on public health, some of which have been decreasing. Energy related greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions remain dominant, accounting for 80% of the total emissions, with the largest emitting sector being electricity and heat production, followed by transport.⁶

---

⁶ European Environment Agency, 2008:8
The blanket of gases that keeps the planet warm gets thicker. This is because when humans burn fossil fuels and cut down trees they add greenhouse gases to the atmosphere that trap the sun’s heat. More heat means more unpredictable weather and other big changes for life on Earth. When fossil fuels are burnt (oil, coal and natural gas) to make electricity, heat homes and offices, cook, or power cars, the main greenhouse gas carbon dioxide (CO2) is released. Once released CO2 can stay in the atmosphere for up to 200 years, heating up the planet.

The latest science from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change IPCC, an independent global climate body, says most of the warming in the past 50 years has been caused by humans. It predicts a temperature rise of up to 6°C by the end of the century.7 The above confirms the threats that climate change poses to the environment.

Every additional ton of carbon dioxide, as well as five other greenhouse gases emitted by the burning of fossil fuels (coal, oil and gas) is warming the planet to potentially dangerous and irreversible levels. The primary culprit is the burning of copious quantities of fossil fuels for the production of electric power around the world.8

Most scientists studying the potential impact of climate change believe that Africa could face conditions more severe than other regions. They estimate that the continent is likely to experience higher temperature increases, rising sea levels that could affect much of its population, changing rainfall patterns, and increased climate variability due to proximity to the equator. The effects of climate change on individual countries depend on their location and attributes, although all countries are exposed to it and have reason for common cause. Africa’s ability to adapt to these effects is lower than that of the rest of the world.

They could, if unmitigated, reduce arable land, worsen chronic hunger

7 7 Friends of the Earth, October, 2008
8 Ferrey S and Cabral A, Renewable power in developing countries” winning the war on global warming, published by Penn Well Corporation, USA, 2006
and even lead to social unrest. The climate change negotiations could offer unprecedented opportunities for Africa to strengthen its adaptive capacity and to move towards low-carbon economic development in a way that will use its comparative advantages. For instance, forests, hydro and solar power potential and land, attract investments from the private sector and benefit its nations.9

Africa therefore has a legitimate need to increase its energy supply. It is the wider global interest that Africa should be able to use clean energy sources. There is enormous potential for this, including through the development of Africa’s huge hydro-power potential.10

Energy supply in most African countries has been a major problem, because of poor infrastructure and the high cost of energy production. Efforts have been made to improve this situation both at the national and regional level. In the case of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), some projects in the energy program have been expanded including the West African Power Pool (WAPP) and the ECOWAS Regional Policy on Energy Access. The ECOWAS Regional Policy on Energy Access, adopted in 2006, planned to increase access to energy services for rural and peri-urban populations.

The East African Power Master Plan in the East African Community (EAC) is planning a seven year regional power system program with a power pool as its central feature. The discovery of oil in the AlbertineGraben, Uganda, will allow the construction of a top-up oil refinery to exploit oil for local use. Tanzania has discovered gas at SongoSongo and Mnazi Bay and is already using it to generate electricity and fuel. Rwanda generates methane gas annually in Lake Kivu. Burundi explores petroleum in Rusizi and Tanganyika Basins and Kenya is developing the geothermal potential in the Great Rift

---

9 Grantham Institute for Climate Change, Possibilities for Africa in Global Action on Climate Change, July 2009
Valley.\textsuperscript{11} The Southern African Development Community (SADC) focuses on energy supply. According to statistics, the SADC region will continue to face power deficits until around 2012. The situation has forced the region to commence a major project to supply an additional 400 megawatts from Hidroelectrica de CahoraBassa to restore other generators in Botswana, the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe (\textit{ibid}).

Efforts to address the energy access demand in the region

SADC has developed many projects over the years as to increase the energy capacity in the region. The region has so much potential and abundant resources to reach its target of halving the number of people with no access to modern energy by 2020. Over the years, there have been many projects by member states nationally, bilaterally and regionally, in an attempt to expand the energy capacity.

Unfortunately, due to the scarcity of funds and proper planning, not all the projects have been successful.

Some of these projects include:

- \textbf{WESTCOR} transmission interconnector
- \textbf{Inga project}
- \textbf{ZIZABONA Project}
- \textbf{DRC-Zambia interconnection}
- \textbf{Malawi-Mozambique interconnection}
- \textbf{Zambia-Tanzania-Kenya interconnection}
- \textbf{2nd 400kV Zimbabwe-Botswana-South Africa Interconnector}

Over the years good ideas have been put on paper but most times have failed to bear fruit. There are many projects still pending, others are long overdue, yet there are new ones being planned and some already

\textsuperscript{11} United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 2010:27
approved. One would then conclude that the region lacks proper planning and/or the capacity to implement. It also raises the question of political will. How committed are the SADC members to the success of the Action Plan? Failure to implement it would have a direct bearing on peace, development and energy security in the region.

**The SADC Energy Strategy and Action Plan**

The Action Plan is guided by the following goals:

- **Strategic goal:** The harnessing of regional energy resources to ensure (through national and regional action) that people of the SADC region have access to adequate, reliable, lowest possible cost, environmentally sustainable energy services.

- **Operational goal:** To endeavour to halve the proportion of people without such access to within 10 years for each end use and halve again in successive 5 year periods until there is universal access for all end uses.

These goals appear to be comprehensive and if achieved could lead to development in the region as well as the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. The chances, however, are very slim as the region is still struggling to get investments into the energy sector as well as proper funding to date.

The United Nations Industrial Development Organization asserts that the extent to which renewable energy can contribute to efforts to address the energy challenges facing Africa needs to be closely analyzed. In general, the role of renewable energy in meeting Africa’s energy demand has been undermined by bad experiences, misinformation, technology push, and consequent negative perceptions. The balance between energy services for meaningful economic growth, on the one hand, and general welfare gains, on the other, continues to be a source of unnecessary conflict among stakeholders, as both are essential and complementary. So far, certain technologies have been disseminated in
circumstances that compromise their further adoption, as beneficiaries have been dissatisfied. The mismatch between energy service provision and income generation to meet the cost of services has been particularly disadvantageous to the promotion of renewable energy.\textsuperscript{12}

The social and economic systems and conditions in SADC countries are diverse. Similarly, the energy needs, income and population distribution and technology associated with production modes vary. Energy plays a crucial role in economic development. Once energy is in short supply, it becomes more costly and depresses the economy, leading to increases in unemployment and compromising development prospects.\textsuperscript{13} This is the challenge facing the region.

It was not until the end of last century that attention was drawn to the fact that by burning fossil fuels and emitting greenhouse gases (GHGs), people are contributing to a change in the planet’s atmosphere and a resultant change in climate\textsuperscript{14}

The countries in SADC, prepared a regional program in 1999, to assess their needs in the area of clean energy technology. This effort was designed to identify the clean energy technologies that have the greatest potential across the SADC region for meeting sustainable development needs, while reducing greenhouse emissions through accelerated private investment and to assist countries in mobilizing that investment.\textsuperscript{15}

Mak and Soltau (2005) point out that affordability in the energy sector is a problem. This is evident in the case of South Africa; its oft-cited off-grid solar voltaic electrification program requires the government to subsidize the capital cost of the equipment and to break even the

\textsuperscript{12} The United Nations Industrial Development Organisation, January, 2009:16
\textsuperscript{14} Haw M and Hughes A, Clean Energy Development for South Africa: Background data, Energy Research Center, University of Cape Town, February 2007
\textsuperscript{15} National Renewable Energy Laboratory, The Technology Cooperation Agreement Pilot Project: A collaborative model for clean energy technology transfer, Diane publishing, October 1999
consumers would have to be charged thirty times more the residential electricity tariff. The same problems with affordability are experienced elsewhere in SADC and the African continent, leading to the call for a more diversified renewable energy policy, one that emphasizes solutions that catalyze income generation.16

Southern African countries should adopt appropriate pricing and subsidies. This is a requirement of the Action Plan to ensure that electricity is affordable. SADC countries have neither the same national energy consumption nor energy access needs. Mauritius leads with 99.9% of energy access; it is the opinion of the researcher that if SADC countries should adopt some of Mauritius energy access strategies.

Countries like Mozambique, Lesotho and Malawi are lagging behind other countries in the region. A lot still needs to be done as these countries have very low levels of energy access and are poor (in terms of development). It is therefore a huge challenge to get investments into the energy sector in these countries. To date, the majority of people still use traditional biomass for energy. This affects their health and the climate. These countries need to adopt the SADC Action Plan, implement it and ensure the achievement of its goals.

Access to clean and affordable energy will ensure the reduction of Green House Gases and reduce global warming. According to the researcher, this will require countries to educate their citizens about climate change and how it affects their livelihood; especially in rural areas.

It is evident that people continue to use fire wood and cow dung as their source of energy, even after they gain access to electricity. This is due to the high costs of electricity as well as the health risks and the damage they cause to the environment by using them. Energy should therefore

Energy is a basic need and all humans need to have some sort of access to energy, be it modern or traditional. It is without doubt that millions of people in the SADC region still use traditional biomass as their main source of energy. This method affects the environment negatively, the very same environment that produces food for them. As the land gets infertile due to deforestation, acid rain and soil erosion among others, food security becomes a major challenge. People then start competing for scarce resources (food) and migrate in search of such.

**Recommendations**

The human race cannot ignore the potential long-term impact on the earth that may arise from continued hydrocarbon combustion and Carbon Dioxide production which contribute to increased global temperatures. Alternative sources are required of energy density similar to that provided by petroleum, but which when consumed, are free of negative environmental impacts.\(^{17}\)

It is not just improved access that counts in the SADC region, but also energy efficient use. Additionally, productive use must be included in energy investment plans so as to boost economic development and reduce poverty (European Union Energy Initiative, undated). The use of energy from fossil fuels and clearance are the main causes of anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide.

These economic activities are therefore the main causes of human-induced climate change. They are also at the very basis of peoples economic lives. Vrolijk (2002: 6) recommends a reduction in emissions to mitigate climate change and states that “the world community is confronted with a radical challenge of a totally new kind”. Countries should stabilize Green House Gas concentrations at a level that

would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.\textsuperscript{18} All SADC countries should honour their commitments as members of the region, as the regional access strategy and Action Plan provides an opportunity for shared revenue and combination of more resources to be used. Regional integration also allows the exchange of experience and ideas in energy access especially from countries like Mauritius, Seychelles, South Africa, Namibia and Botswana. SADC countries must ensure that the energy they provide to citizens is not only ecologically sound and clean but must be affordable and easy to access.

The proper utilization of the abundance of renewable energy resources in Southern Africa requires political will and enthusiasm. Without commitment by governments, none of the goals will be achieved. Political will is therefore of the utmost importance.

Feasible financing mechanisms are needed to enable access to renewable energy technologies. The region should seek financial assistance from International financing institutions as well as the private sector to invest in the “Green Economy” and fund renewable energy projects.

\textbf{Conclusion}

Economic development and growth in the region is an essential need. Peace cannot be maintained if there is no development. Giving people access to modern energy is part of development but it does not end there, people need to use this energy to their benefit and to develop themselves. In some rural areas in the region, people have access to modern energy but still use their traditional ways of producing energy. This is because they cannot afford the costs that are tied to the use of modern energy. It is therefore important for governments to give people

\textsuperscript{18} Vrolijk C. Climate Change and Economic Policy Instruments, in Vrolijk C (ed). Climate Change and Power: Economic Instruments for European Electricity, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 2002
access to affordable and easily accessible energy. Yet South Africa’s power utility, Eskom, has been increasing the energy tariffs yearly, and not doing enough to encourage people to move to renewable energy sources (with the exception of solar geysers).

Lacking access to clean and affordable energy has a tremendous socio-economic impact on education, income, health, water, food and air quality, all of which have negative implications on development in the region and the whole continent. Development requires the eradication of poverty and stability (peace).

The National Energy Regulator of South Africa (NERSA) has approved the principle behind Renewable Energy Feed-in Tariffs and the system will be piloted by 2015. This will enable municipalities, smallholdings, schools and private households as well as businesses to become small generators of power and to contribute the power which is surplus to their needs into the national grid. Such small providers already contribute to the national grid in many European countries (e.g. UK and Germany Renewable Energy Feed-in Tariffs) and the USA, the excess power running their metres backwards and thus reducing their electricity bills at the same time as addressing national power shortages.

Solar power in particular should be used for all household electricity, not just for heating geysers. New technologies and mechanisms (e.g. grid-tie inverter solar panels) have made solar power effective and affordable in many countries which have far less hours of sunshine yearly than SADC countries.

The role of wind and wave power and solar photovoltaic (PV) arrays must also be seriously investigated. For instance, reducing carbon emissions is expected to lead to the increased use of electrical vehicles, charged through PV arrays (Collin.edu/news/HighlighArticles201304solar.html).

The majority of the citizens (rural areas) cannot afford the cost of electricity; hence they opt to use the readily available biomass as was
also the case in Namibia. This hinders development. The adoption of the Action Plan will ensure development in SADC countries and the region as a whole.

The commitment of SADC members in implementing the Action Plan will bring about change and move a step forward in achieving the goals of this policy. The use of renewable energy will also reduce the pressure on the environment and encourage investments into the “Green Market”. Not only will it be a good attempt to adapt to climate change but will also create employment in the “Green Market” and give people access to “clean” affordable energy. This would be a step towards development, energy and food security and ensure peace and stability in the region.

The SADC Action Plan came in as a good solution to our energy demand and the need for renewable energy. The goals of the Action Plan may need to be modified if they are to be achieved in the recommended time frame. In addition, practical ways of implementing alternative energy resources which are daily becoming more affordable with new technological mechanisms need to be integrated into the plan, which still requires further refinement.

It is unfortunate that to date, the Southern African Power Pool and the SADC Secretariat have not officially released the year progress report of the developments made in countries since the adoption of the Action Plan in March 2010.

If the current energy situation (demand that exceeds the supply and use of fossil fuels and traditional biomass) continues, then the region will have more problems to solve. Global warming will lead to scarcity of resources including the basic needs such as food and water, then lead to migration in search of a better life, which would in turn pose a threat to peace as it has the potential for conflict over scarce resources, threatening security and development as well.

There is no doubt that the SADC Energy Access Strategy and Action
Plan has implications for peace, security and development in the region. Therefore the SADC leaders have to abide and honour their commitments to reducing the negative impact of climate change through renewable energy.
PART IV
Peace and Security
Integration in a Troubled Region: Potentials and Pitfalls of the Proposed EAC-IGAD Merger for Eastern Africa

Kizito Sabala

Introduction

On the side lines of the Africa Union (AU) Summit, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in October 2013, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the East African Community (EAC) and the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) were mandated to explore the possibility of merging the two Regional Economic Communities (RECs) with a view to establishing a bigger economic bloc to expedite the integration process and ensure greater economic development and prosperity to the peoples of the Eastern Africa region. Assuming
that all the members of the EAC and IGAD support the merger, the new bloc will have 11 (Table 1) members comprising of Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi, Rwanda, South Sudan, Sudan, Somalia, Djibouti, Eritrea, and Ethiopia.¹ The region will have overlapping borders with the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) to the south; Economic Community of the Central African States (ECCAS) to the west; and the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) to the north.

Further, the proposed bloc will border part of the gulf of Eden through Djibouti and Eritrea, as well as the Indian Ocean Commission.² Except for Tanzania, the new blocs’ membership will still be part of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). In retrospect, the bloc must not only be understood within its immediate neighbourhood but also the wider African Economic Community (AEC) and beyond. The process and development of the proposed merger should also be located within the framework of the eight regional communities namely ECOWAS, ECCAS, IGAD, COMESA, SADC, CEN-SAD, EAC, and the North Africa Regional Capability (NARC) that African Union has identified as the building blocks of the endeavours towards establishing a solid Africa Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).

Table 1: The Projected Membership of the Proposed Bloc

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>EAC</th>
<th>IGAD</th>
<th>COMESA</th>
<th>ECCAS</th>
<th>SADC</th>
<th>Membership in the Projected Bloc</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ Burundi membership to francophone ECCAS reflects the linguistic affinities while Tanzania membership in SADC reflect the frontline fight against apartheid in South Africa and therefore the special relations the country has with the southern region. This assumption is sweeping. It is important to note that practically some states may opt out the bigger union while some neighbouring states may apply to join.

² Whose members are five Indian Ocean Nations of Comoros, Reunion), Madagascar, Mauritius and Seychelles.
Critical Research Question(s)

The proposal presents an opportune moment to revisit the critical questions regarding African integration process the major one being; to what extent will the merger be pursued to a logical success? However, other equally important questions include; what is the implication of the proposed merger to the unaccomplished objectives that informed the establishment of the each bloc? What are the legal, political and financial huddles that will work against the proposal? What about the name of the new organization? What are the institutional and normative difficulties that will work against the proposal? Is it the correct timing? In whose interest and for what purposes is the merger being proposed? Should studies on regionalism in Africa begin to interrogate the possibility of merging RECS as a prelude to African Economic Integration that aims to achieve economic integration, reduce poverty and attain sustainable economic development? For example, should the proposed tripartite arrangement to merge COMESA, EAC and SADC not be interrogated? Or is it also the question of the left hand not knowing what the right hand is doing? The paper does not claim to provide satisfactory answers but notes that it is worth reflecting upon them because they are important questions in relation to the task on the table. Although without ignoring the broader challenges that have slowed down the integration process

---

3 See the final communique of the COMESA-EAC-SADC tripartite summit of Heads of State and Government of 22 October 2008, Kampala, Uganda. In fact IGAD is an observer to these efforts!!!!

In the absence of adequate examples of successful mergers of RECs in Africa with which to judge the current proposals despite the seemingly obvious reasons for the suggestions, the paper does not address itself to the practical possibilities of such a move but rather argues that the bloc will encounter other mammoth challenges such as those responsible for the lackluster performance of integration efforts on the continent; alongside those that are specific to the region to make the merger, at best, a wishful thinking the subject of this section

**General/Generic Challenges relating to Regionalism in Africa**

These include: lack of political will to support the establishment of effective and dynamic supra-national institutions and implement agreed treaties and protocols and lack of enforcement mechanisms against non-compliance and non-adherence to the very ideals enshrined in the founding documents and existing protocols. For instance, non-observance of the rule of law and the values of good governance that are enshrined in the various treaties and protocols agreed upon- including fear of speaking out when they are grossly violated by any member state- is not uncommon. Lack of commitment is also manifested through inadequate funding partly due to significant membership overlap and therefore huge arrears\footnote{For example in the proposed bloc Kenya and Uganda are members of IGAD, EAC, and COMESA yet fundamentally the objectives of the three regional blocs remain basically the same. Of course, this is against the background arguments such as together with Tanzania they share similar history.} which undermines the ability of
RECS to implement the agendas that will drive regional integration process including effectively managing sometimes conflicting interests. Other challenges relate to heavy reliance on tariffs for fiscal revenue, inadequate mechanisms for equitable sharing of the costs/problems and benefits of integration and overambitious goals with unrealistic time-frames that compel several postponements and eventually diminishes confidence in the process.6

Additionally, challenges relates to poor framework to facilitate people-driven integration agenda, particularly that of the private sector and the civil society; and long-term inhibiting factors that include lack of structural diversification in the national economies that form the regional groupings. For instance, the eastern African countries have remained exporters of primary commodities such as coffee and tea since the colonial era. Sometimes, even sectors such as the textile have faced threat of extinction particularly when world prices plummet. In other words, the narrow export base that is largely agricultural has to date not provided the necessary foundation for economic take-off and robust integration on the continent. Furthermore, inter-sectoral linkages are not only very weak and poorly managed, but in some cases nonexistent.

The Merging of EAC and IGAD: A Critical Reflection

Unfinished agenda for EAC and IGAD

Despite the significant role of IGAD in ending the Sudan/south Sudan conflict, the frost relationship between Eritrea and Ethiopia following their 1999 war undermines the very principle and objective of peaceful resolution of disputes among member states through dialogue as enshrined in the organization’s founding document just as does the

6 Trude Hartzenberg, *Regional Integration in Africa* staff working paper ERSD-2011-14, World Trade Organization, Economic Research and Statistics Division
occasional military clashes between the former and Djibouti over border issues. Furthermore, the current ‘senseless war’ in south Sudan that broke out on 15 December 2013 that has led to displacements of large numbers of civilians including wanton destruction of properties is a mockery of regional integration efforts. Furthermore, since the establishment of IGAD, drought and famine continue to be a norm rather than an exception despite the fact that addressing the menace was at the core of existence.

Against the backdrop of significant progress within the EAC in a number of areas such as visa free movement of citizens and the general acceptance of customs union, and despite the numerous non-tariff trade barriers, relations between Tanzania and Rwanda over the latter’s involvement in DRC does not augur well with the overall objective of the bloc and the political federation dream.

Questions over governance and rule of law among the IGAD Member states and EAC partner states that includes Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda continue to characterize the political landscape within the region against the backdrop of explicit expression of these values within the EAC Treaty and IGAD member States being signatories to the African Union African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance which was adopted in Addis Ababa Ethiopia in 2007.

---

7 According to the “Agreement Establishing IGAD” of March 1996, the member states expanded the organization’s mandate to include peace and security by creating mechanisms for the prevention, management and resolution of interstate conflicts through dialogue.

8 IGAD is a predecessor of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) that was established in 1986 to combat drought, alleviate food insecurity and promote development.

9 Several UN reports have implicated Rwanda in the instability in eastern DRC and the President of Tanzania has added his concern on matter a situation that has not gone well with Kigali.

10 The Charter entered into force on 15 February 2012 and the exception of Eritrea all IGAD member states have signed but as at 12 Feb2012 Sudan, Djibouti and Ethiopia had deposited the instruments with the Commission.
**Possibilities/Prospects**

For those persuaded by the idea of a merger of the EAC and IGAD, therefore, the bloc will inherit the benefits associated with the economics of a bigger bloc such as a larger population, as well as the opportunities for investment and markets. It is predicted that the post-merger bloc will have approximately 400 million people growing an average rate of 3% per-annum.\(^{11}\) While the figures are appealing, growth benefits will be hampered by the fact that a large proportion of the envisaged population has low purchasing power because they live below the internationally accepted poverty levels.\(^{12}\) In addition, the majority of regional economies are small and least developed, according to UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) definition.\(^{13}\)

Other obvious advantages of the proposal relates to avoidance of the duplication of resources, being able to develop and promote common programs and may even stabilize the region in sense that a strong united (it if ever happens) voice against the malpractices that have caused conflicts and strife in the sub-region will not be taken for granted. In other words, they will have more standing in the region to deal with common issues.

The merger will be in favour of the proposed African Economic Community (AEC) under the Abuja treaty first because it is very general in nature in calling upon regional integration in Africa and secondly it does not specify individual RECs that should be part of the building bloc towards continental Community.

---


12 Ibid

13 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development UNCTAD (2007), *The Least Developed Countries Report* New York and Geneva, United Nations. For instance, *The State of East Africa Report 2013* notes that half of population of EAC about 71 million live on $1.6 a day while 40% or 56 million people live on $0.63 a day and this situation may be not be far from the truth across the entire eastern African countries.
Pitfalls: Specific Challenges to the proposal to merge

Structural Factors

Widespread and persistence of protracted violent conflicts and political destabilization has not only undermined the growth of economic cooperation in Africa but in some areas completely destroyed basic infrastructures upon which such an important enterprise could be developed and eastern African region is no exception. The latter point is true for Somalia, a country that has been plagued with incessant civil wars alongside the absence of democracy and the rule of law, violation of human rights, complete disregard for the sovereignty of the people, and the lack of empowerment and accountability.

In the same vein, the festering of border conflicts across the proposed new bloc has the potential to set back the quest for integration, if not abruptly end same. For instance, the border dispute between Eritrea and Ethiopia over the region of Badme, the incessant frictions between the former and Djibouti over the border at Ras Doumeira, or the conflict between Sudan and South Sudan, are all likely, and for a long time, to continue to determine the prospects of successful regional integration in the larger East African bloc.

A part from being a direct threat to regional integration in the proposed region, the current conflict in South Sudan will either stall or significantly affect its participation in the Lamu Port Southern Sudan-Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) corridor project. LAPSSET is an ambitious infrastructure programme to link the South Sudan and southern Ethiopia to the Indian Ocean through Lamu port in the north coast of Kenya in order to reduce Juba’s reliance on Khartoum and provide an alternative to the port of Djibouti for Ethiopia. This is also meant to ease the usual problem faced by those landlocked countries that will form part of the new bloc; in particular South Sudan will need access to ports as does Uganda for its newly discovered oil resource. More fundamentally, it has been observed that development partners
are increasingly becoming reluctant to finance regional projects that could spur regional integration.

“Instead multinational projects are usually of low priority in the investment portfolios of international and regional financial institutions. As for the donors, they do not hide the fact that they prefer bilateral to multinational projects. If multinational projects are to be supported, the funding is usually limited to pre-feasibility and feasibility studies and institution-building”.\(^{14}\)

This means that the already donor reliant countries and blocs have to fund important infrastructure development projects which are likely to suffer.

**Historical Factors**

Except for Burundi and Rwanda, integration efforts between Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda dates back to the colonial times. This is the time when the colonial powers sought to integrate the countries ostensible to easy communication and movement of factors of production within the states but also beyond.

This factor not only worked for the re-establishment of the Community following its collapse in 1975 but also largely explains the protracted discussions that characterized the application and the final admission of Burundi and Rwanda into the Community. On the other hand, the establishment of IGAD is relatively new (1986) and its objective is rooted in the common problem of drought and desertification that continues to affect all the IGAD countries to date.

The origin and development of the IGAD and EAC has implication for the merger. Some writers\(^{15}\) argue that indeed the two blocs have nothing

---

14 Adebayo Adedeji Ibid
15 Interview with Professor Makumi Mwagiru on 22 April 2014 Nairobi, Kenya
in common to share in terms of the reasons for their establishment and this will continue to surface either implicitly or explicitly in every discussion relating to the merger.

**Stage of Development**

While overall the two regional blocs are relatively under developed compared to some integration processes such as the ECOWAS when viewed against the backdrop of programs, projects, institutional and normative values, the EAC considers itself more developed than IGAD. There is little doubt that politicians, technocrats, bureaucrats and even businessmen who are yet to exploit the potential within the EAC partner states will question the rational and benefits of the merger. This will be critical when it comes to the question discussed somewhere in the text of ‘**who swallows who**’ and how history judge the victim.

**Legal and Normative Challenges**

The two documents establishing the two organizations are at divergent at each other. While the EAC has a treaty with clear and explicit pronouncements on certain issues such as governance and democracy and enumerate explicit values and norms and principles that define for instance conditions for joining and exit, the IGAD founding agreement do not have. It simple means the criterion for membership may exclude some of the existing members.

This will definitely present a challenge in bringing the two blocs together. Furthermore, the ultimate goal of political federation is ease (though how this can be achieved remains a vision). The political federation won’t let go but will be difficult to sell it to all the IGAD members states and expect to receive without any resistance.

While certain threats to security and particularly to international trade and commerce such as piracy, dumping of toxic materials and crimes along the blocs’ coastline may find convergence among the states in
terms of developing norms and institutions against such they are not sufficiently strong to move the merger forward. In the same vein, the organizational and structural issues such as merging economic and social elements related to directorates look simple on paper, the reality of how to accommodate and manage competing state and elite interests, will remain. In other words, challenges regarded as ‘normal’; for instance, those relating to recruitment of staff and the quota systems, will no doubt immediately become part of the concerns of the new organization. As happened in the past across the continent, there is also no guarantee that dissatisfied states will not hesitate to quit the bloc. For instance, Lesotho, Mozambique, Tanzania left COMESA as did Namibia and Angola while Seychelles left SADC.

Relatively, within the EAC the members tend to respect the provisions of their treaty and they will be reluctant to join hands with a member who is perceived to openly breach such. For instance, Ethiopia has held unto the Chair of IGAD since 2008 despite the clear provisions of the treaty that provides for one year. In EAC this rule is strictly observed. The same Ethiopia took over the chair of the African Union in 2013 and handed over to Mauritania in 2014 after one year period but is unwilling to do the same for IGAD. The critical question is will other EAC members be accommodating of such behaviour?

**Institutional Weaknesses**

IGAD and EAC are two organizations that are not yet fully established. The merger simply means bring together two organizations that are structurally and institutionally weak in terms of taking root which means merging two units that are fundamentally fragile and still trying to establish themselves.

**The Political and Governance Factors**

While key decisions relating to integration process are subjected to referendum in Europe, for instance, it is the political elite in Africa who
decide; often times not necessarily in the interest of their citizens. It is this fact that partly explains the collapse of some blocs in the past.\textsuperscript{16} As Nyerere opined at some point that

\begin{quote}
\textit{“political leaders at the helm would not have the time to think seriously about the way forward for pan Africanism he asks ‘who is to keep us active in the struggle to convert nationalism to Pan Africanism and thus he asks; if it is the staff and students of our universities? Who is it who will have the time and ability to think out the practical problems of achieving this goal of unification if it is not those who have the opportunity to think and learn without direct responsibility for day to day affairs?”}\textsuperscript{17}
\end{quote}

This is not the case in Africa where political elite have arrogated themselves the responsibility of setting set the agenda for integration and put the their imprimatur on virtually every aspect of the process; especially budgetary issues, leadership and recruitment into key positions.

It is obvious the new organization emerging out of the merger will not be called IGAD neither EAC rather a new name must be found. While this may seem less important and therefore insignificant, it is quite clear the new organization will not be informed by the geographical location but rather the mandate and the functions which will definitely influence decision making process and this is where the difficult. Given the intricacies that in will not be a smooth sailing like COMESA or its predecessor the PTA, which was informed by the focus on the market in the eastern African This will be furthermore will be influenced by

\textsuperscript{16} The collapse of the EAC in 1977 was occasioned by the sharp political differences between the then the Tanzanian president the late Julius Nyerere and Ugandan dictator Idi Amin. For a some discussion on people driven-integration process see Shivji Issa G (2006) Let the people speak Tanzania down the road to neo liberalism, Dakar CODESRIA.

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid
the foreign policies and given the existing clashes there is bound to be difficulties in arriving at consensus about the merger but also the functions.

The question of who swallows who cannot be ignored. Even if the two blocs agreed on the name, functions and mandate there will be an implicit question of who has swallowed another one the way NATO swallowed the Warsaw Pact at the end of the cold war though there was a ‘merger’. Within each bloc there are those states that dominate the decision making process either consciously or unconsciously. For instance in the IGAD region, it is not uncommon to hear claims that it is Ethiopia. Such countries will want to maintain the status quo because such status may not be guaranteed within the large bloc.

It is important to consider the fragility of the existing blocks. Of late there have been cracks within the EAC with three of the members namely Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda deciding to go alone under the convenient and unviable framework of Coalition of the Willing (COW). The strong statement used by president of Tanzania while commending on the same spells problems for the future of integration. It is difficult to envisage a successful regional integration in eastern Africa without Tanzania which not only hosts the headquarters of the EAC but also provides port facilities to landlocked Rwanda, Burundi, and parts of eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

Reflecting on the proposal to merge the two eastern blocs, it is imperative to question why it is not about the dissolution of EAC and IGAD in favour of strengthening the COMESA framework to which almost all of them belong. This even makes more sense because the bigger bloc

18 The notion that the integration process will move forward without resolving differences not only undermines the very principle of the process but it is a pipe dream to imagine that Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda will achieve the regional integration objectives by side-lining Tanzania from the process.

19 The Tanzanian President wondered loudly whether his fellow colleagues hates him as a person or have some hidden agenda.
thesis will favour the COMESA market which has made substantive progress in the area of economic integration compared to IGAD and EAC.

Internally, issues relating to the politics of ethnicity are likely to force political leaders in Kenya, Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda, to look more inwards to solve festering problems than outwards to pursue effective regional integration. At best, the elite will continue to mobilize political support along regional and ethnic lines.

What this point implies, for instance, is that when personal interests are at stake, leaders will not hesitate to retreat into tribal/clan cocoons at the expense of norms and values for regional integration.

Another question to pose is where would the merger between the EAC and IGAD leave COMESA? Seven of its members will have formed another big block, obviously a threat to the survival of COMESA. Probably it may indicate the beginning of the death of COMESA or some reconfiguration with unknown implication. Some states would then rather move to belong to SADC while others might even join the new Horn of Africa block and the whole configuration will have to change, a move that will take the process to the basics largely because it will bring countries who are at different levels of norm and institution building for a viable integration process.

The question of governance and rule of law, particularly as they relate to the opposition, will remain a no-go zone for the regional leaders despite the fact that the enabling documents adopted by both blocs embraces democracy and rule of law.

This will, as usual, be left to the leaders to deal with the opposition particularly during elections periods. Given the sensitivity often associated with it, it is likely that bad governance and lack of respect for the rule of law will find space on the regional plan. Instead it will rely on few regional leaders to raise the question; to the detriment of
ilaterial as well as multilateral relations.\textsuperscript{20}

**Policy Issues**

The emerging concept of “Coalition of the willing (COW) partners will not only continue to bog down the regional bloc but will find concrete political support in countries such as South Sudan and Ethiopia. The more suspicious and cautious approach Tanzania has taken on the modus operandi of some elements of the EAC and specifically on the question of land ownership, investment and generally movement of factors of production within the regional bloc is indicative. These issues will find resonance with countries like Ethiopia and South Sudan which are apprehensive about opening up their domestic markets to foreigners.\textsuperscript{21}

In the same vein, opening up of the Ethiopian economy to other states countries within the bloc will remain a thorny issue particularly areas of liberalizing the financial and investment sectors. Moreover, South Sudan continues to be driven by the fear of opening up too much to citizens of other countries and as is Ethiopia which given the experience with COMESA will also not be an easy economy to open to the rest of the region. Yet liberalization of these sectors is critical to attracting foreign investors within a regional grouping.

Furthermore, the problems associated with Somalia, Puntland and Somaliland will find bigger space within the region, and more important will be the fear of the spread of extremist ideas and movements. This will be critical when it comes to the involvement of such country on matters relating to the free movement of people across the region at it pertains to the issuance of travel documents and doing business. In

\textsuperscript{20} For instance the strained relations between Tanzania and Rwanda are largely because the Tanzanian president has spoken firmly on the involvement of the former in the DRC conflict though the claim has been denied by Kigali.

\textsuperscript{21} For instance since the independence of south Sudan, there have been claims that the nationals are apprehensive of foreigners investing and working in the country. A number of Kenyans have been killed on what one Kenyan described as hatred against foreigners.
these respect, countries such as Tanzania, Rwanda, and Burundi will be more wary about threat of terrorists and the spread of the *Al-Shabab*; hence reluctant to agree to a fully-liberalized visa and travel regimes.

Other challenges relates to the disparity in the level and stages of integration. Even within each of the two blocs, member countries are at different levels and stage of regional integration. Accordingly, the IGAD members accepted the Minimum Integration Plan (MIP)\(^2\) while knowing clearly that some of its members are past that level when considered against the COMESA and EAC stages.

The key question is: will the other states readily accept the MIP? Further, the countries within the two blocs will have to harmonize the various stages in order to accommodate not only slower economies but also those taking time to open up.

They will be confronted with the challenge of *variable speed* where some members are ready and willing to move forward which is a convenient way for an organization with a large number of members. On the other hand, if all members agree to move at the same pace then progress will be determined by the slowest member.

The Tripartite agreement between EAC, SADC and COMESA though loosely formed and spearheaded by political leaders, it was meant to be a speedy vehicle of integration by creating a wider Free Trade Area (FTA) between the three RECs but remains largely on paper despite the hype that was generated during its inception. Cracks within the Tripartite are evident with countries like Mauritius, Mozambique and Malawi who belong to one or both of the tripartite members establishing their own coalition to promote their interest.

\(^2\) The IGAD MIP almost returns those countries that have been implementing the COMESA rules to the basics of regional integration process.
The establishment of coalitions and within the arrangement demonstrates little faith in the tripartite or the regional organizations they belong and it should be surprising if such efforts break in the near future.

For the political perspective, the merger between IGAD and EAC is very juicy but the demon lies in the operationalization of the dream. As stated above right, from matters of rule of law to financial liberalization, the realization will pose a big challenge.

Beside that aside, and on integration, all IGAD states are members of COMESA except Somalia. COMESA FTA has made major strides yet some Members that boast of being emerging economies have never acceded to the COMESA-FTA. Ironically some of the same Members are pushing for an IGAD-FTA. Will a merger of EAC and IGAD rid of such a problem? It is important to note that Ethiopia was only recently allowed to join WTO despite not fulfilling all the conditions on liberalization.

Economic blocks are about opening up markets and liberalizing the economies to leverage on bigger markets for economic growth. It would not serve any purpose to have a new economic block just on paper without effective enabling infrastructure in place and that can only be done at the member states level while amending the national legislations.

The EAC credits itself for establishing a Customs Union in 2005 and a Common Market in 2010. Its goals include a monetary union and eventually an apolitical union; a concept that is unclear and elusive. In reality, however, the two stages exist only on paper or at best, at the aspirational level. In some quarters, even, the East African business leaders described the EAC ‘a pet project of government leaders’ with little practical significance’.23

23 This happened at Institute for Defense Analysis (ADA)-sponsored conference in the late 2012, Nairobi
It is also important to note that the six stages envisaged in the final Act of the Lagos Plan of Action do not talk about merging economic communities in Africa in order to achieve integration. Instead the stages emphasize strengthening the existing RECS; creating new ones where none previously existed; establishment, coordination and harmonisation of tariff and non-tariff barriers; strengthening sectoral integration, coordination and harmonization; establishment of free trade area and a Customs Union; and finally, the establishment, consolidation and strengthening of an African Common Market (ACM).

As far reaching as these may seem, there is a strong point to be made that even merging the EAC and IGAD will not accelerate integration within the bloc, or continent-wide. Furthermore, the debate on new regionalism in Africa is focusing on issues such as cross-border initiatives and restructuring of relations between the ACP and the EU countries.

**International Economic Relations**

From the global perspectives, problems such as those identified by the World Bank’s 1981 Berg report that blamed Africa’s economic malaise on the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPS), including the specific problem of the vulnerability of African economies to global economic shocks, such as the 1973 oil crisis to mention but a few will continue to plague the new bloc. In addition, the teething problem of how sub-regional, regional, continental and international arrangements can become effective and mutually reinforcing will continue to plague the initiative.

This includes initiatives such as the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) as well as those within the framework of the World Trade Organizations (WTO). Furthermore, increasing external debt, capital flight, falling commodity prices, will continue to play into the new bloc. The traditional problems relating to how regional arrangements should adhere to the rules of the international trading system but also how
the African economies can participate more effectively and take fuller advantage of the global economy are still abound.\textsuperscript{24}

Of course, the region will remain a theatre for external super power rivalry that will not only entail such traditional forms of competition associated with colony-master relationship but also new ones in the relationship with the EU and the US as well as other global players such as China and India.\textsuperscript{25}

In particular, China has made inroads in the areas of infrastructure development while India is known in the pharmaceutical sector.

**Diplomatic and International Relations Factors**

within the region

Unfortunately, it is likely as it is a norm that the bigger bloc will remain silent on microscopic but critical regional and global issues that sometimes undermines security; for instance, the friction between Eritrea and Yemen, or between the former and some western powers.

Presently, the relationship between Eritrea and several western countries including IGAD remain frosty on alleged support to extremists in Somalia and despite some strong positions by IGAD, Sudan’ seems to have normal ties with Asmara.\textsuperscript{26} Historically, African states are known to remain silent on matters they perceive as internal affairs even when they threatens regional security against the backdrop of the revision of the OAU Charter.

In this regard, Rwanda frequent at odds with Tanzania over issues related to the formers involvement in DRC covets solidarity with both Uganda

\begin{itemize}
\item See’ Obama Pain in dealing the stubborn EA’ in the East African March, 8-14, 2014, Nation Media Group, Nairobi. The paper argues that in Kenya, the ICC cases remain key as Uganda and Rwanda refuses to blink and notes that presently Tanzania is seen as Washington footprint in the region.
\item In this regard the Sudanese leader has made state visits to Eritrea.
\end{itemize}
and Kenya. Left out this Tanzania may have no choice but to move further south. As one respondent said ostensibly in fear that they will be the next!!!\textsuperscript{27} As has been observed with the conflict in south Sudan, states may not speak with one voice on certain matters and bilateral agreements will override regional ones.\textsuperscript{28} Furthermore, the feelings of marginalization that have fuelled separatist and irredentist movements such as those within Ethiopia’s Ogaden region will likely continue to affect internal as well as regional relations. Overall these difficulties are not going to change with the proposed merger which will mean some of the challenges of building consensus on programs will remain.

**Reliance on External Funding and the influence of Donor Politics**

The bulk of the supporting funds is externally sourced be it administrative or even key programme areas. The implication is apart from the IGAD and EAC member states discussing the merger they are unlikely to ignore the influence of the development partners either bilaterally or multilaterally in raising questions relating to the viability and sustainability of the new bloc.

**Recommendations and Conclusions**

**Recommendations**

There is no doubt that the proposal is within the broader commitment to regionalism as part of a continental aspiration to reposition Africa now and in the near future. While theoretically the move is appealing and convincing, the traditional challenges plaguing regional integration in Africa will not disappear with the establishment of a larger regional bloc; indeed, they are likely to become magnified.

However, while the spirit of pan African movement is still alive, the operationalization will be far from being easy, though achievable, if

\textsuperscript{27} One of the officials of the EAC who sought anonymity

\textsuperscript{28} Like in the case of South Sudan while the deployment of UPDF was supported by the IGAD summit held in Nairobi on 27 December 2013 particularly in relation to securing important installations in their engagement in open combat with the opposition threatens the organization’s led peace talks in Addis Ababa Ethiopia
sufficient political commitment could be mobilized on a sustainable basis among the political elite in the dozen of capitals- from Nairobi to Addis Ababa.

In the context of eastern Africa regional problems relating to the syndrome of willing or otherwise among partner member countries and discordant elite interests abound.

Some writers argue that part of the problems of the integration process in Africa is the linear paradigm that calls, first, for the integration of factors of production then to monetary and fiscal aspects, and eventually the consummation of political union which favours import tariffs. The linear continuum of free trade area, followed by the customs union, a common market and then the harmonisation of monetary and fiscal policies that should culminate in an economic union as a prelude to political federation seems to have remained, to say the least, a mirage.

Because political motivations are still the principal driving force behind regional integration arrangements across Africa, it is very likely that sometimes divisive political considerations will feature prominently in hindering the process.

Furthermore, the region must embark on strategic projects; for instance, in the area of intra-regional transportation infrastructure in line with the recognition of the transport as integral to the development of intra-African trade. Indeed in order for integration to succeed in the sub-region, the importance of development of infrastructure from regional lenses must take priority.

Furthermore, the proposal should also be viewed as another alternative approach to achieving regional integration in Africa. However, it is

29 Trude Hartzenberg, Regional Integration in Africa staff working paper ERSD-2011-14, World Trade Organization, Economic Research and Statistics Division
30 Page, S (2000) Regionalism among Developing Countries, London, Macmillan for the Overseas Development Institute
31 ECA Resolutions 32(111) and of 35 (111) of Feb 16 and 17 1961 respectively
unlikely that the merger will address the fundamental challenges that have faced the process in Africa.

**Alternative to the Merger**

From the above, it seems that the case for the merger to succeed is remote. In other words, the odds heavily outweigh the potential. In this regard, the paper notes that it will be self-defeating exercise to forge ahead with the proposed merger against the backdrop of structural and institutional weakness, divergent values and principles, mandate, history political and legal issues, questions of ego, donor influence stage of development of the two RECs among others. If the merger is pushed ahead it will be recipe for a disaster interpreted to even spilt and disintegrate the already fragile institutions with weak grounding.

Instead, it argues that the most prudent approach should be for the two blocs to think about entering into formal working arrangement that will focus on common issues or programs such as early warning and hope it will get to a level where it will not make sense to turn back. In other words, formal arrangement will be used as a stop gap measure to build consensus in programming and in decision making before addressing differences when confidence, trust and synergies among states has been build.

In this way structures such as decision making process can be harmonized gradually while being sensitive and accommodating to concerns and reservations of some of the members. In essence the two blocs may find themselves moving gradually towards a merger without necessarily calling it by name thereby avoiding the unnecessary sensitivities that comes with open reference to the merger proposal. This will also give the political elite time to reflect and work towards the merger without being overly over sensitive.
Conclusion

The proposal highlights several key points. First, that despite the enormous challenges and slow pace of integration in Africa, the spirit, the vision and the optimism of Pan Africanism which dates back to the 1945 Pan African Congress and which motivated the signing of the Constitutive Act of the African Union in 2000 is still alive.\(^\text{32}\) Secondly, that the idea and ideals of regionalism have not only continued to be popular but are recognized to be one of critical imperatives of Africa’s growth and development agenda and finally that the potential of intra-Africa trade as well as trade within each regional bloc is yet to be fully mobilized, and realized.

The African rationale for integration therefore lies, in part, in the belief that there is strength in numbers and in pooling resources together. A corollary to this is that by building upon each other’s comparative advantage, Africa is able to compete better and on more favourable and competitive terms within the international economic and political systems; enough to minimize the continent’s dependence on the advanced countries.

The intention and spirit of merging the EAC and IGAD is conceptually convincing but practically difficulties are likely to discount the attainment of this goal in the unforeseeable future. The paper notes that in order for regional integration to succeed in East Africa, in particular, the solution lies in effective establishing institution and policy building including addressing the persistent and nagging problems relating to bad governance and collapse of the rule of law in many countries. Alongside, is the systemic challenges relating to the convoluted nature of the existing global economic system which have continued to undermine effective and sustainable intra-state co-operation in Africa.

\(^{32}\) The Pan African vision had among other objectives to act as a mobilizing point and vision for political and economic integration.
In other words the challenges and constraints that have bedevilled Africa’s integration process must be addressed including those that are specific to the region if the merger between EAC and IGAD is to succeed.

That subject elicits more questions than answers some of which are controversial demonstrate in part the multiple difficulties that must be addressed if the merger is to succeed. Part of the major problem afflicting the process is elite driven which rarely connects with the interests of the general populace. Despite the recognition of a people-driven integration process in Africa, the process remains highly political with the citizens taking a backseat. Over a half a century elite driven process has continued to produce dismal results and it is high time that the citizens take the driving seat in the integration process in Africa.

Unfortunately very sad, the proposed merger reflects and mirrors the confusion, lack of commitment and focus on how integration process should proceed in the region. This is particularly among the policy makers who will remain the driving forces behind regional integration in Africa for unforeseeable future because they use them to serve their interests. While the paper acknowledges that regional integration is a political as well economic project, it argues that until the citizens are able to set, determine and influence the destiny and direction of the successful integration will remain elusive objective for some time. In this regard, until the academia, the policy makers and the political elite step back, pose and respond objectively to among others the questions posed above, successful regional integration in eastern African will remain a pipe dream.

Despite the above challenges, strong political will, commitment, and strategic approach to issues of convergence and divergence will propel integration in eastern Africa for the betterment of its people and the continent at large.
Introduction

The fact the South African private security industry\(^1\) is one of the largest in the world cannot be overemphasized. In 2007, the industry was estimated to have a net worth of R30 billion.\(^2\) This is the same industry that was valued at R1.2 billion in 1990.\(^3\) To date, the

---

1. This industry is made up of private security companies and private security officers who are legally registered business entities and individuals, respectively, that provide security services on a contractual basis, as defined in the Private Security Industry Regulatory Act of 2001.
3. Ibid, at p. 129.
industry could be estimated to have a net worth of over R30 billion. The private security industry has become a critical player in crime prevention in South Africa. It is no secret that South African crime statistics are among some of the worst in the world. The total crime increased slightly by 0.7% from 2,071,487 cases in 2010/2011 to 2,085,757 in the 2011/2012 financial year. According to the South African Police Statistics, in 2010/2011 there were 247,630 instances of burglary and 16,889 cases of robbery at residential premises. These figures are unacceptably high and one security company argues, such figures ‘indicate a need for South African citizens to enlist the help of private security companies to ensure that they are well protected.’

Currently, the total number of police officers in South Africa is 156,076 (excluding civilians). For 2011, Statistics South Africa (Stats SA) estimated the mid-year population to be 50,59 million. Based on these figures, this means that the ratio of the South African Police to the South African population is 1:324. On their own, the South African policemen and women have no capacity to effectively fight against crime. This is where the demand for the private security sector becomes critical. This assertion, however, cannot just be accepted without any reservation. It has been argued, for instance, that the fact that the number of staff employed by private security companies and the size of their budgets both exceed those of public law enforcement agencies should be a cause for concern. After all, not all private security providers work towards the prevention of crime. As shall be shown, some private security providers are in fact perpetrators of crime.

4 See generally SAPS Annual Report 2011/12.
5 Ibid.
8 One police official for every 324 citizens.
In addressing the role and impact of the South African private security industry on crime, the most serious shortcoming is the absence of empirical evidence to show whether or not crime levels have gone up or down as a result of the intervention by the private security sector. The unfortunate consequence is that this becomes a speculative exercise. This points to the need for a further study on this question in order to have concrete evidence on the role and impact of this burgeoning industry in South Africa. Despite this, the paper shall seek to make use of available information in order to unpack the role and impact of the industry in so far as crime is concerned in Africa.

This paper is divided into six parts, which together present an analysis on the role and impact of the South African private security industry on crime. The first part contextualizes the fight against crime in South Africa. The second part considers the extent of the private security industry in South Africa making reference to past and current statistics. The third part considers the so-called “apartheid of security” as a South African phenomenon. The fourth part discusses the South African private security industry as a crime prevention tool. The fifth part considers the private security industry as a perpetrator of crime in South Africa. The sixth and last part looks at the impact of the private security industry on the public sector, particularly the South African Police Service (SAPS).

**Contextualizing the Fight Against Crime in South Africa**

The historical backdrop of South Africa has largely informed the commercialisation of security to date including the mechanisms that were established to regulate and control. One of the main reasons why the commercialization of security increased exponentially, particularly in the 1980s, was due to the rise of insecurities associated with apartheid activities; the apartheid state’s willingness to accept the private security industry as an adjunct to the state police; and the apartheid state’s attempt to professionalise the industry through the enactment of legislation.\(^{10}\)

---

Ironically, the constant growth of the industry after 1994, that is the new political dispensation, has similar roots. When crime rates rose with post-transitional developments, the white minority felt the need for protection against the black majority, who were involved in crimes against both individuals and properties.\textsuperscript{11} The private security industry thus benefited the white minority in two ways – first, as owners and shareholders and second, as the main recipients of its services.

In September 1998, the then Minister of Safety and Security presented the government’s White Paper for Safety and Security, which essentially provided the government’s vision of improving the safety of the South African citizens.\textsuperscript{12} The main objective for the White Paper titled “In Service of Safety,” was aimed at realizing the government’s vision of improving the safety of South African citizens.\textsuperscript{13} One of the most profound observations found in the White Paper for Safety and Security says the following: -

\begin{displayquote}
The work of fighting crime is becoming more complex, and therefore, more challenging. Criminals are becoming more organized and more sophisticated, operating with little regard to national boundaries. Foreign criminal groups are extending their operations as organized crime becomes increasingly globalized and South Africa is not impervious to this development.\textsuperscript{14}
\end{displayquote}

The White Paper for Safety and Security did not mince any words that fighting crime in South Africa was increasingly becoming challenging. This remains a thorny issue confronting the South African Police Service.

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid p4
\textsuperscript{13} Among other organizations, the following supported and gave assistance to the process of drafting the White Paper on Safety and Security: - the Business Against Crime, Centre for Scientific and Industrial Research, Institute for Security Studies and International Centre for the Prevention of Crime.
\textsuperscript{14} White Paper on Safety and Security.
Sabelo Gumedze

(SAPS). As a result of the challenges faced by the police in fighting crime, South Africa witnessed an emergence of an increasing private security industry, providing security to those who could afford to pay for such services. This point shall be elaborated upon when discussing the so-called ‘apartheid of security’ phenomenon.

While the private security industry does not necessarily replace the South African police, it arguably complements the work of the SAPS. The private security industry provides a whole range of services, including guarding, patrolling, VIP Protection, cash-in-transit, intelligence gathering and providing electronic security technology. In some instances, the private security provides a more professional and effective service than their public counterparts, the SAPS, particularly in the provision of armed response services.

The Extent of the South African Private Security Industry

As a proportion of GDP, South Africa has the largest private security sector in the world, and crime and violence remain highly politicized. The role and impact of the private security industry in South Africa can at best be described as a success story in the sense that the crime levels are minimized particularly in respect of emerging South African working and middle classes as well as the business sector, which forms the backbone of South Africa’s economy. It is also an industry that is fairly well regulated in comparative terms. In order to appreciate the role and impact of the South African private security industry, it is important to firstly understand the extent of the industry, which is one of the largest.

The South African private security industry has, for the past decade, been growing at a very tremendous rate. In August 1999, prior to the promulgation of the Private Security Industry Regulation Act No. 56 of 2001 (the PSIRA Act), the private security industry had 164, 666 registered security officers. In the same period, there were 4, 659
registered and active security businesses.\textsuperscript{15} During the 2011/ 2012 financial year, there were 9, 364 registered active security businesses. In the same period, there were 427, 174 registered active security officers. There were 2, 054, 947 registered security officers (both active and inactive) recorded on the PSIRA’s database for the 2011/2012 financial year.\textsuperscript{16}

From the figures reflected in the latest PSIRA Annual Report (2011/2012), it is clear that the guarding sector is the most sought after. During this period, a total of 6 828 registered active guarding businesses were registered with PSIRA as compared to 6 324 during the 2010/2011 financial year, representing an increase of 6.97\%.\textsuperscript{17} The demand for armed response services is also on the rise. During the financial year 2011/2012, a total number of 2, 982 registered armed response security businesses were recorded as compared to 2, 836 of the 2010/2011 financial year representing an increase of 5.15\% for the 2011/2012.\textsuperscript{18} Another increase is also recorded within the cash-in-transit sector. During the same period, a total number if 2, 367 registered cash-in-transit security businesses were registered as compared to 2, 300 during the 2010/2011 financial year, representing an increase if 2.91\%.\textsuperscript{19}

The above figures illustrate the point that the South African private security industry is thriving and will continue to do so in the foreseeable future. The South African private security is armed, and the key service remains the guarding services, followed by the armed response services, and the cash-in-transit businesses.

Within the South African private security industry are global giants (with international ownership). A quick scan through the PSIRA

\textsuperscript{16} PSIRA Annual Report 2011/2012 at p.20.
\textsuperscript{17} PSIRA Annual Report 2011/2012 at p. 20.
\textsuperscript{18} PSIRA Annual Report 2011/2012 at p. 20.
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid.
database, as at 31 August 2012, there was a total number of 24,120 registered security officers employed by private security business with international (or foreign) ownership. Businesses in the lead include the following: G4S Security with a total of 13,684 security officers; ADT with a total of 6,604 security officers; Chubb Security with a total of 2,043 security officers; Securitas with 662 security officers; Gold Fields Security Limited with 613 security officers; TSU Protection Services with a total of 233 security officers; Checkpoint South Africa with a total of 221 security officers; Siemens Building Technologies with 26 security officers; ASSA Abloy with 18 security officers; and Geovision South Africa with 1 security officer.20

The “Apartheid of Security” as a South African Phenomenon

One of the main disadvantages of the South African private security industry is the fact that it has resulted in what could be referred to as an ‘apartheid of security’, where only a privileged (minority) class – predominantly whites minority benefits on one hand by feeling more secured, and on the other the underprivileged majority – predominantly the black majority (who solely rely on the public police) remain unprotected because they cannot afford to pay for security services.21 This argument is also supported by Abrahamsen and William, who argue paradoxically, that while helping to secure South Africa’s transition to democracy (by allowing a stronger presence of security personnel than the state alone could have provided), private security provision may also help preserve divisions between rich and poor.22

Abrahamsen and William are, however, quick to argue that it is incorrect to associate private security only with the rich or the wealthier sections

of society, such as the case in South Africa. They aver that,

Clearly, the wealthy are the main consumers of private security services, increasingly barricading themselves behind ever higher security walls, installing advanced alarm systems and relying on rapid (sometimes armed) response services in case of emergences. However, private security is a feature of life for most sections of the population, albeit delivered by companies of varying quality, sophistication and reliability.\(^{23}\)

The rise in demand for private security services as such is correspondingly dominated by demand for protection services for property and people. If there was no demand for private security, there rise of the industry could not be witnessed. At the same time, if the crime levels were at acceptable (or minimum) levels, the need for the private security could not be evidenced. As long as there is the demand and those in demand can afford, the private security industry will be on the rise.

As already discussed above, security, private security in particular, is thus accessible for those that can afford to pay for such services, as is the current situation. This, however, has contributed to the perception in South Africa that the private security industry exacerbates the inequality divide between the rich and the poor.\(^{24}\) The Gauteng province of South Africa accounts for 50% of all crimes in South Africa nationally.\(^{25}\) However, recent statistics indicated a decline in crime levels in Gauteng, attributed to migration of crime from “larger centres to smaller centres where there was less visible policing.”\(^{26}\) This could be as a result of the complementary role which the private security plays in the urban areas, particularly in the most affluent neighborhoods.


\(^{26}\) Ibid
It is not entirely true, however, that only the minority white population are the only group of people demanding and affording to pay for private security services. With the new political dispensation, which has also shaped the South African economic front, more black South Africans, some of whom are even wealthier than the white group, are now able to afford the services of the private security. Not only is the rise in the private security associated with the issue of affordability, it is also linked to the fact that the police cannot be trusted in the fight against crime in the most effective way. Abrahamsen and William argue that “[w]ith declining police protection and heightened perceptions of risk, middle- and low-income households also find it necessary to invest in some form of private security, be it intruder alarms, electric fences or guards.”

The Private Security Industry as a Crime Prevention Tool

According to Abrahamsen and Williams, as crime and insecurity has become endemic in many countries, especially in capital cities, private security companies have taken over the role of protection for individuals, households, neighborhoods and business alike. This is equally true with South Africa. They argue that the mere presence and availability of the private security in turn creates its own consumer dynamic, encapsulates in the seemingly insatiable demand for security in contemporary ‘risk society’. They further argue that “[i]n the popular imagination, the expansion of private security on the African continent is perhaps most closely associated with post-apartheid South Africa, where pervasive fear has given rise to what is now, as a percentage of GDP, the largest private security market in the world”.

---

28 Ibid p.5
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
As a result of the South Africa’s high crime rates, especially in the 1990s, road closures were implemented and boom gates were constructed in the most affluent suburbs. These boom gates were to be controlled by the private security sector. This was largely informed by six crime trends that are said to have increased between 1994 and 2000 in enclosed suburbs. The examples of these crimes included the housebreaking at residential premises, which increased by 3.4%, robbery, which increased by 18.5%, and robbery with aggravating circumstances, which increased by 11.06%.

According to a 2003 Institute for Security Studies (ISS) national victim survey, 58% of South Africans felt very unsafe at night, while 10% said they felt very safe at night. According to the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC), in 1994, about 75% of South Africans felt safe, but this number decreased to 44% in 2000.

The question of whether road closures and boom gates, which are controlled by the private security sector, are effective in preventing crime remains a moot question. The South African Human Rights Commission found that there was no statistics that could be found to prove or disprove the effect of these road closures and boom gates on the crime rate. Despite this, reports of individuals residing in gated communities were generally of the opinion that access restrictions (which include the control of boom gates by security service providers) contributed towards the decrease of criminal activity in established and long standing enclosures.

Submissions for the Tshwane Metropolitan Police indicated that such access restrictions only prevented petty or opportunistic crimes and

32 Ibid.
34 Ibid at p. 24.
35 Ibid.
were not effective in combating violent or serious crimes.\textsuperscript{36} Despite the absence of empirical evidence to address the question of the effectiveness of road closures and boom gates, it can be generally argued that the presence of these together with the operation of the boom gates does have a positive impact on crime levels within enclosed neighbourhoods. The private security providers that patrol the neighbourhoods (for which they are contracted and assigned to) actually pose as substitutes for the police. It is not very likely that a would-be criminal can easily commit a crime in their presence.

Some of these private security providers have a very special relationship with the police. In the event that they apprehend a criminal, they would handle them to the police for a formal arrest and eventual prosecution. There is however, no formal partnership between the police and the private security sector in South Africa. The Private Security Industry Regulation Act, 2001 does not mention any involvement in policing (joint or partnership policing) or crime prevention other than where this would involve the provision of security to a client by means of monitoring electronic equipment, installing alarm systems and providing an armed response service.\textsuperscript{37} According to Minnar, for any co-operation, outsourcing or joint policing operations with private security industry to be effected, it remains the prerogative of the SAPS.\textsuperscript{38}

This situation is bound to change with the introduction of the Private Security Industry Regulation Amendment Act, which seeks to provide the Authority with the mandate of promoting crime prevention partnership with organs of the State, among other things.\textsuperscript{39}

\textsuperscript{36} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{38} As above.
The Private Security Industry as a Perpetrator of Crime

The arguments, which paint a rosy picture of the South African private security industry, should always be treated with circumspection. It is not entirely true that the entire industry offer an added peace of mind and a sense of security. In as much as one may find rogue elements within the South African police, the same is true within the South African private security industry. Illegal immigrants also infiltrate the private security industry. There have been reports of foreigners entering the private security industry through the use of fraudulent South African permanent residence permits. Those who violate the provisions of the PSIRA Act and its regulations are usually fined. According to the PSIRA Annual Report 2011/2012, the Authority collected fines from the industry to the tune of R 10,659,559, which almost twice as much as the fines collected in 2010/2011, which amounted to R 5,598,880.

During the year 2011/2012, a total number of 41 operations, targeting the private security businesses and officers, and focusing on compliance with the PSIRA Act, resulted in the following: 169 individuals were arrested for criminal offences; 148 individuals were unregistered with the Authority; 65 were found to be foreign nationals purporting to be registered security officers; 13 individuals were found in possession of illegal firearms; and 33 inspections unearthed non-compliance to South African Labour standards.

On the illegal use of firearms within the private security industry, Jaynes argues that private security companies are perceived high risk of diversion of company weapons to illegal pool and the use of

---

40 Private security officers can only be South African citizens or permanent residents.
41 PSIRA Annual Report 2011/2012, at p 108. Fines are economic benefits or service potential received or receivable by the Authority, as determined by the Private Security Industry Regulatory Act, as a consequence of the individual or other entity breaching the requirements of laws and regulations.
42 Initiated at times by the Authority, or attended upon invitation from stakeholders such as SAPS, Department of Home Affairs and Department of Labour.
43 See PSIRA Annual Report 2011/2012, at p. 34.
company firearms to perpetrate violence.\textsuperscript{44} Jaynes conceives that there is insufficient data on how many firearms are used in which crimes and on rates of diversion.\textsuperscript{45} Relying on anecdotal media reports of the misuse firearms by the private security companies, Jaynes concludes that the private security industry has in fact been a perpetrator of crime in South Africa. This fact is corroborated by PSIRA, which is the regulator for the industry. In its 2011, PSIRA reported that there were 244 illegal firearms seized from private security operators.\textsuperscript{46}

**The Impact of the South African Private Security Industry on the Public Sector**

According to Small, the privatization of security leads to a situation whereby the public security is pitted against the private security sector.\textsuperscript{47} This is equally true with the unprecedented increase of the private security sector in South Africa. Many South Africans would argue that the services offered by the private security sector is much better than the service provided for by the SAPS, particularly in the area of armed response services. In this way, the private security becomes a force to be reckoned with as the trust on the police diminishes when it comes to crime prevention.

A sobbing argument, which South Africa has witnessed in the past five years, is by Mandel who posits that “an unintended consequence of security privatization may thus be to militarise the official government police forces to keep up with prevailing coercion threshold”, and thus promoting a highly militarized society. In April 2010, South Africa

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{45} Ibid.
\end{footnotesize}
witnesses the militarization of the SAPS in April 2010. This included the following: adopting military type ranks; changing the name of the police to a ‘Force’ instead of a ‘Service’; changing attitudes, thinking and ‘operational duties’; adopting a new and fiercer approach towards criminals; maintaining good discipline and morale within the ‘Force’; and appointing commanders to lead the ‘war on crime’.48

With regards to the private security sector, the public sector (particularly the SAPS), always view private security providers as competitors. The perception that for any crime that occurs in any environment that involves private security providers the prime suspects are usually the private security providers. Sometimes this is the true position but sometimes not. Private security providers have been alleged to be involved in cash-in-transit heists collaborating with criminals. This is however not always the case. There have also been allegations of misuse of firearms by private security providers, which to the public perceptions results from the fact that they are criminals themselves. Other private security providers are tempted to get involved in criminal activities (or to collaborate with criminals) as a result of the poor labour standards that they are subjected to by their employers. The reports o the above remain anecdotal and cannot be taken to be reflecting the true picture of the entire industry.

Minnar raises the issue of the absence of a formal body to serve the private security industry such as the Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD), which is entrusted with the responsibility if monitoring the behaviours and sanctions misconduct by the South African Police Service as well and the Metro Police agencies.49 Minnar argues that the ‘non-oversight/unmonitored’ situation raises questions in so far as the control of the

South African private policing is concerned.\textsuperscript{50} This basically means that on issues related to the use of force, control of firearms, and shooting incidents, powers of arrest and seizure, collecting of evidence, and accountability issues, there is still a glaring shortcoming in terms of how the private security industry is regulated.\textsuperscript{51}

\textbf{Conclusion}

That the South African private security industry has effectively stepped “into a gap between the [South African] public’s demand for law and order and the [South African] government’s incapacity to render such services”\textsuperscript{52} cannot be disputed. As already discussed above, it can also not be disputed that the private security in South Africa is a financially and potentially lethal business.\textsuperscript{53} As a major role player within the South African security arena, the private security industry has impacted upon the crime levels, particularly in the urban areas and the affluent neighborhoods. On the one hand, the private security has minimized crime levels by effectively playing a role in crime prevention. The electronic security sector has also made the industry to be a ‘to-go-to’ industry providing technologically advanced electronic security gadgets. On the other, some rogue elements have also tainted the industry by committing criminal offences, resulting from the nature of their work. The misuse of firearms has also been witness within the private security industry.

This paper has attempted to discuss the role and impact of the private security industry in South Africa. In doing so, the paper put into context the fight against crime in South Africa, which has a bearing to the privatization of security phenomenon. The paper also considered the

\textsuperscript{50} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{51} Ibid.
extent of the industry, emphasizing the fact that the industry is one that is thriving. In fact, if one were to suggest that the industry is not here to stay, that would not be entirely true. The paper further discussed the so-called ‘apartheid of security’, which basically perpetuates differentiation of the South African population based on their social status. Further also, a discussion on the private security industry as a crime prevention tool was undertaken. An argument was also made to the contrary, that is, the private security industry as a perpetrator of crime. Lastly, the paper discussed the impact of the private security industry on the public sector.
The Challenge of Managing Private Sector Involvement in Peace and Security in West Africa: What Options for Governance?

Chris Kwaja

Introduction:

Over the last four decades, the West African region has witnessed various forms of militancy and violent conflicts, which necessitated the proliferation of peacekeeping operations. Some of these conflicts were witnessed in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Nigeria among others (Collier & Hoeffler, 2002; Bujra, 2002; King & Verge, 2009;). These high and medium intensity conflicts gave rise to state

1 Devastating conflicts and huge humanitarian challenge that engulfed West Africa in the early 1990s, made the region to be regarded as the ‘symbol of worldwide demographic, environmental and societal stress.’ Hence, the collapse of the region into anarchy was what Kaplan (1994) referred to as the Coming Anarchy.
collapse to the extent that state capacity to control the instruments of force was completely eroded. Such situations posed serious political and socio-economic implications for governance, stability and development in the continent.

An increasing number of private actors have become actively involved in various forms of Peace Support Operations (PSOs) efforts towards bringing peace, security and stability in West Africa. This has attracted scholarly and policy attention. One of such efforts is from the private sector that is contracted to provide some military and security related services. The international community has had to address the challenges posed by violent conflict in West Africa through a variety of means involving both state and non-state actors in peacebuilding and state-building efforts.

The involvement of the private sector in peace and security provisioning can best be discussed within the realm of what is known as the privatization of security, which is a reflection of a global trend whereby military and security functions are outsourced to the private sector. This brings into focus the activities of armies and security personnel that are privately owned and controlled.

In West Africa, the link between the privatization of security, proliferation of arms, the vested interest of Private Military and Security Companies PMSCs in natural resources such as oil and diamond have also drawn attention to the political economy of the privatization of security. This has however had implications for peace, security and stability in the region.

Amidst the growing demand for the private sector to play a central role

in peacebuilding in West Africa, attention has also been drawn to the unregulated operations that characterise such involvement. This practice which has become a norm poses potential threats to the stability of the continent. In view of the ethical, operational and strategic challenges such involvement poses, the need to explore ways of regulating them towards ensuring the expertise they bring will help in the promotion of peace and sustainable development in the continent. This interest therefore becomes an issue for deeper analysis.

**Private Sector Intervention in West Africa’s Peace and Security Conundrum:**

From a peace and security standpoint, a study on the private sector has to do with corporate military and security related entrepreneurs, as well as informal security providers such as vigilantes who provide services in the areas of direct combat operations. These services include: military intelligence, personnel security, aviation support, demining, public order management, transportation, water purification missions, Security Sector Reform (SSR), training, monitoring and communication services during and in the aftermath of internal conflicts as well as community level security provisioning (Diop, 2009:18; Gumedze, 2009:7).

As corporate entities with an estimated annual turnover of far over $100 billion, the PMSCs are seen as convenient force multipliers whose prudent usage is capable of providing the much needed boost to conflict management capabilities (Diop, 2009:9). Reliance on these military and


5 In this paper, the private sector has to do with corporate entities and non-state actors such as vigilantes that are either run for profit or voluntary purposes. While these entities are not controlled by the state, it is expected that there are regulatory mechanisms put in place by the state to monitor them.
security providers has been attributed to their affordability, capabilities and flexibility in situations of emergency response (Brooks, 2002:14).

The failure of the formal security institutions of the state to effectively provide security for the people, prevent crimes, as well as an inefficient justice system have led to a decrease in public confidence on the state and its institutions.

While the state has consistently engaged the services of corporate entities such as PMSCs, the majority of the people who reside in communities and do not have access to the formal security institutions of the state and the PMSCs, turn to vigilantes which then become a viable and credible option. PMSCs, biggest feat is hinged on the guarding sector with government installations, banks, construction companies, oil corporations, private houses and individuals among others being the primary clientele.

Across West Africa, vigilantes operate outside the formal state security structure with no funding or control from the state. These vigilantes take on policing responsibilities and the administration of justice (Kwaja, 2013). The emergence of the civilian vigilante group known as ‘civilian joint task force (made up mainly of youths) in Borno State of Nigeria, represented an attempt by informal or non-state vigilantes to fill the vacuum created by the weak capacity of the Nigerian state to effectively provide security for its citizens in the face of the activities of the armed insurgent group known as Boko Haram. The group is seen as ‘an effective alternative to the governments’ Joint Task Force (Zenn, 2013).

Contemporary PMSCs have taken on a completely different shape and structure that transcends our understanding of mercenarism. Musa and Fayemi (2002) argued that an archetypical mercenary is usually an ex-soldier of a foreign army who freelances his/her services to foreign powers or parties to foreign internal conflicts and is principally motivated to do so by financial gain, sentimentally, a feeling of racial and / or professional superiority or adventure.
Categorising PMSCs and Vigilantes in military and Security Related Provisioning

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Private Military Companies</th>
<th>Private Security Companies</th>
<th>Vigilantes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Strategic planning</td>
<td>• Armed guarding</td>
<td>• Crime prevention such as robbery and banditry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Intelligence</td>
<td>• Protection of Very</td>
<td>• Maintenance of law and order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Land, sea and air</td>
<td>Important Persons (VIPs)</td>
<td>• Protection of infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconnaissance</td>
<td>• Protection of</td>
<td>• Protection of vulnerable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Flight operations of</td>
<td>Installations and property</td>
<td>people such as women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>varied types</td>
<td>such as banks and</td>
<td>and girls against rape</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Manned/unmanned satellite</td>
<td>embassies</td>
<td>• Arrest and punishment of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Military training and logistics</td>
<td>• Technical support and training of police</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Technical support to armed forces such as SSR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Sekhonyane and Louw, 2002; Gumedze, 2009; Diop, 2009;

There is a perception that private sector involvement in peace and security in the sub-region may have contributed to conflict dynamics and as a result impacted on capital flights, resource exploitation and the proliferation of weapons. This was more evident in the Manu River Region of Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone—countries that experienced spiraling violence that culminated in state collapse. In these countries, the private sector was intrinsically linked to the violent conflicts, as well as peace and security efforts. In such situation, the inability of the state to provide the much needed protection in terms of security and public safety laid the foundation for the private sector to now become the primary driver for the provision of additional security and safety.

A major feature of Liberia’s post-conflict peacebuilding process was the involvement of two US based Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs), DynCorp International and Pacific Architects and Engineers (PAE). While the Comparative Peace Agreement (CPA) that was signed in August, 2003 identified Security Sector Reform (SSR) as a central pillar for peace, security and stability in Liberia; the responsibility was given to these PMSCs. On its part, DynCorp was involved in rebuilding the Liberian armed forces and PAE was in charge of handling the reform
of the police respectively. One key lesson learnt from the privatized SSR in Liberia has to do with the interest that they pursue in the field of peace and security. As observed by Malan (2008):

In Liberia, the American contribution to the SSR programme is provided through private contractors. While contractors may be good at providing basic and even advanced military training, they answer to private sector bosses whose bottom line is profit and are therefore not the ideal models to instill in the AFL the notion of duty to country and military subordination to a democratically elected government.

Sierra Leone presents an interesting case for understanding and reflecting on the impact of private sector involvement in peace and security. In 1995, Executive Outcome was contracted by the Sierra Leonean government to displace a rebel group known as the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). What Collier (2000) once referred to as an economic agenda or profit making incentives became a major indices for explaining the involvement of Executive Outcome in Sierra Leone, which further reinforced the strong link between the organization and resource exploitation in Sierra Leone (Aning, Jaye and Atuobi, 2008). The inability of the government to pay Executive Outcome the sum of $1 million on a monthly basis, led to an agreement whereby Executive Outcome was granted license to exploit gold through one of its subsidiaries.

In Nigeria, the return to democratic rule in 1999 placed the issue of a reform of the security sector on the front burner of governance. The core argument was hinged on the assumption that in order to consolidate democratic governance in Nigeria, the security sector must be transformed in a way that will subject it to democratic control. Indeed, this was a huge challenge in the light of the fact that the military was in power for over fifteen years and there was an urgent need to professionalise the armed forces under a post-military regime.
It was against this backdrop fact that the US based Private Military Company (PMC), Military Professional Resource Incorporated (MPRI) was engaged to train the Nigerian armed forces in peacekeeping operations as well as undertake to reform the Nigerian military (Ibeanu and Momoh, 2008). Under the $8 million contract, MPRI was to downsize the Nigerian army from 100,000 to 50,000 (Dare, 2002). Such trainings were also given to the Ghanaian military as part of the US military assistance to the country (Badong, 2009). A major feature of these countries in the aftermath of military rule stemmed from the highly militarized nature as well as the fact that regime security was placed far and above human security. Relying on its track record as a professional provider of military assistance, MPRI regards itself as:

A training, simulation and government services company of skilled and experienced military, law enforcement, diplomatic and private sector leaders with uncompromising professionalism who apply integrity, innovative ideas and integrated solutions to defense and national security challenges (www.mpri.org, 2014).

For the US based International Charter Incorporated of Oregon (ICI), working in danger zones where direct combat operations are needed constitutes one of its key features. It goes into danger zones that conventional US forces cannot be engaged. Within the region, the company was contracted to conduct peacekeeping in Sierra Leone, Liberia as well as support a US military training programme in Nigeria (Verloy, 2004).

A key trend associated with private sector in peace and security in West Africa is hinged on the fact that they (PMCs) are hired by donor governments and humanitarian agencies to provide military related trainings, participate in Peace Support Operations (PSOs) and post-conflict reconstruction programmes (Aning, jaye and Atuobi, 2008). By performing these functions, they have become key vehicles in the pursuit of the strategic interests (mainly political, economic and security) of
the donor governments. As the former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs, Theresa Whelan once observed:

    We wanted to support peace operations in Africa, however, we realized that our forces were tied down elsewhere around the globe and they might not be available for the long-term deployments...Consequently, contractors began to play a larger and larger role particularly in the logistical support of sub-regional peace operations (Whelan, 2003).

The involvement of the private sector in security provisioning has no doubt contributed to peace and stability in the region as evident in the range of activities they are involved in through contracts from both state and non-state actors. The protection of vital infrastructure such as banks, embassies, government buildings, pipelines are increasingly being carried out by the private sector. Across communities where formal policing activities are near absent, the emergence of vigilantes as forms of self-help measures by communities is also another dimension of informal security provisioning that operates outside the formal security system.

Hence, security provisioning in the region embraces both the state, corporate entities as represented by PMSCs, as well as informal security providers (Isima, 2009). Though, it is difficult to accurately ascertain whether or not private sector services are fulfilling their contract professionally since they might create demand for services by either perpetuating conflicts or by fomenting new ones.


Its mandate has to do with the impact on human rights of the activities of mercenaries as well as the emergent trends that are associated with
the activities of PMSCs (Del Prado, 2008). While Africa and the West African region in particular have played host to an array of mercenaries and PMSCs with huge humanitarian impacts, the United Nations and other supra-national bodies on the other hand have not demonstrated any form of authority over their activities despite the existence of the 1977 Organisation of Africa Unity (OAU) Convention on the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa and the 1977 Additional Protocol 1 to the Geneva Convention.

These documents only capture the activities of mercenaries, without any mention of PMSCs. This poses serious threats to both state sovereignty and people’s security.

**Challenges of Private Sector Involvement in Peace and Security in West Africa:**

At country levels across the region, while there are legal frameworks that regulate the activities of Private Security Companies (PSCs), such does not exist for PMCs. The absence of both national and regional regulatory frameworks for PMCs constitutes serious challenges for both national and regional security. At the continental level too, while the African Union (AU) protocol on SSR abhors the use of PMSCs, there have not been concrete efforts by governments at both the national, regional and continental levels to implement it.

A major concern about the challenging role of the private sector’s involvement in peace and security in West Africa mainly relates to regulation, particularly transparency, accountability and recruitment. How do we come to terms with, and address the challenges posed by what Singer (2008:219) described as the ‘unintended consequences’ of PMSCs and by extension other non-state actors in the security sector? Key issues here have to do with the question of mercenarism, vested interests in resource exploitation and the proliferation of arms. This reality fits into the questions Minnaar (2008:127) also poses:– who has ultimate authority over actions, especially when it comes to such issues
as use of force, control of firearms and shooting incidents, powers of arrest and seizure, collecting of evidence and, finally, to whom are the personnel of a private security company ultimately accountable – the client, company bosses or the officials of the regulatory body?

There is a perception that countries that are characterized by weak governance systems, are regarded as useful tools by the government. The activities of Executive Outcome in Sierra Leone readily come to mind, in the sense that the Government of Sierra Leone relied heavily on the private sector for the displacement of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) (Singer, 2008:112).

One key feature that is associated with the activities of PMSCs in West Africa is the lack of transparency and accountability as evident in the lack of local ownership. The situation in Liberia was more disturbing in view of the fact that both DynCorp and PAE were accused of expending over $172 million as part of the post-conflict peacebuilding efforts without any form of input from the Government of Liberia (Aning, Jaye and Atuobi, 2008:624).

Hence, the question of local ownership of the peacebuilding process became a major issue in the country in the aftermath of the conflict. As Wakefield (2003:234) rightly observed:

…the growing role of a regulated private security industry in the field of policing of areas of mass private property, residential areas and even town centres should, therefore, not be seen as unpalatable so long as attention is paid to powers and tools they are given for controlling their territories, the training they receive and the accountability structures that provide a check on their practices.

Human security concerns associated with the violation of human rights by PMSCs and other informal security providers remains an issue that has not been given serious attention. So far, there has not been any
form of documentation and prosecution of persons involved in such violations. This has made the growing demand for more clarifications on the legal obligations of PMSCs and other informal actors under national and international human rights and humanitarian laws.

The adoption of jungle justice by vigilante groups without recourse to the formal security institutions such as the police has been a major source of concern across the region. For instance, the civilian joint task force that operates in Borno State of Nigeria has been accused of creating a detention centre where suspects are punished outside the formal judicial system of the state. In Liberia, armed vigilante groups mete out instant justice that often lead to the death of suspects (Baker, 2007).

The lack of ownership that defines private sector involvement in West Africa, constitute a major challenge for governance. There is a perception that PMSCs operate within the region without any regard for national laws and governance institutions. For instance, there was public outcry in Liberia as a result of the refusal of DynCorp to allow the Liberian parliament exercise oversight on its activities on the grounds that as a corporate entity, it only signed a contractual agreement with the US and can only be answerable to the US. Hence, all complaints from the people and government of Liberian should be sent through the US State Department (Ebo, 2007:86).

From the perspective of responsibility to protect, private sector involvement in peace and security provisioning has serious implications for the social contract between the state and its citizens. Here, rather than enjoy protection from the state as part of the core mandate of the state, both the state and its citizens are increasingly relying on the private sector. In the event that the state is not responsible for citizen’s security

8 The Deputy Governor of Borno State, Alh.Zannah Mustapha cautioned members of the civilian joint task force against taking laws into their hands against the backdrop of complaints that the group has resort to arrest and detention of suspects. For more see www.informationng.com/2013/10/borno-govt-cautions-civilian-jtf-against-taking-law-into-their-hands.html
as being witnessed, the reality is that the governable space shrinks, thereby leading to a regime of contested legitimacy of the state, which in turn will lead to the waning of citizen’s loyalty on the state.

What Lessons on Private Sector Involvement in Peace and Security in West Africa?

A deliberate response of the state to the forces of globalization as popularized by neo-liberal political economy has to do with the privatization of security, which is a reflection of policies related to the outsourcing of military and security functions to the private sector. Here, the Weberian notion of state monopoly and control of the instruments of force is fast giving way to the private sector as a key factor and actor in security sector governance. For West Africa, coming to terms with this reality remains a central challenge for governance.

The involvement of the private sector in peace and security related activities across the region highlights the huge capacity of the private sector on issues related to expertise, rapid deployment of personnel, response capacity, robust and specialized materials and equipment for containing violent conflicts. Hence, they have become one-stop-shops for states and even the private sector to rely on for security provision and military assistance in both stable and unstable states.

The experiences of West Africa over time have shown that there is a strong link between natural resource and private sector. In fact, diamond played a critical role as a driver of insecurity and PMSCs’ activities in Sierra Leone during the civil war that engulfed the country. For a PMSC such as Executive Outcome, its image and reputation was dented due to the vested economic interest the company sought at the expense of long term peace, security and stability in the country.

PMSCs and vigilantism will continue to play a central role in West Africa’s peace and security conundrum. As a long term strategy, emphasis should be placed on creating a regime of cooperation between
Chris Kwaja

the PMSCs/vigilantes and the state in security provisioning. One key reality across the region is that some vigilante groups have become so strong that they exercise the powers of arrest and prosecution. Such relationship between the state and non-state actors will help address such over-lap in duties and responsibilities.

**West Africa’s Military and Security Outlook for the Future: Wither the Private Sector?**

A glimpse at West Africa’s security outlook shows that private sector involvement in military and security provisioning will increase. Hence, from the perspective of security sector governance, there is a need for the strengthening of the monitoring capacity of the state as it relates to the registration and operations of PMSCs and vigilantes. This will go a long way in ensuring minimum standard of operations for these entities in line with laid down principles and regulations at both the national and regional levels.

The involvement of civil society in monitoring the activities of the private sector in peace and security across the region is also germane. Here, emphasis should be placed on ensuring their operations do not go contrary to international human rights and humanitarian laws. The establishment of a Civil Society Working Group on PMSCs and Vigilantes would provide the much needed skills and expertise on how best to monitor the activities of PMSCs to ensure they comply with the basic standard rules and regulations related to their activities.

In view of the strategic role the private sector plays in the discharge of military and security related duties, capturing them as part and parcel of sector security governance is an important issue that should be considered. This is very important because it provides a sound basis for monitoring and prosecuting them in the event of any breach of the law.

As actors that have come to stay in the field of peace, security and stability, PMSCs play a critical and indispensable role in bridging the
gap that exists in terms of capacity deficits on the part of states during peace operations. So far, across the region, there is no country that has the ability and capability to undertake complex operations such as aviation, construction and maintenance of equipment. This makes them key players. This reality remains a dominant feature of West Africa’s military and security outlook for the future. Hence, ignoring the capabilities of the private sector or hamstringing their ability to fully support peace and security operations causes unnecessary delay, risk and suffering for those most in need of assistance.

Conclusion

A fundamental assertion of this paper is that an analysis of PMSCs and other non-state actors in security provisioning in West Africa should take into account the underlying dynamics of the peace and security landscape of the region. For instance, the involvement of the armed forces in the management of internal security as evident in Nigeria as a result of the activities of Boko Haram in the North East, militancy and hostage taking in the South, as well as communal and identity based conflicts in Central region has led to an over-stretching of the armed forces. Conditioned by these realities, the Government of Nigeria was forced to withdraw some of its soldiers from countries such as Mali and Liberia.

This situation makes the option of relying on PMSCs a credible one (Chigozirim and Abena, 2013:95). All that is required at this juncture is to address the challenges associated with their status and operations that are uncertain and unaccountable.

The involvement therefore of the private sector in peace and security issues in West Africa has so far placed the issue of security sector governance on the fore of academic and policy discourse. This is attributable to the fact that states are increasingly relying on PMSCs and vigilantes to manage their peace and security arrangements. Due to
the inherent security vacuum West Africa faces and the need to fill such vacuum, PMSCs and vigilantes, are realities that have become a major force to reckon with on peace and security related activities.

In the final analysis, the central thesis on the privatization of security looks at the nature of PMSCs and other non-state security providers as double edge swords. This point to the positive and negative impact of their activities as agents of peace, security and stability due to their professionalism and discipline on one hand, as well as a negative impact when their vested economic interests and pursuit of the foreign policy of their home countries are at stake.
The continued creation of new African institutions and the perpetual adoption of normative frameworks for conflict resolution, peacebuilding and post conflict recovery at regional and sub-regional levels in the continent Mali, Somalia the Democratic Republic of Congo reveals a continent that is struggling with achieving sustainable peace. It is therefore abundantly clear that, Africa needs to incisively re-evaluate its methods. Samuel Kale Ewusi and a group of established and young emerging researchers in the continent examine the critical challenges of elections, peacebuilding, development, peace and security within the context of the prevailing situation in Africa in a bid to engender discussions on the need for a new path towards sustainable peace in Africa

Dr Samuel Kale Ewusi is the Director of the Africa Regional Programme of the United Nations University for Peace. He specializes in the link between governance, socio-economic conditions and peace and security. He has taught at national security policy at the Rwanda Senior Defence staff college and eight other universities in Africa and Central America.